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I. INTRODUCTION
The term self-determination still teeters on the borders of evolving
legal precept, expression of political will, and universal human aspiration.
The concept never quite settles down into a black letter law
pronouncement or a clearly understood political dynamic. Nor does it find
full expression by being regarded merely as the rallying cry of the
dispossessed. It is this very fact of the amorphous and evolving nature of
the concept of self-determination that makes it both fascinating and
frustrating.
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School, Boston.
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I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEANING OF SELF-
DETERMINATION
The term self-detennination has undergone considerable historical
transfiguration since it was first launched on the international arena by
President Woodrow Wilson. After World War I, when the victorious
powers were busy redrawing state boundaries, self-determination became
the touchstone for the creation of new states that arose out of the rubble of
the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. President Wilson stated:
"National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated
and governed only by their own consent. Self-determination is not a mere
phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will
henceforth ignore at their peril."' There is a certain irony to this statement
as that was definitely the era of a few well-placed men disappearing into
smoke-filled rooms with old maps and emerging with newly drawn borders
although there were some plebiscites among sections of the male
population of certain areas that were supposed to guide the line drawing.
The Covenant of the League of Nations did not mention self-
determination though the Mandate System was supposed to work towards
the development of colonial peoples. A series of treaties were signed after
World War I for the protection of minorities within certain defeated states.
Neither of these regimes, the Mandate system or the minority treaties,
however, offered political participation as a right to the governed group.
The right to separation from the larger state was firmly rejected by the
Commission of Jurists in its ruling on the status of the Aaland Islands in
1920: "Positive International Law does not recognize the right of national
groups, as such, to separate themselves from the State of which they form
part by the simple expression of a wish, anymore than it recognizes the
right of other States to claim such a separation." 2
III. THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND SELF-DETERMINATION
The United Nations Charter mentions self-determination twice.
Article 1(2) mentions as one of the Purposes of the United Nations: "To
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. . . ." Article 55 notes
that "stability and well-being . . . are necessary for peaceful and friendly
relations among nations [which should be] based on respect for the
1. Woodrow Wilson, War Aims of Germany and Austria, in 3 THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF
WOODROW WILSON: WAR AND PEACE, 177 (Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd eds.
1927).
2. Report of the International Committee of Jurists . . . upon the Legal Aspects of the
Aaland Islands Question, LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 3, at 5 (1920).
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principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. . . ." Clearly,
the United Nations system was based on the idea of equality of existing
sovereign states and, to a lesser extent, on moving dependent states
towards independence.
IV. DECOLONIZATION
The rapidly increasing demands for an end to colonialism were the
occasion for raising self-determination to a right and for linking the right
to political participation in governance. In 1960, the General Assembly
declared that: "All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development." 3 This Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
concludes, however, with a clear statement against reading the right to
self-determination as a right to secession. "Any attempt aimed at the
partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity
of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations."4 Much more recently the principle of uti
possidetis juris, the principle whereby colonial countries claiming
independence have to accept their preexisting territorial boundaries, has
been declared part of customary international law by the International
Court of Justice in its 1986 decision concerning the frontier dispute
between Burkina Faso and the Republic of Mali' and its 1992 decision on
the land, island and maritime frontier dispute between El Salvador and
Honduras.6 Although these decisions concerned issues of title to territory
in border disputes, the principle of uti possidetis was affirmed because the
fracturing of preexisting sovereign boundaries was seen as destabilizing the
whole international system.' A system that was, and continues to be, built
on the sanctity of "the territorial integrity . . . [and] political
independence" 8 of sovereign states is unlikely to allow a doctrine to
3. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 67, U.N. Doc. AlL. 323
and Add. 1 - 6 (1960).
4. Id. at para. 6.
5. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22).
6. Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 351 (Sept.
11).
7. "Its [the principle of uti possidetis juris] obvious purpose is to prevent the
independence and stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by
the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power." Supra note 5,
at para. 20.
8. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
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develop that undermines part of the bedrock of the theoretical construct,
namely the state with a defined territory, which is one of the traditional
requirements for statehood.9
The move from a colonial system, which meant that vast numbers
of people were ruled by alien governments, to the achievement of
independent status f6r almost all of the old colonies and protectorates did
not dismantle the state system. Rather it imposed rules on who had rights
to govern. The notion of democracy had begun to take hold as a right
attaching to persons within the framework of the state. In the
decolonization era the right to self-determination became linked to an
emerging democratic right, but the right is best understood in negative
terms: it was the right not to be governed by foreigners. Professor
Thomas Franck notes that "Self-determination postulates the right of a
people organized in an established territory to determine its collective
political destiny in a democratic fashion and is therefore at the core of the
democratic entitlement."' 0 Whatever the democratic entitlement was, its
initial formulation did not seek to dismantle the state.
V. BEYOND DECOLONIZATION
Once we move beyond the decolonization context, the scope of the
rights encompassed by self-determination becomes unclear, and the
question of the entity to whom the right attaches engenders fierce debate
with, as yet, no resolution.
The introduction of the notion of rights in international law that
attach to human beings as individuals has been one of the more remarkable
developments of international law since the end of World War I1."1
Although this movement had much earlier political antecedents, as our
own Constitution and Bill of Rights bear witness, it is only in the latter half
of the twentieth century that these human rights have become an accepted
feature of international law.
9. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. 3 201
(1987).
10. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 46, 52 (1992).
11. There was, of course, a much older branch of international law known as
Responsibility of States for Injury to Aliens under which states were obliged to treat aliens within
their borders with a minimum level of due care but this obligation did not traditionally extend to
a state's own citizens.
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VI. HUMAN RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION
Both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights 2 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights"
contain an article on self-determination. Article 1 (of both Covenants)
states: "1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development. 2. All peoples may, for their
own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources. . . ." The
debate since the introduction of the two Covenants has focused on two
questions: What does the right to self-determination encompass? and who
are the peoples that have this right?
Professor Hurst Hannum has carefully examined a variety of
United Nations materials relating to the meaning of these terms as they
were understood at the time of the drafting of the Covenants. He
concludes that "a careful examination of the legislative history of the
covenants leads to the conclusion that a restrictive interpretation of the
right of self-determination comports with the views of the majority of the
states that supported the right."14  Self-determination at that time was
understood "'as a right belonging only to colonial peoples, which once it
had been successfully exercised could not be invoked again, and it would
not include a right of secession except for colonies." ' 5  Subsequent
occasional discussion of the scope of the right of self-determination by the
Human Rights Committee has failed to produce any agreement -beyond the
colonial context.' 6
VII. SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE DEMOCRATIC RIGHT
What is it that the self determines? It has been suggested that the
central right is "to determine . . . collective political status through
democratic means"" and this indeed may be a structural necessity for
12. International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) (Annex to G.A. Res. 2200, 21 GAOR, Supp. 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 at 490) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
13. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (G.A. Res. 2200, 21 GAOR, Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52)
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
14. Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 23 (1993).
15. Id. quoting the contemporary Director of the U.N. Division of Human Rights John P.
Humphrey, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE 129 (1984).
16. E.g., Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 40,
at 142-43, U.N. Doc. A/39/40 (1984).
17. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 46, 58 (1992).
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protecting other rights falling within the scope of self-determination, such
as the right to "freely pursue . . economic, social and cultural
development."' 8 Although the United Nations Charter does not impose or
require democratic systems of governance, from a whole host of
subsequent declarations, covenants, and other articulated human rights a
convincing argument can be made that the right to participate in
government is now an established norm of international law.' 9 Indeed the
General Assembly's 1970 Declaration on Principles of Law Concerning
Friendly Relations2O links self-determination with the requirement of a
government representing the whole people while at the same time rejecting
the right of secession if the government meets the requirement of
representing the whole people.
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
states conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
as described above and thus possessed of a government
representing the whole people belonging to the territory
without distinction as to race, creed or color. 2'
Three questions naturally present themselves upon reading this
Declaration. What rights do people have if the government does not
represent them? Do they then have a right to secession? What, in fact, is
a representative government for a group that, in some way or another,
perceives itself as dominated by an alien group?
Professor Kirgis reads the language in the Declaration as
indicating:
a right of 'peoples' . . . to secede from an established state
that does not have a fully representative form of
government, or at least to secede from a state whose
government excludes people of any race, creed or color
18. Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1, supra note 12. Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, supra note 13.
19. See generally, FRANK, supra note 17.
20. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the U.N., G.A. Res. 2625, U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292
(1970).
21. Id. at 124, 9 I.L.M. at 1296.
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from political representation when those people are the
ones asserting the right [to self-determination].2
The notion here is that discrimination against certain groups with regard to
eligibility to participate in the political process may legitimatize the claim
to secession. Some writers go beyond participation in the political process
and suggest much broader rights of participation. Professor Nanda writes
of the "right to participate in all value processes-power, wealth and
resources, respect and rectitude, enlightenment and skill, and affection and
well-being," 2 The lower the degree of participation in all of these aspects
of life, the greater the right to secede. The underlying tacit premise of
these lines of argument is that if the subgroup has full access to political
participation or fully participates in all value processes, the claim to
secession is illegitimate. While I do not dispute that the prevalence of
claims for secession reduces where the subgroup does fully participate in
the national life and that the world will be less tolerant of and less
sympathetic towards subgroups with full participatory rights, I do not think
that full participation should be the measure of the legitimacy of
secessionary claims. My principal reason for rejecting full participation of
the subgroup as the litmus test of legitimacy for secession is the argument
based on numbers. If, for example, a particular subgroup who wishes to
secede only make up ten percent of the population, that subgroup will
never find itself living in a nation where its characteristics, however they
may be perceived, are dominant and that is precisely what the subgroup
may wish to achieve by secession. Conversely, where the dominant group
perceives itself as likely to be outnumbered by the dominated group and
likely to have to grant full participatory rights to all governed people it
may well encourage secession, or at least full autonomy. Some writers
have used this latter principle to explain why Israel will, in fact, eventually
recognize a Palestinian state.
VIII. THE SELF OR THE PEOPLE
This takes us directly to the difficult issue of defining the self or
the peoples to whom the right of determination attaches. Certainly it
belongs to the citizens of a state but does it attach to any subgroups?
There is a long trail of lawyerly scholarship that attempts to define groups
which can claim a right of self-determination. Most of these writings
22. Frederick L. Kirgis, Jr., Editorial Comment: The Degrees of Self-Determination in the
United Nations Era, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 304, 306 (1994).
23. Ved Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to
Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257, 276 (1981).
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focus on particular characteristics that the group must possess in order to
qualify for the right. Prime contenders in these lists of distinguishing
characteristics are race, ethnicity, culture, religion, language, history,
tradition, and mutual loyalties, though some authors have rejected an
objective criteria test and recommended a psychological perceptions test.24
Some writers point out that the group must have ties to a specific area of
territory otherwise the claim to recognition as a group is likely to fail.25
These writers often conclude that provided the group has at least a certain
minimum combination of these characteristics then the group has a right to
self-determination which might consist of a considerable level of autonomy
from the dominant group or might consist of the right to secession.
Though there have been examples of peaceful secession, for example,
Singapore from the Malaysian Federation, secession is usually achieved in
the wake of armed uprisings which are seen as threatening international
peace and security, thereby undermining the United Nations system. The
unsuccessful attempts by Biafra to secede from Nigeria and Katanga from
the Congo were both accompanied by bloodbaths and were viewed as
major contributors to destabilization. Thus, the resistance to claims of
secession has continued, though less so in fully democratic states than in
more autocratic systems of government.
IX. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CLAIM TO SECESSION
Once a claim to secession has been voiced, the literature shifts to
focus on criteria or methodology for judging the legitimacy of the claim.
Authors have noted the lack of any formal machinery in the international
arena where such claims can be presented and suggestions have been made
to expand and develop some of the existing machinery to permit it to hear
and determine such claims.26
The suggested criteria for judging the legitimacy of a claim to
secession are often related to the deprivation of human rights, particularly
political rights, for the group claiming secession. Professor Kirgis isolates
two key variables in the test for legitimacy of the claim: "the degree of
representative government . . . and the extent of destabilization that the
international community will tolerate .. ."2 He concludes that "a claim
of a right to secede from a representative democracy is not likely to be
24. Id.
25. Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16
YALE J. INT'L L. 177 (1991).
26. NANDA, supra note 23, at 279-80.
27. Frederick L. Kirgis, Jr. Editorial Comment: The Degrees of Self-Determination in the
United Nations Era, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 304, 308 (1994).
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considered a legitimate exercise of the right of self-determination...
Conversely, a claim to secede from a repressive dictatorship may be
regarded as legitimate." 28 "If a government is quite unrepresentative, the
international community may recognize even a seriously destabilizing self-
determination claim as legitimate. "29
X. SUMMARY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-
DETERMINATION
What has happened to this right of self-determination? It started
out as a right attaching to dominated nations; it gradually transformed into
a right of citizens within a nation; it then became indissolubly linked with
the right of citizens to participate in governance within a nation; later the
notion of participation was expanded to include full participation in the life
of the nation; then the focus shifted onto the groups that were not
experiencing full political or other forms of participation and self-
determination was seen as attaching to those groups; and finally self-
determination has become a declared right for a group to break away from
the nation state and form a new state, at least when full participation (how
ever that is defined) is not guaranteed to the group.
This evolution of self-determination has, to some extent, mirrored
the developments in international law that have moved it from a nation
state focus to a group and individual rights focus. The demise of
sovereignty, which by now has been so frequently noted as to require little
more than a mention, might be thought to be at odds with the movement
towards ever more claims of sovereignty for ever smaller groups, but I am
not sure that it is. Movements towards regionalism, such as the European
Union, or supra-nationalism, such as the deployment of United Nations
forces, is certainly a reflection of both functional necessity and a
movement towards reducing national divisions, but it is worth noting that
all of these larger-than-state structures operate almost entirely through state
participation. The aspiration of a group within a nation to secede and form
a new nation may be seen as an attempt to achieve greater participatory
rights within the supranational structures, not as a rejection of those
structures.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 310.
Epps
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XI. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION
The next move that I perceive is that the right to secede will be
recognized as attaching to any self-declared group (provided it has claims
to territory) even though it may have full political and other participatory
rights. For example, the Quebecois, the Scots, the Basques, even the
Northern Italians may be recognized as having legitimate claims to self-
determination. This type of right is in fact much more likely to be
recognized by fully democratic states, as opposed to dictatorial states,
because democratic states have become accustomed to the notion of ruling
by the consent of the governed. Many social scientists tell us how modem
society fails to support the family and how modern men and women
desperately seek a sense of connectedness. Perhaps smaller units, linked
to larger structures, do provide a better quality of life for their inhabitants.
Recently a student showed me a beautiful map of Europe drawn up in 1992
and neatly divided into seventy five states20 The lines were allegedly
drawn on ethnic and cultural lines. Ancient kingdoms such as Wessex and
Aquitaine were resurrected. I couldn't help wondering if I was looking at
a map of the past or a map of the future.
30. A.H. HEINEKEN, THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE (A EUROTOPIA?) (1992).
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I. THE NEED TO REVISIT THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
"I state practice on the subject reveal how elusive, ambiguous, and
rather vague the concept is, and how it lacks in legal content. "' The term
* Evans University Professor, Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law and Director,
International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver. This is an adapted version of a
presentation at the American Branch of the International Law Association's International Law
Weekend in New York on November 1, 1996, at the panel entitled "The New Dynamics of Self-
Determination." The title of this panel, "The New Dynamics of Self-Determination," reflects
recognition of the need to revisit the concept in the Post-Cold war era.
1. The literature of self-determination is vast. For illustrative purposes, see e.g., LEE
BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1978); GIDEON GOTLIEB,
NATION AGAINST STATE: A NEW APPROACH TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND THE DECLINE OF
SOVEREIGNTY (1993); TED GURR, MINORITIES AT RISK: A GLOBAL VIEW OF ETHNOPOLITICAL
CONFLICTS (1993); MORTON HALPERIN, ET AL., SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD
ORDER (1992); HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF DETERMINATION
(1990); MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE (1982); PATRICK
THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES (1991); U. UMOZURIKE,
SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972); ETHNIC SELF-DETERMINATION AND
THE BREAK-UP OF STATES (Adelphi Paper 283, Dec. 1993); Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-
Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 19 YALE J. INT'L. L. 177 (1991); Allen Buchanan,
Toward a Theory of Secession, 101 ETHICS 322 (1991); Deborah Cass, Rethinking Self-
Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current International Law Theories, 18 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COMM. 21 (1992); Lung-Chu Chen, Self-Determination and World Public Order, 66
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287 (1991); Hector Espiell, The Right to Self-Determination, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1 (1981); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev. 1 (1981); Minasse Haile,
The Legality of Secessions: The Case of Eritrea, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 479 (1994);
Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Self-Determination, 87 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 190
(1993); Benedict Kingsbury, Claims by Non-State Groups in International Law, 25 CORNELL L.J.
481 (1992); Eric Kolodner, The Future of the Right of Self-Determination, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L.
153 (1994); Makau Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16
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is used to justify claims by groups ranging from internal autonomy to
secession; hence the difficulty in finding an operational meaning of "self-
determination" that can be applied in various situations.
Three-quarters of a century ago, former Secretary of State Robert
Lansing remarked that the concept was "loaded with dynamite," and that
"it will raise hopes which can never be realized." 2 That statement was
made in the aftermath of the 1919 Peace Conference at Versailles. Now,
in the post-Cold War era, we are witnessing the unfolding of the explosive
quality of self-determination to which he referred, as the international
community confronts the challenge of ever-increasing ethnic-national self-
determination claims, including, for example, those of the Kurds in Iraq
and Turkey and of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, and similar other claims for
secession in the Balkans, Caucuses, and several parts of Africa. These
claims challenge the territorial approach to self-determination, that once a
territory has achieved independence, it has reached a culmination of self-
determination claimed.
As a marked departure from the past, there no longer is an
international consensus today that the recognition of self-determination
claims is to be limited to colonial and non-self-governing situations,
although even then, a couple of decades ago, there were several of us who
questioned both the validity and wisdom of that consensus.3 To illustrate, I
wrote in 1981 that
[i]t is not the purpose of this paper to encourage and
promote the right of secession. It seems desirable and
necessary, however, to enhance awareness of the likeli-
hood that the international community will, in the future,
be faced with claims for territorial separation in non-
colonial settings and that the absence of institutions,
procedures, and strategies to implement the right of
secession will leave few alternatives to violence ....
[T]he severe deprivations of human rights often leave no
alternative to territorial separation. The world community
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113 (1995); Frederick Kirgis, Jr., Comment: The Degrees of Self-
Determination in the United Nations Era, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 304 (1994); Ved Nanda, Self-
Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 257 (1981); Charles Tilly, National Self-Determination As A Problem For All Of Us,
122 DAEDALUS 29 (1993). David Wippman, Hearing Voices Within the State: Internal Conflicts
and the Claims of Ethno-National Groups, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 585 (1995); and the
authorities cited in these works.
2. Robert Lansing, THE PEACE INITIATIVES - PERSONAL NARRATIVE 97 (1921), quoted
in ALFRED COBBAN, NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 19 (1945).
3. See e.g., BUCHHEIT, supra note 1; Nanda, supra note 1.
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must respond efficiently and effectively to the
consequences of such separation. There is a growing
recognition of the close link between human rights and
international peace and security. It is not premature to
accord recognition to the right to secession in an effort to
promote these goals.'
The fear that secessionist claims by various ethnic-nationalist
groups will exacerbate the existing fragile international order have recently
led some observers to call for placing severe limits on the scope of self-
determination so as to regulate, control, and minimize its evil
consequences.' While it may be argued that this hypothesis remains
untested and lacks validity, I do not wish to enter the debate here. Rather
I-would shift the focus from the discussion about secession, independence
and statehood, which undoubtedly constitute important aspects of self-
determination claims, and instead submit that in light of the degrees and
range of self-determination claims in the United Nations era, 6 it is
necessary for international lawyers to study the mechanisms under which
all these claims can be peacefully pursued and resolved.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF SELF-DETERMINATION
The basic questions pertaining to self-determination that need to be
addressed have not changed. They are: 1) Who constitutes the self, the
peoples who will determine their own future? 2) How is self-determination
to occur and how are the identified peoples to exercise this right? and 3)
What is the nature and scope of the self's, the peoples' determination?
What shape will it take? What issues will it cover: economic, social,
political (foreign policy, security, etc.)?
Similarly, both internal and external dimensions of self-
determination remain as valid today as before. It may be noted that the
reference in the former is to a democratic form of government with wider
participation, for it connotes regulation of relations between those who
govern and the governed within a community,7 and the latter refers to the
4. Nanda, supra note 1, at 280.
5. See e.g., Amitai Ezioni, The Evils of Self-Determination, FOREIGN POLICY, Winter
1992-93, at 21, 35.
6. See Kirgis, supra note 1.
7. See The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 28, at 121 (1971) (Principle (e)) [hereinafter
Declaration]. Principle (e) requires that a state must be possessed of a ."government representing
the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour." Id.
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regulation of relations between a community which has defined itself and
the rest of the world, which may take any number of forms.8
If the self is an ethnic nation or group which demands recognition
for the validity of its claim to self-determination, the characteristics would
be that a people thus defined can be identified as a social entity, that they
have a common ancestry, history, religion, language, culture, identity, or
any combination of these characteristics, and possess an awareness or state
of mind that they are not just a population but have a sense of identity. To
give it a political identity, it is likely to have political institutions, and the
issue arises as to some form of international recognition of its status as a
people.9 As to the scope of self-determination, it ranges from a claim to
preserve ethnic and cultural identity to a demand for separate statehood.
A demand for independent statehood could, in all likelihood, exclude other
ethnic groups and, within the claimant ethnic group, those who disagree
with the demand. What rights do these other ethnic groups and the-
dissidents possess and how are their interests to be accommodated? A
major challenge of ethnic-national claims to self-determination is to the
traditional concept of international order based on international law norms
related to territorial integrity, state sovereignty, prohibition of the use of
force, and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. The challenge,
in essence, is the balancing of these various conflicting and yet
complementary principles on the one hand and the principle of self-
determination on the other.
If the claim of self-determination means that it is a claim to
separation, independence, and statehood, then in addition to the problem
of likely international fragmentation and chaos, the issues pertaining to
creation and recognition of states in light of the existing criteria for
statehood, population, territory, government, and willingness and capacity
to enter into relations with other states, are to be applied.'" And on
recognition of states, existing norms of international law are far from
being precise, leaving their invocation and interpretation to each state,
with a great deal of state subjectivity.
See also Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46
(1992).
8. See Declaration, supra note 7, princ. (e), para 4, which acknowledges that the right of
self-determination may be implemented in any of the following forms: "[t]he establishment of a
sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State, or
the emergence into any other [freely determined] political status ... "
9. See generally discussion in Nanda, supra note 1, at 275-76.
10. See generally JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW




I must begin with the history of self-determination, which arguably
begins with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. To provide a proper
perspective, it will be appropriate to recall that President Woodrow Wilson
introduced the concept to the League of Nations in 1919 as the right of
every people to chose the sovereign under which they live. 2 It may also
be recalled that the League of Nations applied the doctrine in a limited
fashion to ensure the protection of minorities.
In the Aaland Islands controversy a specially-appointed
International Commission of Jurists said in an advisory opinion: "Positive
international law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such,
to separate themselves from the state of which they form part by the simple
expression of a wish, any more than it recognizes the right of other states
to claim such a separation."3 Accepting the Commission's
recommendation, the League of Nations rejected a request by the
representatives of the Islands for annexation to Sweden as an exercise of
their right of self-determination.
Unlike the Covenant of the League of Nations, which did not
mention self-determination, the United Nations Charter specifically refers
to the principle in articles 1 and 55. Among other provisions, articles 2
and 56 directly obligate member states to implement the mandate of
articles 1 and 55. Also, Chapters XI, XII, and XIII, which address
questions of non-self-governing and trust territories, implicitly endorse the
principle since they impose obligations on member states to give effect to
the principle. 4 Specifically, the goal of article 73 is
to ensure, within due respect for the culture of the peoples
concerned, their political, economic, social, and
educational advancement, their just treatment, and their
protection against abuses [and] to develop self-govern-
ment, to take due account of the political aspirations of the
peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development
of their free political institutions, according to the
particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples
and their varying stages of advancement.
11. In this section I have relied on my prior work, Nanda, supra note 1, at 265-271.
12. See generally M. Pomerance, The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives
on the Wilsonian Conception, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1976).
13. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O. J., Special Supp. 1, at 5 (1920).
14. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 73-91.
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As early as 1950, the United Nations General Assembly called
upon the Economic and Social Council to request that the Commission on
Human Rights "study ways and means which would insure the right of
nations and peoples to self-determination.""' Article 1, common to both
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reads:
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development;
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant .. .shall
promote the realization of the right of self-determination,
and shall respect that right, in conformity with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 16
It should be recalled that the General Assembly already had
adopted in 1960 the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to.
Colonial Countries and Peoples, 7 which acknowledged that all "peoples
have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development." It also, however, prohibited all attempts aimed at
"the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial
integrity" of any state.
Subsequently, the General Assembly in 1970 unanimously adopted
the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations, 8 which proclaims as one of seven principles the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, "under which all peoples
have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their
political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural development,
and every state has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter."' 9
15. G.A. Res. 421 D, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 20, at 42, U.N. Doe. A/1775 (1950).
16. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was adopted by
G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6319 (1967), and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966).
17. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doe. A/4684 (1960).
18. Declaration, supra note 7.
19. Id. princ. (e).
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The Declaration obligates a state
to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples
[claiming the right to self-determination] in the elaboration
of the present principle of their right to self-determination
and freedom and independence. In their actions against,
and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the
exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples
are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance
with the purposes and principles of the Charter .... 20
As to the issue of the territorial integrity of states, the Declaration states:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
and thus possessed of a government representing the
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction
as to race, creed or colour. 2'
The logical reading of the Declaration is that a state must possess a
government representing the whole people for it to be entitled to protection
of its territorial integrity against secession.
The principle of self-determination was endorsed by two advisory
opinions of the International Court of Justice. In the advisory opinion on
Namibia,22 the Court affirmed the right to self-determination, stating that
"the subsequent development of International Law in regard to non-self-
governing territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,
made the principle of self-determination applicable to all of them. "'
Subsequently, in 1975, in the Western Sahara case,' the Court approved
of "the right of the population of the Western Sahara to determine their
future political status by their own freely expressed will."'
20. Id. para. 5.
21. Id. para. 7.
22. Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16.
23. Id. at 31.
24. 1975 I.C.J. 6.
25. Id. at 35-36.
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This brief survey shows that in the United Nations practice, the
principle of self-determination had acquired by the late 1970s the status of
an enforceable legal right, but only in the context of colonial and non-self-
governing territories. State practice reveals that the right was, in fact,
until recently considered to be limited to these situations. In its response
to claims for self-determination, the United Nations gave very restrictive
interpretation of the concept, by limiting the self to territorial entities under
colonialism or international trusteeship. To illustrate, secessionist attempts
in 1960 in Katanga and in 1967 in Biafra failed.26 While considering the
Biafra conflict, a meeting of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government, the supreme organ of the Organization of African Unity,
condemned efforts at creating an independent Biafra and reaffirmed
"adherence to the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity" of Nigeria.27 Bangladesh was an exception for special reasons.28
Former United Nations Secretary General U Thant's often-repeated words
of 1970 reflect the then-prevailing attitude of the United Nations as an
international organization being unequivocally opposed to accepting
secession. He said that the United Nations "has never accepted and does
not accept and I do not believe will ever accept the principle of secession
of a part of its Member State."2 9
IV. CURRENT TRENDS
I would, however, submit that more recently the right of self-
determination has been extended to non-colonial situations as well. During
the Cold War, there was obviously no challenge to borders in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union. Those wishing to claim the right of
self-determination were deterred by the dictatorial regimes. But with the
collapse of the Soviet Union, a rush of claims in Yugoslavia, the Baltics,
the Caucuses, in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan, among
others, challenged the international community, forcing it to take such
claims seriously. Even the Organization of African Unity has reluctantly
recognized the right of Eritrea to secede.30
26. For a brief history and analysis, see Nanda, supra note 1, at 272-74.
27. AHG/Res. 51 (IV) (1976), cited in Tiewul, Relations Between the United Nations
Organization and the Organization of African Unity in the Settlement of Secessionist Conflicts, 16
HAR. INT'L L.J. 259, 290 (1975).
28. See generally Ved Nanda, A Critique of the United Nations Inaction in the Bangladesh
Crisis, 49 DENV. L.J. 53 (1972); Nanda, supra note 1, at 274.
29. 7 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Feb. 1970, at 36.
30. See generally Haile, supra note 1; Mutua, supra note 1.
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This is not to say that states are reconciled to recognizing self-
determination claims, especially those which seek secession. Nine
Governments are genuinely and appropriately concerned with the threat of
chaos in the international arena from the existence of too many separate
states, as well as the domino effect of such claims and whether they will
ignite dormant conflicts.
The conflict in former Yugoslavia is worth noting. The European
Community established an Arbitration Commission comprising the
presidents of five constitutional courts which was asked to consider the
disputes from the federal government of Yugoslavia and the six republics.
Based on the Commission's interpretation of international law, it gave ten
opinions.
In response to a question on whether Yugoslavia had disintegrated
or whether the republics had seceded, in Opinion 1,31 the Commission said
that when the organs of a federal state do not meet the "criteria of
participation and representativeness inherent in a federal state," when
violence is prevalent, when the federal authorities fail to "enforce respect
for ... cease-fire agreements," and when the republics express their wish
to be independent, a federal state is under these circumstances "in the
process of dissolution." This undoubtedly is a pretty broad statement
which lacks precision and fails to provide workable guidelines as to when
parts of a federation can secede or when a federation is "in the process of
dissolution."
In Opinion 2,32 the question posed was whether the Serbs in
Croatia and Bosnia had the right to self-determination. After
acknowledging that there was a lack of clarity in international law on the
subject, the Commission said that it was nonetheless clear that any such
right "must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of
independence (uti possidetis juris) except where the states could agree
otherwise."
The Commission failed to provide guidance on what kind of self-
determination rights the Serbs could have in Croatia and Bosnia. By
equating the right to self-determination simply to secession and changes in
boundaries, the Commission lost an opportunity to clarify alternatives to
secession as a valid exercise of self-determination. Several years of
bloody civil war followed. Why could the Commission not have
recommended peaceful resolution of the disputes by a negotiated
redrawing of the boundaries of Yugoslavia based upon plebiscites under
31. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 1, Opinions on the
Questions Arising from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M. 1494-97 (Nov. 1992).
32. Id. at 1497-99.
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international supervision? This, after all, was not a colonial situation and
the Commission should not have invoked the concept of uti posseditis
juris, which traditionally has been applied to international borders.
V. APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I reiterate that claims to secession must only be considered as a last
resort when it is clear that ethnic groups cannot live together and it is
equally clear that the group claiming secession makes a compelling case
because of its perceived deprivation of human rights within the larger
community. The claim that it is deprived of its right to participate in all
value processes, power, wealth, and resources, respect and rectitude,
enlightenment and skill, and affection and well-being,33 should establish its
right to secede. The proper context should also include the potential
impact of secession upon the parent state and other states, and security and
stability in an international or regional context.
It follows, therefore, that the international community should pay
greater attention to internal aspects of self-determination. Claims to self-
determination become violent, leading to civil wars, and are at times likely
to spread regionally when there are no peaceful mechanisms for pursuing
these claims and reconciling competing ones through the process of
negotiation. The role of preventive diplomacy, early warning systems and
peaceful settlement of disputes through mediation, conciliation, and
negotiations need to be explored.34
Whether self-determination takes the form of the creation of a
state, a federal entity, or a confederation of states, ethnic power-sharing
arrangements must be explored. Perhaps the traditional concept of
sovereignty, which is already eroding, must be seen in a new light so that
it can be shared between various ethnic groups. In some situations,
cultural or linguistic autonomy should be considered adequate expression
of self-determination.
Promotion and protection of minority rights and means for
redressing grievances regarding violation of human rights need to be given
greater consideration. The United Nations and regional organizations must
play an active role. The stationing of United Nations peacekeepers in
Macedonia in 1993 was a landmark decision, a useful model of preventive
diplomacy. Regional efforts, such as undertaken by the Organization for
33. See MYRES McDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 336-37 (1960).
34. See e.g., An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and
Peacekeeping, Report by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. 5/24111 (1992).
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Security and Cooperation in Europe," are promising. The OSCE's
emphasis on the protection of minority rights, recognizing them as
collective rights, and the establishment of a High Commissioner for
National Minorities are important elements in its focus on internal aspects
of self-determination.
Similarly, the OSCE aims at strengthening human rights and
democratic institutions. Its efforts include the establishment of a conflict
prevention center in Vienna. Although it covers only inter-state conflicts,
it has played a role in addressing ethnic conflicts as well, such as those in
Rumania and Hungary, Albania and the federal republic of Yugoslavia,
Hungary and Slovakia, and Moldova and Russia. It will be essential that
other regional efforts also move in this direction. It is equally important
that they also pay attention to confidence building mechanisms.
Concerted international efforts are needed toward the promotion of
respect for human rights, pluralism, democratic forms of government and
the encouragement of constitutional frameworks within which claims for
self-determination can be reconciled and resolved. Also, it is essential to
explore the conferring of legal personality on and allowing formal
participation of ethnic-national groups, nations and non-state actors
including international organizations for specific purposes in the
international arena. Such efforts will provide an effective preventive
mechanism to violent claims for secession.
35. See generally ETHNIC SELF-DETERMINATION AND BREAK-UP OF STATES, supra note
1, at 64-66.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the legal issues left by recent territorial change in eastern
Europe is the status of persons of a former majority group who become a
minority. This issue has presented particular difficulties where, the
remaining population is of an ethnic group that formerly held a
predominant role vis-d-vis an ethnic group that, as a result of the
territorial change, has become a majority. Thus, Serbs find themselves a
minority in the new states of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, while
Russians find themselves a minority in the new states formed out of the
Soviet Union on Russia's periphery.
The situation of these populations raises issues of appropriate
treatment of minorities, and that of the status they should appropriately
enjoy in the new states. In particular, does the fact that these populations
are of an ethnic group that may have suppressed the national aspirations of
the now majority ethnic group justify negative action towards them, or
deprive them of rights they would otherwise enjoy as a minority group?
In addition, the situation of these populations raises questions
regarding the status of territories because of potential claims to
independence by the Serbs or Russians, and because of the potentiality that
Yugoslavia or Russia might intervene militarily to protect their
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B., M.A. 1966, Harvard Law School.
The author is grateful to the United States Information Agency for an opportunity to lecture in
Moldova on minority rights in 1993. The author served in 1994-1995 as an expert for the
Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe to make recommendations on the status of
Crimea.
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compatriots. This article focuses on these issues as they have played
themselves out in certain of the new states on Russia's periphery.
II. PRECEDENT
The twentieth century has witnessed two previous situations in
which loss of territory by states has left populations of their nationals in a
minority position. The first is the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian
empire in central Europe at the end of World War I, and the second is the
breakup of the European colonial empires in Asia and Africa in the years
following World War II. In each instance, nationals of the formerly
dominant state found themselves in a territory in whose political system the
leading role was played by groups that had formerly been in a subordinate
situation.
When the Austro-Hungarian empire fell many Germans and
Hungarians became minorities in states carved out of the empire.' The
borders drawn up for a new, truncated Hungary, for example, were so
tight that fifteen million Hungarians found themselves outside Hungary,
primarily in Slovakia, Romania, and Serbia. 2 The situation of the minority
populations resulting from the border-drawing at Versailles was deemed to
require international attention. A body of law was created, backed up by a
League of Nations enforcement mechanism to protect these minorities.3
The states conferring at Versailles drafted a separate treaty to protect the
minorities in each state where they had come to exist. The new states
undertook not to discriminate against the minorities and, in addition, to
facilitate the perpetuation of their ethnic identity.4
This minority protection system was, in motivation, less
humanitarian than it was strategically oriented. The Versailles conferees
1. Danilo Turk, Le droit des minorit~s en Europe, in LES MINORITI5 EN EUROPE:
DROITS LINGUISTIQUES ET DROITS DE L'HOMME 447 (Henri Giordan ed., 1992).
2. GIDON GOTrLIEB, NATION AGAINST STATE: A NEW APPROACH TO ETHNIC
CONFLICTS AND THE DECLINE OF SOVEREIGNTY 29-30 (1993).
3. See Nathaniel Berman, A Perilous Ambivalence: Nationalist Desire, Legal Autonomy,
and the Limits of the Interwar Framework, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353 (1992); Nathaniel Berman,
"But the Alternative Is Despair:" Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1792 (1993).
4. Treaty of Versailles (Poland), 1919, reg'd no. 36 League of Nations; Treaty of Saint
Germain-en-Laye (Austria), 1919, reg'd no. 37 League of Nations; Treaty of Saint Germain-en-
Laye (Czechoslovakia), 1919, reg'd no. 38 League of Nations; Treaty of Saint Germain-en-Laye
(Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), 1919, reprinted in 1 INT'L LEGIS. 312 (M.O.
Hudson ed., 1931); Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine (Bulgaria), 1919, reg'd no. 40 League of
Nations; Treaty of Paris (Romania), 1919, 5 L.N.T.S. 335; Treaty of Trianon (Hungary), 1920,
reg'd no. 152 League of Nations; Treaty of Sflvres (Greece), 1920, 28 L.N.T.S. 225; Treaty of
Lausanne (Turkey), 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 12.
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feared that suppression of Germans and Hungarians might prompt these
minorities to seek assistance from Germany or Hungary, and that
international tension could ensue. Unfortunately, the League did not
follow through sufficiently to prevent precisely such a problem from
becoming a precipitating factor in World War II, namely, the
marginalization of Germans in the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia, which
provided a rationale for Germany's occupation of the Sudetenland in 1938.
Nonetheless, the League of Nations made significant efforts at
protecting the minority populations. It reviewed petitions from those who
alleged their rights had been infringed.' Under the minority protection
treaties, the Permanent Court of International Justice was given
compulsory jurisdiction to resolve disputes, and the court heard a number
of such cases. The court gave advisory opinions as well on minority
issues. In one advisory opinion, it found Albania to have violated the
rights of Albania's Greek minority when Albania ordered the closing of all
private schools.6
A similar situation might have developed again after World War
II, when the borders of Germany were constricted on the east under the
post-war settlement. A substantial portion of Germany, inhabited
primarily by Germans, was ceded to Poland. However, the Germans were
expelled and thus did not become a minority population of Poland. Their
expulsion was rationalized on the basis that Poland needed land
compensation for having lost its own eastern territory to the Soviet Union
expulsion of resident Germans was also carried out from states that
Germany had occupied, particularly from Poland, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia. One rationale for that expulsion was that resident
Germans had collaborated with Germany's army. In any event, the
expulsion reduced the minority populations that had existed between the
wars. In all, some fifteen million Germans were expelled after World War
II, many in conditions of severe deprivation. An estimated two million
died in the process.,
When colonialism ended in Asia and Africa in the 1950s and
1960s, a comparable issue emerged. In many, though not all, of the
colonies, nationals of the colonial power had settled in substantial
numbers, and while many of these voluntarily departed, others sought to
5. Natan Lerner, The Evolution of Minority Rights in International Law, in PEOPLES AND
MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 77, 85 (C. BrOlmann et al., eds., 1993).
6. Advisory Opinion, Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 64, at
19-20, 23.
7. See generally ALFRED DE ZAYAS, NEMESIS AT POTSDAM: THE EXPULSION OF THE
GERMANS FROM THE EAST (1989).
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remain. No international mechanism comparable to the post-World War I
system was established to protect these Europeans. On occasion, the
former colonial powers intervened during times of disturbances. In the
Congo, Belgium intervened in 1964 at Stanleyville, and again in 1978 in
Shaba province, on a rationale of protecting endangered Belgians and other
foreigners.
This method of protection of the settler populations raised a
suspicion that the former colonial power was seeking to foster its own
interests. In both instances of Belgian intervention in the Congo, Belgium
was suspected of trying to influence the outcome of events to its favor.8
III. RUSSIANS AS A MINORITY POPULATION
The breakup of the Soviet Union left twenty-five million Russians
as ethnic minorities in newly independent states in the Caucusus, the
Baltics, Central Asia, and on Russia's southwest frontier.9  Like the
Germans after the two world wars, and the Europeans upon the demise of
colonialism, these Russians were a suspect group. Resentment was
directed against them for two centuries of Russian political domination.
Some Russians settled during the Soviet period, many dispatched as
technicians or specialists. Others are the descendants of Russians who
pre-dated the Soviet period in these territories having settled as the
Russian empire expanded southward in the nineteenth century.
Russians have been replaced in many jobs by members of the
newly predominant ethnic group. Some of the states have required
knowledge of the newly dominant language as a condition for holding
certain jobs. Some have made it difficult for Russians to acquire
citizenship.
Individual Russians have adapted to the new circumstances in
varying ways. Some are more ready than others to learn the local
language. Many feel themselves to be at too advanced an age to learn the
language but want their children to do so, rather than to have them
educated in a solely Russian-language environment.
8. JOHN QUIGLEY, THE RuSES FOR WAR: AMERICAN INTERVENTIONISM SINCE WORLD
WAR 11 119-24 (Stanleyville intervention 1964), 165-70 (Shaba intervention 1978).
9. Russia considers sanctions to protect kin in "near abroad;" AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
June 7, 1995, available in NEXIS, News Library. Highly approximate Russian population
percentages are: Azerbaijan 7%, Uzbekistan 8%, Turkmenistan 10%, Kazakhstan 38%,
Tajikistan 8%, Kirghizia 22%, Moldova 13%, Latvia 33%, Lithuania 9%, Estonia 33%, Belarus
12%, Ukraine 21%, Georgia 7%, Armenia 2%. See Russians feel alone in Estonia, WASH.
TIMES, June 1, 1992, at Al. On the situation in the Baltics, see Marc Holzapfel, Note, The
Implications of Hunan Rights Abuses Currently Occurring in the Baltic States Against the Ethnic
Russian National Minority, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 329 (1995-1996).
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The governments of the states in question have shown some
restraint in pressing the use of the local language, not only because of
pressure from the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), but as well from practical considerations. Russian remains the
language of the region, and the small new states risk the danger of
isolating themselves from economic, cultural, and scientific life if the
population is unable to operate in Russian. Further, many of the Russian
speakers in their territory possess skills important for the state's economic
development. As the first flush of nationalism has been replaced by the
reality of stagnant economies, this consideration has assumed prominence.
In post-independence Africa, the colonial languages have retained an
important role, providing a lingua franca for Africans speaking many
different languages. Russian can be expected to play a similar role in the
territories of the former Russian Empire, as it allows communications
across ethnic lines within each of the new states, as well as among them.
For the Russians, the motivation for maintaining the status of the
Russian language is in part related to their identity and sense of belonging,
but as well, and primarily, to a concern that they will be unable to make a
living if they are required to achieve fluency in the local language. In a
recent article, Hurst Hannum makes the important point that a desire for
self-determination frequently springs from a defensive motivation. ° It
serves as a protection for populations that are endangered because of
pressure from some other population.
IV. THE LAW OF MINORITY PROTECTION
The minority Russians have received support from international
organizations. The Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe"
has assumed the role of defusing ethnic tensions through the practice of
preventive diplomacy. It has viewed the status of minority Russians as an
issue that could threaten the peace of the region. It created the post of
High Commissioner on National Minorities, whose incumbent has urged
governments in the newly independent states to ease requirements related
10. Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 63-64 (1993).
11. As of Jan. 1, 1995, the name Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was
changed to Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
12. ROB ZAAGMAN & HANNIE ZAAL, THE CSCE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON NATIONAL
MINORITIES: PREHISTORY AND NEGOTIATIONS, IN THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE: THE
HELSINKI SUMMIT OF THE CSCE AND ITS AFTERMATH 95, 104 (Arie Bloed ed., 1994) (stating
that the idea was to provide an impartial intermediary to mediate between the parties to reduce
tension before it might lead to armed conflict).
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to language use and to acquisition of citizenship. 3 The OSCE has leverage
in this endeavor because these new states seek admission to Europe's
political and economic institutions."
In assuming this stance of support for the Russians, the OSCE is
being guided by, and is building upon, existing law protecting ethnic
minorities. Ethnic minorities are, of course, entitled to be treated in a
non-discriminatory fashion, but beyond that they are entitled to protection
against efforts to limit the development of their culture. In perhaps the
most important legal proposition on this issue, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights provides, "[I]n those States in which ethnic,
religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities
shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own
religion, or to use their own language.""
Ethnic conflict in eastern Europe has brought a proliferation of
new documents from both the United Nations and European institutions to
address minority rights, and to expand protection. In 1992, the United
Nations General Assembly adopted a Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities' 6 which
recognized for minority groups a right to enjoy their culture, to practice
their religion, to use their language, to maintain their associations, and to
participate in the public life of the state they inhabit." The OSCE adopted
something akin to a bill of rights for national minorities' and the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe opened for signature a
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. 9
13. Helsinki Decisions, July 10, 1992, pt. 2, reprinted in 13 HUM. RGTS. L.J. 288, 289
-(1992). On the origin and creation of this post, see ZAAGMAN & ZAAL, supra note 12, at 95-
111. On the nature of the post, see ZAAGMAN, & ZALL, supra note 12, at 113-75.
14. See, e.g., Russia, 23 JANE'S DEFENCE WKLY. 19 (Mar. 25, 1995), available in
NEXIS, News Library (stating that President Eltsin agreed to the stationing of OSCE observers in
Chechnia in hope of gaining trade concessions from the European Union).
15. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 27, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
16. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities, art. 1, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/135 (1992), reprinted in
14 HUM. RGTS. L.J. 55 (1993).
17. Id. at art. 2.
18. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of
the CSCE, ch. IV, in THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE:
ANALYSIS AND BASIC DOCUMENTS, 1972-1993 456-60 (Arie Bloed ed., 1993).




The Council of Europe's 1992 European Charter for Regional or
Minority Languages obliges states to promote minority languages in legal
proceedings, education, culture, and the media.2 The Charter seeks the
"facilitation and/or encouragement of the use of . . . minority languages,
in speech and writing, in public and private life." 2' The Charter requires
states to make education available in minority languages.2
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has
reported on human rights in eastern Europe with particular attention to the
status of minorities.2 3  The Parliamentary Assembly drafted an Eleventh
Protocol to the European human rights treaty to deal with minority rights .
However, differences over the coverage led to the shelving of work on a
final text.Y
The instruments embodying principles of the law on protection of
minorities suggest no exception where the minority group is made up of
nationals of a state that formerly held sovereignty in the territory in
question. Indeed, the history of minority protection from the League days
suggests that one of the primary purposes of this body of law is to protect
precisely such persons. The proliferation of legal instruments on point in
the wake of the recent developments in eastern Europe confirms this
conclusion and strongly suggests that it is not permissible to suppress an
ethnic group because of perceived unfair treatment in the past by the state
in which that ethnic group is a majority.
V. MINORITIES AND SELF-DETERMINATION
For the new states, one factor in their policy towards their Russian
minorities is a fear that Russia might intervene, perhaps even militarily, in
support of these Russians. These fears were heightened in April 1995
when Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev, speaking of ill treatment
20. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Eur. T.S., No. 148, opened for
signature Oct. 2, 1992, reprinted in Hannum, supra note 10, at 86.
21. Id. at art. 7.
22. Id. at art. 9.
23. See, e.g., Report on the legislation of the Republic of Slovenia, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 437
(1993); Report on the legislation in the Czech Republic, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 442 (1993); Report
on Human Rights in Slovakia, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 446 (1993).
24. Council of Europe, Commission for Democracy through Law, Draft Convention for the
Protection of Minorities, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 265 (1991); see also Andras B. Bake, The
European Convention on Human Rights and the Protection of Minorities under International Law,
8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 227, 236-37 (1993) (arguing that a minority rights protocol to the European
convention is advisable).
25. Council of Europe Assembly asks for EU membership to be examined, Agence Europe,
Reuter Textline, Jan. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Europe File.
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of Russians in these states, said "There may be cases when the use of
direct military force will be needed to defend our compatriots abroad."
26
Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Churanov backed up Kozyrev's view,
stating that Russian speakers were being humiliated in some of the new
states, and that diplomatic measures might not always be sufficiently
persuasive to correct the situation.27 By 1996, however, Russia's debacle
in Chechnia brought greater caution on Russia's part and seemed to reduce
the likelihood of military intervention in support of Russian speakers.
Minority protection, as it has come to be practiced in Europe, is
not aimed at any right to political separation for a minority group. The
OSCE viewed infringement of the status of minorities as a prime factor in
hostilities, particularly in eastern Europe.2 Like the League of Nations
before it, the OSCE European institutions viewed preservation of the peace
as the primary reason for protecting minority rights. In a policy
proclamation on minority rights, the Heads of State and Government of the
Council of Europe stated "[w]e express our awareness that the protection
of national minorities is an essential element of stability and democratic
security in our continent."29  The Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities recited in its preamble that the protection
of minorities was to be accomplished "within the rule of law, respecting
the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of states. 30
National minorities were to eschew separation from the states
whose territory they inhabited. This position was at odds with the classical
idea of self-determination, which yields several options, one of which is
political independence. Thus, the OSCE undertook the rather delicate task
of promoting the rights of minorities, but only if the minorities remained
with the political status quo.
For Russians in states on the periphery of the Russian Federation,
the issue of possible political separation arose most sharply in Moldova.
26. Kozyrev fuels fears of harder line in Kremlin: remarks on use of force alarm ex-soviet
states, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1995, at 2.
27. Deputy defence minister supports use of force to protect Russians abroa, (BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Apr. 25, 1995), available in NEXIS, News Library.
28. ZAAGMAN & ZAAL, supra note 12, at 95 (stating that "it is ethnic conflicts which are
currently the single most important cause of violent conflicts in Europe").
29. Summit Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the 32 Member States of the
Council of Europe, Oct. 8-9, 1993; Vienna Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of
the member States of the Council of Europe on the Reform of the Control Mechanism of the
ECHR, on National Minorities; and on a Plan of Action against Racism, preamble, para.
reprinted in 4, 14 HUM. RGTS. L.J. 373 (1993).




In most of these states, Russians found themselves dispersed through the
state's territory, but in Moldova's eastern sector, Russians and Ukrainians
formed a slight majority over ethnic Romanians, who constitute overall the
majority population of Moldova. In 1990 a government formed claiming
to represent this territory and succeeded in establishing control there."
Other states refused to recognize the Transdnestr Republic as a state, and
the OSCE worked to keep it within Moldova.
A similar situation arose in the Crimean peninsula, which was
transferred from Russia to Ukraine in 1954. The majority population is
Russian, and many desire separation from Ukraine. However, these
Russians, unlike those in Moldova, have not sought an independent state,
but rather an affiliation with Russia. Russia, however, has manifested
little interest in incorporating Crimea, leading the Russians to demand
republic status within Ukraine that, the Russians hope, might be organized
as a federation. In addition, they sought a special relationship with Russia
that would allow trade advantage and access to Russian higher educational
institutions. In both Moldova and Ukraine, potential confrontation has
been averted for the present. Negotiations are ongoing, leading in the
direction of an anticipated arrangement whereby the minority entity would
enjoy certain protections, and a measure of self-rule.12 In Moldova, the
greatest fear of the Russians and Ukrainians is that Moldova might one day
merge with Romania, leaving them a quite small minority. There is an
understanding that if such a union should come about, the status of
Transdnestr would be revisited.
One potential innovation in self-determination practice has been
proposals, made with respect both to Transdnestr and Crimea, for an
autonomy or self-rule arrangement for the minority territory, but with
international oversight. Russians in Crimea sought an agreement between
Crimea and Ukraine. The Ukraine government resisted such an
agreement, fearing that it would be taken as implicit recognition by it of an
international status for Crimea. Transdnestr Foreign Minister Valerii
Litskay has said that proposals from the Moldovan side for a solution
entirely within the framework of the Moldova constitution do not provide
adequate guarantees that Moldova will not override whatever rights are
written into an agreement between Moldova and Transdnestr, or into the
31. V. NEDELCHUK, RESPUBLIKA MOLDOVA [Republic of Moldova] 71 (1992) (text of
proclamation of Sept. 2, 1990 in Tiraspol of Transdnestr Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic).
32. Signing of memorandum on Dnestr settlement postponed (BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, July 1, 1996), available in NEXIS, News Library.
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Moldova constitution." The OSCE seems a likely candidate for such an
oversight role?'
International oversight, of course, is not a new concept for
protection of minorities, but the specific modality proposed here would
differ from past arrangements. An agreement would be drawn up between
the central government and the minority entity, and a specific international
actor would be empowered to entertain complaints by either side that the
other was failing to observe the agreement.
VI. CONCLUSION
The striving of a population for self-determination, with an aim
either of political independence or of an improved status within a state, is
not necessarily a manifestation of chauvinism and xenophobia, or an
inability to get along with others. In many instances, it reveals rather an
effort at survival. Indeed, the nationalism reflected in the ruling circles of
the new states on Russia's periphery is largely based on a striving for self-
assertion in response to longtime domination by Russia.
An important aspect of the situation of the Russian minorities is
that international institutions have intervened and have played an active
role. The state practice suggests that rights of minorities are recognized as
international norms, and that these rights apply to protect a minority
population associated with a formerly dominant state. The newly
independent states have manifested a willingness to accommodate the
needs of the minority Russians. An initial striving to promote the local
ethnic group at the expense of the Russian minority has given way to a
policy of accommodating the interests of the Russian minority.
33. Dnestr minister says Moldovan crisis proves need for international guarantees (BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Mar. 19, 1996), available in NEXIS, News Library.
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UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CASE
OF THE DEATH PENALTY
Christina M. Cerna
THE ISSUE OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Forty-five years after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights the international community met in Vienna to elaborate the
human rights agenda for the next twenty-five years. The second United
Nations World Conference on Human Rights was intended to focus on the
implementation of the human rights standards that had been adopted since
the Universal Declaration, but found itself challenged instead by a number of
Asian countries on the very issue of the universality of these rights, which
they argued reflected Western values and not their own.
Paragraph 5, inter alia, of the Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action,' reaffirmed the universality of human rights using the English
language in such a way that only a non-native-English speaker could
appreciate:
Paragraph 5: All human rights are universal, indivisible
and interdependent and inter-related. The international
community must treat human rights globally in a fair and
equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same
emphasis. While the significance of national and regional
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious
backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of
States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural
* Senior Specialist in Human Rights at the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights of the Organization of American States. Affiliation for identification purposes only. The
opinions expressed are those of the author alone and are not to be attributed to the Organization
of American States or to any of its organs.
This article expands upon the author's presentation on Friday, November 1, 1996, at the
International Law Weekend (organized by the American Branch of the International Law
Association, the American Society of International Law, and other similar associations) at a panel
of the same name organized by Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, of the U.N. Office of Legal
Affairs.
1. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action: Report of the World Conference on
Hwman Rights, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 157/24 (Part 1), at 20-46 (1993).
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systems, to promote and protect all human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
What was the content behind the Asian challenge? The response to
the Asian challenge set forth in the Vienna Declaration was obscured in the
deliberate imprecision of the language. In two earlier attempts to
comprehend the nature of the Asian challenge, I came to the following
conclusions. 2 First, that the Asians were in agreement with the West on
certain "minimal standards of civilized behavior," for example:
there should be no torture, no slavery, no arbitrary
killings, no disappearances in the middle of the night, no
shooting down of innocent demonstrators, no
imprisonment without careful review. These rights should
be upheld not only for moral reasons. There are sound
functional reasons. Any society which is at odds with its
best and brightest and shoots them down when they
demonstrate peacefully, as Myanmar did, is headed for
trouble. Most Asian societies do not want to be in the
position that Myanmar is in today, a nation at odds with
itself.3
And second, that the disagreements resided in an area that I termed
the "private sphere" which relates to the personal life of the individual.
These rights have traditionally been covered by religious law and they still
are in many countries.4 This private sphere, which deals with issues such as
religion, culture, the status of women, the right to marry, to divorce, and to
remarry, the protection of children, the question of choice as regards family
planning, and other issues which are still highly controversial in the West,
such as sexual preference, abortion, and euthanasia, is a domain in which the
most serious challenges to the definition of human rights arise and, more
particularly, to the universality of such rights.5
2. See Christina M. Cerna, Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity:
Implementation of Human Rights in Different Socio-Cultural Contexts, 16 HUM. RTs. Q. 740-52
(1994) [hereinafter Cerna, Universality of Human Rights]; Christina M. Cerna, East Asian
Approaches to Human Rights, 89 AsIL PROC. 146 (1995), and 1995-1996 BuFF. J. INT'L L. 2
[hereinafter Cerna, East Asian Approaches].
3. Kishore Mahbubani, An Asian Perspective on Human Rights and Freedom of the Press,
quoted in Cerna, Universality of Human Rights, supra note 2.
4. Religious law, or Shari'a, is prominent in many Islamic states; Judaic law is prominent
in Israel; Canonic law is prominent in the Holy Sea, and penetrates the legal thinking of many
states with large Christian populations.
5. See Cerna, Universality of Human Rights, supra note 2, at 746.
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So where does the death penalty fit into this discussion of the
universality of human rights? The goals behind the imposition of the death
penalty are basically two: retribution and deterrence. Society exacts its
pound of flesh from the perpetrators of the most atrocious crimes set forth in
the criminal law and which generally involve the violent, premeditated
taking of life; this is retribution writ large, and is profoundly entrenched in
Western conceptions of justice. Lex talionis, the principle or law of
retaliation that a punishment inflicted should correspond in degree and kind
to the offense of the wrongdoer, as an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, is
part of the Judeo-Christian baggage which informs our notions of morality
and of what is right.6 If an offender has taken a life, it is considered just that
he forfeit his life; there is symmetry and equality between the punishment
and the offense.
So my first point is that I would place the death penalty into the area
I termed the "private sphere." Unless one believes in such religiously-
charged definitions of justice it is not immediately or necessarily clear or
self-evident what should be done with a wrongdoer who commits a
homicide. Some countries seek to provide a form of compensation for the
victim's relatives in the form of monetary damages provided by the state (or
the labor of the perpetrator) which gives them something tangible beyond the
vaguer satisfaction arising from the imprisonment or execution of the
wrongdoer. My point here is that if we remove the religious connotations
from the concept of justice we are left with more pragmatic attempts to seek
to compensate the victim. Justice, having removed God and the concomitant
absolutes from the equation, is more difficult to define in human or human
rights terms.
Take, for example, the case of a judge who errs and mistakenly
sends an innocent man to the gallows. The judge has taken a life, is it just
that he forfeit his own? It is unlikely that any society would devise such a
solution.
If our notions of justice are culturally determined and informed by
religious precepts, as I am suggesting that they are, then if we strip awdy
6. Albert Camus, in his celebrated essay on capital punishment, Reflections on the
Guillotine, refers to the "quasi-arithmetical" reply of society to wrongdoers, and denies that the
law of retaliation is a principle.
That reply is as old as man; it is called the law of retaliation. Whoever has done me
harm must suffer harm; whoever has put out my eye must lose an eye; and whoever
has killed must die. This is an emotion, and a particularly violent one, not a principle.
Law, by definition, cannot obey the same rules as nature.
Albert Camus, Reflections on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION AND DEATH (Justin
O'Brien trans., 1960).
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these preconceptions, we find that there is no inevitability or necessity in
requiring the death penalty for the taking of a life.
This brings me to the second point that I wish to make.
The law presents us with a paradox. The international community
has reached consensus on the abolition of torture, no country in the world
allows its police or other state agents to torture as a means of obtaining
information or for any other reason. It is prohibited in all criminal codes in
every country in the world. Yet the same international consensus has not
been reached on the abolition of the death penalty which is arguably the most
extreme form of torture.,
The death penalty is specifically excluded from the international
torture conventions. For example, the United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
defines torture in article 1 as:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture"
means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or
a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only
from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
(Emphasis added.)
Consequently, since the death penalty is considered a "lawful
sanction" in many states, the international human rights organizations
seeking the abolition of the death penalty cannot attack the death penalty, per
se, since it is not defined as an arbitrary deprivation of the right to life, and it
is explicitly excluded from the definition of torture.
The 1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture
goes a step further than the United Nations in its definition of torture. In
article 2 of this treaty, torture is defined as:
7. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the American Convention on
Human Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights all include the death penalty as
an exception to the arbitrary deprivation of the right to life. It should be noted, however, that
each of these treaties has been "amended" by an additional protocol on the abolition of the death
penalty which are only in force for the ratifying states parties.
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any act intentionally performed whereby physical or
mental pain or suffering is inflicted on a person for
purposes of criminal investigation, as a means of
intimidation, as personal punishment, as a preventive
measure, as a penalty, or for any other purpose. Torture
shall also be understood to be the use of methods upon a
person intended to obliterate the personality of the victim
or to diminish his physical or mental capacities even if
they do not cause physical pain or mental anguish.
The OAS treaty specifically excluded lawful measures from its
definition of torture, but it included a proviso: "The concept of torture shall
not include physical or mental pain or suffering that is inherent in or solely
the consequence of lawful measures, provided that they do not include the
performance of the acts or use of the methods referred to in this article."
(Emphasis added).
The proviso explicitly allows abolitionists to challenge the death
penalty by creating arguments that the manner of imposition of the death
penalty, i.e. the suffering inherent in a slow, painful death, is tantamount to
torture, or the delay in carrying out an execution due to defense driven
appeals is tantamount to torture, insofar as the manner or the delay create a
disproportionate amount of suffering for the wrongdoer.
In sum, we are left with the irony that the death penalty retentionist
states now seek to impose capital punishment in such a way as to cause the
condemned individual a minimum amount of suffering.
Last week, for example, a British pro bono lawyer contacted the
Commission on behalf of an individual on death row in Missouri. Britain,
which has abolished the death penalty, now provides technical assistance to
United States lawyers working on death penalty cases. This lawyer was
seeking to prove that "the combination and cumulative effect" of enduring a
period in excess of thirteen and a half years on death row, the staying of
three separate Warrants of Execution in the final days prior to the scheduled
execution dates, the initiation and progression of the "Missouri execution
protocol" to within one hour and forty-six minutes of a scheduled execution,
and the issuance of seven Warrants of Execution in total, amounted to cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment under the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and under international human
rights law.
All these stays were defense driven and hence one could argue that
the delays in the imposition of the death penalty were voluntary, and
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consequently could not be defined as torture.A In addition, they were all acts
incidental to or inherent in lawful sanctions. Some courts, however, have
interpreted such acts, although pursuant to law, as violative of international
human rights standards.9
In 1993, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London
reversed an earlier holding and found that a delay in the imposition of the
death penalty caused by the Appellant's legitimate right to appeal cannot be
blamed on the prisoner. In Pratt Morgan v. Attorney General for Jamaica
the Privy Council stated that:
It was part of the human condition that a condemned man
would take every opportunity to save his life through use
of appellate procedure. If it enabled the prisoner to
prolong the appellate hearings over a period of years, the
fault was to be attributed to the appellate system that
permitted such delay and not to the prisoner who took
advantage of it.
The logical conclusion is that it is the death penalty that should be
abolished, in the same way that torture, which in earlier more barbaric times
was considered a lawful and legitimate means of punishment, has now been
abolished in the law. Of course, torture continues to be practiced in many
countries in the world but the point is that it is not permitted in any legal
system in the world. The first step is to abolish the death penalty, de jure,
and then to abolish it de facto.
The third and final point I wish to make deals with the question of
whether the international community is nearer to a consensus on the issue of
prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles under the age of
eighteen? The international human rights treaties explicitly prohibit the
imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by persons below the
8. I use the terms "torture" and "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment"
interchangeably.
9. Since 1978 some prisoners in the United States have challenged their conditions of
imprisonment on death row as an infringement of their rights under the Eighth Amendment. In
Texas, as a result of Ruiz v. Estelle (1982), a class action in which the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that the vastly overcrowded conditions under which all Texan prisoners were held
violated the Eighth Amendment, agreement was reached, in 1986, to improve conditions for
death row prisoners. Hearing of the effects of the "death row syndrome," the European Court of
Human Rights decided in July 1989, in the case of Soering v. United Kingdom, that it would be a
breach of article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights to extradite the prisoner,
Soering, who would face the death penalty in Virginia because his inevitably long wait on death
row would amount to inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment. See ROGER HOOD, THE
DEATH PENALTY, A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE (Clarendon Press 1996). The above-




age of eighteen, unlike their tolerance of the death penalty generally.
Consequently, has this norm, prohibiting the execution of persons for crimes
committed under the age of eighteen, achieved universality?'0
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights had the
opportunity to consider this issue in a case brought before it against the
United States in 1985.11 The petitioners, James Terry Roach and Jay
Pinkerton, had been sentenced to death for crimes which they were adjudged
to have committed before their eighteenth birthdays.
Since the United States is not a party to the American Convention on
Human Rights, the Commission applied the American Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of Man, an instrument comparable to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which is considered to have binding legal
force within the inter-American system.
The petitioners alleged that the United States had violated article I
(the right to life), article VII (special protection of children) and article
XXVI (prohibition against cruel, infamous and unusual punishment) of the
American Declaration by executing persons for crimes committed before the
age of eighteen. The facts in the case were not in dispute between the
parties.
The petition for James Terry Roach was filed on December 4, 1985.
The Commission requested the United States Secretary of State and the
Governor of the State of South Carolina to issue a stay of execution pending
the Commission's examination of the case. The requests were denied and
after the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case, Roach
was executed on January 10, 1986.
The petition for Jay Pinkerton was filed on May 8, 1986. The same
appeals were made requesting a stay of execution to the United States
Secretary of State and to the Governor of Texas. The requests were again
denied as was Pinkerton's writ certiorari by the United States Supreme Court
on October 7, 1985. Pinkerton was executed on May 15, 1986. On
February 23, 1987, the United States Supreme Court announced that in its
10. See, e.g., article 6(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
"Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of
age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women." See also article 4(5) of the American
Convention on Human Rights: "Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons who, at
the time the crime was committed, were under 18 years of age or over 70 years of age; nor shall
it be applied to pregnant women."
11. See Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser. L./V./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). The
case was reported in 8 HuM. RTS. L. 345 (1987). For a general introduction to the functioning
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, see Cecilia Medina, Procedures in the
Inter-American System for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. An Overview, 6 SNL
83 (1988).
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next term it would take up the case Thompson v. Oklahoma, for the first time
considering the constitutionality of the execution of juvenile offenders.
The issue as framed by the Commission was whether the absence of
a federal prohibition within United States domestic law on the execution of
juveniles who committed capital crimes under the age of eighteen violated
human rights standards applicable to the United States under the inter-
American system. Article I of the American Declaration protects the right to
life but is silent on the issue of capital punishment. Article 4(5) of the
American Convention on Human Rights specifically prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty on persons who were under the age of eighteen at the
time the crime was committed. However, since the United States had not
ratified the American Convention, it is not bound by its provisions.
The petitioners had argued that the United States is bound by a norm
of customary international law which prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty on persons who committed capital crimes before the age of eighteen.
They alleged that this customary norm could be derived from widespread
state practice which had been codified in certain treaties. They asserted that
"the greater the number of parties to a treaty, the greater the inference that it
rises to the level of customary international law."12
The United States, in response, argued that no such customary norm
existed and that it could not be considered legally bound by a conventional
norm without its consent (i.e. expressed through ratification of a treaty).
The Commission reviewed the elements necessary for the formation
of a norm of customary international law: consistent state practice and
opinio juris, and then cited the rule set forth by the International Court of
Justice to the effect that a customary rule does not bind states which protest
the norm.'3
The Commission concluded that the petitioners' argument was
unconvincing. It found that a norm of customary international law, even if it
were held to exist, would not be binding on the United States because the
United States had protested the norm. The Commission found evidence that
the United States had protested the norm in light of the fact that the Carter
Administration had proposed a reservation to the American Convention on
Human Rights when it transmitted this Convention (and three others) to the
United States Senate for ratification. The proposed reservation, as regards
12. See an article by one of the petitioners' lawyers on the case, Professor David
Weissbrodt, Execution of Juvenile Offenders by the United States Violates International Human
Rights Law, 3 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 346-52 (1988).




the Roach case, stated: "U.S. adherence to Article 4 is subject to the
Constitution and other laws of the U.S." 4
For a norm to be binding on a state which protested the norm it must
have acquired the status of jus cogens, the Commission continued.15  The
Commission found that in the member states of the OAS a universal norm of
jus cogens is recognized which prohibits the state execution of children. The
norm, it stated, is accepted by all the states of the inter-American system,
including the United States.1 6  The Commission found evidence for the
recognition of this norm in the response of the United States Government to
the petition which affirmed that: "[a]ll states, moreover, have juvenile
justice systems; none permits its juvenile courts to impose the death
penalty." 7
The Commission found that the case arose, not because of doubt
concerning the recognition of an international norm as to the prohibition of
the execution of children but because the United States disputes the
allegation that there exists consensus as regards the age of majority.
Specifically what is at issue here is the United States law and practice, as
adopted by different states, to transfer adolescents charged with heinous
crimes to adult criminal court where they are tried and may be sentenced
as adults.'8
Since the federal government did not preempt the issue, the states,
under the United States constitutional system, were free to exercise their
discretion as to whether or not to allow capital punishment and to determine
the minimum age at which a juvenile may be transferred to adult criminal
court where the death penalty could be imposed. Thirteen states and the
District of Columbia had abolished the death penalty in 1987, and the others
which permitted capital punishment had retained death penalty statutes which
1) prohibited the execution of persons who committed capital crimes under
the age of eighteen, or 2) allowed for juveniles to be transferred to adult
14. President's Message on Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, S. Exec. Doc. C,
D, E, & F, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, 17 (1978).
15. Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser. L./V./II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987), at para. 54. The
concept of jus cogens is included in article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
which states: "A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character."
Id.
16. Id. at para. 56.
17. Id.
18. Id. at para. 57.
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criminal court where they could be sentenced to death. The Commission
concluded that
[w]hereas approximately ten retentionist states have now
enacted legislation barring the execution of under-eighteen
offenders, a hodgepodge of legislation characterizes the
other states which allow transfer of juvenile offenders to
adult court from age seventeen to as young as age ten, and
some states have no specific minimum age.' 9
It was this diversity of state practice within a federal system which
the Commission found violative of articles I (the right to life) and II (the
right to equality before the law) of the American Declaration. The fact that
some states had abolished the death penalty, whereas another state, Indiana,
potentially allowed it to be applied to juveniles as young as ten years of age,
was impermissible in the view of the Commission, when the most
fundamental human right, the right to life, was at stake. The violation was
not one committed by the States of South Carolina or Texas, but rather the
federal government:
For the federal Government of the United States to leave
the issue of the application of the death penalty to juveniles
to the discretion of state officials results in a patchwork
scheme of legislation which makes the severity of the
punishment dependent, not, primarily, on the nature of the
crime committed, but on the location where it was
committed. Ceding to state legislatures the determination
of whether a juvenile may be executed is not of the same
category as granting states the discretion to determine the
age of majority for purposes of purchasing alcoholic
beverages or consenting to matrimony. The failure of the
federal government to. preempt the states as regards the
most fundamental right - the right to life - results in a
pattern of legislative arbitrariness throughout the United
States which results in the arbitrary deprivation of life and
inequality before the law, contrary to Articles I and II of
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, respectively.0
The United States Government rejected the Commission's decision
in this case, which it considered not legally binding, but the United States
19. Id. at para. 58.
20. Id. at para. 63.
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Supreme Court, in its 1988 decision in Thompson v. Oklahoma, held that the
execution of juveniles under the age of sixteen violated the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment.
By way of conclusion, I wish to reiterate an earlier point. The
international consensus on the abolition of torture marked a sign in the
progress of civilization. Such a similar international consensus needs to be
reached on the issue of the abolition of the death penalty. The obstacles to
such a consensus are to be found in our outmoded, religion-burdened
concepts of justice. The attempts of nongovernmental'human rights
organizations to achieve the abolition of the death penalty by means of
arguments suggesting that the manner in which it is imposed or the delay in
its imposition is tantamount to torture is ludicrous when the imposition of the
death penalty itself is the most extreme form of torture imaginable, but is
excluded from the definition of torture by means of a legal fiction.
Similarly, it is equally barbaric to impose the death penalty on capital
offenders who committed atrocious crimes under the age of eighteen, but it
is wishful thinking to argue that this prohibition has achieved the status of a
norm of customary international law. We need to look at crime and
punishment in a new way that does not rely for a concept of justice on the
law of retaliation.
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The application of the death penalty has occupied a number of
United Nations human rights treaty bodies, and in particular the Human
Rights Committee established under article 28 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter referred to as ICCPR).
Article 6 of the ICCPR does not disavow capital punishment, but limits
the imposition of a capital sentence to the most serious crime. Moreover,
a capital sentence can only be pronounced upon conclusion of a trial in
which all the guarantees of due process have been scrupulously observed
under article 14 ICCPR.
The present article focuses on the approach of the Human Rights
Committee vis-A-vis the death penalty. This will be done by reference to
the Committee's periodic state reporting procedure, governed by article 40
of the ICCPR, and by reference to the Committee's jurisprudence on the
death penalty, by now well established, under the First Optional Protocol
to the ICCPR.
The Human Rights Committee is a body of eighteen independent
experts of universal composition. Of the 132 states parties to the ICCPR,
many still retain the death penalty on their books, although some are de
facto abolitionist or have not carried out executions in many years. Other
states parties, however, do resort to capital punishment. Given the
wording of article 6 of the ICCPR, the Committee cannot be openly
* The initial version of the article was presented during the International Law Weekend
of the ILA/ABA in New York on November 1, 1996. The opinions expressed in this article are
the author's and do not reflect those of the United Nations Organization. The author, a staff
member of the United Nations Center for Human Rights, is currently on sabbatical leave at
Harvard Law School.
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abolitionist. The adoption of the Second Optional Protocol on the
Abolition of the Death Penalty in 1990, however, has given the Committee
some leverage to press states parties on the death penalty issue; many
Committee members have put probing questions on the death penalty to
State party representatives, some of which will betray their abolitionist
leanings. Thus, the tendency of the past six to eight years has been to
question states parties which do carry out executions rather critically on
their attitude towards the death penalty. This is true both for the state
reporting procedure under article 40 of the ICCPR and the Optional
Protocol procedure.
I. THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE PERIODIC STATE REPORTING
PROCEDURE
The Committee first addressed the issue of the death penalty in
general terms in its General Comment 6[16] on the right to life, adopted in
July 1982. In it, it suggested that while the Covenant did not prohibit the
death penalty, the article refers to abolition in terms which strongly
suggest (paragraphs 2 and 6 of the provision) that abolition is desirable. It
concluded that all measures of abolition should be considered as progress
in the enjoyment of the right to life within the meaning of article 40
ICCPR.'
This philosophy has permeated the Committee's comments on
states parties' periodic reports, in as far as the death penalty is concerned.
The following examples are illustrative:
In its Comments on the Third Periodic Report of Japan, the
Committee expressed serious concern over the number and the nature of
crimes punishable by the death penalty under the Japanese Criminal Code.
It recalled, in language that could be termed by now as standard, that the
terms of the Covenant tend toward the abolition of the death penalty and
those states which have not already abolished the death penalty are bound
to apply it only for the most serious crimes.2
Commenting on the Second Periodic Report of Cameroon, the
Committee was concerned that, in spite of a recent reduction, the number
of offenses punishable by the death penalty in the Criminal Code [was] still
excessive, in particular aggravated theft or traffic in toxic or dangerous
wastes, and at the number of death sentences handed down by the courts.3
1. General Comments under Article 40, Paragraph 4 of the Covenant, 1982 Y.B. on
H.R., General Comment 6(16), Article 6, at 196-7, U.N. Sales No. E.88.XIV 6.
2. See Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 40,
Vol. I, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994).
3. Id. at 37.
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It is noteworthy that the Committee claimed the authority to
determine what, in its opinion, constitutes a most serious crime for the
purpose of article 6. By doing so, it is progressively limiting the number
of offenses for which the death penalty may legitimately be imposed.
Admittedly, the Committee's observations and concluding comments in no
way bind states parties to the Covenant, but states do pay attention to these
statements and frequently try to implement them at the domestic level.
The Committee criticizes states parties' resort to capital
punishment regardless of the legal system they adhere to. Commenting on
the second periodic report of Yemen, whose legal system is based on
Islamic law, the Committee deplored that, on the basis of the information
before it, executions of persons below the age of eighteen had taken place
and deemed this to be a clear violation of article 6, paragraph 5, of the
Covenant.4
Perhaps the Committee's most detailed criticism of the application
of the death penalty was formulated upon conclusion of the examination of
the initial report of the United States in March 1995. In its Comments, the
Committee expressed
[a] concern about the excessive number of offenses
punishable by the death penalty in a number of States, the
number of death sentences handed down by thecourts, and
the long stays on death row which, in specific instances,
may amount to a breach of article 7 of the Covenant. It
deplores the recent expansion of the death penalty under
federal law and the re-establishment of the death penalty in
certain states. It also deplores provisions in the legislation
of a number of states which allow the death penalty to be
pronounced for crimes committed by persons under 18 and
the actual instances where such sentences have been
pronounced and executed. It also regrets that, in some
cases, there appears to have been lack of protection from
the death penalty of those mentally retarded.5
In another section, the Committee criticized the United States
reservations entered in respect of articles 6, paragraph 5, prohibition of
execution of minors, and paragraph 7, exemption of the death row
phenomenon from the scope of application of the provision-the so called
Soering reservation and urged the United States Government to withdraw
4. Annual Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, Vol. 1, Annex I, at 51,
U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (1995).
5. Id. at 54.
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them. In this context, the Committee was undoubtedly mindful of the
objections to said reservations deposited by a number of European states
after United States ratification of the Covenant in the summer of 1992.6 It
went on to urge the Government to revise federal and state legislation with
a view to restricting the number of offenses carrying the death penalty
strictly to the most serious crimes and with a view eventually to abolishing
it. The Government was further exhorted to take steps to ensure that no
one is sentenced to death for crimes committed under the age of eighteen.
Finally, the Committee considered the determination of methods of
execution had to take into consideration the prohibition against causing
avoidable pain and urged that the Government take all necessary steps to
ensure respect of article 7 of the Covenant.7
At the same time, the case of the United States exemplifies the
limits of the Committee's capacity to influence a state's attitude vis-A-vis
the death penalty, let alone its domestic politics. While the United States
representative thanked the Committee for its carefully worded
recommendations and promised to convey them to the Clinton
Administration, he made it equally clear that the issue of withdrawal of the
U.S. reservations to articles 6 and 7 and of a possibly more restrictive
resort to capital punishment were non-negotiable politically. But even in
such a situation, the Committee's recommendations should not be
dismissed as pious or nave formulae - if they are taken up by sizable
segments of civil society and repeatedly placed before executive and
legislative bodies for consideration, the long-term effect may be far from
negligible. Finally, repeated public criticism may ultimately shame a
Government into action.
Close observers of the Committee's practice under article 40
ICCPR have charged - and not without some justification - that it has
not always been consistent in its calls for the abolition of the death penalty,
and that it may have applied a double standard with regard to abolition.
While the suggestion of abolition was put to the United States delegation,
this was not done in the cases of Yemen and Cameroon. In still other
instances, the Committee has recommended that states parties consider
ratifying the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant, aiming at the
Abolition of the Death Penalty.'
6. Reprinted in United Nations Office of Legal Affairs C.N.377, 1993 TREATIES 21
(1994).
7. See Annual Report, supra note 4, at 56.
8. Adopted on Dec. 15, 1989, in force since July 11, 1991. Twenty-nine states were
parties to the Second Optional Protocol as of July 1996.
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The Committee has iewed with concern the movement, in some
states parties to the Covenant, towards re-introduction or extension of the
death penalty, mostly against a background of rampant violent crime or
anti-Government terrorism. Thus, the death penalty was recently re-
introduced in Chile and in El Salvador; in Guatemala, its scope was
extended. In the case of Peru, where the death penalty was re-introduced
and extended in the 1993 Constitution to a wider range of offenses than in
the 1979 Constitution, the Committee recalled its General Comment 6[16]
of July 1982 and concluded that extension of the scope of application of
the death penalty raises questions as to its compatibility with article 6 of
the Covenant.9 On another occasion, it has argued that the re-introduction
of the death penalty by a State which had previously abolished capital
punishment would raise serious issues under article 6, paragraph 6.
II. THE DEATH PENALTY UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL
PROCEDURE
Since 1987, the Committee has been seized of numerous individual
complaints involving capital punishment under the Optional Protocol
procedure. Over the past decade, it has been, able to set out numerous
principles which, in their combination, limit the capacity of states parties
to carry out capital sentences. At the same time, it should be pointed out
that on no issue has the Committee been divided to such an extent as over
the death penalty, as is borne out by the ratio decidendi of, and the
numerous individual opinions appended to, many decisions addressing the
so-called death row phenomenon, as well as the views dealing with the
complex issue of extradition to face the death penalty.' 0
The Committee has consistently held that in capital cases, the
obligation of states parties to observe rigorously all the guarantees for a
fair trial set out in article 14 of the Covenant admits of no exception.
From this premise, it has developed a number of principles for the conduct
of capital cases in domestic courts, and which states parties are expected to
respect. While this article does not permit a detailed analysis of the
Committee's jurisprudence on the death penalty," the most important
statements are covered hereafter. Thus, on the issue of legal
9. Preliminary Observations of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.67 (1996).
10. Regrettably, the Summary Records of plenary debates on complaints examined under
the Optional Protocol are confidential, so that no specific examples can be given.
11. Cf. the overview of the Committee's jurisprudence in MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMITTEE (2nd ed. 1994) (discussing article 6 of the ICCPR in one of its chapters);
SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2nd ed. 1997).
1997]
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
representation of prisoners under sentence of death, the Committee has
stated that it is axiomatic that legal assistance must be made available to a
convicted prisoner under sentence of death. This, it added, applies to the
trial in the tribunal of first instance as well as to all appellate
proceedings.'"
The right of the accused to be present during his appeal has been
addressed by the Committee in several capital cases. It found violations of
article 14, paragraph 3(d), where the accused was not allowed to attend the
hearing of his appeal despite his manifest desire to do so, or where he was
represented by a lawyer whom he had not been able to instruct and who,
without consulting with his client, had abandoned one or several grounds
of appeal, thereby leaving the accused without effective representation.
13
In a recent case concerning Jamaica, the Committee held that while it had
no competence to question counsel's professional judgment that there was
no merit in the appeal, counsel should nonetheless have informed his client
of his intention not to raise any grounds of appeal, so that the latter could
have considered any other remaining options open to him. 14
In what is by now firmly established jurisprudence, the Committee
holds that violations of the fair trial provisions in article 14 ICCPR in a
capital case entail, if no further appeal against the sentence is possible, a
violation of the right to life:
[t]he imposition of a sentence of death upon conclusion of
a trial in which the provisions of the Covenant have not
been respected constitutes, if no further appeal against the
sentence is possible, a violation of article 6. [T]he
provision that a death sentence may be imposed only in
accordance with the law and not contrary to the provisions
of the Covenant implies that the procedural guarantees
therein prescribed must be observed, including the right to
a fair hearing by an independent tribunal, the presumption
of innocence, the minimum guarantees for the defense, and
12. Hum. Rts. Comm., Communication No. 250/1987 (Reid v. Jamaica.), Views adopted
on 20 July 1990, para. 11.4.
13. See, e.g., Hum Rts. Comm., Communication No. 232/1987 (Pinto v. Trinidad), Views
adopted on 20 July 1990, para. 11.4.
14. See Hum. Rts. Comm., Communication No. 353/1988 (Grant v. Jamaica), Views
adopted on 31 Mar. 1994, para. 8.6.
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the right to review of conviction and sentence by a higher
tribunal. 15
The question of what constitutes the most serious crime within the
meaning of article 6, paragraph 2, ICCPR, has been discussed in several
communications, but only one final decision is available as of the autumn
of 1996. In a recent case concerning Zambia, the complainant had been
sentenced to death for aggravated robbery involving the use of firearms.
Considering that in the circumstances of the case, no person had been
either killed or wounded, and that the domestic courts could not take these
elements into consideration when imposing the death sentence, the
Committee concluded that the mandatory imposition of the death sentence
in the circumstances was incompatible with article 6, paragraph 2. 16 While
it is obviously difficult to generalize from a single decision, one may read
between the lines that the Committee interprets the terms most serious
crime in a restrictive manner; while states may retain some margin of
discretion as to what constitutes a most serious crime, it is clear that the
list is being narrowed down progressively.
Extradition to face the death penalty is a phenomenon which has
occupied numerous judicial instances and human rights organs in recent
years. The Human Rights Committee is no exception. In three decisions
adopted in 1993 and 1994, respectively, the Committee was called upon to
determine whether the extradition by a country which has abolished the
death penalty to a country retaining capital punishment may be deemed a
violation of article 6 ICCPR. 17 In all three cases, the defendants, United
States citizens, had been either convicted of a capital offense in United
States courts or were facing capital charges in United States tribunals; they
fled to Canada, where they were apprehended, and detained pending
judicial determination of the United States' request for their extradition.
After the Supreme Court of Canada had held that they could be extradited
under the 1976 Extradition Treaty between the United States and Canada,
the complainants turned to the Human Rights Committee. While the
Committee majority held that the obligations arising under article 6,
paragraph 1, did not require Canada to refuse the applicants' extradition
without seeking assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed
and respectively carried out in the United States, an important Committee
15. See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., Communications 464 and 482/1991 (Peart v. Jamaica),
Views adopted on July 19, 1995, at 44, in U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/57/WP.1 (1996).
16. Hum. Rts. Comm., Communication No. 390/1990 (Lubuto v. Zambia), Views adopted
on Oct. 31, 1995.
17. This issue is dealt with in more detail in the contribution of William Schabas to the
symposium.
19971 483
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
minority held that by allowing the authors' extradition, Canada, a state
only retaining capital punishment for some offenses under military statutes,
was violating its obligations under article 6 by exposing individuals under
its jurisdiction to capital punishment in another state. 8
The three preceding cases have tested the Committee's consensual
decision-making procedure to its very limit. This becomes clear when one
compares the number of individual opinions appended to the decisions in
these cases, admittedly on different legal issues, to any other case
previously decided by the Committee. This author submits that the
Committee majority has been considerably more restrictive in its approach
than other national highest appellate jurisdictions recently called upon to
determine similar legal issues, e.g., the Hoge Raad of the Netherlands 19 or
the Conseil d'Etat of France. 20 In the perhaps most far-reaching judgment,
the Italian Constitutional Court recently held that an individual may not be
extradited to a state which retains the death penalty even if the receiving
states gives assurances that the death penalty, if imposed, would not be
carried out. The absolute guarantee [of the right to life] is not satisfied by
a system that allows a decision on extradition to countries with the death
penalty to be taken on a case-by-case basis, where the discretion to
evaluate the guarantees given by the requesting state lies with the
extraditing authorities.2' While this judgment may not be representative, it
is clear that the trend goes in the direction of the highest domestic
appellate instance refusing extradition to a country retaining the death
penalty if no satisfactory assurances are received from the receiving
country that the death penalty, if imposed, would not be carried out. 22
Another issue which has caused considerable discussion and
dissent within the Committee concerns the so-called death row
phenomenon, i.e. whether prolonged detention on death row can be
deemed to constitute cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment within the
18. See Hum. Rts. Comm., Communications No. 469/1991 (Charles Ch. Ng. v. Canada),
Views adopted in Nov. 1993, Communication No. 470/1991 (Kindler v. Canada), Views adopted
in July 1993, Communication No. 539/1993 (Cox v. Canada), Views adopted on Oct. 31, 1994.
On the case of Joseph Kindler, see Schabas, 4 REVUE UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
65-70 (1992).
19. See Jurisdiction-NATO Status of Forces Agreement-U.S. Servicemen Charged with
Criminal Offenses Overseas-European Convention on Human Rights: Short v. Kingdom of the
Netherlands, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 698 (1991).
20. Aylor v. France, Judgment of the Conseil d'Etat of Oct. 15, 1993, reported in
LIBERATION, Nov. 3, 1993.
21. Italian Constitutional Court, judgment of 27 June 1996, reported in BULLETIN OF
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 197-198 (Sept. 16, 1996).
22. See THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND UNITED
KINGDOM LAW 644-645 (Harris ed. 1995), for the chapter written by Markus G. Schmidt.
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meaning of article 7 ICCPR. In its first decision which addressed the
problem, the Committee did not accept the authors' argument that
detention on death row for over ten years constituted treatment contrary to
article 7:
[iun principle prolonged judicial proceedings do not per se
constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment even if
they can be a source of mental strain for the convicted
prisoners. However, the situation could be otherwise in
cases involving capital punishment and an assessment of
the circumstances of each case would be necessary.
23
The Committee's approach in Pratt and Morgan must be contrasted
with the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of
Soering v. United Kingdom, in which the court held that the length of
detention prior to execution, the conditions of incarceration on death row,
as well as the complainant's mental state would bring the treatment on
death row within the scope of application of article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 4
In 1992, the Human Rights Committee had the opportunity to fine-
tune its jurisprudence on the death row phenomenon in the cases of Barrett
and Sutcliffe. The complainants, who had been on death row for over
thirteen years and argued that the length of their detention on death row
violated article 7. The Committee reiterated its statement from Pratt and
Morgan quoted above and added:
[i]n states whose judicial system provides for a review of
criminal convictions and sentences, an element of delay
between the lawful imposition of a sentence of death and
the exhaustion of available remedies is inherent in the
review of the sentence. Thus, even prolonged detention
under a severe custodial regime cannot generally be
considered to. constitute cruel and inhuman treatment if the
convicted person is merely availing himself of appellate
remedies.25
Significantly, one Committee member appended an individual opinion,
noting that a very long period [of detention] on death row, even if partially
23. Hum. Rts. Comm., Communications Nos. 210/1986 & 225/1987 (Pratt v. Jamaica),
Views adopted on 5 Apr. 1989, para. 13.6.
24. Series A, No. 161 (1989).
25. Hum. Rts. Comm., Communications Nos. 270/1988 & 271/1988 (Barrett v. Jamaica),
Views adopted on 30 Mar. 1992, para. 8.4.
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due to the failure of the condemned prisoner to exercise a remedy, cannot
exonerate the state party from its obligations under article 7.2
Although the Committee has confirmed its jurisprudence on
several occasions since 1992, the repeated changes in the formulation it
has chosen for its decisions, and a fresh look at the death row phenomenon
by the highest judicial instances of some states parties, including the
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe2' and the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council in London,2 8 have contributed to renewed and sometimes sharp
exchanges between Committee members on the compatibility of prolonged
detention on death row with article 7. In its latest decision, adopted in
March 1996, the Committee acknowledges that it is aware that its
jurisprudence has given rise to controversy. The detailed arguments that
follow by and large confirm the Committee's previous jurisprudence, but
at the same time some formulations in the operative part of the decision
might lock the Committee into a straightjacket, permitting it no
differentiated treatment of cases in which the length of detention exceeds
every reasonable limit.
29
The compatibility of methods of execution of a capital sentence
with international or regional human rights instruments has, to date, not
been addressed by any of the regional human rights bodies. At the
universal level, the Human Rights Committee was faced with it in 1993 in
the case of Ng v. Canada. The complainant, awaiting extradition from
Canada, argued that, if extradited to California and sentenced to death, he
would face death by gas asphyxiation in the gas chamber, which he
contended was contrary to article 7 ICCPR. The Committee began by
noting that any method of execution provided for by law must be designed
in such a way as to avoid conflict with article 7. It then noted that, by
definition, every execution of a sentence of death could be considered to
constitute cruel and inhuman treatment within the meaning of article 7. As
article 6, paragraph 2, permits the imposition of capital punishment for the
most serious crimes, however, the execution of the sentence must be
carried out in such a way as to cause the least possible physical mental
26. Id., as per individual opinion of Ms. Christine Chanet.
27. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General,
Supreme Court Judgment No. S.C. 73/93 (1993).
28. Pratt v. Attorney-General of Jamaica, Nov. 2, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 364.
29. See Hum. Rts. Comm., Communication No. 588/1994 (Johnson v. Jamaica), Views
adopted on 22 March 1996, para. 8.2 to 8.6. Some formula, such as "Life on death row, harsh
as it may be, is preferable to death," could for example be read as ultimately legitimizing periods
of detention on death row exceeding twenty years. Two complaints currently pending under the
Optional Protocol procedure and awaiting a decision on the merits may soon require further
clarifications by the Committee.
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suffering. On the basis of the detailed information provided by the
defendant's representative, which had not been contradicted by the State
party, the Committee concluded that asphyxiation by cyanide gas would
not meet the test of least physical and mental suffering.3"
The Committee's reasoning was criticized by two Committee
members who appended their individual opinion to the views. They
rightly point out that every known method of judicial execution in use
today, including execution by lethal injection, has come under criticism for
causing prolonged pain or the necessity of having the process repeated.3'
Furthermore, if one method of execution is deemed incompatible with
article 7 ICCPR, the state party concerned may simply change the method
of execution or provide for a choice between two or several methods; this
is indeed what occurred in California, where the law now provides for a
choice between execution by lethal injection or by gas asphyxiation. 2
Finally, the Committee has not hesitated to request interim
measures of protection in many capital cases placed before it for
consideration under the Optional Protocol, The basis for requests of stays
of execution is Rule 86 of the Committee's rules of procedure, which
provides that a state party may be asked not to take measures which would
cause irreparable harm to the petitioner. Since the spring of 1987,
numerous requests for stays of execution have been addressed to states
parties in capital cases, occasionally in urgent situations in which the
execution of the petitioner was scheduled within hours. Mechanisms have
been devised by the Committee's Secretariat to process and transmit such
requests as quickly as the situation warrants. The Committee has been
careful to add that a request for interim measures does not imply, in any
way, a determination of the admissibility or the merits of the
communication. Thus, if consideration of a case is concluded with an
inadmissibility decision or a merits decision finding no violation of the
Covenant, the State party may in principle proceed with the execution.
States parties have displayed a commendably high degree of
compliance with the Committee's requests for stays of execution.
Requests under Rule 86 have been issued in approximately 150
communications involving the death penalty since 1987; in all but two
cases have stays of execution been granted by the states parties concerned.
In one instance concerning Trinidad and Tobago, the petitioner was
30. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., Communication No. 469/1991 (Charles Ch. Ng v.
Canada), Views adopted on 5 Nov. 1993, para. 16.2-16.4.
31. Appendix B. to Views on communication No. 469/1991, supra note 30.
32. Execution by cyanide gas asphyxiation was held to be unconstitutional in Fierro v.
Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996).
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executed despite a request for a stay of execution transmitted to the State
party authorities one day prior to the scheduled execution. Apprised of the
matter, the Committee plenary decided to schedule a public hearing on the
issue; 33 it expressed its indignation over the state party's failure to comply
with the request under rule 86 and adopted an unprecedented decision to
this effect, which was published in the Committee's Annual Report.34
In the second case of non-compliance during the summer of 1996,
concerning Guyana, the confidentiality of the proceedings was similarly
waived. While this procedural device obviously cannot help the victim, it
does have its use for future cases: no state party likes to see itself
criticized or placed on what amounts to a black list in public documents of
the United Nations General Assembly. On balance, the application of
rules on interim measures of protection has been efficient and prevented
many executions from being carried out. It might be added here that in
many of the capital cases from Caribbean States examined by the
Committee, to which the tenor of the judgment of November 2, 1993 of
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council applies, namely that death
sentences should be commuted to life imprisonment if the appellate process
has not been completed in five years, the request for interim measures of
protection under rule 86 of the Committee's rules of procedure has the
effect of carrying the complainants beyond the five-year threshold while
their case is pending before the Committee, thus providing a ground for
commutation.35
Since 1991, the Committee has endeavored to follow up on all
those final decisions in which it found violations of the ICCPR, so as to
improve the record of states parties' compliance with its recommendations.
In numerous capital punishment cases in which the Committee concluded
that the State party had violated the complainant's right to a fair trial, it
recommended the author's release; in other cases, notably where judicial
proceedings were deemed unduly prolonged in violation of article 14,
paragraph 38, of the ICCPR, it recommended the commutation of the
death sentence. It is interesting to note that it was the death penalty cases
decided since 1989 which incited the Committee to establish what might be
termed a follow up fact-finding capacity for the Committee's Special
33. Consideration of complaints under the Optional Protocol normally takes place in closed
session, and on the basis of the parties written submissions. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 63, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994).
34. Id. at 70.
35. It is clear that the procedure under the Optional Protocol can be abused by
complainants simply with a view to carrying them beyond this five-year threshold-this has been
pointed out by some States parties to the Optional Protocol and was discussed in a working paper
prepared for the Committee's 57th session in July 1996 (not made public).
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Rapporteur for the follow-up on Views. This procedure is designed to
facilitate a dialogue between the Committee and state party authorities,
with a view to ultimately improving any given state party's compliance
with the Committee's recommendations.
The first such follow-up mission took place in Jamaica in June
1995. During his mission, the Special Rapporteur for the follow-up on
Views thoroughly discussed the status of implementation of Views adopted
in respect of Jamaica with highlevel government and law enforcement
officials and representatives of the judiciary. He was informed of the
constitutional and legal constraints which had made it difficult to
implement the Committee's recommendations fully.36  Nonetheless, a
number of death sentences had recently been commuted. The facilitation
of this type of follow-up dialogue is in itself a novel and welcome
development. If it further facilitates implementation of the Committee's
recommendations and results in the commutation of sentences and/or the
release of convicted prisoners, the quasi-judicial nature of the Optional
Protocol procedure will be enhanced significantly.
III. CONCLUSION
The preceding sections demonstrate that in spite of the
permissibility of the death penalty under article 6 of the Covenant, the
Human Rights Committee has used both the reporting and the Optional
Protocol procedure in an endeavor to significantly limit states parties'
resort to capital punishment. The Committee has necessarily done so in a
circumspect way - this is only natural, given that many states (and indeed
most states parties to the Covenant) retain capital punishment, and that the
trend towards abolition is slow and perhaps not even irreversible, as the
re-introduction of the death penalty by some states in recent years shows.
But the Committee has formulated such an impressive number of
procedural safeguards which must be observed before a capital sentence
can be imposed and executed that many states parties stop and pause to
reflect before imposing the ultimate punishment.
In some instances, the Committee's comments under article 40 of
the ICCPR or its recommendations in decisions adopted under the Optional
Protocol have sparked national debates on the desirability of the
maintenance or the abolition of the death penalty. If, in the process,
states' parties also realize that the imposition and execution of capital
sentences seldom fulfills the objective of deterrence, the Committee will
have -made a major contribution.
36. See Annual Report, supra note 4.
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS: PANEL ON
INTERNAL CONFLICTS
John R. Crook*
Welcome. The purpose of our panel this morning is to look at
some difficult questions related to nature and the role of international law
applicable in non-international conflicts. Most of the world's conflicts
today are not international. They take place within the boundaries of a
single state. They often involve contests between the authorities of a state
and other groups who seek power, or between armed groups that do not
necessarily function under state authority. Consider some recent cases:
Rwanda, Afghanistan, Angola, Liberia, Chechnya, and Somalia. The list
could go on.
Particular circumstances vary widely, but these situations are often
marked by great violence and brutality on all sides. Violence is often
deliberately directed against civilians, prisoners, cultural sites, and other
types of persons or property that would be protected by the law of war in
international conflicts.
The reason for organizing this panel is my strong belief that
international law does not now play an effective role in restraining these
conflicts. There are many reasons for this. I hope we will talk about
some of these here. I hope the panel will also have some practical
suggestions about what can be done. I will sketch a bit of the legal
background and then introduce our panelists.
The most familiar text applicable in all non-international armed
conflicts is article 3, common to each of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.'
Common article 3 provides that "in the case of armed conflict not of an
international character occurring in the territory" of a party to one of the
Geneva Conventions, each party to the conflict shall observe certain
minimum standards. Persons who take no active part in hostilities must be
treated humanely: murder and torture are banned, there must be no
* Assistant Legal Adviser, United Nations Affairs, Department of State. The views and
opinions expressed are those of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect the position of the
Department of State or of the United States Government.
1. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
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summary executions, and so on. By its terms, article 3 seems to apply to
both sides, even those that do not represent a State. But there is a
threshold legal question whether a particular situation constitutes an armed
conflict triggering common article 3. And, clearly, common article 3 is
not being applied in many situations where it ought to be.
Then there is protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Protocol II was designed to lay down standards of conduct in civil war
situations, but its threshold of application is high. It applies only to armed
conflicts between national armed forces and "dissident armed forces or
other organized armed groups" that have command structures, that control
territory, and that can carry out "sustained and concerted military
operations." Protocol II has been applied in a few situations; perhaps our
panelists will have something to say about its strengths and weaknesses.
Finally, there is human rights law, both customary and
conventional. However, human rights law is subject to a variety of
possible qualifications or derogation in conflict situations.
We have a distinguished and experienced panel to discuss these
issues today. Ambassador Michael J. Matheson is the Acting Legal
Adviser of the Department of State. He was a leading figure in developing
the mandates of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Recently, he led the United States delegation
that successfully negotiated a protocol strengthening the land mine
provisions of the Weapons Convention. Mike will give a short overview
from his perspective of a senior United States' government lawyer.
Dr. Luke Lee of the Department of State's Refugee and Migration
Bureau has done a great deal of work on the special problems of protection
of displaced persons, among the most vulnerable of all groups in internal
conflicts.
Professor Leslie C. Green has a long and distinguished career as a
scholar in this area. Professor Green now holds the Stockton Chair at the
Naval War College; I believe he may be the first non-United States citizen
do to so. Professor Green will address problems of enforcing the law in
these conflicts.
Our last speaker will be Professor Theodore Meron, another
leading authority in the field, known not least for his remarkable book on
the role of the law of war in Shakespeare's Henry the Fifth. Ted may talk
about current proposals to articulate a set of minimum humanitarian
standards applicable in all situations.
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LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT AND THE LAW
L. C. Green
The term low-intensity conflict is relatively new in military and
political language and is employed more or less synonymously with non-
international conflict, especially when such a conflict becomes of
international concern. The rubric non-international conflict itself is a
refined term for what were formerly known as revolutions or civil wars,
particularly when these have developed into major operations with the
likelihood or reality of atrocities being committed against non-combatants,
whether civilians or those hors de combat, a fact that is often more
common in non-international than international conflicts, especially when
ideological, ethnic, or religious differences are in issue. It is for this
reason that it must be borne in mind that the term low-intensity has no
relation to the severity or violence of the conflict. It is a term used to
indicate that the conflict is not between recognized states nor that any
major power is directly involved.
According to the classical writers and generally accepted
customary international law these conflicts were outside the purview of
international law since they were regarded as being totally within the
domestic jurisdiction of the state in which they were being waged.
Nevertheless, even Grotius, who regarded war as being limited to an
engagement between sovereign states by way of their armed forces,'
conceded that if an over-mighty prince so ill-treated his subjects that they
were compelled to rise up against his rule, other princes had a legal right,
and perhaps were even under a duty, to come to the assistance of those
subjects and even displace the prince against whom they were revolting. 2
It must be recognized, however, that such intervention might well be little
more than a cover for predatory activity by the savior, intent upon adding
the territory in question to his own. Even so, it was generally considered
that such intervention could only take place in the most exceptional of
* C.M., LL.B., LL.D., F.R.S.C.; Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law,
U.S. Naval War College; University Professor Emeritus and Honorary Professor of Law,
University of Alberta.
1. GROITUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS Lib. III, Cap. III, §§1, 4 (1625).
2. Id. at Lib. II, Cap. XX, § XL.
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circumstances since, as indicated by Vattel,3 all states were equal,
regardless of their size, so that no prince possessed jurisdiction over the
acts of another.
It was not only classical writers who recognized that in extreme
circumstances intervention might be legitimate when all humanitarian
principles as then understood were being infringed. In the Middle Ages,
princes were issuing codes of conduct for the behavior of their soldiery
even though, to a very great extent, the campaigns in which they were
involved were internal and dynastic rather than international. Thus, as
early as 1385 Richard II of England issued orders concerning the rights of
justice of commanders over their own men,' and by the fifteenth century
such military codes tended to forbid pillage and the destruction of private
property as well as postulating respect for monasteries and priests, women,
children, the infirm, and others, and had developed sufficiently even for
Shakespeare to have Fluellen, in Henry V, refer to a law of armes.6
It is often said that the first war crimes trial was that conducted by
representatives of a group of Hanseatic cities against Peter of Hagenbach
at Breisach in 1474.1 In fact, the conflict in which Hagenbach's offenses
were committed was a non-international conflict waged by some of the
inhabitants of territory controlled by the Count of Anjou who were seeking
their independence. In the course of suppressing their revolt, Hagenbach
committed a number of atrocities which would now be classified as crimes
against humanity and which the tribunal condemned as contrary to the laws
of man and of God.
What may be described as the first modern statement providing a
code of law for the behavior of the military was drawn up by Professor
Lieber of Columbia College and promulgated by President Lincoln for the
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 1863,1 which was
to a great extent the outcome of his concerns during the Civil War:
3. VATIrEL, Introduction to LE DROIT DES GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA LoI NATURELLE §
18 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie 1916) (1758): ("Strength or weakness counts for
nothing. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant is; a small Republic is no less a sovereign State
than the most powerful Kingdom.")
4. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS app. II, at 1412 (reprint 1986).
5. Estatuz et custumes 'ost, in 1 BLACK BOOK OF ADMIRALTY 453-54 (Twiss ed., reprint
1985) (1871).
6. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY THE FIFTH act 4, sc. 7.
7. See, e.g., Gerorg Schwarzenberger, The Law of Armed Conflict, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
LAW ch. 39 (1988).




Ever since the beginning of our present War, it has
appeared clearer and clearer to me, that the President
ought to issue a set of rules and definitions providing for
the most urgent cases, occurring under the Laws and
Usages of War, and on which our Articles of War are
silent. 9
While the Lieber Code is intended to apply to American forces
whenever and wherever they may be engaged, it has been pointed out that
The first section of the Code [Arts. 1-30, 'Martial Law,
Military Jurisdiction, Military Necessity, Retaliation']
appears on the whole to be ill organized and less
convincing than it might have been had Lieber followed
the plan of organization he had used in his previous
lectures and writings. The sources of this section of the
Code are, however, unmistakable - a quarter century of
Lieber's thought modified to some degree in the light of
the practice of the United States, particularly as concerned
military occupation and relationships with the Confederate
forces during the Civil War.,
It is not necessary to specify the conduct which Lieber considered
to be contrary to the law of war, nor the fact that his hope that it would
form the basis for similar codes to be adopted by the European powers"
soon came to fruition.' 2 What is important is that it was applied during the
Civil War and enforced against those guilty of breaches. Perhaps the most
significant instance of enforcement of the law during this particular non-
international conflict was the trial of Wirz in 1865. '1 The charges against
him were similar to those later brought against the Nazi war criminals at
the end of World War II, and arose out of atrocities committed allegedly
on his orders or as a result of orders conveyed by him against Northern
prisoners. Already in this conflict we see a military tribunal guided by its
Judge Advocate to apply the rules concerning superior orders and
9. Letter to General Halleck, Nov. 13, 1862, in Baxter, "The First Modem Codification
of the Law of War," 3 INT'L REV. RED X 1963, No. 25, 171 (offprint, p. 12), (quoting FRANCIS
LIEBER FRIEDEL, NINETEENTH CENTURY LIBERAL 331 (1947)).
10. BAXTER, supra note 9, at 23.
11. Letter to General Halleck, in THOMAS E. HOLLAND, THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND 72
(1908).
12. Id. at 72-73.
13. H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 23, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1867).
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command responsibility which were later established in relation to an
international conflict:
With what detestation must civilized nations regard that
government whose conduct has been such as characterized
by this pretended confederacy. An ordinary
comprehension of natural right, the faintest desire to act on
principles of common justice, would have dictated some
humane action, would have extorted from some official a
recognition of international rules of conduct . . . . It was
not . . . ignorance of the law; it was the intrinsic
wickedness of a few desperate leaders, seconded by
mercenary and heartless monsters, of whom the prisoner
before you is a fair type . . . . It is urged that during all
this time [Wirz] was under General Winder's' 4 orders . . .
15
A superior officer cannot order a subordinate to do an
illegal act, and if a subordinate obeys such an order and
disastrous consequences result then both the superior and
the subordinate must answer for it. General Winder could
no more command the prisoner to violate the laws of war
than could the prisoner do so without orders. The
conclusion is plain, that where such orders exist both are
guilty .... Strongly as it may strike you that strict justice
would require the punishment of the arch-conspirator
himself ... you cannot stop the course of justice or refuse
to brand [the accused's] guilt as the law and evidence
direct .... [The accused] executed the bloody work with
an industry which was almost superhuman and with a
merriment which would have shamed a demon ....
There could be no collision where the subordinate was
only anxious to surpass an incomparable superior .... If
[the accused] still answer that, admitting the facts charged,
he did these things in the exercise of authority lawfully
14 Winder was Provost Marshal of the Confederacy.
15. See, e.g., L.C. GREEN, SUPERIOR ORDERS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1976); Command Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 319 (1995); Y. DINSTEIN, THE DEFENCE OF 'OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR
ORDERS' IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965); NiCO KAIJZER, MILITARY OBEDIENCE (1978).
16. He had apparently stated that he would "dance on the grave of every Yankee." Wall
v. Mcnamara, 1 Term Rep. 536 (1779).
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conferred upon him .... I answer him in the language of
Lord Mansfield .... ' 7
In trying the acts done by military officers in the exercise
of their duty . . . great latitude ought to be allowed, and
they ought not to suffer for a slip of form, if their intention
appears, by the evidence to have been upright .... [T]he
principal inquiry to be made . . . is, how the heart stood,
and if there appears to be nothing wrong'8 there, great
latitude will be allowed for misapprehension or mistake.
But if the heart is wrong, if cruelty, malice, and
oppression appear to have occasioned or aggravated the
imprisonment, or other injury complained of, they shall
not cover themselves with the thin veil of legal forms, or
escape, under the cover of a justification the most
technically regular, from that punishment which it is your
province and your duty to inflict on so scandalous an abuse
of public trust. 9
In fact, the tribunal decided that the crimes alleged against Wirz
were so outrageous that a pardon which had apparently been extended to
him was considered to be null and void. This decision indicates that as
early as the American Civil War it was recognized that the laws and
customs of war, derived from the Lieber Code and the generally accepted
rules relating to armed conflict going back to feudal times,2 were
applicable in a non-international conflict and could be used to punish
offenses considered unacceptable by a civilized force.
While accepting that they had no right to intervene in civil wars,
third states claimed the right to secure observance of the law even during a
non-international conflict when their own interests were damaged. Thus,
during the Spanish Civil War a number of European and Mediterranean
Powers adopted the Nyon Agreement 2' directed against unknown
submarines which were attacking merchant vessels legitimately trading
with the Spanish government. In this case the law was enforced not
17. Id.
18. Cp. Israeli decision in Malinki v. Chief Prosecutor, (ISR. MI. CT. APP. 1959),
reprinted and translated in Karf Qassem: A Civilian Massacre, 2 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L LAW 69
(1985).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., MAURICE H. KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES
(1965); CONTAMINE, WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES 270-77, (1984).
21. Nyon Agreement, 181 L.N.T.S. 137; Schindler and Toman, supra note 8, at 88.
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against the parties to the conflict, but the officially unidentified powers
whose vessels were indulging in these unlawful attacks against neutral
shipping.
Perhaps the first attempt to provide an international instrument
with relevance to non-international conflicts was the Genocide Convention
of 1948.22 This created a new crime in international law, that is to say an
offense defined by international law, imposing an obligation upon the
parties to enact legislation for its prevention and punishment.
Genocide embraces a number of specified acts intended to destroy,
in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such,
and may be committed in both peace and war. While during an
international conflict the intent of each belligerent is to destroy or disable
as many of the personnel of the adverse part as possible, because they are
personnel of that party and thus an identifiable group, the fact that an
international conflict is involved tends to render this type of destruction
lawful, provided the generality of the laws and customs of war are
observed. In a non-international conflict, particularly as experienced since
1945, there is often evidence of atrocities intentionally directed against a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such, and the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia with its ethnic cleansing is a clear example of this in
operation.
Unfortunately, the method of enforcement envisaged by the
Convention is somewhat ineffective. Genocide is not a crime that is
capable of being committed by an individual acting on his own. Since it is
directed at an identifiable group, it is almost certainly to be carried out as
part of state policy and this is where the difficulty becomes evident. Until
such time as there is an international tribunal with jurisdiction over this
offense, it is punishable only in the courts of the state in which it has been
committed.Y To the extent that it is state policy, it is unlikely that the local
authorities will be prepared to take the steps necessary to try and punish
those of its leaders who have instituted the policy. In so far as it has been
committed during a non-international conflict, trials may well be instituted
by the government of those of its opponents who have committed this
crime, or by the revolutionary authority if it should capture governmental
representatives responsible or, more likely, if it has succeeded in its
endeavors, in which case it is likely to try the former rulers for any
number of offenses which they may well describe as genocide.
More directly concerned with providing legal principles to operate
during non-international conflicts are the 1949 Geneva Conventions
22. G.A. Res. 260 (III); Schindler and Toman, supra note8, at 231.
23. G.A. Res. 260 (III), at art. 6.
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relating to humanitarian law during war.2 Article 2 common to the four
Conventions makes it clear that they are intended for inter-state situations.
However, there is a new principle introduced by Article 3, which is to be
found equally in each of the Convention. By this, in the event
of an armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply,
as a minimum . . . [to] persons taking no part in the
hostilities, including members of armed forces who have
laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause
[certain minimum rights to ensure that they] shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex,
birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
The four Conventions include an obligation for parties to inform
each other of the laws they adopt to ensure their application, while those
on prisoners of war and civilians impose a further obligation "to provide
penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any
of the grave breaches" defined therein. However, the definition of grave
breaches does not overlap the minimal rights detailed in Article 3. But to
the extent that there is such overlap, it might be contended that, even in a
non-international conflict in the territory of one of the contracting parties,
the legislation would operate to penalize such breaches. It must be noted,
however, that Article 3 makes it clear that its provisions "shall not affect
the legal status of the Parties to the conflict." This means that the
governing authority of the territory concerned retains the right to treat its
opponents as traitors or terrorists and subject them to the full rigors of the
law as established in national legislation, even though this might be less
than envisaged in Article 3.
Whatever lacunae regarding enforcement this may lead to, the
situation has been remedied somewhat by developments in the field of
human rights and recognition of crimes against humanity, which must not
be confused with breaches of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
or either of the two Covenants, none of which imposes an enforceable
24. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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obligation upon the parties. However, constant reiteration in United
Nations documents, together with assertions of their significance by both
writers and states, as well as reference to them in World Court judgments,
leads to the conclusion that these amount to opinio juris ac necessitatis and
constitute either customary international law or general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations.75
More important than any of these documents is the concept of
crimes against humanity. This was first postulated as black letter law in
the London Charter establishing the International Military Tribunal for the
Prosecution of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis at
Nuremberg. 26 While it is true that this was formulated2 for the purposes of
the Tribunal and to deal with such offenses as had been committed during
the Holocaust and the Nazi occupation of Europe, the concept has been
greatly widened. There is much to be said in favor of adopting the view
expressed in its Interim Reportn by the Commission of Experts appointed
by the Security Council to investigate the alleged atrocities committed
during the civil war in Rwanda.
If the normative content of "crimes against humanity" had
remained frozen in its Nuremberg form, then it could not
possibly apply to the situation in Rwanda that existed ...
because there was not a "war" in the classic sense of an
inter-state or international armed conflict. 29
However, the normative content of "crimes against
humanity" - originally employed by the Nuremberg
Tribunal for its own specific purposes in connection with
the Second World War - has undergone substantial
evolution since the end of the Second World War.30
"[C]rimes against humanity" as a normative concept finds
its very origins in "principles of humanity" first invoked in
the early 1800s by a state to denounce another state's
25. Statute of International Court of Justice art. 38.
26. London Charter, 82 U.N.T.S. 280 (1945); Schindler and Toman, supra note8, at 911.
27. G.A. Res., art. 6(c). See also at Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 178, 205 (1946).
28. S.C. Doc. S/1994/1125, Oct. 4, 1994.
29. Id. at para. 113.
30. Id. at para. 114.
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human rights violations of its own citizens.,, Thus,
"crimes against humanity as a juridical category was
conceived early on to apply to individuals regardless as to
whether or not the criminal act was perpetrated during a
state of armed conflict or not and regardless of the
nationality of the perpetrator or victim. 32
Secondly, the content and legal status of the norm since
Nuremberg has been broadened and expanded through
certain international instruments adopted by the United
Nations since 1945. In particular, the Genocide
Convention of 1948 affirms the legal validity of some of
the normative content of "crimes against humanity" as
conceived in article 6 (c) of the Nuremberg Charter, but
does not overtake it. The International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid33 .
refers in article 1 to apartheid as a "crime against
humanity. "-1
Thirdly, the Commission of Experts on [crimes in] the
former Yugoslavia . . . has stated 3 that it considered
crimes against humanity to be: "gross violations of
fundamental rules of humanitarian and human rights law
committed by persons demonstrably linked to a party to
the conflict, as part of an official policy based on
discrimination against an identifiable group of persons,
irrespective of war and the nationality of the victim." This
view finds support in the writings of publicists.
31. See, e.g., Green, International Law and the Control of Barbarism, in Macdonald et al.,
The Role of Law in the International Behavior, 17 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 149 (1987).
32. Id. at para. 115.
33. The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 50. It should be noted that not all the major powers have ratified
this instrument.
34. S.C. Doc. S/1994/1125, Oct. 4, 1994 at para. 116.
35. This quotation seems to have been take from the Interim Report since this wording
does not appear in the Commission's Final Report, U.N. SCDOC.S/1994/674 (1994), but it
forms a summary of paragraphs 84-6 of that Report.
36. S.C. Doc. S/1994/1125, Oct. 4, 1994 at para. 117.
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Although there is a tendency among them to consider that many of the
crimes against humanity committed in a non-international conflict do not
need to be discriminatory and directed at any particular group. 3 7
The Commission of Experts on Rwanda [likewise]
considers that "crimes against humanity" are gross
violations of fundamental rules of humanitarian and human
rights law committed by persons demonstrably linked to a
party to the conflict, as part of an official policy based on
discrimination against an identifiable group of persons
irrespective of war and the nationality of the victim .... 38
By this reiteration of the concept of discrimination, the two
Commissions seem to have made it clear that genocide, which is
essentially a discriminatory offense, is in fact a crime against humanity
hardly a necessary undertaking. The philosophy required to bring the
concept of crimes against humanity into line with current thought cannot
be argued with, in which case, provided the necessary tribunal exists,
there would be little difficulty in asserting that such crimes committed
during non-international conflicts are amenable to criminal prosecution.
Since it is generally accepted that war crimes are subject to universal
jurisdiction and there is a somewhat similar approach developing, if not
already existing, with regard to crimes against humanity, it would lead to
the conclusion that such offenses can be tried in any state in which an
offender is found. The two ad hoc tribunals established in connection with
crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda enjoy concurrent jurisdiction
with such national tribunals, although the latter must give way to the
claims of the former should these be lodged, as has. in fact already ensued
as between Germany and the Yugoslav tribunal and Tanzania and that for
Rwanda. In addition, a Spanish judge has ruled that the torture and
disappearance of Spanish nationals in Argentina during the dirty war in
that country, a clear non-international or low-intensity conflict, amount to
crimes against humanity grounding jurisdiction in Spain and imposing an
obligation on all countries to recognize any warrant for arrest issued in
respect of the alleged offenders. Moreover, a French court has sentenced
Captain Alfredo Astiz of the Argentine Navy to life imprisonment for
murdering two French nuns in 1977. However, the Argentine Under-
37. In fact, it was not the Tribunal which established the nature of crimes against
humanity, but the Charter setting up the Tribunal which resulted in this interpretation. The Role
of Law in Establishing Norms of International Behavior, in THE RULE OF LAW IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 239 (1978).
38. U.N. SCDOC.s/1994/674 (1994).
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Secretary for Human Rights has made it clear that the Argentine
Government will not cooperate in any way in regard to allegations against
any Argentine subject charged with offenses during this particular low-
intensity conflict, since "a foreign court has no jurisdiction over events
that took place on Argentine soil. 39 This does not mean, however, that
any state in which such Argentine citizens may be found is prevented from
recognizing the validity of an attempt by an accusing state to obtain the
extradition of such accused by giving effect to such an international
warrant or proceed to try the accused itself by exercising universal
jurisdiction in respect of alleged crimes against humanity.
The most important developments in the law concerning non-
international conflicts were effected by the 1977 Protocols annexed to the
1949 Geneva Conventions.40 Protocol I introduces a most fundamental
change in the law of armed conflict. So long as an internal conflict is
directed towards self-government, the Protocol provides for its recognition
as an international conflict governed by the Conventions and the Protocol,
as well as the ordinary law regarding international armed conflicts. By
article 1(4), an armed conflict includes one:
in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the
exercise of their right of self-determination as enshrined in
the Charter of the United Nations4' and the Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations.42
However, in the practice of the United Nations not all conflicts in
which one of the parties claims to be seeking self-determination fall within
the framework of this provision. To qualify as a national liberation
movement so engaged, the entity making the claim must be recognized as
such by the regional organization in the area in which it is operating. This
would exclude the various guerrilla movements of Latin America, none of
39. Marlise Simons, Unforgiving Spain Pursues Argentine Killers, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24,
1996, at Al.
40. Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Geneva Convention].. Schindler and
Toman, supra note 7, at 621, 689.
41. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1. "The purposes of the United Nations are... (2) To develop
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples,. " See also U.N. CHARTER, art. 73(b).
42. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. (1970).
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which is recognized by the Organization of American States, and which
movements in any case are revolutionary groups seeking to replace the
local government rather than to overthrow domination, alien occupation or
a racist regime. Equally, the Irish Republican Army, though it claims to
be seeking self-determination from alien occupation, is not so recognized
by either the Council of Europe or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
the members of which regard the movement as being terrorist.
The same denial is extended to, for example, the struggle by the
people of Chechniya seeking to break away from Russia; the various
Kurdish groups trying by force of arms to separate from their various
rulers; or the Sikhs aiming to establish a State of Kalistan distinct from
India. Each of these claims to be fighting for self-determination, but none
of them is accepted as a national liberation movement, nor regarded as
falling within the scope of article 1(4) of Protocol I.
Moreover, the Protocol and the Conventions do not come into
force automatically as they do with an international armed conflicts . 4
Instead, by article 96(3) of the Protocol the authority representing the
"people engaged against a High Contracting Party" must make a unilateral
declaration of adhesion and compliance, sent to the Swiss government as
depositary, undertaking to apply the Conventions and the Protocol during
the conflict. While this entails:
the Conventions and the Protocol [being] brought into
force for the said authority as a Party to the conflict with
immediate effect [with that] authority assum[ing] the same
rights and obligations as those which have been assumed
by a High Contracting Party ... and the Conventions and
Protocol [becoming] equally binding upon all the Parties to
the conflict"
the Protocol is silent as to the position if the governing authority has failed
to ratify the Protocol or refuses to consider the national liberation
movement as anything but a band of traitors. Moreover, its right to do so
seems to be confirmed by article 4 of the Protocol for "the application of
the Conventions and of the Protocol ... shall not affect the legal status of
the Parties to the conflict ... "
However, both parties would still be bound by the minimum
conditions of humanitarian law, leaving it open, should that possibility
arise, for the partisans of either to be tried for genocide or crimes against
43. Geneva Conventions, supra note 40, art. 3(1).
44. Protocol I, supra note 33, at art. 96.
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humanity, especially in the light of the widened interpretation given to the
concept of crimes against humanity already mentioned.
Should all the requirements in article 96 be satisfied, with the
governing authority equally bound, both the national liberation movement
and its opponent would become subject to all the provisions of the
Conventions and Protocol including those relating to grave breaches. In
addition, since such a conflict is now regarded as equivalent to an
international armed conflict the laws and regulations, both customary and
conventional, governing such a conflict would be operative, thus
subjecting the members of both antagonists to any prosecution and
punishment for war crimes that they might commit, including those
relating to command responsibility or superior orders.
At present, with the vastly reduced number of colonial territories
awaiting liberation, there are few areas which may be truly regarded as
satisfying the conditions of article 1(4) with regard to self-determination.
In the future, there is likely to be a proliferation of situations which were
formerly regarded as civil wars or revolutions, thus reducing the possible
significance of article 1(4), and the fact that the revolutionary authority
describes itself as a national liberation movement seeking self-
determination does not alter the legal position in any way.
To some extent, this type of situation is covered by Protocol II,
which seeks to extend that part of humanitarian law which serves to protect
non-combatants - a need that, in view of the ideological hatreds often
aroused in such a conflict, is often more important in a non-international
than an international armed conflict. But, acknowledging that internal
order is a matter of domestic jurisdiction, the scope of Protocol II is
somewhat limited. In the first place, the Protocol does not apply "to
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature, as not being
armed conflicts,""5 even though the armed forces whether regular or in the
form of some national guard are needed to suppress them and restore
governmental authority. Second, the threshold for operation of the
Protocol is even higher than that required to bring article 1(4) of Protocol I
into operation. For Protocol II to apply, the conflict must be between
governmental armed forces "and dissident armed forces or other organized
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a
part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted
military operations and to implement this Protocol." 46
45. Protocol II, supra note 40, at art. 1(2).
46. Protocol I, supra note 40, at art. 1(1).
5051997]
506 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
Protocol I does not require that the national liberation movement
waging its war for self-determination be in control of any part of the
national territory. It would suffice if all operations are directed from
outside such territory so long as the conditions of article 96 are complied
with. For Protocol II, however, the threshold is such that the Protocol
cannot really come into operation until the conflict takes on the form of a
civil war somewhat similar to that waged in Spain between the Republican
government and the Nationalist authorities. For the dissidents merely to
declare no go areas, as the Irish Republican Army tends to do, is
insufficient.
Another failing of the Protocol is that it prescribes no method for
its implementation and is silent on enforcement. Nor is there any
provision as to breaches or their punishment, nor even to any obligation
upon a governing authority to take steps to ensure that the humanitarian
principles embodied therein are observed. Presumably, however, the
reference in the article to the dissidents being under responsible command
suggests that, to the extent that any liability might arise, some measure of
command responsibility does in fact exist. While Protocol I calls upon the
parties to disseminate and educate both the military and civilian
populations, 7 article 19 of Protocol II merely states "[t]his Protocol shall
be disseminated as widely as possible." In fact, when at Geneva during
the drafting of the Protocol it was suggested that there should be a
provision similar to that in Protocol I, the representative of one South
American country, where revolutionary activity has not been rare, made it
clear that there was no way his government would agree to any suggestion
that it was obliged to inform its population as to what its rights might be in
the event of an attempt by that population to resort to force aimed at the
overthrow of the government.
To some extent this view finds some support in article 3 of the
Protocol, a provision relating to state sovereignty which is somewhat wider
than that to be found in Protocol I:
1. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the
purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the
responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means,
to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to
defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the
State.
47. Id. at art. 83.
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2. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a
justification for intervening, directly or indirectly, for any
reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or
external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the
territory of which that conflict occurs. 8
There is no indication in the Protocol as to what is meant by all
legitimate means open to the governing authority to maintain its position.
Since silence cannot be construed as imposing any limitation on a
sovereign's freedom of action,' 9 this leaves it open to that authority to
apply any means, under its national law - and this is traditionally not open
to third party criticism - which it may consider necessary to achieve its
purpose. Further, since the Protocol is an international instrument
between states, it only confers rights upon the parties thereto. If a party to
the Protocol involved in a non-international conflict were to ignore the
provisions of Protocol II, the only rights arising in respect of that breach
are the normal rights attending a breach of treaty, and, as the World Court
has indicated, while a state may have the competence to bring an action, it
can only succeed if it has itself suffered damage as a result of the breach.1
Virtually all states in the modern world are parties to human rights
instruments or have declared adherence to the principles embodied in such
documents, and there has been constant reiteration of their significance in
resolutions adopted by both the General Assembly and the Security
Council, as well as other international organs, sufficient to maintain that
these principles now amount to customary law and perhaps even jus
cogens.5' This means that, regardless of any obligations that might arise
from Protocol II, there are certain obligations binding upon the parties
engaged in a non-international conflict. Further, since the Protocol is
additional to the 1949 Conventions, to which almost all states are party,
the minimum rights embodied in article 3 of those agreements operate
whatever be the position concerning Protocol II. Finally, it should be
borne in mind that much of Protocol II is little more than a reaffirmation of
the basic principles of humanitarian law binding on all states, military
authorities, and civilian populations, breach of which would in many
instances amount to crimes against humanity. When they do, all
offenders, regardless of rank, status, or nationality, become amenable to
48. Protocol II, supra note 33, at art. 3.
49. See, e.g., S.S.Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.10; Hudson, 1934 WORLD COURT
REPORTS 1, 163.
50. South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), 1966 I.C.J. 6.
51. See, e.g., THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS
CUSTOMARY LAW (1989).
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trial by any state in the territory of which they may be found, and this is
especially so in the light of the extended interpretation now being given to
crimes against humanity.
In addition to the means of enforcing the law in non-international
or low-intensity conflicts outlined here, there is always the overriding
power of the Security Council to declare that a particular situation amounts
to a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression
calling for enforcement action under chapter VII of the Charter and
overriding the normal reservation regarding domestic jurisdiction
embodied in article 2(7) of the Charter, as may well result from the
presence of alien volunteers intervening on behalf of either the government
or the dissidents. In this regard it should be noted that there is no effective
way in which the Security Council may be held to have exceeded its
competence. 2  Moreover, in view of the new significance accorded to
respect for human rights there is strong ground for believing that such
intervention might be tolerated internationally, as it has been in some parts
of the African continent. It has even been suggested that there might be
created a standing army of African soldiers to intervene to protect civilians
threatened by the collapse of a local nation state, and where civilian
casualties are likely to be extremely high.5 3 Such a force "would not be
allowed to take sides, but would set up safe areas where civilians could be
protected. "14 However, the establishment of such a safe area and
protection of the civilians therein - hopefully more effectively than was
the case in Bosnia - would almost certainly be regarded by one of the
parties to the conflict as taking sides. Such intervention could be defended
on the ground that it did not impinge upon article 2(4) of the Charter, since
there was, theoretically at least, no threat to the territorial integrity or
political independence of the state concerned. It would nevertheless
appear that moving in because of the collapse of a nation state was in fact
a denial, however temporary, of its political independence. Determination
as to whether this is in fact so, however, would be by decision of the
Security Council, which would probably decide that, in view of the
significance of human rights, the intervention was clearly consistent with
the purposes of the United Nations, which include "respect for the
principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples," 5 the
52. See, e.g., Lockerbie Aerial Incident (Libyan Arab-Jamahirya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3,
15; see also, id. at 114, for a similar Order re Libyan request against United States.
53. See infra remarks concerning possible assumption of power on behalf of the United
Nations.
54. THE TIMES (London), 1 Sept. 1996.
55. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
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intervention having been directed to protecting the equal rights of the
civilian population and to enable the entire people to exercise its right to
self determination by way of a more acceptable administration.
In the course of its fifty years of existence the United Nations has
on a number of occasions made use of national contingents provided by
members to act as peacekeepers or interposition forces aimed at keeping
the contestants apart, but without any right to intervene, even in the event
of their witnessing acts which are clearly contrary to humanitarian law,
although this does not mean that local commanders or the states sending
them have not taken such an initiative, as the United States sought to do
without success in Somalia.
Most significant has been the reaction of the Security Council to
events consequent upon the break-up of the former Yugoslavia or
following the mysterious death of the President of Rwanda in an air crash.
After Yugoslavia broke up into a number of independent states,
conflict broke out between Serbia and Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia
Herzegovina and Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina. While these conflicts
subsisted they were clearly international armed conflicts subject to the
rules pertaining thereto. In Bosnia Herzegovina, however, dissident
ethnic/national groups made up of local Serbs and Croats took up arms
against the largely Muslim Bosnian government seeking either to establish
an independent state of their own within Bosnian territory, or with the
intention of seceding and adhering to Serbia or Croatia as the case might
be. In addition, dissident Muslim groups also took up arms against the
Bosnian government. These conflicts were clearly non-international, even
though many of the officers involved had been officers in the former
Yugoslav Army and in the earlier stages at least had received support and
arms from the Croatian and particularly Serbian governments. While such
assistance subsisted it might have been difficult to determine which
breaches of the law were committed during an international conflict
constituting war crimes, and those perpetrated during a low-intensity
conflict, and which, though they might amount to genocide or crimes
against humanity, would not fall within the normal understanding of the
rubric war crimes. When assistance from Croatia and Serbia ended, the
conflicts reverted to their status as non-international. The situation
remained under some measure of legal control however, since the
government of the former Yugoslavia had ratified the Geneva Conventions
and .the two Protocols and the governments of Croatia and Bosnia had
announced their adherence thereto. To that extent, therefore, the conflicts
were subject to those instruments, fully in the case of the international
conflicts involved and, to the extent already analyzed, to the non-
international conflicts in Bosnia as well.
1997] 509
510 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
In so far as Rwanda is concerned, there were no similar problems
of classification. There it was a simple case of the larger ethnic group, the
Tsutsis, taking up arms against the ruling minority ethnic group, the
Hutus. During this conflict extensive atrocities were committed, especially
by forces and officials owing allegiance to the overthrown Hutu
administration.
In Bosnia Herzegovina the warring parties, and particularly the
Serbs, pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing involving the expulsion of non-
Serbs from their homes and from territory under Serb control. Many of
the expelees died from starvation and exposure, while there was evidence
that massacres on a fairly large scale were being perpetrated against
expelled Muslims as a matter of policy. Even if the deaths are ignored, it
is difficult to deny that such a policy would cause, in the terminology of
the Genocide Convention, "serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group[s]" affected. Similarly, in Rwanda extensive massacres of
Tstutsis by Hutus, and vice versa, ensued, including raids on refugee
camps in neighboring countries. Such offenses were, in accordance with
the terminology of the Genocide Convention, to be tried by the authorities
of the territories in which the offenses were committed. Any such trials,
however, were more likely to be based on a demand for vengeance than a
pursuit of justice." If such acts of vengeance were to be avoided or
minimized, some means of establishing an international criminal tribunal
would have to be resorted to.
Acting on instructions from the Security Council, the Secretary
General of the United Nations established two Commissions of Inquiry to
seek out evidence of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and, in the light of
their reports, he proposed to the Council that international ad hoc tribunals
be established to try offenders and submitted a draft statute for each of two
distinct bodies. A problem soon arose concerning the competence of the
Security Council to establish such a court since the Charter is silent on the
matter. This issue of jurisdiction was raised in the case of Dusko Tadic5
the first to be charged before the Yugoslav tribunal. In the course of its
rejection of the plea, the Appeal Chamber, having ruled that the Council
would certainly have been able to establish such a tribunal to deal with
issues arising from an international conflict as being in breach of or
threatening the peace,8 continued:
56. In fact, Rwanda announced its intention to bring thousands of Hutu to trial.
57. The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 32.
58. Id., para. 30.
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But even if it were considered merely as an 'internal
armed conflict', it would still constitute a 'threat to the
peace' according to the settled practice of the Security
Council [the constitutionality of which it was beyond the
competence of the Tribunal to question] and the common
understanding of the United Nations membership in
general. Indeed, the practice of the Security Council is
rich with cases of civil or internal strife which it classified
as a 'threat to the peace' and dealt with under Chapter VII,
with the encouragement or even at the behest of the
General Assembly, such as the Congo crisis at the
beginning of the 1960s and, more recently, Liberia and
Somalia. It can thus be said that there is a common
understanding, manifested by the 'subsequent practice' of
the membership of the United Nations at large, that the
'threat to the peace' of Article 39 may include, as one of
its species, internal armed conflicts .... 9
Here we have an instance of a specially created tribunal deciding
that the organ of the United Nations establishing it possesses a power not
apparent from the text of the Charter by construing the acquiescence of the
membership as equivalent to opinio juris ac necessitatis, and perhaps even
constituting a de facto amendment of the Charter itself. The Chamber then
proceeded to find that the establishment of the Tribunal is fully within the
competence of the Council, since it:
matches perfectly the description in Article 41 of
'measures not involving the use of force.' The measures
set out in [that] Article are merely illustrative exampleswl
which obviously do not exclude other measures. All the
Article requires is that they do not involve 'the use of
force.' It is a negative definition . . . . Logically, if the
organization can undertake measures which have to be
implemented through the intermediary of its Members, it
can a fortiori undertake measures which it can implement
directly via its organs, if it happens to have the resources
to do so. It is only for want of such resources that the
United Nations has to act through its Members. But it is
of the essence of 'collective measures' that they are
collectively undertaken. Action by Member States on
59 Id.
60. Id. (italics in original).
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behalf of the Organization is but a poor substitute faute de
mieux, or a 'second best' for want of the first. This is also
the pattern of Article 42 on measures involving the flse of
armed force. In sum, the establishment of the
International Military Tribunal falls squarely within the
powers of the Security Council under Article 41 ....
The Security Council of the United Nations has resorted to
the establishment of a judicial organ in the form of an
international criminal tribunal as an instrument for the
exercise of its own principal function of maintenance of
international peace and security, i.e., as a measure
contributing to the restoration of peace in the former
Yugoslavia . . . . Article 39 leaves the choice of means
and their evaluation to the Security Council, which enjoys
wide discretionary powers in this regard, and it could not
have been otherwise, as such a choice involves political
evaluation of highly complex and dynamic situations ....
[T]he Appeals Chamber considers that the International
Tribunal has been lawfully established as a measure under
Chapter VII of the Charter.6 1
This may be considered a somewhat extensive interpretation of the
powers of the Security Council since there is nothing in the Charter to
indicate any likelihood of the Council establishing a court additional to the
International Court of Justice, although it may perhaps be contended that
since the Charter describes the Court as the "principal judicial organ of the
United Nations,"62 it leaves the way open for further tribunals to be set up.
But the World Court is a civil tribunal and there is nothing in the Charter
indicating a competence to establish criminal courts. Moreover, to
establish such a court is inconsistent with the traditional attitude of states
which has not been excessively favorable to the establishment of a tribunal
having jurisdiction to try governmental leaders and hold them personally
responsible for what may be claimed to be the illegal activities of the states
they administer.
It was also claimed that the Tribunal was not properly set up since
it was not established by law. The Appeal Chamber rejected this
contention, holding that:
The important consideration in determining whether a
tribunal has been 'established by law' is not whether it was
61. Id. at paras. 32-40.
62 U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
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pre-established or established for a specific purpose or
situation; what is important is that it be set up by a
competent organ in keeping with the relevant legal
procedure, and that it observes the requirements of
procedural fairness .... 6
This suggests that if a revolutionary authority which had not yet
created a proper legislative body established a tribunal by executive decree
with the sole object of trying the president and other members of the
overthrown administration, such a tribunal would be considered as
established by law, provided it conducted itself in accordance with
acknowledged principles of justice. We might question here, therefore,
whether the tribunal established in Angola for the trial of mercenaries 2
would be considered one established by law. Similarly, did the tribunal
envisage by article 227 of the Treaty of Versailless- to try Wilhelm II
satisfy all these conditions since it was implied that the mere constitution of
the tribunal would assure "him the guarantees essential to the right of
defense . . . [and as iun its decision the tribunal will be guided by the
highest motives of international policy, with a view to vindicating the
solemnity of international undertakings and the validity of international
morality[?]"
It is not really of major significance from the point of view of the
relevance of law to low-intensity or other non-international conflicts
whether one accepts the Tribunal's interpretation of Chapter VII of the
Charter and the competence of the Security Council thereunder. The
General Assembly has confirmed the existence of both tribunals and no
member of the United Nations has contested this. Some, in fact, have
already given effect to the obligation embodied in the relevant statute"
recognizing that, while there is concurrent jurisdiction as between the
Tribunal and national courts, the former enjoys primacy. Thus, although
German law grants jurisdiction to German courts to try those found on
German soil who may be accused of crimes against humanity, German law
was amended so that Tadic was surrendered to stand trial before the
Tribunal at The Hague. Similarly, Tanzania extradited Akeyasu so that he
might be tried by the Rwanda Tribunal.
63. Para. 45 "to Tadic case."
64. See, e.g., Green, The Status of Mercenaries in International Law, in ESSAYS ON THE
MODERN LAW OF WAR ch. 9 (1985); Lockwood, Report on the Trial of Mercenaries, 7
MANITOBA L.J. 183 (1972).
65. Treaty of Versailles, 225 Consol. Treaty Series 189 (1919).
66. Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal art. 9 (2); Statute of Rwanda Tribunal art. 8 (2).
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The various jurisdictional problems concerning the Yugoslav
Tribunal did not arise in relation to the Tribunal for Rwanda for there was
never any doubt that the conflict on that territory was anything but non-
international. Moreover, the Rwanda Tribunal was not granted
jurisdiction to try offenses against the laws and customs of war.
As to substantive issues of jurisdiction, the Yugoslav Tribunal has
jurisdiction over violations of the laws and customs of war, genocide, and
crimes against humanity. Its competence concerning the laws and customs
of war relates to incidents perpetrated during the international conflicts
occurring in the former Yugoslavia.
The Statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal indicates that violations of
the laws and customs of war
shall include, but not be limited to:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, town or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of
undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to
institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education; the
arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and
science;
(e) plunder of public or private property. 67
Except for the last two items, it is submitted that this enumeration,
together with other unspecified breaches of the laws and customs of war,
in fact constitute crimes against humanity. It may be suggested, therefore,
that it would perhaps have been better had the Statute not referred to this
collection of offenses in any way. Had this been the case, many of the
jurisdictional issues relating to the Yugoslav Tribunal might have been
averted, for, in the light of the new attitude to crimes against humanity,
there is little doubt that these crimes would now be regarded as subject to
universal jurisdiction.
67. Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, art. 3.
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As to genocide, although the Convention provides for local
jurisdiction pending the establishment of an international tribunal
possessing jurisdiction over this offense, the international tribunals, though
ad hoc and created for a limited purpose, satisfy this requirement. It may
also be argued that genocide is in fact the gravest of all crimes against
humanity and, therefore, it might have been as well that the Tribunals
should simply have been endowed with jurisdiction over crimes against
humanity and nothing else. However, in view of the universal horror
resulting from the ethnic cleansing that took place in the former
Yugoslavia and the openly inter-tribal massacres perpetrated in Rwanda, 61
it was probably considered useful to indicate that genocide was so
horrendous a crime as to warrant specific condemnation, rather than
simply to include it in the generality of crimes against humanity.
Both Statutes, confirming the accepted practice with regard to
crimes against international law, particularly those committed during
conflict, confirmed that the status of an accused would not provide
immunity 9 and that individual responsibility would attach to anyone
planning, instigating, ordering, or aiding and abetting in the planning or
preparation of crimes within the tribunal's jurisdiction, as well as to any
superior who knew or had reason to know that a subordinate was about to
commit any crime within the tribunal's jurisdiction and who failed to take
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the
perpetrators, while at the same time it was made clear that superior orders
could not be pleaded by way of defense.o
The issue of competence in the case of the Yugoslav Tribunal with
regard to crimes against humanity was really beyond question, once it was
decided that the Security Council could establish it. The tribunal had no
option but to try those charged with such crimes committed in the former
Yugoslavia during those conflicts which were non-international, for article
5 of the Statute expressly conferred such jurisdiction over crimes against
humanity "when committed in armed conflict, whether international or
internal in character, and directed against the civilian population." As
regards its general competence, article 1 provided that it "shall have the
power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of
68. During the trial for genocide of Jean-Marie Akayesu, defense counsel cited the killing
of at least one million, the prosecution claimed that 800,000 of these were Tsutsis, while the
defense contended that "800,000 Hutus and 200,000 moderate Tsutsis have been killed in the
1994 massacres rather than the other way around." THE TIMES (London), Sept. 1, 1996, at 27.
69. Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal art. 7 (2); Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal art. 6 (2).
70. Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, art. 7(1), (3), (4); Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal,
art. 6 (1), (3), (4).
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international humanitarian law committed in the former Yugoslavia since
1991 . . ." and international humanitarian law includes grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I, war crimes in the traditional
sense, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
Many of the persons indicted by the Yugoslav Tribunal, including
Tadic, Radic, Mladic, and Karadzic were charged with offenses which
involved both personal as well as command responsibility. Among the
charges leveled against Mladic and Karadzic were genocide, crimes
against humanity, unlawful confinement of civilians and destruction of
sacred sites, as well as unlawful shelling of civilian cities, including
Sarajevo, together with seizure of a number of United Nations
peacekeepers and holding them as hostages. The crime of genocide can
not really be committed by a single individual acting alone, even though he
may be committing his offenses in accordance with his own discriminatory
prejudices. Nor is it likely to be initiated by a person holding inferior
rank, for it is a question of executive or command decision on a highly
sensitive policy issue. The same is true of any decision to seize and hold
hostage United Nations personnel.
The first person to appear for trial before the Rwanda Tribunal
Jean-Marie Akeyasu, was similarly charged with offenses involving
personal and command responsibility. As the former mayor of Taba, he
was charged with genocide, murder, and crimes against humanity arising
from the massacre of local Tsustis, including the killing and mutilation of
pregnant women. Overall, he was charged with prime responsibility for
what had happened. 71
Even if we ignore the existence of the two specially created
tribunals, it may probably be said that it is now well established that
crimes committed during a low-intensity or non-international armed
conflict which amount to crimes against humanity are, like war crimes
committed in an international conflict, subject to universal jurisdiction,
amenable to trial in any country wherein the offender may be found.
In so far as either of the tribunals has authorized issue of an
Indictment, that Indictment is universally valid and the named accused is
liable to arrest wherever he may be found and then handed over to the
tribunal for trial, 72 even though the members of the Implementation Force
in Bosnia appear unwilling to recognize the validity of such an instrument.
It is thus, at least theoretically, impossible for anyone so indicted to claim
asylum.
71. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1996.
72. Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, arts. 19(2) & 29; Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal,
arts. 18(2) & 28..
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Equally significant with regard to the applicability of universal
jurisdiction in respect of crimes against humanity committed during a non-
international conflict has been the decision of Judge Baltazar Garzon in
Madrid. An allegation was brought by a Spanish woman alleging that her
husband and two sons were tortured and disappeared during the dirty war
in Argentina. Judge Garzon ruled that, regardless of the Argentine
amnesty concerning such offenses and which, in any case, enjoyed no
validity in Spain, he possessed jurisdiction over cases of torture and
murder committed against Spanish citizens in Argentina during the period
of civil disturbance. In his view, these acts amounted to crimes against
humanity which were subject to universal jurisdiction, so that any warrant
he might issue would be entitled to international recognition and
enforceable universally. Similarly, in relation to the same low-intensity
conflict in Argentina, France has sentenced Captain Alfredo Astiz of the
Argentine Navy to life imprisonment for the unlawful killing of two
French nuns in 1977. It must be noted, however, that Argentina's Under-
Secretary for Human Rights has made it clear that the Argentine
Government will not cooperate in any way with such proceedings, since "a
foreign court has no jurisdiction over events that took place on Argentine
soil."1 3  But this does not mean that any person named by a state as
responsible for criminal activities amounting to crimes against humanity
during Argentina's dirty war and found outside Argentina will not be
handed over to a demanding country by the host state.
As to genocide as defined by the Convention, the lacuna
concerning jurisdiction may be filled by acknowledging that genocide is a
crime against humanity and so, regardless of the Convention
nomenclature, 74 clearly subject to universal jurisdiction.
Where war crimes are concerned, in a mixed situation involving
both international and non-international conflicts, it may well be advisable
to ignore these completely and lodge charges in accordance with the law
concerning crimes against humanity, into which category at least the more
serious war crimes would fall, and, if desired, to charge with genocide as
well. In this way, any dispute concerning the applicability of the law of
war with regard to any aspect of the conflict would be avoided, while at
the same time ensuring that any crimes which might in the course of the
73. N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 24, 1996.
74. In the case of State of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (1961/2)., the Israeli authorities
did not prosecute him for genocide as such, since the Convention, with its international
definition, was adopted after he had committed his crimes. Instead he was charged with a series
of crimes which amounted to genocide in the ordinary meaning of that term as generally
understood by the time of the trial.
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international conflict amount to war crimes or grave breaches will in
relation to the non-international conflict be equally subject to trial.
From an extra-judicial point of view other means exist for ensuring
enforcement of the law in a non-international conflict. In the first place, it
is open to the Security Council to decide, as it has done in establishing the
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, that the conflict
constitutes a breach of the peace or a threat thereto, requiring enforcement
action under chapter VII. In addition, events in Iraq following the 1991
Gulf War between that country and the Coalition forces, as well as in
Bosnia, demonstrate that, when circumstances relating to a continuance of
hostilities or denial of human rights are involved, the world community, or
groups of states acting on their own or in the name of an international
organization may decide that, for humanitarian reasons, it has become
necessary to resort to measures which would normally, or under a narrow
interpretation of the domestic jurisdiction reservation in article 2,
paragraph 7, or the injunctions in article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter5
be condemned as unwarranted intervention.
In Iraq no-fly zones were established to protect the Kurdish
minority from abuse by the Iraqi government against which it was waging
a conflict directed at securing independence. When the various Kurdish
groups fought as between themselves, and one requested aid from the Iraqi
government which aid was given, the United States, claiming to be
enforcing protection of the Kurds in accordance with Security Council
resolutions relating to the earlier invasion of Kuwait, protection of the
civilian population and the restoration and preservation of peace in the
area, unilaterally extended the no-fly area and attacked military
installations in southern Iraq, even though the operations affecting the
Kurds were taking place in the northern parts of the country.
Where Bosnia Herzegovina was concerned, an attempt was made
to stop the fighting and prepare the way for the establishment of an elected
government through the medium of arrangements set out in the General
Framework Agreement for Peace drawn up in Paris in 1995.6 The United
Nations peace-keeping force in the country was replaced by an
Implementation Force (IFOR) deployed under NATO (North Atlantic
Treaty Organization) auspices. The Force's remit was to ensure
compliance with the cease-fire by all parties and supervise the election of a
75. "All Members shall refrain in their international relations form the use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations."
76. Bosnia & Herzegovina-Croatia-Yugoslavia: General Framework Agreement for Peace
in Bosnia & Herzegovina with Annexes, Jan., 1996, 35 I.L.M. 75.
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democratic administration representing the various interests. The
contingents making up IFOR were not authorized to intervene on behalf of
the various ethnic groups, even against violence committed in their
presence, although some local commanders acting on their own initiative
did resort to protective intervention measures. Most significant, however,
was the fact that the IFOR command interpreted their task under the Paris
Agreement as precluding IFOR members from arresting persons who had
been indicted by the ad. hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia," such
persons had been accidentally come upon, as in fact happened in the case
of one intelligence officer who had been entrapped by altered road signs
which diverted him from a route described as safe. He was sent to The
Hague, but the charges against him were dropped. Some of the persons
against whom indictments have been issued have participated in
discussions with IFOR representatives concerning the application of the
Paris Agreement, but this has not been considered sufficient to warrant
their being arrested, despite the issuance by the Tribunal of internationally
valid warrants. 8
It is submitted that there is enough legal authority to enforce the
law in non-international conflicts without having recourse to any specially
created tribunals. Since virtually all the breaches committed during such a
conflict amount to crimes against humanity and frequently include
genocide, there is sufficient evidence to support the contention that all such
offenses are subject to universal jurisdiction, so that offenders may be tried
by any country in which they may be found. This is not to suggest that the
jurisprudence of the two ad hoc Tribunals which have been established is
insignificant. Their creation has been accepted by the world community,
and any problems that may have existed with regard to their
constitutionality or competence are no longer in point, for the findings in
regard thereto have equally been acquiesced in. If, therefore, any such
tribunal were established in the future, it may be accepted that no such
questions will be raised or given any weight.
77. See, e.g., case of an individual indicted by the international war crimes tribunal on
charges of gang rape and running a slave/brothel for Bosnia Serb soldiers walked into the office
of the U.N. police monitors to protest that he was being harassed by the Bosnian police, he was
given the standard complaint form to fill out. When he said he was especially upset because
while he routinely passed through NATO military checkpoints with no trouble, the Bosnian police
were trying to arrest him, he was told that his difficulty would be investigated. When
questioned, "senior officials of the U.N. police monitors said they felt no remorse at having
missed the chance to detain Mr. Stankovic, since it 'was up to his colleagues in the Serbian
police.'" N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1996.
78. Both Karadzic and Mladic fall into this category.
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As regards the precedential value of any judgments delivered by
the tribunals, whether in regard to international, non-international, or other
low-intensity conflicts, these should be granted as much authoritative
consideration as the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg. Moreover, having been created by the United Nations, rather
than by a group of victorious combatants granting jurisdiction only over
named individuals, it might even be suggested that the decisions of these
tribunals, as coming from. a less biased court, should enjoy greater
authority than is given to Nuremberg.
Furthermore, the events in Iraq and Bosnia demonstrate that,
should humanitarian considerations warrant it, intervention on behalf of an
international organization or perhaps even by a leading power, may
become acceptable even in a non-international conflict. In this connection,
reference might also be made to the possible use of extensive interpretation
of chapter XII of the Charter, 9 the concomitant creation of a replacement
for the Trusteeship Council which, after all, was considered to have
replaced the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League systems,
although it is accepted that some other term than trusteeship would have to
be found. When the governmental system of a state has disintegrated to an
extent that it is no longer possible for the national authorities to protect the
inhabitants or itself resorts to measures which in the past would probably
have resulted in humanitarian intervention, it should be possible for the
United Nations to decide that the state authorities in question have lost the
competence to be considered a legitimate authority rendering it necessary
for the United Nations itself, or powers authorized by it, to take over the
administration of that state and supervise the re-establishment of a system
that will once again permit local authorities to perform the proper
functions of a government in so far as protection of its citizenry is
concerned. To be properly performed, this would require the United
Nations, despite its financial difficulties, to establish a core of
administrators, much as Protocol I, 1977, envisages regarding the
recruitment and training of qualified persons who may be required to act
on behalf of a Protecting Power,' trained to fulfill such tasks and
immediately available should their services be required.
The arguments set out above should be sufficient to indicate that
means now exist so that the law may be enforced in respect of offenses
committed during non-international and low-intensity conflicts as much as
it seeks to do in regard to international conflicts. Arguments based on the
79. International Trusteeship System.
80. See, e.g., the various rulings of the World Court with regard to South West Africa.
81. Protocol I, art. 6.
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traditional view that such non-international conflicts are within the
domestic jurisdiction and so outside the purview of international law have
lost their validity. This means that the silence of Protocol II regarding
both breaches and enforcement becomes irrelevant, and it can no longer be
maintained, at least if genocide or crimes against humanity are committed,
that these are matters within such jurisdiction and beyond the scope of
international legal concern.
ASIL INTERNATIONAL LAW WEEKEND: PANEL
ON INTERNAL CONFLICTS
Michael J. Matheson
As John Crook has pointed out, most of the armed conflicts of
recent years have been internal rather than international, and most of the
suffering of the civilian population has occurred in these internal conflicts.
The United States and other western governments have been trying for a
number of years to improve both the legal standards applicable in internal
conflicts and the means for their enforcement. This morning, I would like
to survey the various contexts in which this question has arisen and to
describe what the United States has attempted to do in each case.
John has already referred to the basic texts that apply rules of
international humanitarian law to internal conflicts-namely, common
article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol
II to those Conventions. During the Geneva Diplomatic Conference which
adopted the Additional Protocols, the western group fought a hard and
largely unsuccessful battle to bring the substance of provisions applicable
in internal conflicts closer to those applicable in international conflicts,
particularly with respect to protection of the civilian population.
There were two primary obstacles. First, the nonaligned and
Soviet blocs expressed the concern that any strengthening of the
obligations applicable in internal conflicts would give enhanced political
and legal status to insurgent groups, and would lead to greater
international intrusion into their internal affairs. This was a particular
concern of the many nonaligned states that did not have a strong history of
national unity, and that lived in fear of secessionist ethnic, tribal and
religious movements within their societies. It was also a concern of
governments that had been the object of international criticism for
domestic abuses, and that were not inclined to give new grounds and new
opportunities for such criticism or intervention.
Second, there were concerns that the standards and procedures of
international humanitarian law, which had been developed to regulate the
conduct of states and regular armed forces, could not sensibly be applied
to internal conflicts where the insurgent groups often had little internal
discipline and fewer incentives to comply with international standards they
* Principal Deputy Legal Advisor, United States Department of State.
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had no hand in negotiating and may never have accepted. A frequent
objection was that these governments could not be expected to require their
military forces to obey restrictions which their insurgent opponents had not
accepted and might not have the ability to comply with if they wanted to
do so.
As a result, Additional Protocol II is not as comprehensive as
western delegations had wanted, either with respect to its substance or its
scope of application. With respect to substance, the Protocol was an
important improvement in some areas, but its protections for the civilian
population, for detained persons and for those engaged in humanitarian
work were in many ways only a pale copy of the rules for international
armed conflict.
With respect to its scope of application, the Protocol excludes
conflicts with insurgent armed groups which are not under responsible
command or which do not exercise such control over a sufficient part of
national territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted
military operations. Unfortunately, these provisions would exclude many
guerrilla wars fought by irregulars. They have also provided a convenient
basis for governments that do not wish to apply the Protocol to decline to
do so.
The view of the United States is that the rules of Additional
Protocol II should apply to all internal armed conflicts, and in submitting
the Protocol to the Senate the Executive Branch proposed that United
States ratification be subject to a formal Declaration that it would so apply
the Protocol and would encourage all other states to do likewise. We hope
that the Senate can be persuaded to give its advice and consent to the
Protocol with this Declaration at an early date.
Since 1977, the United States has attempted in various contexts to
expand the application of international humanitarian protections to internal
conflicts. For example, during the drafting of the Statute of the
International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, we took the
position that the Tribunal should have jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes
against humanity and genocide in internal as well as international armed
conflicts.
The Statute that was drafted by the United Nations Secretariat and
adopted without change by the Security Council in 1993 included four
jurisdictional articles. The article on crimes against humanity expressly
stated that the Tribunal had jurisdiction over such crimes when committed
in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character .... The
articles on grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, other
violations of the law and customs of war, and genocide did not expressly
state whether they applied in internal conflicts. In her explanation of vote
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in the Security Council in favor of the Statute, Ambassador Albright stated
for the record that the United States interpreted the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal to apply in all respects to internal as well as international
conflicts, including violations of the provisions on internal armed conflicts
in common article 3 of the 1949 Conventions and Additional Protocol II.
When these issues came before the Appeals Chamber of the War
Crimes Tribunal in the course of ruling on various appeals by the first war
crimes defendant (Dusko Tadic), we argued that the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia was in fact an international conflict, but that in any event each
of the jurisdictional provisions of the Tribunal's Statute applied in both
international and internal conflicts. The Appeals Chamber disagreed with
our argument that the entire conflict was international in character, and
disagreed with our argument that the grave breaches provisions of the
1949 Geneva Conventions applied in both types of conflicts. However,
the Chamber agreed that the other jurisdictional provisions applied in
internal as well as international conflicts, relying heavily on the United
States statement during the deliberations of the Security Council.
Therefore, although we did not agree with the reasoning of the Appeals
Chamber on all points, it did sustain our basic argument that the Tribunal's
jurisdiction did apply to violations of genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity committed during internal armed conflict.
When the International War Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda was
created by the Security Council in 1994, it was agreed by all concerned
that the Rwanda situation was an internal armed conflict, and this time the
jurisdictional provisions of the Rwanda Statute were drafted so as
expressly to apply to the rules of humanitarian law in internal armed
conflict, as well as to genocide and crimes against humanity. Therefore,
there should be no question that the applicable rules of common article 3
and Additional Protocol II will apply in the Rwanda war crimes trials.
The question of internal armed conflict was also a critical issue
during the negotiations of the past few years to improve the international
rules governing the use of conventional weapons-particularly land mines
and similar devices, which are governed by the Mines Protocol of the 1980
Convention on Conventional Weapons. Unfortunately, the 1980
Convention clearly applied only to international conflicts, while the great
majority of civilian casualties from land mine use in recent conflicts have
occurred in internal conflicts, such as those in Angola and Cambodia. It
was therefore one of the primary United States objectives in the revision of
the Mines Protocol to expand its scope to include all internal conflicts. At
first, the nonaligned states opposed such an expansion, for all the same
reasons that had caused them to oppose the expansion of the scope and
content of Additional Protocol II.
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In the end, we and other western delegations were able to convince
these states that a revised Mines Protocol would be of little practical value
if it did not apply to internal conflicts, and that there was no valid reason
for denying the civilian population protection from land mines simply
because the conflict in which they found themselves happened to be
internal rather than international. To meet their concerns about the legal
effects of expanding the scope of the Protocol, we added language
specifically disclaiming any effect on the legal status of the conflict or the
insurgent groups involved, as well as a provision stating that the
obligations of the Protocol would apply equally to all parties to the
conflict. These additions seemed to provide the necessary cover to allow
them to agree to the expansion of scope.
However, I do not know whether this expansion of the Mines
Protocol to internal conflicts suggests that it may now be possible to
expand other humanitarian law protections to internal conflicts. In
agreeing to the expansion of the scope of the Mines Protocol, one key
nonaligned state made clear that it viewed this as an exceptional
circumstance that should not be repeated elsewhere, and blocked the
proposed expansion of the scope of other parts of the Convention,
particularly the new Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons that was adopted
at the same time. Furthermore, we were not able to persuade the
nonaligned to accept a western proposal for international fact-finding
investigations into alleged violations of the Mines Protocol, and one of the
reasons often cited for the nonaligned refusal was that it would never be
acceptable to have international investigations into the circumstances of
internal conflicts.
In surveying the field on the application of law to the conduct of
internal armed conflicts, we should not neglect various provisions of arms
control agreements that affect the use of weapons in those conflicts. The
best early example of this was the 1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibited
the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. This Protocol is often
classified as an arms control agreement, but in fact it states a very
important rule of the law of armed conflict. By its terms, the Protocol
only applies to the use of these weapons in war, which was understood to
mean international armed conflict. Over the years, however, more and
more states came to accept the position that this prohibition had become a
part of customary international law applicable in internal as well as
international conflicts. This position was supported by the United States in
the aftermath of the use of chemical weapons by Iraqi forces against
Kurdish civilians in northern Iraq after the end of the Iran-Iraq War.
Not all states accept this view of customary law. However, two
arms control agreements concluded in recent decades would produce much
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the same effect. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention did not
expressly deal with the use of such weapons in armed conflict, but did
prohibit any acquisition or retention of biological agents of types or in
quantities that have no justification for peaceful purposes, or of weapons
or means of delivery designed to use such agents for hostile purposes or in
armed conflict. The effect of these prohibitions is to make it impossible
lawfully to use biological weapons in any form of armed conflict.
Likewise, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention expressly prohibits the
use of chemical weapons, and the use of riot control agents as a method of
warfare. This would clearly preclude the lawful use of chemical weapons
in either internal or international conflicts.
The United States was a strong supporter of both these
conventions, and is of course a party to the Biological Weapons
Convention. The Chemical Weapons Convention has been submitted to
the Senate, but the Senate has not yet given its consent to ratification. We
hope this will occur soon.
Finally, attempts have been made recently by government and non-
government experts to identify the rules which may be said to be part of
customary international law in international and internal conflicts, or to
define sets of principles that should be applied in all circumstances-
whether in armed conflict or peacetime. I imagine that Professor Meron,
who has been active in these efforts, will describe them in greater detail.
The United States is particularly interested in the current project of the
International Committee of the Red Cross to conduct a detailed study of
the customary rules of international humanitarian law, and hopes to
contribute in a concrete way to this useful work.
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There are some thirty million internally displaced persons (IDPs)
today as compared to fifteen million refugees. The root causes generating
refugees and IDPs are essentially the same: armed conflicts and human
rights abuses. While refugees are protected by a number of international
treaties and organizations, and are enjoying comparative safety in countries
of asylum or resettlement, IDPs are not - supposedly on the ground that
since IDPs are within their own country, their government should be
responsible for their protection. This ignores the fact that their own
government often is the source of their persecution or is unwilling or
unable to provide them with protection. Consequently, IDPs on the whole
suffer more than refugees. Little effort, however, has been made to fill
the gap in the protection of IDPs by the United Nations and international
lawyers. With respect to the United Nations, on the recommendation of the
Commission on Human Rights, the Secretary-General in 1992 appointed
Dr. Francis Dent of the Sudan as his representative on IDPs, but with very
little budgetary or staff support. The United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR) has extended its protective arms to IDPs on an ad hoc
basis at the request of the General Assembly. The International Law
Commission or the Sixth Committee (Legal) of the General Assembly has
not seen fit to codify or progressively develop the legal status of IDPs.
At the non-governmental level, the International Law Association
(ILA) established in November 1992 an International Committee on IDPs,
with Professors Rainer Hofmann of Germany and Yukio Shimada of Japan
as co-Rapporteurs, and myself as Chairman. The Committee is drafting a
Declaration of Principles of International Law on IDPs for adoption by the
* Special Adviser, Population, Refugees and Migration, Department of State. The views
expressed in this paper are entirely the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Department.
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ILA in 1998. At its conference in Helsinki last August, the ILA
provisionally adopted a Draft Declaration and is requesting comments
from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs, as well
as from UNHCR, United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), and relevant regional and non-governmental organizations.
The Committee would also welcome- your comments and would send you
copies of the text of the Draft Declaration upon request. I would like to
discuss my topic under three headings: protection of IDPs by governments
and de facto authorities, protection of IDPs as refugees, and protection of
humanitarian personnel.
I. PROTECTION OF IDPS BY GOVERNMENTS AND DE FACTO
AUTHORITIES
The term internally displaced persons may be defined as "persons
or groups of persons who have been forced to leave or flee their homes or
places of habitual residence as a result of armed conflict, internal strife,
systematic violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters,
and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border."'
Recognizing the indispensable role of de facto authorities in the
protection of IDPs, the Draft Declaration singles out such authorities for
special emphasis and defines them as "any non-State entities in actual
control of parts of a State's territory which are parties to an armed conflict
and/or internal strife or have generated or hosted internally displaced
persons. "2
We proceed from the premise that a foremost responsibility of a
government is to provide protection to its nationals. As defined by Vattel,
nationality is "the bond which ties a state to each of its members." In the
Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railways case, the Permanent Court of International
Justice observed: "[I]n the absence of a special agreement, it is the bond
of nationality between the State and the individual which alone confers
upon the State the right of diplomatic protection."
If, during an internal armed conflict, a government is unable to
provide protection to its citizens in an area from which it is driven away,
the de facto authorities must assume the responsibility. Indeed, their
ability to succeed to the de jure government hinges on their fulfillment of
such responsibility. Thus, under the Draft Declaration, de facto
1. Draft Declaration, art. 1(1).
2. Draft Declaration, art. 1(1).
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authorities have the obligation to adopt all necessary measures to ensure
that IDPs have free and safe access to assistance and protection by relief
organizations (article 9); to take joint and separate action with states and to
cooperate with the United Nations and other international organizations,
both governmental and non-governmental, to promote respect for and
safeguard the rights and interests of IDPs (article 3); to renounce the use of
starvation as a weapon against IDPs during armed conflicts (article 16); and
to address the root causes of internal displacement with a view to adopting
preventive measures and obtaining durable solutions (article 11).
The aspirations of de facto authorities to succeed to the de jure
government and be recognized as such, as well as to gain membership in
the United Nations, provide a strong incentive for their compliance with
the Draft Declaration's provisions, especially if coupled with sanctions in
the event of noncompliance.
IL PROTECTION OF IDPs AS REFUGEES
The question may be raised as to whether the legal status of IDPs
may be analogized to that of refugees. An affirmative answer would
entitle IDPs to international protection as refugees, mutatis mutandis. An
analysis of their legal relationship follows.
The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status
of Refugees, the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa, and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration, all
retain crossing of national borders as sine quo non for the definition of
refugee. Thus, if persecuted individuals cross their national borders, an
elaborate system of international law and institutions comes into play for
their protection. However, if they remain within the national border, they
are not considered refugees, hence not entitled to such protection. But the
use of border crossing as the most important criterion for distinguishing
between refugees and IDPs, hence determining their eligibility to
international protection, may be faulted on historical, practical, juridical,
and human rights grounds. Each of these grounds will be briefly
discussed. Historically, the phenomenon of refugee has existed since time
immemorial; some would date it to the proverbial expulsion of Adam and
Eve from the Garden of Eden. And yet territorial boundaries assumed
importance only after 1648 with the establishment of the Peace of
Westphalia that set the stage for the modem nation-state system. Indeed,
until the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, there had
never been any agreement defining refugee as a person who must be
outside his country. Under the May 12, 1926 arrangement, for example, a
Russian refugee was defined as "[a]ny person of Russian origin who does
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not enjoy or who no longer enjoys the protection of the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and who has not acquired another
nationality."
Similar definitions were adopted in the June 30, 1928
arrangement, the 1933 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, and
others mutatis mutandis. The decisive criterion was the presence or lack
of protection by the governments concerned.
Even during the early years of the United Nations, the term
refugee included also the meaning of IDPs. Under the International
Refugee Organization of 1946, un-resettled persons of Jewish origin or
foreigners or stateless persons who had resided in Germany or Austria,
who were victims of Nazi persecution, and who were detained in Germany
or Austria, were also defined as refugees even if they had never left
Germany or Austria.
During the Korean War, the United Nations did not differentiate
between refugees and internally displaced persons in United Nations
documents. The United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has treated many IDPs as Palestine
refugees. Even during the early 1980s, the United Nations Group of
Governmentaf Experts on international Cooperation to Avert New Flows
of Refugees, of which I was a member, did not adhere to any refugee
definition using border crossing as a criterion.
Why, then, do the 1950 Statute of the UNHCR and the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees give great emphasis to
border crossing as a prerequisite to the refugee status?
It is necessary to place the 1951 Convention in perspective:
namely, it was adopted against the backdrop of a deepening Cold War.
Originally and essentially a European regional instrument until the
adoption of the 1967 Protocol, the 1951 Convention perforce mirrored the
political realities then in Europe, where the crossing of the Iron Curtain
was considered to be of critical importance and where political control
within Communist countries was so tight as to leave no room for conflicts
that might produce IDPs.
With the disappearance of the Soviet Upon as a superpower and
communism as a dominant ideology, the political persecution of
individuals by government has been largely replaced by human rights
abuses, ethnic conflicts, and generalized violence. Under these situations,
border crossing should no longer be made a prerequisite to the attainment
of the refugee status. The impracticality of using boundaries to distinguish
refugees from IDPs was highlighted by John Bolton, former Assistant
Secretary for International Organization, who accompanied former
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Secretary of State James Baker to the Iraqi-Turkish border near Tchivergia
in April 1991 as follows:
We saw very dramatic evidence of the plight of the refugees and
displaced. The Turkish military very kindly took us up to the border right
at the border so we could look out on this hard to describe scene of
thousands and thousands of people just sitting on the sides of the hills, and
in the valley; no shelter, no sanitation, no food distribution, nothing just
people who had come and were sitting there. A very dramatic sight, it had
a profound effect on the Secretary and in my view led directly to our
decision to launch "Operation Provide Comfort." But, just as an example,
we were to go up to the border and it was in a very hilly area. The
Secretary was there and our Defense Attach6 from Ankara came up to me
and said: 'I don't know how quite to say this, but we and the Secretary
are about ten yards inside Iraq.' It was a telling example that they did not
have bright yellow line painted in the sand or in the dirt between Iraq and
Turkey at that point, and the people on one side of the line were in exactly
the same condition as the people on the other side of the line. They both
needed protection and they both needed assistance.
Similarly, in my travel to the Ethiopian-Somali border as a
member of a Multi Donor Technical Mission in February 1991, I was
struck by the irrelevance of boundaries to nomads who fled ethnic conflicts
or civil strife crisscrossing the border. Since these nomads shared the
same ethnicity or nationality, religion, custom, language, or dialect, were
they Somali or Ethiopian refugees? Were they IDPs or returnees? Or a
mixture of the above? What difference would it make anyway, so long as
they needed the same kind of assistance and protection? Indeed, the Multi-
Donor Technical Mission rightly decided to base its recommendations for
their assistance not on their legal status, but rather on their needs.
A formidable juridical argument against the use of boundaries as
determinant of the refugee status is the fact that the validity of a boundary
is inextricably linked to the diplomatic recognition of the state concerned.
And yet there is no rule mandating a uniform diplomatic recognition of a
particular state. Thus, a country or a party to a civil war may be
recognized by some states, but not by others. Cases in point are Biafra
during the late 1960s, former North and South Vietnam, former East and
West Germany, North and South Korea, and now the fragmentation of the
former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In each case, a displaced person
may be considered a refugee and IDP simultaneously by different states,
depending on the recognition factor. Such dual status cannot but blur the
boundary between the two.
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Indeed, the domestic laws of some countries already recognize that
refugees need not be outside their country. The Refugee Act of 1980, for
example, defines refugee to mean, inter alia:
In such special circumstances as the President after
appropriate consultation . . may specify, any person who
is within the country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, within the country
in which such person is habitually residing, and who is
persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.'
This provision has provided the basis for the Orderly Departure
Program (ODP) administered by UNHCR, under which refugees have
been airlifted from Ho Chi Minh City to Bangkok for onward journey to
resettlement countries. It has also formed the basis for in-country
processing of asylum seekers in Russia, Cuba, and Haiti. In view of the
involvement of UNHCR in the ODP, all of its members may arguably be
presumed to have accepted the fact that refugees need not by definition be
physically outside the countries of origin.
But the strongest argument against the use of border crossing to
justify preferential treatment of refugees over IDPs is its incompatibility
with equal protection under human rights defined by the late Sir Humphrey
Waldock, former President of the International Court of Justice, as "rights
which attach to all human beings equally, whatever their nationality," and,
I would add, wherever they may be. To the extent that their basic human
rights have been violated, they are entitled to protection and assistance
whether as refugees abroad or as IDPs within their own country. Equal
rights for all individuals, be they aliens or nationals, refugees or IDPs, is
implied in all universal and regional United Nations human rights
instruments through the use of such expressions as all human beings,
everyone, no one, or all. Not a single right in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, for example, is specified or implied as belonging only to
refugees, and not IDPs. Thus, in the words of the present United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees: "It made little sense for UNHCR to
bring relief and protection to one group of suffering people, i.e. refugees
under the 1951 Convention, and to disregard the misery of the other
afflicted people."
She therefore proposed international relief and protection based on
needs rather than on the categories into which people are classified.
3. The Refugees Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(42) 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
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But can equal protection of refugees and IDPs be translated from
theory into practice? The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) has shown that this can be done. And the Security Council, in
Resolution 688 of April 5, 1991, mandates "that Iraq allow immediate
access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of
assistance in all parts of Iraq," in addition to requesting the Secretary-
General "to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees and
displaced Iraqi population."
The foregoing analysis shows that basing international protection
of refugees and IDPs on border crossing is untenable on historical,
practical, juridical, and human rights grounds. Border crossing should no
longer be the criterion for conferring or withholding international
protection. Both refugees and IDPs are entitled to international protection.
There are, to be sure, procedural differences between the
implementation of international protection of refugees and that of IDPs.
However, such differences should not be allowed to obscure the
substantive similarities. How to harmonize the two poses a serious
challenge to international lawyers.
III. PROTECTION OF HUMANITARIAN PERSONNEL
It is truism to state that humanitarian services and supplies cannot
be effectively delivered abroad without the active involvement of
humanitarian personnel, both expatriates and local employees, whose
safety must be ensured. While, in the event of an armed attack or a threat
thereof, expatriates can be withdrawn to safety in their home base or
country relatively easily in view of their small numbers, local employees
and their families, however, present a more difficult problem. The current
-debate over the evacuation of local employees of American relief agencies
and their families from northern Iraq to Turkey and thence to Guam and
the United States for resettlement is a case in point. Might not such
evacuation and resettlement have a deterrent effect on future humanitarian
effort?
One possible solution lies in linking all humanitarian efforts vis-A-
vis IDPs to the United Nations or one of its agencies, as well as in
promoting the widest possible adherence to the United Nations Convention
on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, signed
December 9, 1994. The Convention defines associated personnel as, inter
alia, persons deployed by a government, intergovernmental organization
or "a humanitarian non-governmental organization or agency under an
agreement with the Secretary-General of the United Nations or with a
Lee
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specialized agency .. to carry out activities in support of the fulfillment
of the mandate of a United Nations operation"4
4. (Art. l(b)(ii)).
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I. PREFACE
This paper may raise more questions than it answers. The plight
and saga of the ship Golden Venture, Chinese and specific case studies will
be employed to illustrate the issues addressed. Space limits this paper to
an overview of the topic. To cover each stage in depth would fill a book.
That is how complex this case has become. Areas to be highlighted are
selected United States laws regarding asylum, the complex and convoluted
process to date of asylum determination and other outgrowths of this case.
It is an amazing story that goes far beyond the law. It involves the White
House, members of Congress, politics and business, the media, a new art
form, and the creation in York, PA of a nationwide grass roots
organization, The People of the Golden Vision. These elements will be
woven into this narrative.
II. INTRODUCTION
"Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to
breathe free . . . " states the beginning of Emma Lazurus' poem inscribed
on the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty. The Statue of Liberty itself has
been, for over 100 years, the symbol of freedom to the oppressed and
persecuted of this world as they sought asylum and refuge in this great
country of ours. With the enactment into law of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA) in September
and the current anti-immigrant fervor, what has happened to the welcoming
message of these oft-quoted words written by this nineteenth Century
American poet and Jewess.
We as a nation seem so quick to stereotype all immigrants and put
them into the same kettle. Myths continue to be fomented by the
government, the media, business, and others to inflame anti-immigrant
fervor. This to the point where the reality is skewed. If it is politically in
the interest of the United States, our government may or may not do
business with atrocious human rights violators or, as in the case of China,
the current Administration looks the other way. These instrumentalities
legitimize and escalate the fears about groups of immigrants, particularly
illegal aliens. This instead of looking at the countries and cultural
practices from which they fled, and basic human rights violated by the
persecutory policies of their homelands as really implemented. In reality,
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did those coming to our shores illegally have any other way to flee
persecution and relevant policies of their countries?
This raises multiple issues for those of us, on both sides, who will
determine their fate. Our immigration laws and most immigration decision
makers, including many in the legal profession, when evaluating these cases
have little understanding of the cultures and cultural practices, the distrust
and fear of government authorities, and potentially persecutive actualities
and pressures imposed at all levels of implementation of government policies
in the countries from which they fled, specifically of those coming from
communist and totalitarian regimes or other countries in turmoil. One needs
to be aware of these regimes and what is regarded as and punishable as
political or imputed political opinion. Documents from non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), other international human rights monitoring groups,
and the facts presented by asylee after asylee from certain countries are and
should be barometers of truth. On the other hand, asylum seekers from such
regimes are expected to respond to our legal system which is alien to them.
The current Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) system is
not one of the United States tradition of basic fairness. At issue is the
current Administration's fast track (particularly as designed for those of the
Golden Venture) of determining these cases. This raises many problems.
Documentation takes time. Evaluating an asylee's claim via an interpreter,
overcoming language barriers, gaining the person's trust (a difficult task for
those coming from repressive regimes where one trusts no one), and getting
to the truth of the matter takes time. Finding pro bono attorneys, yet alone
any with immigration experience, in the small towns where the INS places
illegal immigrants takes time. The system does not allow even a reasonable
time for us in the legal profession to do our job. All of the above play a
major role in how illegal aliens will respond to questioning, and how their
cases will be presented and adjudicated. This issue becomes clear later when
discussing the Immigration and Naturalization Service and judicial process of
deciding these cases.
It is unfortunate that history repeats itself. As World War II was
igniting, the ship St. Louis was off the United States coast in May 1939.
Filled with over 900 Jews fleeing Nazi Germany, the ship's captain waited
for permission to land on our shores. Partly due to strong anti-immigrant
feelings, immovable immigration quotas, and political reasons, our
government refused entry. The ship with its human cargo was sent back to
Europe, and most of those on board perished in Nazi concentration camps -
part of the final solution. There was documented knowledge in this country
that the Nazis had targeted the Jews. Yet, we did not believe or want to
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believe the horror stories of Nazi inhumanity, and our country sent them
back.
Fast forward to 1993. Enter the ship Golden Venture. A repeat
again, with Chinese human cargo this time, of a plea for asylum from
illegals, or are they in truth refugees, fleeing persecution. This ship landed
off the beach of Long Island on June 6, 1993. On board were nearly 300
exhausted Chinese men and women, arriving illegally on our shores, after a
harrowing journey of months on the high seas in a seedy, unseaworthy ship.
For many this had been a year-long journey. They were frightened, weary,
and sick, yet excited that they finally had reached this land. They had
dreamed of and survived a death defying voyage to touch and embrace this
nation of freedom. This was not to be.
Most came seeking asylum from China's coercive and inhumanely
executed family planning policies. The policy of forced abortion and forced
sterilization and its physically and emotionally brutal execution had touched
them in persecutive ways. Were it our wives, mothers, or sisters, we would
never tolerate the forced or coerced implementation of such a policy or even
such a policy itself. In 1995 Congressional committee hearings, during
testimony of three Golden Venture women, this comment was emphatically
stated by members of the committee. They were shocked by what they
heard.' Yet, our government wants to send and has sent some of those from
the Golden Venture back to the persecutors from which they had fled. In
most cases their actions in protecting their families against the cruelty of this
system were regarded by the local Chinese officials as an act of political
opinion. The current Administration did not see it that way. Therefore, the
joy of being safe and free in this new land was short lived. Within hours,
the INS herded them in, processed them as a group and sent them to prisons,
most in small towns in Pennsylvania, Mississippi, California, Virginia, and
Louisiana. These remote locations alone complicated the adjudication of
these cases.
Thus began a legal process that has raised numerous issues about
asylum and asylum law as actually practiced in this country. Over three
years later, a large group from the Golden Venture still remains in York
County Prison (Pennsylvania) with a few scattered elsewhere. They have
waited and waited to be free, while their cases are debated, disputed, and
bandied about by contradictory interests and the bureaucracy of our system
i.e., the INS, the Administration, judicial system, politics, a group of
attorneys determined to see the real justice of our system prevail by having
them set free, lay people organized in their support, members of Congress,
and others.
1. See discussion infra Part VI(D).
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Just as those on the ship St. Louis, the only crime committed by
those on the Golden Venture was the need to flee quickly. There only was
one way out: to pay the real criminals, the smugglers, for passage. This
was not unusual. It certainly was true during World War II, during the Cold
War, and currently in countries where it is a matter of one's survival.
Historically then, many fleeing persecution paid bribes, and still do so, to
corrupt government officials, and others. Corruption breeds on the plight of
the persecuted. The smuggled are the pawns; yet, the Office of Immigration
Litigation (OIL) regards them as criminals and has incarcerated them as
criminals. One reason given by the INS regards the sums of money each
paid to smugglers to get them out. Something is radically wrong with our
system if the illegal alien is deemed a criminal without regard to the facts of
his or her case and the conditions of the country from which he has fled.
China's flagrant violations of human rights, particularly their methods of
implementation of coercive abortion and sterilization, are well documented.
Times have changed. The Cold War is over. Abusive practices
such as forced, coercive, and in practice involuntary abortion, sterilization,
and genital mutilation/circumcision no longer can be overlooked. They no
longer can be rationalized as internal problems as civilized nations conduct
business as usual, which belies the "lip service/a slap on the wrist" to
countries like the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) on human rights abuses.
It is continually well documented that PRC has one of the worst human
rights records in the world. China is a communist/totalitarian regime. Its
population control program is state sponsored terrorism. It is carried out
through fear, pressure upon pressure on officials to implement the one child
per family policy at all levels, and meeting sterilization quotas in disregard of
the health of the woman; doing the same with forced implantation of Intra
Uterine Device (IUD) and seasonal forced examinations of women to see if
the IUD remains. If found removed, even if necessary for the health of the
woman, without the Family Planning cadres approval, the woman will be
forcibly sterilized. This goes against all international conventions and the
United Nations Declaration on Human Rights. It has opened the eyes of the
world community to new abuses of human rights as seen in recent
nationalistic uprisings.
Unfortunately, current United States immigration law and the laws
of other civilized nations have not kept up-to-date with these intolerable
human rights issues. Instead, procedures under the new 1996 immigration
law further restrict the admission and evaluation of bona fide asylum
seekers. Under the new system, many continue to fall through the cracks.
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Il. BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES ENFORCEMENT OF ASYLUM
CLAIMS BASED UPON CHINA'S COERCIVE FAMILY PLANNING
POLICIES
In the mid-1980s the United States began to deal with some asylum
claims based on China's coercive family planning policies. It was only after
the June 1989 uprising in Tiananmen Square that led our government and
others to recognize the true nature of the inhumane application of these
policies and the need for action, particularly in allowing people fleeing this
regime asylum. Tiananmen Square resulted in Congressional and
Presidential action to change and allow for enhanced consideration for
admissibility of these aliens; President Bush's late 1989 Executive Order
12,711 (Executive Order) states that a person seeking asylum could establish
eligibility for asylum by showing he or she had been persecuted or had a
well founded fear of persecution based on the PRC's coerced population
control policies. If so, it would be considered that this person could be
granted asylum on account of political or imputed political opinion.
However, with the landing of the Golden Venture in June 1993, the
May 1989 Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision, In re Chang, was
resurrected by the current Administration and implemented by the INS.
Executive Order 12,711 still was in effect; however, it was to be ignored.
Now those who came fleeing the PRC's coerced population control policies
were summarily denied not just asylum but even parole. Many continue to
be incarcerated, as this is written in January 1997.2
The Golden Venture claims have been denied asylum by the
Immigration Judges based upon conclusions reached by the BIA in In re
Chang.3 The real holding of this case should have been that Chang had not
been subjected to forced sterilization or abortion, had not been persecuted
for failure to submit to these procedures, nor had he presented any credible
evidence of fear of such persecution. In fact, Chang in his testimony
"disclaimed any mistreatment by the government and did not refer to any
fear stemming from China's population control measures."'
Instead, it is the second part of the Chang decision that has been
applied to those of the Golden Venture and others with similar claims. This
part of the Chang opinion addressed the position that would have been
before the BIA had Chang been persecuted because he had refused to
comply with this program. In this portion of the opinion, the Board stated:
2. See discussion below and later the discussion on the question of political influence by the
current Administration into the judicial adjudication of the Golden Venture cases.
3. In re Chang, Int. Dec. No. 3107 ( BIA 1989).
4. Id. at 12.
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that even if enforcement of China's population control program involved
coercive measures and even if it violated fundamental human rights, as long
as these measures were "solely tied to controlling population, rather than a
guise for acting against people for reasons protected by the IIRAIRA. " This
application of Chang precludes the immigration judge hearing each case
from considering, as part of his or her decision, whether or how the facts of
that case differ from those of Chang and, therefore, should be considered as
"fear of persecution on account of political opinion.",
As stated in the Introduction, the persecutive and inhumane realities
of the PRC's policies for controlling population have been documented over
and over again. The Chang opinion excludes this reality. It also overlooks
the real question which is that the PRC regards resisters to the population
control program as political dissenters and applies harsh and cumulative
punishment. Chang was decided in May 1989. Times have changed. At
the International Women's Conference held in Beijing, at which Hillary
Clinton spoke, she and others deplored the very PRC policies under
discussion as unacceptable behavior to civilized nations and recognized that
this kind of abuse, particularly of women, cannot be tolerated. This writer
and colleagues continued to argue that Chang is bad law.7
An overview of the process of these administrative and
congressional actions is worth reviewing to show how intertwined and
convoluted is the implementation, for example, of administrative policy from
the President, who signs the Executive Order, to those delegated to enforce
it. There are questions of how and when does it get enforced? What do the
regulations say? What is the role of the Attorney General to whom this has
been delegated and more?'
Executive Order 12,711 was issued pursuant to the inherent policy-
making authority of the President. When elevated in matters which concern
the country's foreign affairs, this authority includes the admissibility of
aliens. The Executive Order's directives to the Attorney General rest upon
specific statutory authority set forth in section 103(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), written in the early 1980s. 9 This charges the




8. Brief of Immigration and Naturalization Service, Int. Dec No. 3107 (BIA 1989). Brief
was written by Grover Joseph Rees III, then-General Counsel of the INS. It is clear that Rees
opposed the application of Chang in these cases. This was not to be the case. His legal opinion and
sense of justice fell on Administration "deaf ears." He resigned that July.
9. In re Chang, Int. Dec. No. 3107 (BIA198).
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is equally binding upon subordinate executive officials in the Immigration
and Naturalization Service and the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR). The terms of the Executive Order, not being incompatible with the
expressed will of Congress, were specifically intended to implement
protections for Chinese nationals that had been approved by overwhelming
majorities in both houses of Congress.0
The suggestion of the BIA, in a later decision in Matter of Chu, that
the Executive Order was not binding because the January 1990 interim
regulations on such asylum claims were omitted from a subsequent
codification and because no regulations had replaced them." Rees noted that
the apparent reason for this holding is that the Executive Order is not self-
executing and, therefore, not binding upon Department of Justice (DOJ)
personnel absent further directives. Rees states that this position was legally
and factually untenable. He goes on to note that paragraph four of
Executive Order 12,711 was plainly intended to change the policy, reflected
in Chang, of denying that persons fleeing forced abortion or sterilization or
persecution for resistance to these measures are eligible for protection under
United States asylum and refugee laws.
It also Was maintained by the DOJ that the term enhanced
consideration was too vague to.be applied without further direction. Rees
indicated that the Executive Order explicitly referred to the January 1990
regulations as the standard for implementing enhanced consideration. He
concluded that the Department's failure to include the January 1990
regulations in a July 1990 codification of the asylum regulations cannot be
said to negate either the terms of the Executive Order or the obligation of
10. The provisions of the interim rule, published January 29, 1990; and the Executive Order
were adopted from the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989, H.R. 2712 (1989)
(commonly referred to as the Pelosi Bil). The measure included the Armstrong-DeConcini
amendment, which its sponsors intended to overrule Chang. The Senate passed this amendment
unanimously (July 19-20, 1989). The House instructed its conferees to concur in the amendment
(November 2, 1989). The amendment would have required the Attorney General to issue regulations
stating that nationals of the PRC who resist the policy of coercive abortion or sterilization shall be
viewed as engaging in an act of political defiance sufficient to establish a well-founded fear of
persecution. In other words, this kind of action would be viewed as rising to the level of persecution
on account of political opinion or, as Mr. Rees argues, imputed political opinion. This is one of the
grounds for asylum in the INA. The President pocket vetoed the above Emergency Act. But, at that
time, he issued a statement directing the Attorney General and Secretary of State to, inter alia, defer
enforced departure of PRC nationals and to provide enhanced consideration under the immigration
laws for those fleeing coerced family planning policies. In January 1990, there was an attempted
override of the President's veto. The President had promised to issue an Executive Order
establishing all of the protections for PRC nationals included in the Bill. This then accomplished
everything the Pelosi bill did. Therefore, the House did vote to override the veto, but the Senate fell
three votes short of a two-thirds majority to do so. With the President's above promise, Congress
agreed to accomplish these same goals through Administrative remedies.
11. 55 Fed. Reg. 2,803.
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Departmental personnel to adhere to it. Paragraph four of the Executive
Order directs that enhanced consideration shall be given to those who
express a fear of persecution due to coercive family planning policies, a
direction not contingent upon the issuance of regulations or subject to the
Attorney General's discretion. Despite the clarity of the President's
directive, unjustified confusion has persisted regarding the meaning of
enhanced consideration and its relation to the Executive Order. This
confusion ignores some basic and indisputable points.
At the very least this phrase must mean not adhering to the broad
dicta in Chang, which would require the denial of virtually all asylum claims
by persons fleeing coercive population control policies. 12 Congress made this
clear when it voted overwhelmingly to direct the Attorney General to
overturn Chang by regulation. Furthermore, in the President's veto message
on H.R. 2712, he stated in his directions to the Attorney General and
Secretary of State, and later incorporated in the Executive Order, "will
provide effectively the same protection as would H.R. 2712."1'
As noted before, the Executive Order does not give the Attorney
General discretion, but rather directs him or her to provide such enhanced
consideration and to do so as implemented by the January 1990 regulations.
This does not mean that the current Attorney General or the immigration
judges acting under her authority have no discretion in how to apply the
substance of the enhanced consideration standard. However, they do not
have the discretion to ignore the standard or any standard that cannot
reasonably be described as "enhanced consideration ... as implemented by
the Attorney General's regulation" as stated infra. Rees notes that the basic
requirement of the Executive Order, as discussed infra, is not contingent
upon continued publication of the January 1990 regulations. Therefore, as
long as the Executive Order remains in effect, so does this requirement.
Rees points out that the silence of current regulations is just that, silence.
It should be clear, Rees noted, that although enhanced consideration
means that persecution for failure to comply with coercive population control
policies is to be regarded as persecution "on account of political or imputed
political opinion," it does not mandate that everyone from the PRC should
be granted asylum. The applicant must present credible and convincing
evidence that this really happened to him or her. The person must show that
a reasonable person in his or her circumstances would be afraid. However,
12. This is exactly what has happened in the adjudication of the Golden Venture cases. Even
credible claims were summarily denied by the Immigration Judges hearing these cases and then
affirmed by the BIA.
13. Mem. of Disapproval, Nov. 30, 1989.
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the enhanced consideration of the Executive Order only removes the
irrebuttable presumption against such claims as proclaimed in Chang.
Background Summation
The interim rule and the Executive Order, an outgrowth of the 1989
Congressional legislation, were also prompted by the narrow construction of
the asylum laws adopted by some immigration officials when asylum seekers
from the PRC first began making claims based upon forced abortion and
sterilization in the early 1980s. It was at this time that the Immigration and
Nationality Act was written."1 When this Act was written "a well-founded
fear of forced sterilization or of persecution for refusal to be sterilized,
pursuant to a foreign country's coercive population control policies" was not
a consideration. In fact, it was not until this time period that China started
full scale and coerced enforcement of this policy."
It was not until after Tiananrmen Square that the true character of the
coercive nature of this PRC policy gained worldwide attention. Thus, after
this event in June 1989, the President and Congress concluded that those
seeking asylum because of their opposition to and, therefore, fear of
persecutory retribution might, in fact, warrant asylum because of
"persecution on account of political or imputed political opinion." Indeed,
in China, this was and is considered a political act, and as we now have
documented, severely punished as such.
In mid-January 1993 prior to President Bush leaving the White
House, the final rule of the interim rule on the above was signed by then
Attorney General Barr. Signed only a few days before the January 20
change of administrations, the final rule did not get published in the Federal
Register prior to Clinton being inaugurated. According to Rees' Brief, as of
June 1993 such publication still was pending, waiting for a decision by the
current Attorney General on whether the rule should be published. Since the
final rule was signed by the Attorney General prior to leaving office,
publication really was a technicality. Executive Order 12,711 still continued
in force and continued to be enforced under the new Administration.
In June 1993 with the landing of the Golden Venture, the current
Administration elected now to ignore the Bush Executive Order. They did
not revoke it. In fact, a colleague noticed it finally was not officially
revoked until August, 1994, hidden in the INS Memorandum regarding
14. Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) of the Act states the five
statutory grounds on which one can be granted asylum, "persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."
15. See In re Chwag, Int. Dec. No. 3107 (BIA 1989) (discussing the September 1996 Illegal
Immigration and Immigration Responsibilities Act in footnote 4).
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Humanitarian Parole. By then the Golden Venture cases based upon coerced
family planning had been denied by the Immigration Judges (IJs) and BIA
under Chang.
The INS now began enforcing Chang which still was on the books.
In essence, no matter how strong the evidence in each Golden Venture case
and no matter how egregious the PRC government's conduct underlying the
claim, if the asylum claim related to PRC's population control policy,
asylum was denied. In Chang, the BIA ruled that the PRC policy of coerced
abortion and sterilization did not rise to the level of political opinion, one of
the noted five statutory grounds for asylum.
IV. How I GOT INVOLVED
In late July, 1993, I received my monthly meeting notice from the
International Human Rights Committee of the Philadelphia Bar Association.
Attached was a request for pro bono attorneys in Lehigh County (Allentown,
Pennsylvania). Needing representation were Chinese men who had entered
the country illegally on June 6, 1993. Remembering my World War II
history, specifically the tragedy of other illegal boat people on the ship St.
Louis, I called the local attorney in Allentown to offer my services. Another
colleague of mine from my locale, Jerilyn Getson, agreed to join me in this
effort. We were given a one day background briefing on these cases in
Philadelphia.
Although I was not an immigration attorney (not a prerequisite), I
had had hands on experience in human rights missions to the Soviet Union in
the 1980s and had spent time with friends and pursued legal studies in
countries of communist Eastern Europe. These experiences and, therefore,
an understanding of the realities of living under these repressive regimes
were essential to the successful adjudication of the first case I was given,
Knowing the law only would not have won this man's freedom.
V. CLIENT ONE: A CASE STUDY
A. Case Facts, Preparation and Strategy
In mid-August 1993, we were assigned the case of Deshui Jiang.
He was forty-three years old, married, and the father of three teenage
children. He already had gone through master calendar and charging
document hearings shortly after his arrival at Lehigh County Prison. He was
from Fujian Province, as were his co-passengers. He had paid the
snakeheads (the smugglers) thirty-thousand dollars to escape from China.
This was to be paid by his family to the snakeheads in China in three stages
of ten thousand dollars each, first before Jiang left, second on his arrival in
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Kenya through a telephone call to his family, and the balance on his arrival
in the United States. Later, he explained to us that the money came from
many sources, including the greater portion a thirty-six percent interest loan
from loan sharks. The snakeheads were hounding his family for payment.
After all, he had arrived in the United States.1" I will go into some detail
about this case. It supports some of the concerns expressed in the
Introduction regarding case evaluation, preparation and presentation.
What would possess someone of Jiang's age to leave his family and
endure a year long journey over land and deadly seas? As his story
unfolded, it was clear that his life had been at stake. In initial hearings,
Jiang said that he had left due to Chinese coercive sterilization policies. It
seems that the smugglers had told all of the Golden Venture passengers to
say this if they were caught. Eighty-five percent of other Chinese illegals,
who arrived as recently as May 1993, had been granted asylum, under the
still in force Executive Order 12,711 on claims of fleeing the persecution of
the PRC's coerced family planning policies.' 7
16. For those of the Golden Venture and others who still owe money, it is well documented
that the snakehead organization in the United States lie in wait to kidnap these people when they are
released from prison. Until that final debt is paid, they work in America's Chinatowns, particularly
New York, treated like indentured servants under terrible conditions. This has caused a problem for
the INS as well as for those of us representing them. For the few who have been released, we are
and continue to be very protective of their whereabouts and have asked the INS to release them only
to designated people or their attorneys. Initially, there were problems.
17. It was the sense of Congress, in the post-Tiananmen Square legislation, and of
President Bush in issuing Exec. Order 12,711 (1989), that Chinese seeking asylum for the above
reasons would be granted asylum if they could prove their claim. It was accepted by our
government that protests against this coercive policy and threats or actual imposition of this
policy against the asylee applicant or spouse rose, under United States law, to "persecution on
account of political or imputed political opinion."
Under section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [hereinafter INA]
there are five grounds in the Act's refugee definition under which asylum can be granted:
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group and
political opinion. When the Act was written in the early 1980s, abuse of women, coerced
abortion and sterilization as applied today were not issues of world concern. In fact, China was
praised for its population control policies. As previously discussed, supra, such acts no longer
can be tolerated by civilized nations as internal country affairs. From the Bush to the Clinton
Administration and, indeed, until June, 1993, INS trial attorneys so stipulated to the IJ that if the
claimant could show that his claim was based on coerced population control policies, a ruling of
asylum should be granted. In other words, Exec. Order No. 12,711 (1989) was not challenged
nor the 1989 BIA decision, In re Chang, invoked.
After June 6, 1993, this changed with the landing of the Golden Venture. The INS
attorneys now challenged these cases, arguing that Chang was ruling law -- that the PRC's
coerced family planning policy did not meet one of the five statutory criteria for a grant of
asylum. The Chang decision now was included in the legal packets given to the immigration
judges brought in to hear these cases. Executive Order 12,711 was not revoked, just ignored.
See discussion on historical evolution of these policies, including a court challenge by the Golden
Venture attorneys of improper political influence into the judicial arm of the INS (EOIR -
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My co-counsel and I had less than two weeks to prepare Jiang's
defense before his U hearing on the merits. Jiang spoke no English. All of
our discussions were through an interpreter. We were fortunate to have two
excellent volunteers who were professional men with full time jobs and
belonged to the local Chinese church.' 8 In over thirty hours of interviewing
Jiang and gaining his trust, it became clear that he fled because of religious
persecution. Over a period of about six years, Jiang had embraced the
philosophy and spirituality of Christianity. This involvement began shortly
after the forced sterilization of his wife around 1983. He begged the
family planning officials not to sterilize her. The Jiangs already had their
family of three children, including a son, all of whom were born in the
1970s. This was prior to the implementation of the family planning
policies. Jiang's plea fell on deaf ears. The local officials had a monthly
quota to be met for women sterilized. Afterwards, Jiang's wife never was
emotionally the same.
Jiang also was a member of a minority group, the Sher. Both his
protests regarding his wife's sterilization and his minority status led the
local officials to deny him a promotion to captain of the fishing ship, even
though his co-workers had elected him. For the same reasons, his older
daughter was denied entrance into a preferred school for higher education,
even though she qualified and passed all of the examinations.
Despite all of this, Jiang had a good job on a fishing vessel, had a
growing family and had no plans to leave China. In December 1991, he
was given no choice. He could flee or face harsh and cumulative
punishment. Jiang belonged to a household church. These were illegal
meetings in people's homes. Bibles and religious books were outlawed in
China, except for what was sanctioned by the government for the official
churches. However, members of minority groups, such as the Sher, were
not allowed to attend or join these churches. In addition, it was dangerous
to attend the official church. The ministers, in most cases, were
government informers and many of those attending also were informers.' 9
Therefore, the household church was Jiang's only choice to meet with
Executive Office of Immigration Review - which oversees the BIA and immigration judges) by
the White House and others in the Department of Justice (hereinafter DOJ). Although the
judicial and enforcement arms of INS are within the DOJ, they are to be kept separate. At this
time, these barriers broke down, which the Golden Venture attorneys alleged influenced the IJ
and BIA handling of the Golden Venture cases.
18. We were appalled when Jiang was brought into the room in handcuffs. Even though he
had yet to prove his case, was this the way our democratic government treated those seeking asylum
from persecution?
19. I witnessed this same thing when, in 1983, I attend the one synagogue allowed in
Moscow. This was further confirmed in visits to Soviet refuseniks.
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other Christians. His knowledge of Christianity was similar to that of the
early Christians, i.e. a philosophy of Christian thinking. There was a
special signal to enter. This way those inside would know it was a friend,
not the police.
In December 1991, the police, in a lightening attack, broke down
the door of this house and arrested the attendees. Jiang was able to jump
out of a window and escape. He later heard that those arrested were
severely beaten and sent to labor and re-education camps. Those arrested
told the police that Jiang was a Christian and had been in the house at the
time of the raid. Jiang was a hunted man. He had to get out of China.
The snakeheads, the smugglers, were known in Fujian Province.
They were his only way out. Therefore, it was arranged for Jiang to be
smuggled out of China. It was not until later that he knew the United
States was his final destination. From Voice of America and other
broadcasts, he was aware that the United States was "the land of the free."
He longed for such freedom. The saga of his year long journey by land
and sea that got him to the United States is a harrowing story by itself.
Jiang stated that he was sure those on the Golden Venture would die,
particularly in the terrible storms encountered as they sailed around the tip
of Africa. He said that it was his faith in Jesus and God that sustained
him.
It was this story that he told the IJ at his hearing on the merits.
However, there were major obstacles to overcome in presepting his case.
Jiang in previous hearings and in his application for asylum (Form 1-589)
stated that he left China because of the PRC's forced family planning
policies. Now he was changing his reason for seeking asylum. How
would this affect his credibility before the U? (This will be addressed
later.)
We felt he met two of the grounds for which he could qualify for
asylum, a history of ethnic discrimination and persecution on account of
religion. Even credible cases based on China's coerced sterilization and
abortion policies were being denied, because the Us automatically applied
In re Chang, which the INS attorneys now argued was controlling law. In
so doing, it negated any assessment of the facts of each case, how these
facts differed from those in Chang, and the fact that Chang did not take
account of the evidence that the PRC authorities regard resistance to the
population control program as a political offense. Although this was a
component of Jiang's case, this was not going to get him asylum.
First we filed a Motion to Terminate, arguing that Jiang had made
an entry into the United States and, therefore, should be in deportation
proceedings rather than in exclusion. The INS in its response took the
opposite view. For the hearing, we found documentation of on the scene
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news reports and other interviews which clearly noted that the Golden
Venture had not been under constant INS and police surveillance when it
entered United States territorial waters and landed on the Long Island
beach.20
My co-counsel and I contacted human rights organizations and
others to obtain as much supporting information on religious persecution in
the PRC. We also needed to find an expert on the minority group to
which Jiang belonged, the Sher. There were many China experts and
university professors in Philadelphia, but none knew much about the Sher.
Three days before the hearing, after many phone calls and referrals, we
finally found an expert not just in ethnic minorities in China, but someone
who knew about the Sher. She had just returned from China, was an
anthropologist with a focus on China, was a curator of the Asian section of
the University Museum of the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia
20. The following details on the entry issue give the reader an idea of the multiple legal
maneuvers taken by Plaintiffs' counsels during these past three and one-half years. If one has
entered the United States, then his or her case is heard in deportation hearings. A person in
deportation is eligible for immediate parole, can name the country to which he wishes to be
deported if not granted asylum, and has greater protection under United States law. On the other
hand, if an asylum seeker is deemed not to have entered, he or she is in exclusion and can be
deported back to the country from which he or she came at any time (no choice), can not be
granted parole and more. Thus the reason why one of the first motions filed is to argue that your
client belongs in deportation proceedings not in exclusion. Ninety percent of those rounded up
that night of June 6 were placed in exclusion. Ten drowned trying to get to the beach. A few
wondered off into the local town, before police and INS agents arrived, and later were caught and
imprisoned.
There are differing opinions and case law on this issue. Middle District Judge Rambo,
as noted below, was asked to decide this question. This was a test case on this issue. Judge
Rambo ruled that the petitioner, one of the Golden Venture men, had entered when he jumped off
the ship into the water. Her decision broadened the scope of entry into United States territory.
She ruled that as long as the ship was in United States territorial waters and the tests for entry
had been met, they did not, as held by other courts "to be on dry land and venture away from the
beach." Under Rambo's holding, an entry had been made by all on the Golden Venture.
Therefore, they should be in deportation not exclusion proceedings. This, in turn, would make
them eligible for immediate parole.
More motions were filed by Plaintiffs' counsels to protect all the detainees. This
presented a rash of different issues and the type of motion to be filed. Many individual motions
on this issue had not been filed previously based upon the widely held belief that only those who
made it to dry land stood a chance of being placed in deportation proceedings. Therefore, it was
necessary to determine the location of each of our clients when the ship landed. These different
motions and legal maneuvers were made in anticipation of an INS appeal to the Third Circuit.
The INS was determined not to parole these detainees and threw every delay and
obstacle in the way. The INS immediately appealed Judge Rambo's decision to the Third Circuit,
asking for a temporary stay of parole to keep the Judge from issuing paroles. The stay was
granted a few days later, but not before several were paroled.
In May, 1995, the Golden Venture Steering Committee went before the Third Circuit. This
court reversed Judge Rambo's entry ruling.
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and taught Chinese cultural anthropology at the University. She also was
aware of the household churches and religious practice* there. With the
approval of the U and the INS attorney, we arranged to depose her on a
Friday afternoon. Jiang's hearing was the following Monday. The I
agreed that we could deliver the deposition to him first thing on Monday
morning, so he could review it before Jiang's hearing that afternoon.
B. The IJ Hearing on the Merits
My co-counsel and I made an opening statement. We apprised the
judge that Jiang really fled the PRC because of religious persecution. It
was essential that the IJ understood what it meant to be a Christian in
China, and he could not judge the sincerity of Jiang's beliefs based upon
the way Christianity was practiced in the United States. If he questioned
Jiang on doctrine, he would not know. It was realistic to ask him about
why he embraced Christianity and how he felt about it. I then explained
the realities of religious practice in a Communist country and the meaning
and dangers of attending the official church. It was here that my first hand
experiences in this area in the USSR made a significant difference in




The IJ indeed was furious that Jiang had changed his reason for
seeking asylum. He also was confused as to why Jiang initially had not
stated religious persecution. We explained about the snakeheads, but
suggested that the IJ ask Jiang directly.2 1
Two days later, we returned for the IJ's oral decision He began
by noting that he found Jiang credible. This was an essential element for a
favorable decision. He denied Jiang asylum on four counts, including
actions against him because of belonging to an ethnic minority. To this
point, a half hour had passed. That left only the statutory ground,
persecution on account of religion, on which asylum could be granted.
After discussing his reasoning on this issue, he rendered his decision
granting Jiang asylum. When the interpreter told Jiang the decision, he
fell on the floor sobbing. For an Asian man, this outward show of
emotion was amazing. Two days later, on September 3, 1993, Jiang was a
21. Recently, I was asked to review certain Golden Venture cases for findings of
credibility. I found several cases that clearly were religious persecution cases; yet had been
denied or not argued as such. It seems that the U's questioned the asylee on religious doctrine.
He, of course, could not respond; therefore, he was deemed incredible and was denied asylum.
In some cases, the petitioner appeared pro se because he couldn't find a lawyer. I hope my
colleagues and I will prevail in getting these cases re-opened and re-heard.
22. We anticipated that Jiang's simple response would help establish his credibility. Jiang
replied without hesitation," because the smugglers told me to."
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free man. Jiang was among the first and one of very few Golden Venture
asylees released.
C. A "Free Man"
Jiang was free and safely under the protection of the Chinese
interpreters in Allentown, who had become his mentors. Through our
efforts and theirs, Jiang got a position working in the freezer in an area
meat processing plant. The myth that illegal aliens granted asylum go on
welfare and take jobs from American workers for the most part is not true.
Jiang was willing to do any kind of work. The job he got was one that
most Americans do not want. I see this over and over again. Today, he
knows enough English that we can have a reasonable conversation.
I promised to arrange the necessary documents for his family to
join him. This was a very involved process, partly because his older
daughter was to turn twenty-one within the year. It is too complex to go
into here and not the subject of this paper. Suffice it to say, that his wife
and two of his children arrived in Allentown on November 14, 1994.
Unfortunately, there was a last minute glitch, and his older daughter was
left by herself in China. With the assistance of the United States Consulate
in Guangzhou, the older daughter got to the Chinese border crossing to
enter Hong Kong. She would just come under the wire before she reached
twenty-one. After that, under United States immigration policy, her status
would change. Her documents were in order, after months of getting them
processed in China and in the United States, airline tickets were arranged
for her in Hong Kong, and she would be on her way just before her
birthday. She got to the Chinese border by train in time. For whatever
reason, the Chinese border officials refused to let her cross. Working to
reunify her with her family continues.
Jiang's wife, son, and younger daughter arrived in Allentown on
November 14, 1994. My colleague and I and others instrumental in
getting them reunited were there, with Jiang, to greet them. Today, his
wife and children, when not in school, work in a knitting factory at
minimum pay, but grateful to work. His daughter, who spoke some
English when she came, became proficient enough in the language to pass
the entrance exams for Pennsylvania State University. She has a difficult
curriculum, but is doing well. Jiang's son, who spoke no English when he
came, now is in the honors class in high school.
VI. CLIENT Two: A CASE STUDY
In the Spring of 1994, Jiang asked me to represent another Golden
Venture passenger, Fen-Hou Chen, who still remained in Lehigh County
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Prison. It had gotten back to this man's family in China that Jiang's
attorneys had gotten him asylum. Now Chen's family persuaded Jiang's
family (still in China) and, by telephone to Jiang, for him to prevail upon
me to represent Chen. At that time, I did not plan to take another case,
although I continued to review and consult on other Golden Venture cases,
and was on the Golden Venture legal team pursuing discovery into the
question of administrative political influence in the adjudication of these
cases.2Y As a favor to Jiang, I finally agreed in March to represent Chen.
However, I asked Jiang to make it clear to Chen's family that our legal
system worked differently and legal procedures must be adhered to;
therefore there were no guarantees I could get Chen asylum. This was
particularly true since Chen's case clearly was based on China's coerced
abortion and sterilization policy, and all such claims were being denied.
A. Chen's Story
Chen's story revolves around the birth of his second child, a son.
His first child, a girl, was born five years before. It was only after his
second child was born that it became known that his wife had had a baby.
She was bleeding severely and had to go the hospital. She had managed to
hide her pregnancy. Had she been caught, she would have had a forced
abortion and additional punishment for removing her IUD without
permission. Initially, she did so because the IUD caused her health
problems. It has been documented that second babies are killed at birth or
forcibly aborted even at the latest stages of development. They not only
wanted a second child but also hoped for a son. 4
Within days after Chen's wife's return from the hospital, the local
police came to take her to be sterilized. Chen asked for a month's delay
because she was too weak. If she would not go, then they would force
Chen to be sterilized. For Chen, this was not an option. He needed his
strength to work (in construction) to support his family. He knew of other
men sterilized and how it weakened them, physically and emotionally.
He then got into serious trouble with the officials when he dared to
question why they, their friends and others whom they favored, were
allowed to have more than one child. Clearly, the officials could be as
preferential as they wanted as long as they met their monthly quotas of
sterilizations and others. The coerced and selective manner in which they
23. See discussion infra Part VI(E).
24. In Chinese culture a son is essential, especially to those who live in the villages. It is
the son who takes care of and is responsible for supporting his parents in old age, whose family




did so was not to be questioned. The officials were furious that Chen
should dispute their authority. They would be back and soon.
That night Chen took his wife and children to hide with family in
another village. The next day his neighbor warned him at work that a
contingent of police came to find him and were so angry that no one was
there that they broke down the door to his house. Chen knew he had to
escape. He or his wife faced forced sterilization, no matter what their
health, imprisonment and stiff fines equal to a year's salary. To this day,
his wife and children remain in hiding. They have no registration or work
papers. If they went out, villagers would report them to the police as
strangers there.
These actions by Chen were treated, in the PRC, as defiant acts of
opposition to an official policy and against those who were to carry out
these policies. In the PRC, it has been documented that such actions rise
to the level of political opinion, which not only is not tolerated in the PRC,
but punishable in the most inhumane and persecutive ways.
B. Initial Legal Procedures
It was mid-March 1994. Timing was crucial. At the end of
March, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals hear and render a decision, a
class action suit filed on behalf of the Golden Venture detainees in York
and Allentown. This was an appeal from the Middle District Court, where
Judge Sylvia Rambo had denied the suit. The Third Circuit concurred.
The INS had agreed to wait for this ruling before proceeding on
deportation processing. At this point anyone not protected by a habeas
petition was in jeopardy. The INS again set a mid-April deadline to deport
the imprisoned Golden Venture people, specifically those who had
exhausted their administrative remedies. Chen fit into this category. In
December, 1993, the BIA denied Chen asylum based upon Chang. This
even though they affirmed the IJ's finding of credibility. Chen's only
means for protection against deportation was to file a writ of habeas corpus
before the end of March. I met with him over the March 13th weekend to
ascertain the facts of his case. On March 24 1994, the habeas was filed in
the United States District Court in Philadelphia.
C. INS Transfers Chen from Allentown to York, Pennsylvania
On April 19, 1994, the INS moved the forty-five Golden Venture
men in Allentown to join over 100 of their shipmates in York County
Prison. The York group was under the jurisdiction of the United States
Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Habeas petitions had been
filed, and the cases consolidated into one civil action suit. Judge Sylvia
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Rambo had notified the INS that none of these men were to be deported
without her knowledge and before their individual cases were ruled upon.
This gave added protection, which was not a certainty in the Eastern
District where Chen's habeas was filed and where his case would be
heard. If he were denied asylum, he would be deported back to China.
Only one other District Court, in Virginia, had ruled in favor of a
Golden Venture petitioner. This was an excellent opinion, which reflected
a common sense judge who had knowledge of the human rights realities in
imposition of the PRC's family planning policies. In that case, the INS
still did not free him. The INS claimed that the BIA's Chang decision took
precedence, and that the decision of one federal district court did not
change this. Therefore, in Chen's case, even a favorable ruling in the
Eastern District was no guarantee that he would prevail. Other federal
court decisions were mixed, most supporting the position of the INS.
This presented this counsel with a dilemma. Chen's life was at
stake if he were deported back to China. Looking at all the factors, this
counsel determined that the safest route for Chen was to transfer his case
to the Middle District. His case would be consolidated into the Civil Case
before Judge Rambo. Here he also would not be isolated from his Chinese
friends. On May 2, 1994, Chen's case officially was transferred.
D. Joining the Nucleus of Golden Venture Legal Team in York: A
Concerted Effort and Resulting Congressional Action
With Chen's transfer to York, I became more deeply involved than
I ever anticipated in the plight of the Golden Venture detainees and in the
legal team." It was only working as a coordinated group that we had any
hope of freeing these men. The government was immovable on the
implementation of Chang.
So begins a remarkable story of a commitment to ideals, fairness,
and dedication by lawyers and lay people in rallying around those of the
Golden Venture. It was this combined effort, including hundreds of hours
of pro bono time, that resulted in the inclusion in the 1996 Illegal
Immigration and Responsibilities Act of section 601, which amended the
INA statute's definition of persecution on account of public opinion to
include those seeking asylum from China's coerced population control
program. This was one of the few positive aspects of the IIRAIRA. The
25. The nucleus of the Golden Venture Steering Committee, set up by Judge Rambo toward
the end of 1993, and the legal team was in York. However, attorneys for these men are in
Philadelphia, New York, Pittsburgh and so on.
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IIRAIRA was passed by Congress and signed by the President on
September 30, 1996.26
This did not mean, however, immediate implementation. There
were issues to be resolved. The government was in a dilemma on how to
proceed and continues to drag its feet in most cases. Do they parole all of
the men or just those whose cases were deemed credible by the IJ and
BIA, but who were denied by Chang. Not factored into the equation was
that many of these cases did not get correct hearings on the facts of each
case, or that some had no attorneys because of the fast track expedited
nature of the hearings, or that the issue of credibility was not addressed
because the case was automatically denied under Chang, and on and on.
The maneuvering continues.
With the advent of the new law, the next step, as Chen's attorney,
was to file a request for parole and a grant of asylum to the INS District
Director in Philadelphia. Chen qualified. However, in August 1994 he
also had qualified, under newly announced INS guidelines, for
Humanitarian Parole and, again in June 1996, under enhanced
procedures/criteria for Humanitarian Parole. Each time, I filed the
required requests and supporting documentation. Each time I received a
form letter of denial as had my other colleagues .21 It seemed clear that the
Golden Venture people would not be paroled. We kept meeting dead ends.
What would be the reason now under the new legislation for Chen
not to be released? This was our best shot yet. After all, Chen's story had
been deemed credible both by the IJ and BIA. So, again, I filed with the
District Director a request for Chen, based on the IIRAIRA, for a
minimum of parole as well as asylum. This was on November 22, 1996.
I called daily to inquire on the status of his petition. The response for
weeks was, "[w]e're working on it" or "[wje are waiting to hear from
Washington." However, by law, it was in the discretion of the District
Director to grant parole. This was a familiar pattern and could go on for
26. In brief, section 601 of the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibilities Act
amends the INA's definition of refugee. " It recognizes that:
resistance to, failure or refusal of a person to undergo coerced abortion and involuntary
sterilization and persecution because of such resistance to a coercive population
program and/or a person who has a well founded fear that he/she will be forced to
undergo such a procedure shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution
on account of political opinion.
The latter is one of the five enumerated grounds for asylum. In some ways this confirms the
meaning and application of Exec. Order No. 12,711 (1989).
27. In a discussion with one of my colleagues, he noted that hidden in this 1994 memo on
Humanitarian Parole was the first formal policy declaration that Executive Order 12,711 (1989)
no longer was in force, but Chang was. Yet, the IJ's and BIA had been applying Chang for over
a year.
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months. In the meantime, Chen was facing his fourth Christmas in prison.
Emotionally and physically, Chen and the other Golden Venture men in
York were ready to break. Previously, some had asked to go back to
China. Those who have returned have not been heard from.
Therefore, other action was needed to move this along. I
contacted my Congressmen and had them call the INS legislative liaisons
in Philadelphia and Washington. I contacted the INS General Counsel's
office in Washington. It was his office that issued an internal agency
memo on the new law on October 21st and the procedures to be followed
in finalizing these cases. The memo concluded that, under the IIRAIRA,
Chang no longer was valid.
Finally, on January 3, 1997, Chen was one of two granted a sixty
day parole from York County Prison. This would be extended to a year
once I filed a Motion to Re-Open or Remand. This has been done in a
joint motion with the Office of Immigration Litigation to the BIA. It now
is up to the BIA to evaluate Chen's request for asylum under the new law
and, as I expect, to grant him asylum.
There are others who are credible; yet they still remain in prison.
Why remains a mystery. The maneuvering for their release continues as
do I as a member of the Golden Venture legal team.
E. The Formation of the "People of the Golden Vision:" An
Interfaith Coalition For Immigrants' Rights
In August 1993 a rash of I decisions on the York cases came
down. All were denied. One of the York pro bono attorneys for the 100
plus Golden Venture men, Craig Trebilcock, was so incensed that he called
a press conference the next day. After reading this news story in the local
paper, Joan Maruskin, an area pastor contacted Trebilcock to see how she
could help. This also was the beginning of nationwide media coverage of
the plight of the men and women of the Golden Venture.
This was the commencement of People of the Golden Vision
(Golden Vision), under the dynamic leadership of Pastor Joan Maruskin
(Pastor Joan). This grass roots group started out with weekly protests
outside York County Prison, which included prayer services entitled
Services of Exodus, Freedom, and Justice. At this writing, these
gatherings are in their 180th week. This organization, now in its fourth
year, will continue until the last person of the Golden Venture is released
from detention. The nucleus of the group is in York but it has grown to
include people nationwide.
One of the heartwarming results of the formation of the Golden
Vision is its diverse composition of lay people and attorneys, conservatives
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and liberals, pro-choice and pro-life, people of color, people of different
religions, and on and on. It has made activists out of people who do not
get involved in issues. The Golden Vision has aroused the interest and
support of the entire York community. Under Pastor Joan's leadership,
they have made their voices heard in the media, in the halls of Congress,
at the White House, and elsewhere. They have raised money to pay for
supportive services for the defense of these men, including art sales of
their intricate freedom paper sculptures. A significant percentage of these
proceeds has been placed in a central account. These funds are used to
give each of the men spending money while in detention and resettlement
money upon release.2
The bottom line of the People of the Golden Vision and subsequent
activities of this group, indicate that most Americans, whatever their views
on the moral and political questions surrounding abortion and related
human rights issues, regard coerced abortion and sterilization as ghastly
violations of fundamental human rights. As a global issue, it should be
noted that forced abortion and related acts were considered a crime against
humanity at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, and by other
international treaties, and United Nations documents.
An outgrowth of the plight of the Golden Venture has been a
Golden Vision sub-group, spearheaded by Pastor Joan, to look into prison
conditions for those incarcerated while seeking asylum. It was a revelation
of institutional abuse and inhumane treatment. We found this varied from
prison to prison. However, in each detention facility, the Golden Venture
asylees were in the criminal category.
As part of this sub-group, I attended meetings in New York and
with West Coast human rights groups. While in Los Angeles, Pastor Joan
and I visited the Golden Venture women incarcerated in the Lerdo Facility
in Bakersfield, California, a deportation holding center. I was appalled at
the conditions there. This could have been a third world prison. There
were slits for windows, covered with what looked like plastic wrap; the
water was not drinkable; the women, for example, reported that they could
get only one sanitary napkin at a time and not always when needed;
breakfast was served at 4 a.m., lunch at 10 a.m. and dinner at 4 p.m. The
women reported that they went outside for air maybe twice a week. They
were put into isolation or severely reprimanded for infractions as minor as
talking too loud, laughing or crying. I had seen other prisons, but
Bakersfield was a shock. Even though I was an attorney, I could speak to
only one woman at a time, and this by telephone through a glass wall. The
English speaking Golden Venture woman was not allowed to stay to
28. See discussion on Golden Venture.
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translate for one who spoke only Chinese. Therefore, I was precluded
from talking with her. Pastor Joan was with me, only she had to wait until
my visit was over before she could go in.
Later, Pastor Joan agreed that the treatment in Bakersfield was
horrendous, but that it was absolutely inhumane when these same women
were incarcerated in New Orleans (prior to being shipped to California).
She tried to visit them at the New Orleans facility, but found that these
thirteen Chinese asylees were not allowed visitors. Even their attorneys
most times were denied admittance. Somehow she managed to speak with
them. Pastor Joan noted that these women were treated with all kinds of
abuse and lived under hellish conditions. This was affirmed in letters
which these women sent to members of the Golden Vision in York. They
pleaded for help. So this is how we treat those fleeing persecution!
In contrast, at York Prison, I could meet with my client in person
or join my other colleagues for a group meeting with the men. My client
could bring an English speaking Golden Venture person with him to act as
translator. The men no longer were handcuffed within the prison. Within
the confines of being in prison, these Chinese men were treated as human
beings. However, their spirit is broken and some, because of the prison
diet which is not digestible by them, have developed serious illnesses. For
some, the stress of waiting and confinement were too much, and they
asked to go back to China .29
Through our investigations into prison conditions for those
requesting asylum, we have learned that our government pays more than
twice as much per day to the prisons for illegal aliens than the prisons get
for real criminals. This is big business for local prisons with, it seems,
very little federal control. In the final analysis, it is our tax dollars that
pay for this and that perpetuate this unjust system of justice of the free to
the persecuted who come here because we are a nation of freedom.
F. Congressional Hearings
The plight of the detained Golden Venture asylees finally reached
the halls of Congress. In May, June, and July, 1995, the House
Subcommittee on International Relations and Human Rights of the
Committee on International Relations held hearings on coercive population
control in China. After several promises and canceled sessions, the INS
finally brought several of the Bakersfield women to testify. The chair of
this committee was the Honorable Christopher Smith of New Jersey,
whose legal counsel was former INS General Counsel, Grover Joseph
29. See discussion infra Part VI(E).
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Rees. After much discussion, the committee denied DOJ's request for a
closed hearing. The public had a right to know what these women had to
say.
Representatives Smith, Hyde, Goodling (from York County), and
others on the committee were incensed when the women were brought in
handcuffed. They were told by the INS security people that these women
were considered prisoners; therefore, the rules had to be followed. The
handcuffs finally were removed. This, however, set the tone for their
dramatic testimony of involuntary sterilization, forced abortion of a late
term pregnancy, forced implementation and life threatening infections
from IUDs, fines equal to a year's salary because of non-compliance, and
much more. Those on the Subcommittee were shocked. They were
incensed not only by the testimony of these women but also by the cruel
way in which they were being treated in detention here worse than
common criminals in a country that prides itself on being just and free.
During their discussions, the overwhelming feeling of the committee was
that these women and others on the Golden Venture should be treated as
refugees, not as illegal immigrants.
Congresspeople, too, needed this kind of a reality check. It belies
the myths perpetrated on illegal immigrants from certain countries. It was
a real education on the way we treat those who have fled persecution to
come here and are again persecuted.
The outgrowth of these hearings, with continued pressure by the
Golden Vision group and Golden Venture lawyers, was section 601 of the
IIRAIRA.3 0
G. Charges Against the Administration of Political Influence
In November 1993, the first writs of habeas corpus were filed by
York attorney, Craig Trebilcock, and others on behalf of those Golden
Venture men who already had been denied asylum by the BIA. He felt
there was something more behind the Administration's decision, after the
landing of the Golden Venture, to suddenly begin to be apply Chang to this
group as a denial of asylum versus Executive Order 12,711, under which
they would have and had been grated asylum. The latter had been applied
since June 1989 and as recently as May 1993 to those seeking asylum
because of recognition that China's coerced population control programs
were the worst kind of human rights violations.
Trebilcock's interest in what seemed to be the possibility of
political influence in the adjudication of the Golden Venture cases peeked
30. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 601 (1996).
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in the Fall of 1993. As he read through some of the IJ merit hearing
transcripts and oral decisions, he noted judge's comments regarding
"expedited hearings, fast track adjudication for the Golden Venture cases."
This was substantiated further by a conversation pro bono attorney Ann
Carr had in July 1993 with a clerk in the Baltimore Immigration Court, a
field office of EOIR. Carr called the court office to inquire if she had any
other options to get a continuance for her Golden Venture client's hearing
on the merits. She just. had been given, by the U, only four days from an
initial hearing to the merits hearing although she had explained that she
just had been given this client. To prepare even a reasonable defense on
such short notice was hampered further by having to work through a
translator, around cultural barriers, prison regulations, and more. The IJ
made it clear that no further continuances in these cases would be granted.
This was true of others as well.
Ms. Carr asked the Immigration Court Clerk why no extensions
were being granted on hearings on the merits. The clerk replied: "[T]he
Clinton White House had personally called this Immigration Court and
asked that all the Chinese detainee cases be expedited and that no
continuances be granted."' Trebilcock presented Ann Carr's affidavit and
other evidence discussed, supra, to Middle District Judge Sylvia Rambo.
He requested a court order to allow him, on behalf of all petitioners, to
proceed with discovery of certain INS, DOJ, EOIR, White House, and
other relevant documents. These might shed light on this question of
possible political influence, specifically in the adjudication of the Golden
Venture cases. Judge Rambo saw enough evidence to warrant granting
this order. She set up a Petitioners' Steering Committee as a liaison to the
Court for all of the Golden Venture attorneys, with Trebilcock as
Chairman.
Government compliance with Judge Rambo's order was fraught
with all kinds of delays, citing confidentiality and security reasons for non-
release of certain documents, answers of petitioners' interrogatories and
more. Eventually, Trebilcock and others of us on the designated
Discovery Team conducted depositions with members of the White House
staff, including members of the National Security Council (NSC) and of a
committee organized by the NSC, the Border Control Working Group
(BCWG), those working under the Attorney General, the Counsel to the
Director of EOIR (EOIR Counsel), and others. The EOIR director, to
whom the EOIR Counsel reported and advised on legal issues, also was the
Chairman of the BIA.
31. This conversation was documented in a affidavit by Ann Carr, dated Sept. 16, 1993.
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These depositions took us to Washington, Miami, and elsewhere.32
We discovered information about the Border Security Working Group
(BCWG) meetings at the White House. Attending some of these meetings
was the EOIR Counsel. It was he who was asked, shortly after the arrival
of the Golden Venture, by the Attorney General's office to prepare an
expedited plan to deal with the detained Chinese asylees, specifically those
on the Golden Venture. This fast track plan was dated June 15, 1993.
Prior to that, he was privy to policy discussions at the White House
meetings of the BCWG. This petitioners' counsel noted was in direct
conflict to his role as EOIR Counsel to the BIA. He was well aware from
attending these meetings that the Administration wanted a "deterrent to the
Chinese smugglers bringing in these people." It is EOIR that oversees the
BIA and immigration judges. Yet here was their counsel being part of the
discussion on the need to make an example of the Golden Venture. Deny
them asylum and perhaps this will stop the smugglers and send a signal
back to others in China. It then was decided to implement Chang for the
first time since it was decided in May 1989.11 Clearly this was a radical
departure from immediate past procedure, which, infra, had been
discussed in great detail at the BCWG White House meetings.
This discovery process indicated that barriers had broken down
between INS litigators and judges, i.e. the enforcement and judicial arms
of DOJ. Ann Carr's affidavit and the discussion, supra, clearly support this
breakdown from the newly expedited hearing policy, the Administration's
policy on setting up the adjudication of the Golden Venture cases as a
"deterrent effect on smugglers,"34 the Office of Immigration Litigation's
(OIL) resurrection of Chang as applicable law to accomplish this goal, the
conflict of EOIR's Counsel's participation in BCWG meetings at the White
House, and his position of counselor to the judicial arm responsible for
adjudicating these cases. This interference of the White House staff in the
judicial process had filtered as far down as the clerical staff at the Office of
the Immigration Judge in Baltimore.,,
It was clear from the testimony heard that the White House was
calling the shots and using the adjudication of the Golden Venture cases as
an example. This was confirmed in the New York Times statement quoted
below by special assistant to then-Associate Attorney General, Webster
Hubbell. In this September 5, 1993 Times article, entitled United States
Tightens Asylum Rules for Chinese, she states, "[w]e've made no secret of
32. Immigration judges who had been brought in to hear these cases were deposed.
33. In re Chang, Int. Dec. No. 3107 (BIA 1989).
34. See supra note 31.
35. Id.
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the fact that these cases be expedited. We want the authentic refugees to
be found and others deported to China, as a bit of a signal, especially to
the criminals organizing the smuggling."36 The article goes on to note that
not only were these cases being decided faster, but tougher standards
(namely, Chang) have meant that the vast majority of the Golden Venture
passengers automatically would be denied asylum and deported. 7
In the name of justice, we attorneys and the People of the Golden
Vision are just as determined that they shall never be forced to go back to
China. Their fate now will be even more persecutive, partly. because of all
of the media and other attention which has been focused on these cases.
From various sources, we know that each person from the Golden Venture
is known to the highest level of the PRC's government. Unfortunately,
some of the men could not take the stress of our prisons, and the excessive
waiting. So they asked to go back. They promised to let us know if they
were okay. To date, it is no surprise that we have heard from none of
them.
H. Fly to Freedom: The Art of the Golden Venture Prisoners
The men of the Golden Venture detained in York County Prison
obviously had time on their hands. Almost all were non-English speaking
and, therefore, not interested in watching television. One of the men knew
a form of Chinese paper folding. He taught a few of the others around
him. The first piece he made went to the prison Chaplain's office. It is the
simple figure of a bird reminiscent of Fujianese practice of paper folding
folk art called zhizha or huzhi. So, while the men waited they folded.
Prison regulations dictated what tools they could have. They were
permitted magazines, legal pads (left by the attorneys during client
meetings), and toilet paper. At first no scissors were allowed; but later,
they were permitted children's safety scissors, magic markers, and white
glue. The first sculptures were of eagles. They called them freedom
birds. They symbolized the men's dreams of freedom. An eagle less than
a foot high could contain over seven hundred or more of individually
folded paper, just in the wings and tail alone. Folding not only became a
means of passing the time, but the resulting sculptures a means of gratitude
for their pro bono attorneys.
Over the three and one-half years of incarceration, these sculptures
have become more intricate, a form of Chinese folk art carried to new
heights of artistic and creative expression. New techniques were





developed to show texture. The men were divided into pods, and different
pods would develop different specialties. Over the years new styles have •
been added - pineapples, ginger jars, vases, bonsai trees in pots (using
individual threads from towels for tree needles), dragons, statues of
liberty, seven story towers, and more. The Chaplain's office and later the
Warden became very supportive. They realized that this an excellent way
to keep these 100 plus non-English speaking frustrated and bored Chinese
prisoners constructively occupied.
Soon these sculptures were seen in lawyer's offices and elsewhere.
People who saw them were astounded by these unique works, the obvious
patience and talent it took to fashion them and wanted to know how they
could acquire them. The Golden Vision began having art auctions and
shows of these works to raise money for the men. The men now had
reason to speed up their production, while continuing to refine each hand-
crafted piece.
The news media became fascinated by this unprecedented story,
the quality of expression of, and the growing excitement over the prison
art of the Golden Venture men. Feature articles with photographs appeared
in Life Magazine, the Philadelphia Inquirer Sunday Magazine, Folk Art
Magazine, and newspapers nationwide. In fact, several have been granted
artist visas and more are pending. This is a testimony of the artistry of
their art designs and their execution.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
On January 30, 1997, the United States State Department came out
with its annual reports on human rights in 193 countries. Cited right at the
top of the list for worsening human rights abuses was China. This
reaffirms what we attorneys initially believed and came to substantiate over
these past three and one-half years as defenders of the passengers of the
Golden Venture.
As exemplified by this article, the INS, DOJ, the federal courts,
BIA, INS District Directors, the Administration, and others appeared to
have put insurmountable obstacles in our way. They thought that, at some
point, we attorneys would become frustrated enough and throw in the
towel, particularly, since this was and is mainly a pro bono effort. In
essence, this would leave the road open for the INS to deport the
incarcerated Golden Venture men and women back to China. As noted,
supra, over 100 have been sent back. There is no word from any of them,
which says it all.
In doing so, it is not China's coerced family planning policy that is
on the lines. It is the very democratic values that we say we cherish and
19971
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preach to other countries to embrace. It is our immigration process, and
the manner in which these asylum cases have been adjudicated that is on
the line. It is the manner in which we detain and treat such people when in
detention that is on the line. It is the fact that our government would
change five years of United States policy, i.e. the 1989 Executive Order,
that was dictated by Congressional action in granting asylum to such
Chinese, by imposing a pre-Tiananmen Square BIA decision, Chang,
which automatically denies asylum to those fleeing China's coerced family
planning policies. The criminal act a is using this BIA decision as a means
of denying asylum and reason to send those on the Golden Venture back to
China because the Administration wanted this group to serve as a deterrent
to the smugglers who brought them to our shores, and others. It is in these
actions and the real meaning of United States human rights policies that are
on the line.
This does not mean that the Administration should not set policies
which would deter such smuggling of human cargo, whether from China
or elsewhere. However, to do so at the expense of those fleeing to our
shores, even illegally, because of China's persecutive human rights
policies cannot be justified. Good policy does not go after the persecuted,
who are the pawns and not the criminals. It finds and prosecutes the
smugglers and others who profit from the persecuted.
It was Congress again, as it had in 1989, that acted to grant those
of the Golden Venture and others asylum, for reasons already noted, by
including section 601 in the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (1996 Act). Congress had spoken and the
1996 Act was signed into law by the President on September 30, 1996.
However, the actual implementation of this law has been fraught with
delays and seemingly bureaucratic indecision. It should be noted that
section 601 limits to 1,000 persons per year who can be granted asylum
because of coercive family planning To date, this has non been a problem;
but it could become one in the future. In the meantime, for us as a nation,
it is important that this issue of coercive family planning has shocked the
conscience of our elected officials to the point of such action.
To date, only my client (Fen Hou Chen) and one other have been
released on parole under this new law. My client's claim now has been
remanded, jointly by this attorney and the government attorneys at OIL, to
the BIA for their adjudication. How long this review will take, we do not
know. It could be months; but, at least Chen is free on parole. However,
until he is granted asylum, he cannot apply for his family to join him. It
already has been over four years since he has seen them. In the interim,
his wife, to avoid immediate forced sterilization and to protect their
children, remains in hiding in China. The rest of the Golden Venture
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detainees still remain incarcerated. Each day that they continue to sit in
prison has become another nail in their coffins. This is a statement of fact.
How can this or any United States Administration expect the
Chinese government ever to change its coercive human rights and other
such abusive policies, when the procedures and actions of our government
plainly show that we have and may still continue to send back to China
those persecuted under the PRC's system? Such United States conduct
truly belies the January 30, 1997 State Department Report condemning
China's horrendous human rights policies and the outrage expressed
publicly by members of this Administration.
There is more. What messages have United Nations agencies and
in turn, the United States Administration, in funding and supporting these
agencies, continued to send to China about concern for their human rights
policies? For example, the United Nations Agency For International
Development's (UNFPA) Executive Director, as recently as 1991, told a
meeting in Washington that the Chinese program was totally voluntary and
that China had every reason to feel proud of and pleased with its
remarkable achievement in family planning. One can state that the initial
concept may have looked good; however, the media, NGOs, the Golden
Venture documentation and our own State Department note that the above
quoted comments are not and have not been true for over a decade.
Despite this, and media reports of rising coercion levels in these Chinese
programs as of May of 1993, the United States Administration went ahead
with its funding of UNFPA shortly after the June landing of the Golden
Venture.
What signal is President Clinton really sending to the Chinese
leadership by his extraordinary gesture to China's president at the
November Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Manila of an
exchange of presidential state visits. This was the first agreed on exchange
of presidential visits since 1989? The lack of state visits at this highest
level did tell the Chinese that if China wanted such United States
recognition, it had to make dramatic changes in its human rights policies.
Even the signing by the President of the1996 Act, which clearly recognizes
China's coercive policies, did not stop this invitation. Therefore, China
now is getting its wishes without any pre-conditions.
Did our President have to go that far, even for reasons of doing
business with China? This lack of such state visits did not stop the
growing economic ties between the two countries. My colleagues and I
submit, he did not. China needs our business and our markets. To make
matters worse, on the January 30th McNeil Lehrer Report, dealing with the
just released State Department human rights report, John Shattuck,
Assistant Secretary of State, noted that China now has closed down all
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dissent. He commented that this and their oppressive human rights
policies are of concern; however, in other ways China is making progress.
This is even more reason why the presidential visit possibly should be
reconsidered. What does such a summit meeting say about the very values
for which our nation stands?
In February 1997, the new Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright,
will visit China. In a January 31, 1997 International Herald Tribune
editorial, it stated that Secretary of State Albright's commitment to human
rights and democracy faces its severest test in China. Vice President Al
Gore, who plans to play a larger role in China, and the Clinton
Administration, will be judged on how they handle China on this issue.
To quote the above editorial: "Mr. Clinton's press conference remarks,
read closely, were an argument against pushing China hard on human
rights and internal political reform." The editorial continues,
the problem with this analysis is that it indulges Chinese
repression and may be taken by Beijing as a sign of
American weakness. But Washington does need to be
more assertive about its interests, more demanding of an
end to China's human rights abuses, and less willing to
sacrifice American principles for American commerce in
China. This is not Berlin and the demise of European
communism. There is already abundant evidence
suggesting that communism in China is not dying, but is
.instead mutating into a new form that tolerates economic
liberties while still suffocating political freedom.
Why then should China correct its human rights policies? It seems
that commercially and otherwise, China gets what it wants without doing
so. There may be one very important reason. China does want to join the
World Trade Organization (hereinafter WTO). To do so, China will have
to make some human rights and other changes to meet WTO's standards
unless in some way, other members. of the WTO, including the U.S.
decide differently.
The comments of Dr. John Aird at the Subcommittee hearings
brought in a most important message. For many years he was the United
States Census Bureau's principal expert on population. In the PRC, he
stated, "the United States always has played a major role in promoting the
idea of universal human rights, not only through the United Nations but
also in its relations with other countries." But our policies and actions
have not always matched our words. Human rights considerations at times
come into conflict with various domestic interest groups, who are
successful in getting the United States government to strike compromises
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that serve their own economic and other ends. This is particularly true
with a country like China, which is economically and politically important
to the United States and others; yet has one of the worst or worst human
rights records in the world. Of course China, as did the former Soviet
Union, is a closed society and claims that these are internal issues and are
not to be meddled in by the United States or others.
This issue of asylum and asylum law and the broader question of
immigrations, legal and illegal, has created much interest in the
international law and human rights communities. The Cold War is over.
Conflicts within and among regional nations have created the most
atrocious violations of human rights and the flight of refugees seeking
asylum. This has raised many questions of responsibility and resolution on
a global scale, particularly in democratic countries. Ad hoc solutions no
longer are workable. In the case of the Golden Venture, we have explored
the options, including finding third countries that will take them. An
indication of this topical significance was its inclusion in the November
program of International Law Weekend 1996, an annual event held at the
New York City Bar Association. This important conference is presented
by the American Branch of the International Law Association in
conjunction with other international law organizations. As a member of
the planning committee, I suggested this topic and organized the program.
The panel was a diverse group, which included this writer, Enid H. Adler;
the INS General Counsel, David Martin; Director of Press and Public
Affairs, European Commission in New York, Wouter Wilton; the Director
of Immigration and Refugee programs at Harvard University Law School,
Deborah E, Anker; Counsel, Human Rights Watch/Africa, Binaifer
Nowrojee; and the Director of Migration Services, the Open Society
Institute, Arthur C. Helton. We each presorted our views to a crowded
room. Our intent is to follow-up on this lively discussion and serious
issue-.
If in this process of the resolution of the Golden Venture case, we
attorneys, the People of the Golden Vision, and others have been
influential in raising the awareness of Congress with the resulting passage
of section 601 of the IIRAIRA, all to the good. If in this process, the
media has given the plight of the Golden Venture nationwide coverage and
raised the consciousness of the nation, all to the good. If in this process,
those fleeing persecution and seeking asylum on our shores now should be
treated with dignity and in non-prison decent facilities, all to the good. If
in this process, those writing the immigration policies, overseeing and
enforcing our immigration laws will be better trained, educated, and
sensitized to the realities from which those seeking asylum fled, the
political and legal systems, cultures, fear and lack of trust of government
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and other authorities, language misinterpretations and more, all to the
good. If in this process, we have shown the real spirit of how a diverse
group of Americans can come together and make a difference in our
immigration system, changes in the law, and more, all to the good.
The fear that continues today, that millions of Chinese will come
to our shores if we opened our doors to those fleeing coerced abortion and
sterilization, is a myth. It hasn't happened and will not. It is so difficult
to get out of the PRC, legally or illegally. Clearly, from the saga of the
Golden Venture asylees, people usually do not flee their homeland and risk
their lives on such a treacherous journey without good cause. To date we
are talking about Chinese refugees in the single digits compared to asylum
seekers to the United States from other countries. As already stated, the
1996 Act has placed a cap of 1000 such refugees per year.
My colleagues and I have persisted and will continue to do so, not
only for those from the Golden Venture but also others from the PRC who
have fled to our shores because of China's persecutive policies, coerced
family planning, religious persecution, any political dissent. To allow the
INS to send these people back, to face what our own government has
documented as the worst kind of human cruelty, would go against our very
sense of acceptable human behavior, of justice, and fairness under the law,
the right to freedom of expression and the ideals for which we believe our
nation stands.
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WHAT PRICE PEACE: FROM NUREMBERG TO
BOSNIA TO THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE
Malvina Halberstam *
In the fifty years that have elapsed since the Nuremberg Trials, we
have made tremendous progress in the development of human rights. The
Genocide Convention,' the Convention on Civil and Political Rights,, the
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,, the Convention
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, and the Convention
Against Torture- have all been adopted by the United Nations and ratified
by the vast majority of states in the world.6
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University Prepared
for presentation at the Panel on International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law After Bosnia,
The International Law Weekend, New York, November 1, 1996. The author wishes to thank
Allan Blutstein, Cardozo 1997, for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
2. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
3. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
4. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46,
at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980).
5. International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1987).
6. Some of these are now considered to be binding under customary law and even to
constitute jus cogens. See Jordan J. Paust, The Significance and Determination of Customary
International Human Rights Law: The Complex Nature, Sources and Evidence of Customary
Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 147, 153 (1996) (noting that the prohibition of
genocide is a well-recognized peremptory norm of jus cogens); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702, and cmts. d, f (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT]; Jordan J. Paust, Symposium, The Ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights: Avoiding 'Fraudulent' Executive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-
Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1257, 1274 (1993)
(explaining that certain rights reflected in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have now
become peremptory norms of jus cogens); Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International
Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed
Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 817 (1990) (noting that human rights values embodied in the
U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights are all elements of customary international law that are rapidly
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Treaties prohibiting various aspects of terrorism, such as hostage
taking,, airplane hijacking,, sabotage, 9 seizure of ships on the high seas,10
and attacks on diplomats," have also been ratified by a large number of
states. 2 These Conventions, not only prohibit the conduct, but make it
criminal" or require states parties to make the conduct criminal under their
internal laws,' 4 punishable by "severe penalties,"" and require any state in
which an alleged offender is found to either prosecute or extradite him.
16
In one respect, however, we have not progressed, and seem to have
regressed: those responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and
terrorism, still go unpunished. They walk free, with impunity, and in
some cases are even courted by heads of state and honored with the most
prestigious awards that the international community can bestow.
In the case of the former Yugoslavia, an International Criminal
Tribunal has been established to try those responsible for war crimes and
establishing themselves as jus cogens); Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of
the Rights of Individuals Rather Than the States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1982) (noting that
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, as well as about fifty additional declarations and conventions
concerning issues such as discrimination against women and racial discrimination, have become a
part of international customary law).
7. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S.
11081, 1315 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Hostage Convention].
8. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22
U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Hijacking Convention].
9. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 1151 [hereinafter
Sabotage Convention].
10. Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988) [hereinafter Maritime Terrorism Convention].
11. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S.
167 [hereinafter Internationally Protected Persons Convention].
12. As of January 1, 1996, 157 States had ratified the Hijacking Convention, supra note 8;
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 326-27 (1996); 157 States had ratified the Sabotage
Convention, supra note 9, at 327-28; 94 States had ratified the Internationally Protected Persons
Convention, supra note 11, at 441-42; 76 States had ratified the Hostage Convention, supra note
7, at 442; and 32 States had ratified the Maritime Terrorism Convention, supra note 10, at 398.
13. See Hijacking Convention, supra note 8, art. 2; Sabotage Convention, supra note 9,
art. 1; Hostage Convention, supra note 7, art. 1; Maritime Terrorism Convention, supra note 10,
art. 3.
14. See Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 11, art 2.
15. See e.g., Hijacking Convention, supra note 8, art. 2, 22 U.S.T. at 1646, 860 U.N.T.S.
110.
16. See Hijacking Convention, supra note 8, art. 7; Sabotage Convention, supra note 9,
art. 7; Internationally Protected Persons Convention, supra note 11, art. 7; Hostage Convention,
supra note 7, art. 8; Maritime Terrorism Convention, supra note 10, art. 10.
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crimes against humanity." A number of persons, including prominent
leaders in the conflict, responsible for unspeakable atrocities, have been
indicted.'8 But, they have not been apprehended and brought to trial.1'
There appears to be great reluctance to do so.20 Although they have been
barred from running for office, and display of their pictures has been
prohibited, those seeking office showed empty frames to convey the
message that they identify with and have the support of these leaders
whose image was barred.2'
The question of whether the leaders should be prosecuted has been
the subject of scholarly debate, with some commentators taking the
position that perhaps we should forego prosecution." For example,
Professor Ruth Wedgwood stated,
[i]t may not be possible to bring about a peace settlement
in the former Yugoslavia if the Tribunal is going forward
with active prosecutions of the state leaders of the
belligerent parties . . . . You may need to accept a punto
final, and sacrifice the prosecutorial interest in general
deterrence for the sake of future peace.23
She suggests that "the slow start of the Tribunal reflects a fear that the
Tribunal's work could impede the peace process. "24'
The picture is even bleaker with respect to those responsible for
terrorist acts. No international tribunal has been established to try
terrorists who have killed innocent men, women, and children. Although
17. See U.N. SCOR, Res. 827, May 25, 1993, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203.
18. See William Drozdiak, Top Serbs Charged With War Crimes, WASH. POST, July 26,
1995, at Al (reporting the tribunals indictment of Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his
top military commander, Ratko Mladic).
19. See Robert Marquand, Bosnia War Crimes Judge Talks of Quitting, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 22, 1996, at 1 (noting that only seven of 74 people indicted by the
tribunal for war crimes are in custody, none of whom are leaders).
20. See Philip Shenon, Mixed Signals on Bosnia War Crime Issue, N.Y. TIMES, June 4,
1996, at Al (discussing statements by Pentagon officials that NATO commanders are reluctant to
step up efforts to capture accused war criminals because arrests might endanger peacekeeping
forces).
21. See Chris Hedges, Karadzic Is Out of Sight, But Not Out of Voters Minds, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 1996, at AI0.
22. See Ruth Wedgwood, Symposium, War Crimes Bosnia and Beyond: War Crimes in
the Former Yugoslavia: Comments on the International War Crimes Tribunal, 34 VA. J. INT'L L.
267, 273 (1994); Anthony D'Amato, Peace vs. Accountability in Bosnia, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 500
(1994).
23. Wedgwood, supra note 22, at 274-75.
24. Id.
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an International Criminal Court may finally be established, its jurisdiction
may not include the acts made criminal by the various terrorist
conventions. The draft statute provides for such jurisdiction,2 but the
United States is apparently opposed,26 notwithstanding that in the
Antiterrorism Act of 1986 Congress urged the President to work towards
"establishing an international tribunal for prosecuting terrorists."2 1
Not only is there no international tribunal to try those responsible
for major terrorist attacks but, unlike the situation in Bosnia, they continue
in leadership positions. Let me give you two examples.
On the evening of March 1, 1973, Cleo A. Noel, Jr., the United
States Ambassador to the Sudan, and George C. Moore, the United States
Charg6 d'Affaires, were taken hostage at a reception at the Saudi Arabian
embassy in Khartoum.2 Late the following night they were brutally beaten
and machine-gunned to death.2 9 A Belgian diplomat, Guy Eid, was also
killed. A Jordanian diplomat who had been taken hostage was released. 0
The President of the Sudan immediately made public evidence showing
that the operation had been carried out by Fatah (the Palestine Liberation
Organization faction founded and headed by Yasir Arafat), including a
written copy of the plans for the operation, which had been found in the
desk drawer of the top Fatah official in Khartoum.3'
In 1985, it was reported that the United States had information
from reliable sources that Yasir Arafat played a key role in orchestrating
the operation and gave his personal approval for the execution of Noel and
Moore. According to these sources, Arafat and other Palestine Liberation
Organization officials were directing the assassins from Fatah headquarters
25. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session,
Draft Statute of an International Criminal Court, 2 May C 22 July 1994, at 51, U.N. GAOR,
49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49110, Art. 20(e) and Annex. See also, Forty-Sixth
Session, Draft Statute of an International Criminal Court, 2 May C 22 July 1994, at 51, U.N.
GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10, Art. 20(e) and Annex. See also, id. at
Appendix II.
26. Id.
27. Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399,
§1201(d), 100 Stat. 853, 896 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §2331).
28. See Joshua Muravchik, Arresting Arafat: A Warrant for the PLO Chief?, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 30, 1985, at 12.
29. Id.
30. Richard Lyons, President Declares Killers Must Be Brought to Justice, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 1973 at A1-A2. WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1973, at Al, A22-A23.
31. See Muravchik, supra note 28.
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in Beirut, and those holding Noel and Moore did not kill them "until
receiving specific code-worded instructions" from Beirut.3"
It was further reported that "United States intelligence possessed a
taped intercept of Arafat personally ordering the Khartoum murders.",
Walter Vernon, then United States ambassador to the United Nations and
deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency at the time of the
Khartoum murders, stated in an interview in 1985, that he had been told of
the existence of such a tape. Although he did not know Arabic and had
not personally heard the tape, he said the existence of the tape "was
common knowledge at the time, among all sorts of people in the
government. "-'
Charles Lichtenstein, deputy United States representative to the
United Nations under Jean Kirkpatrick" and others urged the Attorney
General to issue a warrant for Arafat's arrest. Arafat was, however, not
indicted by the United States, nor did the United States seek his
extradition.16  The Justice Department took the position that because the
United States legislation giving United States federal courts jurisdiction to
try someone for the murder of United States diplomats abroad was adopted
after the Khartoum killings, prosecution of Yasir Arafat in the United
States was barred by the ex post facto clause of the United States
Constitution.1
The validity of that conclusion is open to serious questions. The
United States Supreme Court has interpreted the ex post facto clause to bar
prosecuting a person for an act that was "innocent when [it was] done." 8
The killing of Noel and Moore was clearly not "innocent when it was
32. Gaylord Shaw, U.S. Urged to Seek Arafat's Indictment, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1985, at
part I, p. 4 .
33. See Muravchik, supra note 28.
34. Id.
35. See Shaw, supra note 32.
36. President Reagan did threaten to boycott the United Nations 40th Anniversary
commemoration in 1985 if Yasir Arafat was invited. See Elaine Sciolino, Reagan May Boycott
Fete at U.N. if Arafat Shows Up, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1985, at A10; Elaine Sciolino, U.N.,
Facing Boycott Threat, Drops Effort to Invite Arafat, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1985 at 1. In 1988
and 1990 the United States denied Arafat visas to enter the United States to address the U.N. See
Laurence McQuillan, U.S. Visa Denial For Arafat Sparks Fight Over U.N., REUTERS, Jan. 27,
1988; Paul Lewis, Arafat Seeks to Attend U.N. Council Debate, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1990, at
C12.
37. Letter from John R. Bolton, Assistant Attorney General, to Senator Orrin G. Hatch,
(Apr. 21, 1986), reprinted in ROBERT A. FRIEDLANDER, GLOBAL TERRORISM IN THE
DANGEROUS DECADE, 335-36 (1992).
38. See e.g., Calder v. Bull. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 390 (1798).
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done." It was a crime under the municipal law of the Sudan '9 and a
violation of one of the oldest and most fundamental principles of
international law: that the person of the ambassador is inviolate.- The
Supreme Court has also stated that the ex post facto clause applies to
substantive rules, not to procedural rules.4 1 Although the Supreme Court
has never decided whether jurisdiction is substantive or procedural, an
analysis of the cases and of the policies underlying the ex post facto clause
leads to the conclusion that jurisdiction is procedural. The appropriate
action, if the United States wanted to prosecute Arafat, would have been to
obtain the indictment and to let the Court decide whether the prosecution
was or was not barred by the ex post facto clause.
International law clearly does not consider it a violation of ex post
facto to try a person before a court that did not have jurisdiction at the
time the act was committed. Neither the Nuremberg Tribunal, which tried
persons charged with committing war crimes during WWII, nor the
recently established Yugoslavia and Rwanda War Crimes Tribunals even
existed at the time the acts for which the accused were or will be
prosecuted were committed.
Not only did the United States fail to indict Arafat or to request his
extradition, but in September 1993 the President of the United States,
whose ambassador he ordered murdered, welcomed Arafat to the White
39. Section 246 of the Sudan Penal Code of 1974 (Act No. 64), Offenses Against the
Person, defines culpable homicide as follows:
Whoever causes death by doing an act:
(a) with the intention of causing death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,
or (b) with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the
offence of culpable homicide . . . . To be deemed murder, the death of the deceased
must have been the probable consequence of the act . . . . Murder is punished with
death of [sic] imprisonment for life, with the possibility of a fine.
CARLETON W. KENYON, THE SUDAN: LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 23-24 (1984).
40. This rule is codified in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Immunity, 23 U.S.T.
3227, T.I.A.S. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, which has been ratified by 175 States. U.S. Dept. of
State, Treaties in Force 324 (1994). Article 29 provides: "The person of a diplomatic agent
shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State
shall treat him with due respect and shall take appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his
person, freedom, or dignity." See also, Republica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) 114, 119
(Pa. 1784); Legal Mechanisms to Combat Terrorism: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1986) (the statement of Harris Weinstein). Weinstein stated that in his view,
"substantial authority supports the view that ex post facto clause would not bar prosecution."
41. See e.g., Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987) ("No Ex Post Facto violation
occurs if the change in the law is merely procedural").
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House 2 and on December 10, 1994 he was awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize.43 Mr. Kare Kristiansen resigned from the Nobel Peace Prize
Committee in protest. He said, "[H]is past is too filled with violence,
terrorism and bloodshed . . . . It will give the wrong signal to other
violent organizations ... ."" But, the propriety of the award did not give
rise to a great deal of diplomatic or scholarly debate.
The other example involves Abu Abbas, who masterminded the
seizure of the Achille Lauro, an Italian flag ship. Several hundred
passengers were held hostage and one, a crippled American man in a
wheelchair, was killed and thrown overboard." The hijackers eventually
surrendered in Egypt.4 1 Contrary to its obligations under the Hostage
Convention 8 to either extradite or prosecute the offenders, ' 9 Egypt
permitted them to leave and even provided them with an Egyptian military
airplane for that purpose °
At President Reagan's direction, United States military airplanes
forced the Egyptian plane carrying the hijackers to land at a United States
military base in Italy." The United States wanted to transfer the hijackers
42. Statements by Leaders at the Signing of the Middle East Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
1993, at A12. Arafat has been welcomed to the White House on several occasions since then.
43. John Darnton, P.L.O. Leader and 2 Israelis Share Award, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
1994, at A8.
44. Nobel Panelist Resigns Over Arafat Award, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 15, 1994, at
A17.
45. John Tagliabue, Ship Carrying 400 Is Seized, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1985, at Al. The
Achille Lauro seizure was the subject of numerous legal articles. For a discussion of whether the
seizure constituted piracy even though the motive was not monetary, see Gerald P. McGinley,
The Achille Lauro Affair - Implications for International Law, 52 TENN. L. REv. 691 (1985)
(piracy); Gregory v. Gooding, Fighting Terrorism in the 1980's: The Interception of the Achille
Lauro Hijackers, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 158 (1987) (piracy); Note, Towards a New Definition of
Piracy: The Achille Lauro Incident, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 723 (1986) (not piracy); see also,
Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO
Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 269 (1988); Malvina Halberstam, Terrorist
Acts Against and on Board Ships, 19 IS. YB. H. RTS. 331 (1989); Jordan J. Paust, Extradition
and the U.S. Prosecution of the Achille Lauro Hostage Takers: Navigating the Hazards, 20
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 235 (1987).
46. William E. Smith, The Voyage oftheAchilleLauro, TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 30-31.
47. Id.
48. Egypt ratified the Convention on December 17, 1979. See TREATIES IN FORCE, supra
note 12, at 432.
49. Hostage Convention, supra note 7, art. 8(1), 18 I.L.M. at 1460.
50. George Russell, The U.S. Sends a Message; A Bold, Nonviolent Stroke Ends Four Days
of Horror and Humiliation, TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 22.
51. Id. For a view highly critical of the United States action, See ANTONIO CASSESE,
TERRORISM, POLITICS AND LAW: THE ACHILLE LAURO AFFAIR (1989). Cassese characterized
the United States action as "an act of shameless arrogance and a sign of political ineptitude," id.
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to a United States plane and to take them to the United States for trial, but
Italy refused to permit the United States to do so and also refused United
States extradition requests. However, all the perpetrators, except Abu
Abbas were tried, convicted and imprisoned in Italy. Abu Abbas, who
carried a diplomatic passport and, at the time, denied his involvement in
the Achille Lauro seizure, and claimed to be the one who negotiated the
release of the hostages, was permitted to leave Italy despite United States
protests. 2 He was later tried in absentia in Italy, convicted and sentenced
to life in prison., A 115 page report prepared by the Italian magistrates
stated that the evidence against him was "multiple, unequivocal, and
overwhelming. '" It found that "Abbas conceived the action, selected its
actors, trained them for the specific enterprise, financed them" and
"provided them with the arms to conduct the action. . . . ,,5 He was never
apprehended, however.
On April 22 of this year, Reuters reported that Abu Abbas,
"emerging from hiding for the first time since the 1985 hijacking,"5 held a
press conference in Gaza, surrounded "by some of his old fighters and by
armed bodyguards, "5 in which he acknowledged his role in the Achille
Lauro seizure and referred to the murder of Klinghoffer as a "mistake."5 8
The following day, Congressman Saxton and several other members of
Congress wrote to the Attorney General urging the extradition of Abu
Abbas for trial in the United States. 9 On April 30, the Senate passed a
resolution, ninety-nine to zero, also urging the Attorney General to seek
at 78, and refers to the United States request for the provisional arrest of Abu Abbas as "how the
super power 'bullied' Italy." Id. at 88. For a review of the book, taking issue with Cassese's
positions, see Malvina Halberstam, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 410 (1991).
52. See George Russell, The Price of Success; Reagan's Coup Breeds Anger in Egypt,
Crisis in Italy, Disarray in Diplomacy, TIME, Oct. 28, 1985, at 22.
53. Andrew Hurst, Three Life Sentences in Achille Lauro Verdict, REUTERS, July 10,
1986.
54. From letter by Congressmen Saxton, Forbes, Ackerman, and Engel, to U.S. Attorney
General Janet Reno (on file with the author).
55. Id.




59. Letter from Congressman Jim Saxton, Michael P. Forbes, Gary L. Ackerman, and




his extradition to the United States for trial for the murder of Klinghoffer. 6
Three months later, the Attorney General's Office sent a reply to
Congressman Saxton. After apologizing (but giving no reason for the
three-month delay in responding), the letter from an Assistant Attorney
General, stated:
The applicable statute of limitations at the time of the
crime was 5 years. Further, we are unable to meet the
standard for flight from justice necessary to stay the statute
of limitations. The United States, consequently, does not
have a basis to seek the extradition of Abu Abbas for trial
in this country.6'
While the Justice Department is correct that the applicable statute
of limitations for hostage taking at the time was five years, 6 the law also
provides that "[n]o statute of limitations shall extend to any person fleeing
from justice."63 The letter does not indicate the basis for the Justice
Department's conclusion that it is "unable to meet the standard for flight
from justice to stay the statute of limitations." However, earlier statements
by the Justice Department suggested that the tolling statute did not apply
because there was no outstanding arrest warrant or indictment.
There is no requirement that there be an outstanding arrest warrant
or indictment for the statute of limitations to be tolled. Numerous cases,
spanning over 150 years, have held that a person may be fleeing from
justice, even though no process was issued against him." A memorandum
prepared by the Congressional Research Service, also disagreed with the
Attorney General's conclusion that the tolling provision was inapplicable.
After reviewing the applicable law on this point, the memorandum
concluded, "[fjrom this, it would appear that section 3290 would operate
60. S. Res. 253, 104th Cong. 2d Sess., Apr. 30, 1996. A similar resolution, introduced in
the House of Representatives, was referred to the Committee on International Relations. H. Res.
444, 104th Cong. 2d Sess., May 29, 1996.
61. Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General, to Congressman Saxton (July
23, 1996) (copy on file with the author).
62. 18 U.S.C.S. §3282 (Law. Co-op. 1993), amended by 18 U.S.C.S. §3286 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1996). The statute of limitations for hostage taking is now eight years. 18 U.S.C.S.
§3286 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996). Moreover, if a hostage is killed, the penalty is life
imprisonment or death. 18 U.S.C. §1201(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996). There is no statute of
limitations for capital crimes. 18 U.S.C.S. §3281 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996). However, the
longer statute of limitations and increased penalty cannot be applied to crimes committed earlier
as that would violate the ex post facto clause.
63. 18 U.S.C. §3290.
64. See e.g., United States v. White, F. Cas. No. 16675 (CC Dist. Col. 1836); United
States v. Fonseca-Machado, 53 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 1995).
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to toll the statute of limitations in Abbas' case."6  The memorandum
further stated:
The hijackers forced the Achille Lauro to sail to Egypt
rather than Israel. Abbas' failure to turn himself over to
Italian authorities would probably be sufficient to trigger
3290 by itself. Moreover, he could hardly be ignorant of
American efforts to arrest him. The plane on which he
was a passenger was forced to land at a NATO base in
Sicily by American fighter planes and American authorities
only reluctantly allowed Italian authorities to take custody
of him there. There is no evidence Abbas has made any
effort to make himself available to American or Italian
authorities since his departure from Italy, in fact the
opposite seems to [be] more readily apparent."
To the best of my knowledge neither Italy nor the United States has
requested the Palestinian Authority to hand over Abu Abbas, and he
continues as a member of the Palestine National Council.
A number of others responsible for terrorist attacks on innocent
civilians, including some who have been convicted, serve in high positions
in the Palestinian Authority. Abu Eain, convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment for placing a bomb in a trash can near a bus stop in
Tiberias, Israel that killed two sixteen year-old boys and injured thirty-six
other children and adults,67 was released by Israel, pursuant to an
undertaking in the Oslo Accords, and is now the Comptroller for the
Palestinian Authority. 6
The mother of Nachshon Wachsman, who was kidnapped and
tortured by terrorists before he died, wrote:
65. Memorandum from Charles Doyle, Senior Specialist, Congressional Research Service,
to Congressman Jim Saxton 9(CRS/7) (Sept. 27, 1996) (on file with the author).
66. Id.
67. Following the attack, he fled to the United States and was arrested in Chicago. The
extradition proceedings, in which he was represented by Ramsey Clark, a former United States
Attorney General, took over two years, including a hearing before a United States magistrate and
a United States district court, Eain v. Adams, 529 F. Supp. 685 (N.D. Ill. 1980), and review by
the Court of Appeals, Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981). For a discussion of the
anti-American atmosphere that prevailed at the U.N. at the time and led to a General Assembly
Resolution condemning the United States for extraditing Abu Eain, see Allan Gerson, The
Kirkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy Without Apology - America at United Nations 1981-1985
(1991), at 77-78, quoted in, Malvina Halberstam, Book Review, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, at
409 (1992).
68. Alon Liel, An Impossible Question, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 17, 1995, at 5.
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In October 1994, after being kidnapped and held hostage
for six days by Hamas terrorists, our third son Nachshon
was murdered. The man who masterminded our son's
kidnapping walks the streets of Gaza freely. Indeed, he
was a member of the Palestinian Authority negotiating
team who met with the approval of our government. This
is an obscenity, a mockery, and a travesty of justice. It is
a distortion of the concept of peace.69
Of course there are differences between the prosecution of those
responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Bosnia and
those responsible for terrorist acts. But, 1) both involve conduct that is
criminal under international law and that states are required to prosecute
and punish with severe penalties, and 2) both involve offenders in a
position to further or impede a precarious peace process.
While the legal obligation to prosecute and the desirability of such
prosecution has been the subject of scholarly debate in the context of the
conflict in Bosnia,70 and with respect to repressive regimes replaced by
more democratic governments, 7' there has been almost no discussion of the
desirability or legal obligation to prosecute terrorists who can effect the
peace negotiations. 71 Should we prosecute those responsible for war
crimes, crimes against humanity, or terrorism when doing so may impede
the peace process?
It is not an easy question. It can be argued, with some force, that
it is more important to establish peace than to pursue those responsible for
past crimes. We should be aware, however, that a decision not to
prosecute those in a position to influence the peace negotiations will not
foreclose prosecution in a few isolated cases only. Those responsible for
war crimes, crimes against humanity, or major terrorist acts will generally
be in leadership positions and, absent complete surrender, as was true for
Nazi Germany after World War II, will generally be in a position to
further or impede the peace. Thus, a decision to forego prosecution when
69. Esther Wachsman, And Justice Wept, JERUSALEM POST INT'L ED., Mar. 30, 1996, at
10.
70. See Wedgwood, supra note 22; D'Amato, supra note 22; Jordan J. Paust, Applicability
of International Criminal Laws to Events in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POLICY, 499 (1994); Jordan J. Paust, Letter to the Editor, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 715 (1994).
71. See Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute
International Crimes in Haiti, 31 TEX. INT'L L. J. (1996); Diane F. Orentlicher, Symposium,
Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE
L. J. 2537 (1991).
72. But see Louis Rene Beres, International Law Requires Prosecution, Not Celebration of
Arafat, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 569 (1994).
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it might endanger the peace process would preclude most prosecutions, or
at least, the most important prosecutions. Permitting those responsible for
war crimes, crimes against humanity and terrorism to go unpunished will
undermine the moral force and the deterrent effect of those laws; it will
effectively vitiate those laws.
It is a question that should engage the attention of scholars and
statesmen, not be decided by default, as is being done in Bosnia by the
failure to apprehend those charged, and as is being done with Yasir Arafat
and Abu Abbas, by reliance on dubious technical arguments to justify the
failure to indict and seek extradition. Supreme Court Justice Breyer
recently stated that the importance of Nuremberg was that it established the
principle "that persons responsible for inhumanity toward man will be held
accountable for their crimes and brought to justice."73 What we do about
bringing to trial Radovan Karadzik, Ratko Mladic, Yasir Arafat and Abu
Abbas, will determine our continued commitment to that principle.
73. Justice Stephen Breyer, Address Before the International Association of Jewish Jurists
and Lawyers (June 20, 1996), in NEWSLETTER, Fall 1996, at 2.
582 [Vol. 3:571
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AFTER
BOSNIA
Jean-Philippe Lavoyer
To start, I would like to thank Professor Paust for inviting the
International Committee of the Red Cross (I.C.R.C.) to participate in this
panel. Its subject is indeed closely linked to the I.C.R.C.
In my brief presentation, I would like to comment on the following
issues which are related to the theme of this panel: 1) Is present
humanitarian law still adapted to the needs of modem wars?; 2) How
should war criminals be prosecuted?; and finally 3) How safe can safe
areas be?
As most of you know, the I.C.R.C.'s activities are based on the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the statutes of the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Its mandate is to protect and assist
victims of armed conflicts and internal disturbances.
First, the I.C.R.C. protects and assists the victims in the field. It
protects the civilian population, it visits prisoners of war and other
detained persons, provides food, medical and other assistance, re-
establishes the link between separated family members through Red Cross
Messages, tries to find persons who went missing during the conflict, and
reunites family members.
Second, the I.C.R.C. is mandated by the international community
to act as promoter and guardian of international humanitarian law. Its
delegates in the field, which number about one thousand, monitor respect
of humanitarian law and, in the case of violations, they intervene with the
party concerned. These interventions are made at all levels. The I.C.R.C.
seeks to establish a constructive dialogue with all the parties concerned,
with governmental authorities as well as with armed opposition groups,
which, and this should be underlined, are also bound by humanitarian law.
This dialogue with the parties is the reason why the I.C.R.C. treats
its findings and representations in a discreet and confidential way. The
principle of confidentiality is thus not an end in itself, but rather a working
method. It has its limits: when severe violations of humanitarian law
continue even after the I.C.R.C. has intervened, it reserves the right to
denounce such violations publicly. The I.C.R.C. has made a more liberal
use of this policy in the last few years, in particular, during the war in the
former Yugoslavia.
* Legal Advisor, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva.
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After these general comments, let me turn to the question of
whether present law is still adapted to the needs of modern warfare.
Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of many armed conflicts
has changed. Bosnia is a case on point We have witnessed there, I think
in particular of the atrocious policy of ethnic cleansing, types of behaviors
which were in complete contradiction with the most fundamental principles
of humanitarian law.
In Rwanda and Burundi, ethnic wars have claimed hundreds of
thousands of victims, and the present situation in Zaire is extremely
preoccupying.In other parts of the world, such as Liberia, state structures have
disintegrated and collapsed to a point where the total lack of discipline and
the apparently unlimited availability of light weapons make it impossible
for humanitarian organizations to work. Combatants, which often include
young children, do not fight for an ideology anymore, but for mere
survival.
What lessons should we draw from this grim picture? Is existing
law insufficient, and should we therefore advocate new law?
Let me say briefly that the mere fact that a rule is violated does not
mean that it is bad. This may sound trivial, but in the ongoing debate,
there is a widespread confusion between the quality of the rule and its
effective implementation. These are two different things. We are
convinced that humanitarian law offers adequate protection. The problem
is often a manifest lack of political will to apply the law.
When state structures disintegrate, the problem becomes more
specific, as civilian and military command lines, which are essential for the
respect of humanitarian law (and law in general), have ceased to exist.
There does not seem to be a ready-made solution for this problem. Better
law is certainly not a solution, as it would not be enforced. It is then
rather the responsibility of states to intervene, as humanitarian actors reach
the limits of their work. But this is a political, rather than a legal, issue.
Let me add that these situations of failed, disintegrated states are,
at least for the time being, not so frequent. They are certainly much less
frequent than people think! Take Bosnia: it was not in the process of
disintegration in the sense previously mentioned, even though this
argument was often used as an excuse. There was generally no lack of
command lines, as the violations of humanitarian law were mainly the
result of clear-cut policies. Forcing people to flee had become part of a
political strategy. Moreover, the rules of humanitarian law were often
well known.
So the problem is often more political than legal. The parties to an
armed conflict have to accept more readily the application of humanitarian
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law. At the same time, states have to assume their international
responsibility and ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions as stipulated
in Common Article 1.
At the same time, one should remain pragmatic: the law may need
to be developed in certain specific fields. A case in point is the adoption,
in May of this year, of a Protocol prohibiting the use of blinding laser
weapons.' Its Protocol II on land-mines was also revised.
There has also been a debate on whether persons displaced within
their own country were sufficiently protected. The representative of the
Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Mr. Francis Deng, has
clarified the issue by publishing his Compilation and Analysis of Legal
Norms protecting the internally displaced. He came to the conclusion that
most of the protection needs of the internally displaced were adequately
covered.
Here again, what is lacking is the proper implementation of
existing rules: humanitarian and human rights law. Respect of that law
would help prevent many population displacements, because it is their
violation which forces entire populations to flee their homes.
Let me now turn briefly to the prosecution of war crimes. First, I
would like to recall that the Geneva Conventions introduced a system of
universal jurisdiction. This means that states have an obligation to
prosecute suspected war criminals. It is regrettable that this system has not
worked. The ad hoc tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are
an important step. This selective approach is, however, insufficient.
There is a need for a permanent international criminal court, as the present
impunity cannot last forever.
In the I.C.R.C.'s view, such a court should have the following
characteristics:
a) It should be complementary to national courts, the system of universal
jurisdiction should remain in place.
b) The court should also deal with internal, armed conflicts, and
prosecute those who have committed serious violations of common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of Protocol II of 1977, even
though these violations may not constitute grave breaches.
c) The court should be impartial and independent; the prosecutor should
be able to open investigations on his own initiative, and the court
should not have to obtain permission from concerned states.
d) The court should be independent from the Security Council, which
should not be able to block the activities of the court.
1. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons, Apr. 10, 1981, Protocol IV, 19 I.L.M. 1523 (1980).
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In order to have the system of universal jurisdiction work, it is
essential that states adopt proper national legislation allowing for the
prosecution of war crimes. In order to assist states, the I.C.R.C. has
recently set up an Advisory Service. Lawyers based at I.C.R.C.
headquarters in Geneva, as well as experts based in the field, seek to assist
states in adopting such national laws.
To conclude, I would like to say a few words about the concept of
safe areas. When speaking about Bosnia, one. will of course remember the
tragic events surrounding the town of Srebrenica. Srebrenica had, though,
been declared a safe area by the Security Council. The question we have
to ask ourselves is: How safe can safe areas be?
When discussing this issue, it is important to clarify the terms
being used, as there exists quite some confusion.
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols contain
several rules about the establishment of protected zones. They are
intended to protect the military sick and wounded, or the civilian
population, against hostilities. I cannot go into the details of such zones
here, and shall limit myself to say that these zones are based on the
consent of the parties. In addition, they have to be demilitarized, which
necessitates a strict control of the concerned zones.
In practice, there have been great difficulties in establishing such
protected zones because of the lack of trust between the fighting parties.
The I.C.R.C., on its part, has managed to create some neutralized zones,
though limited in space and in time.
The safe areas established by the United Nations are very different
in nature. They are imposed on the parties, as it happened in the former
Yugoslavia, on the basis of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
The consequence of this is that these zones are very fragile, and need a
very strong protection force in order to be implemented. This was not the
case in Bosnia, where the United Nations protection forces were clearly
insufficient. Moreover, the zones in Bosnia were not even demilitarized,
and could, therefore, be seen as legitimate military targets.
We know the sad results. Not only were the people in these zones
not adequately protected, but, worse, the civilian population was given a
false sense of security and protection.
What lessons should we draw from this experience?
1) It is very difficult and risky to establish safe areas. That means that
one has to think twice before acting.
2) If special protection zones are to be created, the principles and rules
of humanitarian law should more readily be taken into account.
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3) If they have to be imposed, which may be justified in certain
instances, they should be completely demilitarized and effectively
protected. And, last but not least,
4) Humanitarian law protects the civilian population as a whole; zones
under special protection should under no circumstances undermine
this general immunity.
TRIAL OF THE CENTURY? ASSESSING THE CASE
OF DUSKO TADIC BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA
Mark S. Zaid
It is more than bitter irony that nearly fifty years to the day after
the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg rendered its judgment,
we are here today analyzing the first international war crimes trial held
since the end of World War II. The trial of Dusko Tadic, an alleged war
criminal from the former Yugoslavia, concludes within the month. After
seventy-four trial days and eighty-one witnesses, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is preparing to hear
closing arguments now scheduled to begin on November 25, 1996. A
decision is expected by early February 1997.
The ultimate fate of Tadic may be as yet unknown, but the events
that have transpired over the last six months enable us to offer preliminary
analysis. The legacy of the ICTY is finally beginning to form.
Unfortunately, the legacy developed thus far offers a very mixed picture;
indeed, some might say a bleak one. But before I examine the particular
details of the Tadic trial, I believe we first need to understand the
backdrop in which this Tribunal was created and why, for to understand
the significance of the Tadic case requires a lesson in history.
What was it that awakened the outrage in people after fifty years
that the name of Nuremberg once again pursed our lips? After millions of
people had died in countless civil wars, insurrections and revolutions, why
suddenly did a cry for justice arise? The concept of an international
criminal court had been a matter of discussion for decades. One might
* J.D., Albany Law School, B.A., University of Rochester. Mark Zaid is a
Washington, D.C. practitioner who specializes in matters of international criminal law, public
international law, national security issues, and litigation under the Freedom of
Information/Privacy Acts. He is the Chair of the American Bar Association's Task Force on
Proposed Protocols on Evidence and Procedure for Future War Crimes Tribunals, and was a
member of the Committee on Experts on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
organized under the auspices of the Association Internationale de Droit Penal, the Instituto
Superiore Internazionale di Scienze Criminali, and the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and
International Penal Law. The views expressed by Mr. Zaid are his own and do not necessarily
reflect the views of any organization or entity with which he is or has been affiliated.
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assert that the movement to create an international criminal court gained
tremendous strength following Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of
neighboring Kuwait and the senseless slaughter of Shiite and Kurd
minorities. But it was the color pictures - both on television and in
magazines - of Serbian concentration camps, grotesquely reminiscent of
places like Auschwitz and Dachau, that was just too much for the world to
bear. Word of mass deportations, exterminations, and systematic rapes
spread throughout the international community. And then the magic words
were spoken-ethnic cleansing.
The world was compelled - if not forced - to act. On February
22, 1993, the United Nations Security Council voted to create an
international tribunal to prosecute crimes committed in the Former
Yugoslavia.' Three months later the Court was established, at least on
paper.2 And with the blessing of the Security Council people across the
globe spoke of another Nuremberg. But the ICTY is not another
Nuremberg, and much of the frustration expressed throughout the world
following the near completion of the Tadic trial is likely traced to this
inappropriate comparison.'
Several immediate differences are readily and significantly
apparent. First, the Germans on trial at Nuremberg did not deny the
accusations, but argued essentially that their individual actions "[w]ere
justified or outside of their individual responsibility." 4  Tadic's sole
defense has been one of alibi - he did not commit the charged offenses.'
This fact alone sets the stage for a very different trial. Second, the
Nuremberg defendants were leaders, high-level officials of the Third
Reich. For example, one of the smaller figures on trial was Hans Frank
who was the Governor-General of Poland. Ninety percent of all Jews
were exterminated under his watch. While Tadic is accused of several
1. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, 3175th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. SIRES/808
(1993).
2. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, 3217th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993).
3. Public perception, probably more than anything else, has cast the ICTY in the shadow
of Nuremberg. Within the prosecution's office there was little doubt. Minna Schrag, then a
senior trial attorney for the Tribunal stated, "[tihere's no question that this is no Nuremberg."
William W. Home, The Real Trial of the Century, THE AM. LAW., Sept. 1995, at 5, 58.
4. "For example, when pleas were required from defendants, Goering had planned-but
was not permitted-to read a speech declaring, in part, that 'I accept the political responsibility for
all my own acts or for acts carried out on my orders... I must ... reject acceptance by me of
responsibility for acts of other persons which were not known to me; of which, had I known
them, I would have disapproved and which could not have been prevented by me anyway.'"
ANN TuSA AND JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBURG TRIAL 150 (1986).
5. Home, supra note 3, at 8, 65.
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counts of murder, persecution, and war crimes, he had no involvement
with development of policy or control over those who were to carry out
any such policies.6
In many ways Nuremberg can perhaps be considered or
characterized as the parent of the ICTY, keeping in mind that while there
is a relationship between parents and children, they can have very different
traits and personalities. Justice Robert H. Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor
for the International Military Tribunal (IMT), invoked Justice Cardozo's
statement "[tjhe power of the precedent is the power of the beaten path" in
referring to the chief obstacle facing the Nuremberg Court.7 In creating
the ICTY, a beaten path, of course, existed that could be traced directly
back to the IMT. From there, however, the ICTY must create a path of its
own, one very distinct from Nuremberg.
Many of the problems and criticisms faced by the ICTY start with
Nuremberg and the unfair expectations that arose from its ashes. Twenty-
two major Nazi defendants were tried by the four victorious Allied
Powers, including Hermann Goering, Julius Striecher, Hans Frank and
Wilhelm Frick. Nearly all of the high-level German officials who
survived the war were present at Nuremberg and on trial. But it was not
only those who survived that were on trial. Nuremberg placed on trial the
ghosts of Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, and other leading architects of
Nazi Germany. Those that were responsible for the deaths of millions
were judged at Nuremberg whether they were physically present or not.
Goering stated before the trial began that it was a political court.8
By that he meant the trial was merely one for show; each of the
defendants' fate had already been sealed before the first piece of evidence
was even introduced. Goering was right, but wrong in his application.
The IMT was political, just as is the ICTY and the forthcoming permanent
International Criminal Court (ICC), but they are or were political
necessities, not political trials. 9 These courts were, and will be in the case
6. Another significant difference is that the Serbs, unlike the meticulous Germans of
World War II, kept no written records of their deeds. Therefore, the evidence against Tadic is
almost entirely based on eyewitness testimony.
7. Prosecution of Major Nazi War Criminals: Final Report to the President From
Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, 15 DEP'T ST. BULL. 946, at 771,774.
8. Goering stated that "[a]s far as the trial is concerned, it's just a cut-and-dried political
affair and I'm prepared for the consequences. The victors are the judges ...I know what's in
store for me." TUSA & TUSA, supra note 4, at 13.
9. Of course, at first, the simple political solution expressed by the British and Russians
in the waning days of World War II was to simply execute the German leaders. ROBERT E.
CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG 14 (1983). Fortunately, the position of the United States to
convene an international court prevailed.
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of the ICC, created to judge those who can not or should not be judged in
national courts for political reasons.
Why was Tadic then, as the first alleged war criminal, brought to
trial before an international criminal court? What is the legacy of Tadic's
trial? On a macro level, the ICTY presents a significant achievement in
the development of the law of nations and individual and state criminal
responsibility. On the micro level, so long as Tadic remains the Tribunal's
sole voice, it borders on failure. 0
This takes me back to my initial observation. From the beginning
we expected the ICTY to be another Nuremberg. Before a panel of three
judges from three different countries would occur the prosecutions of
Nuremberg-like defendants. Mass murderers, killers of defenseless
women, helpless children, infirm elderly, and members of minorities -
those types of people were Nazis. We expected swastikas and tales of
concentration camps." We saw the decimation of Yugoslavia and the
horrors of Serb concentration camps on television. Someone must be held
accountable. Instead, we got Tadic. 2
If future war criminals are to learn anything from Tadic, it is not
to vacation in a region known for war refugees. Tadic, as you recall, was
arrested in February 1994 by German police while he was vacationing in
Germany to visit his brother. Refugees from Serbian concentrations camps
recognized Tadic as one of their tormentors. 3 Tadic, however, is a small
fish. I assert this statement for the first time in a public forum. It is a
term that ICTY Chief Prosecutor Justice Richard Goldstone resented
hearing during the beginning stages of the proceedings against Tadic, and
rightly so. Tadic was accused of horrendous atrocities including war
crimes, persecution, and deviant sexual mutilation.' 4  The latter charge
being a very Nazi-like crime. To his alleged victims, Tadic, of course,
10. At least one commentator has asserted that the Tadic trial may be the "most important
criminal trial in this century . . . because it is a chance for the world to redeem the international
rule of law and prove it learned something from the horrors of World War Two." Home, supra
note 3, at 5, 6 (emphasis in original). Of course, this statement was written months before the
trial began.
11. Indeed, it was initially believed that "if the prosecutors are even half-right, Dusko
Tadic ...is a perpetrator of the worst sort." Home, supra note 3, at 6. The American Bar
Association Journal pointed out that. "Tadic is charged with what history usually associates with
the atrocities of the Nazis: war crimes and crimes against humanity." James Podgers, The
World Cries for Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1996, at 52.
12. Tadic was accused of raping one woman, murdering 13 men, committing repeated acts
of torture, and of involvement in a brutal castration incident. In all, 132 counts were originally
levied against him. Podgers, supra note 11, at 65.
13. Home, supra note 3, at 61.
14. The prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Dusan Tadic, Case IT-94-1-T (Feb. 13, 1995).
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was no small fish. That is why I believe many of us in the international
community avoided the term, perhaps more out of respect for the victims
and their families than any other reason. But I believe many of us
harbored doubts inside as to what was to emerge from the prosecution of
Tadic. We truly hoped that the prosecution of Tadic would once again
send a Nuremberg-like message throughout the world - war criminals
beware!
To some extent the Tribunal can not be faulted for what has
transpired. Tadic was chosen as its first case for several reasons, some of
which were realistically out of its control. First, the Prosecution was
under intense pressure to begin a trial - any trial. 5 After being created in
May 1993 the Tribunal sat for months with a full contingent of judges
drawing comfortable salaries and no prosecutor, which was acceptable
since there were no defendants. 6 Millions of dollars for the Tribunal's
budget were being fought over and eventually allocated for nothing.
Therefore, it was time to live up to expectations and begin a trial. In this
vein, Tadic's arrest in Germany was a fortuitous event.
Second, in investigating the allegations surrounding Tadic's
activities, the German authorities were beginning to interfere with the
ICTY's investigation of the Omarska region. 7 German investigators were
speaking to the same witnesses, gathering evidence, and interfering with
the efforts of the Tribunal's investigators. This was becoming a real
problem. As a result the Prosecutor acted, and on November 8, 1994,
Justice Goldstone formally requested that Germany defer prosecution of
Tadic to the Tribunal.
18
Having watched the trial closely from the beginning, my
conclusion is that Tadic was not worthy of international prosecution. Had
15. Even the Tribunal's judges became frustrated by the perceived inertia. On February 1,
1995, President Cassese issued a press release on behalf of the judges in which they "wished to
express their concern about the urgency with which appropriate indictments should be issued."
Home, supra note 3, at 61.
. 16. Although the judges were elected to office on September 15, 1993, it was not until
August 15, 1994, that the Chief Prosecutor assumed office. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER
MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA 202 (1996).
17. Author's discussion with official in the Office of the Prosecutor, July 1996.
18. Deferral Application Submitted by the Prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, of Dusko Tadic,
Case No. IT-94-I-T (Nov. 8, 1994). Tadic's actual transfer was further delayed because it was
necessary to wait for the German Parliament to enact appropriate implementing legislation that
would permit Germany to effect transfer to the Tribunal of an individual in their custody which
they finally achieved on March 31, 1995. Dorothea Beane, The Yugoslav Tribunal and Deferral
of National Prosecutions of War Criminals, 13 ASIL NEWSL. Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 3. Tadic was
transferred to the Tribunal on April 24, 1995 and pled not guilty at his arraignment the following
day.
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circumstances been different, he should have been left for the Germans to
prosecute. 9 Those who should be prosecuted by an international tribunal
are those whose prosecution would make a significant difference in the
international community. The Tadics of the world will never be affected
by this prosecution. Primarily because it is likely that a person such as a
pre-conflict Tadic is fairly law-abiding and does not know their nature
could permit a transformation into an alleged war criminal until after the
event occurred. What is it that suddenly turns one's neighbor and best
friend into an alleged murderer?2' Why is it that one day someone decides
to commit a murder based on ideological or ethnic beliefs? That answer is
beyond my expertise, but it is my contention that is not necessarily those
who seemingly change overnight for no apparent reason that should be
brought to trial before an international tribunal, but rather those who
caused the igniting spark that set that transformation in motion.
Let me examine briefly the events that transpired during the May-
November 1996 trial of Dusko Tadic.
1) Rape Charge: The sole rape charge against Tadic was withdrawn
early in the proceedings. This was obviously very disappointing to
many. The alleged victim, despite assurances provided by the
Prosecutor's Office, refused to testify. Such occurrences, of course,
are not uncommon in rape cases and while the fact can not be viewed
as the fault of the Prosecution, it nevertheless harmed the case -
particularly the case of public perception - against Tadic.
2) Sexual Mutilation Charge: In the indictment, Tadic was alleged to
have participated in ordering or overseeing the sexual mutilation of a
prisoner by having one male inmate bite off the testicles of another
who subsequently died. Of all the charges levied against Tadic, this
was the true Nazi-like crime. Yet, as far back as 1994, I recall
discussions with colleagues who participated in the United Nations
investigation of war crimes in the Former Yugoslavia which preceded
the creation of the ICTY. They expressed grave doubts regarding the
inclusion of this charge against Tadic. It was not Tadic, I was not
told, who was involved in the incident. Unfortunately, it was this
charge that so intrigued the international community. As much as we
all shuddered at our mental pictures of how the incident was being
described, we relished in the charge being proven true. This was the
19. The president of the Tribunal, Antonio Cassese, has publicly stated that "[mlinor thugs
who rape or kill, without command responsibility, should be [handled] by the state courts."
Home, supra note 3, at 61.
20. Tadic was accused of participating in the death of Emir Karabasic who was allegedly
one of his best friends.
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act of a true war criminal. Again, it was a Nazi act. And when the
Prosecution failed to even link Tadic to the crime scene, we were
very disappointed, although perhaps not yet dejected. True, the case
had now lost a great deal of its glamour, but, after all, Tadic still
stood accused of ethnic cleansing and murder. Soon, however, these
charges as well would seem to be slowly vanishing.
3) Murder Charges: Tadic was accused of participating or committing
over one dozen murders. The Prosecution, however, found it difficult
to directly link Tadic to almost all of them. Although several
witnesses testified that Tadic beat them severely, a bully - which is
the picture of Tadic that has seemingly developed during the course of
the trial - justifies an international prosecution even less so than a
murderer. Only one witness truly provided strong eyewitness
testimony that Tadic had committed murder. Nihad Seferovic stated
categorically that Tadic had slit the throats of at least two men. In
fact, he had seen it happen. Quite compelling testimony, but one
small problem. The indictment against Tadic states that Tadic shot
the victims to death. The two types of death seem so glaringly
different that one is compelled to seriously question the discrepancy
and perhaps discount the eyewitness.
4) Witness L, Draco Opacic: As the Prosecution's case seemed to be
slowly collapsing, a quick burst of strength appeared late in the case
in the guise of Witness L, of whom little we were initially told. A
young man who had previously pled guilty to war crimes in Croatia
and whose identity was withheld from the public, he appeared to tell
the Tribunal of horrific accounts that directly implicated Tadic in
mass murder. Tadic, Witness L testified, had ordered him to kill ten
people and when Witness L refused, Tadic killed several of them
himself right in front of witnesses. Rapes were committed in public
as well. Tadic, again, was becoming the Nazi we hoped to see
prosecuted. But something was glaringly wrong from the start.
Witness L set forth some very damaging and specific allegations
which alone would likely result in Tadic receiving a life sentence.
Yet not one - not one - of these allegations was contained in the
indictment. It was too good to be true, and it was. Witness L, or
Draco Opacic, as we later discovered his name to be, was completely
lying. The entire story was a fabrication made up at the insistence,
according to Draco Opacic, of the Bosnian government. Draco
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Opacic had never met Tadic and none of the events ever happened.
Another devastating blow to the Prosecution.2'
In closing his final report on Nuremberg, Justice Jackson wrote
President Truman that:
it would be extravagant to claim that agreements or trials
of this character can make aggressive war or persecution
of minorities impossible, just as it would be extravagant to
claim that our federal laws make federal crime impossible.
But we cannot doubt that they strengthen the bulwarks of
peace and tolerance. 22
It is undoubtedly unfair to rest the legacy of the ICTY on the
shoulders of Tadic. But for now, unfortunately, the Tadic case conveys
the message of the ICTY - its song perhaps. It is a song very much out
of tune, but one that has just begun and will hopefully change and evolve.
Tadic is but the first to stand before the Tribunal. How many others will
follow, however, is unclear. And whether the leaders of the Yugoslavian
conflict such as Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, both of whom have
been indicted by the ICTY, or Slobadon Milosovich, will ever be brought
before the ICTY for a judgment of their guilt or innocence remains a
difficult question to answer. Yet if the leaders who served as the spark to
encourage people such as Tadic are not be brought before this international
criminal tribunal, then the ICTY will never live up to the expectations,
however unfair they may be, of Nuremberg.
21. However, it must be said that the Prosecution acted with utmost integrity and
forthcomingness by its acts to denounce Witness L and request that the Court disregard any of the
testimony introduced therefrom.
22. DEP'T ST. BULL., supra note 7, at 775-76.
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A FRONTE PRAECIPITIUM A TERGO LUPI:'
TOWARDS AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TRIAL OF
DUSKO TADIC BEFORE THE ICTY
Raymond M. Brown
"What man has done to man in the former Yugoslavia strains the most
agile capacities of human reason."
Prosecutor Grant Nieman's opening statement in the Tadic case.
"My readers don't care about this stuff!"
Parting comment of American reporter leaving the Tadic trial.
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The voyage towards an evaluation of the first international war
crimes trial in fifty years is perilous.
# "Between a rock and a hard place."
+ This essay is based on two presentations made to ILA Fall Weekend '96. The author
was originally asked to address "The trial of the Century? Assessing the Case of Dusko Tadic
Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia." He also spoke about
"Global Media: International Images from OJ to Dusko Tadic" as a substitute for Steven Brill,
CourtTV's founder and architect of its coverage of the Tadic trial.
* The author is a partner with the law firm of Brown and Brown, a Fellow of the
American College of Trial Lawyers, and an anchor at the Courtroom Television Network. These
presentations were based on observations made while participating in CourtTV's coverage of
Tadic's trial. The author alone is responsible for any opinions although he is indebted to Peter
Aronson, Dan Broden, Anne Dorman, Felice Conte, Alexis Claibom, Michael Christian, Mary
Jane Stephenson, Clara Tuma, Beth Karas, Dan Abrams, and many guest commentators for
helpful discourse and debate.
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Any legal journalist making this sojourn is buffeted by
contradictory theories of the trial's significance. These treacherous
currents are best navigated from a seat in the gallery of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
I. THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY
For a portion of the trial of Dusko Tadic, I occupied a gallery seat
at The Hague, separated from Tadic by a glass wall, 20 feet, a linguistic
chasm, and war crimes charges.'
Tadic is a Bosnian Serb cafe owner from the town of Kozarac in
the Prijedor District of northern Bosnia. He was charged 2 with beating and
killing Muslims and Croats in Prijedor from May through December of
1992 during the Serb offensive in Bosnia. Prosecutors contend that he
subsequently tortured and killed inmates in the Serb-run detention camps at
Omarska, Trnoplje, and Keraterm.
In defense, Tadic's lawyers have offered an alibi. They say he
was absent when crimes were committed in Kozarac and surrounding
areas. They deny that Tadic was a Serb nationalist or affiliated with Serb
paramilitary organizations.
Regardless of the trial's outcome,3 it is obvious that Tadic was an
insignificant personage in the war. Consequently, the principal dilemma
confronting the legal journalist is to put the Tadic trial in context. What
larger meaning can be attached to the trial of a minor figure in a war
which destroyed a nation, produced 250,000 casualties, and disgorged
millions of refugees?
In mute response the gallery seat almost compels its occupant to
explore whether the Tadic trial is a harbinger of a system of fair trials for
all accused perpetrators of war crimes and genocide. Certainly many in
the human rights community have hailed the ICTY and the Rwanda
1. The Courtroom Television Network provided a figurative gallery seat through its
"gavel to gavel" coverage of most of the prosecution phase of the trial. During the defense phase
it created War Crimes on Trial to provide highlights and expert commentary. After the first
month of the proceeding the author participated in CourtTV's coverage of the trial from New
York.
2. Tadic was tried on superseding Indictment IT-94-1-T charging him with 34 counts of
Crimes Against Humanity, Grave Breaches of the Geneva Convention of 1949, and Violations of
Laws and Customs of War. The indictment alleged that Tadic engaged inter alia in "willful
killing, torture or inhumane treatment, inhumane acts, etc.;" counts 2 - 4 charging Tadic with
Forcible Sexual Intercourse against witness "F" were withdrawn on the first day of trial because
of the unwillingness of the alleged victim to testify.
3. A verdict is expected in late March of 1997.
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(ICTR) Tribunals as reincarnations of the spirit of Nuremberg and as
catalysts for the creation of a permanent international criminal tribunal.
Weighed against that optimistic view is a mountain of trenchant
criticism hurled at The Hague and at the nations theoretically supporting
the ICTY's mission. Most of this criticism reflects the Byzantine nexus
between politics and international justice.' Some challenges are however,
more cogent than others.
The most telling criticism of the early proceedings came from an
unexpected source, the President of the Tribunal. While the Tadic trial
was underway Antonio Cassese journeyed to America to address a
gathering commemorating the Nuremberg trials. He told this group,
which included representatives of the press that, "[i]f the major powers of
the world are not consistent and don't make arrests in the next ten months,
we are prepared to pack up and go home. We think our job is to try
leaders, not small fry."
Cassese's comment touched upon the one point on which virtually
all tribunal critics agree. Dusko Tadic is a smallfry!
As the United States presidential election ended and the Tadic trial
drew toward its close even spokesmen for the western alliance were hard
pressed to justify the specter of a small fry like Tadic facing the
consequences of Yugoslavia's bloody demise while more than three score
Serbs and Croats indicted on more serious charges found refuge and
employment in Croatia, Serbia, and Republika Srpska. 8
4. See generally LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IN THE NATIONAL
INTEREST 1 (Quadrennial Report on Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy 1996). INT'L CRIM.
CT. MONITOR (NGO Coalition for an INT'L CRIM. CT.), July/Aug. 1996, at 12. See also the
presentation at ILA/95 of Evan T. Bloom, Comments on the International Criminal Court, 2 ILSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 649 (1996). Although the proposal for a permanent court has long been
moribund, there is now a draft statute for such a court (ICC) and a U.N. sanctioned diplomatic
conference on the subject scheduled for the coming year.
5. Some critiques flow from the partisan divide over the causes of the Yugoslav conflict.
See Syrdja Trifkovic, The Hague Tribunal, Bad Justice, Worse Politics, CHRON. Aug. 1996.
Others stem from Parisian struggles outside of the Balkans. On the heels of the July hearing held
pursuant to Rule 61 of ICTY Rules of Procedure & Evidence which resulted in the issuance of
international warrants for Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic the
Republican party issued its platform. The GOP called for "[b]ringing indicted war criminals to
justice," (Restoring The American Dream: The Republican Platform 1996, Restoring American
World Leadership "The Atlantic Alliance and Europe - Bosnia") but insisted that "we will not
permit any international court to seize, try or punish any American citizen." (Restoring
American World Leadership "Protecting American Interests"). These assertions express a
hostile, but imprecise criticism of ICTY proceedings.
6. Robert Marquand, Bosnia War Crimes Judge Talks of Quitting, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Nov. 1, 1996.
7. The Coalition for International Justice released a report indicating that many of the 67
Hague indictees not in custody roam freely and are gainfully employed in areas subject to Serb
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The ICTY will not garner history's blessing if its primary legacy is
the sacrifice of the Dusko Tadics as propitiation for the sins of those
indicted for war crimes but never tried. However, while the international
community tries to unravel its geo-political Gordian knot, some defendants
will continue to face trial and possible imprisonment before the ICTY. As
long as these parallel processes continue, the proceedings of the Ad Hoc
Tribunals constitute the most important legal story of the decade.
However, the legal journalist who reports on the tribunal's work
or tries to translate the competing analyses offered by the cognoscenti must
do so in the face of the blas6 reactions of American citizens. The observer
faced with this huge abyss between these historic events and the gaping
American yawn which has greeted them must confront two questions: 1)
Is the trial a huge leap forward or a huge fraud? and 2) Why don't
Americans seem to care?
Together these questions reveal a gap in America's public
discourse on an issue of critical importance. They raise serious doubts
about the sacred mantra of America's criminal justice system, that
punishment must be swift and certain to deter violence. The fact that
Americans seem uninterested in violations of this sacred tenet in
circumstances involving the deaths of hundreds of thousands is
discouraging.
In the ordinary citizen's defense, it must be said that little effort
has been expended by the American media to present the Tribunal's story.
International justice like its domestic cousin is ultimately dependent on
and Croatian control. Steven Lee Myers, Rights Group Says Bosnian Suspects flaunt Freedom,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 26, 1996, at 4. Ironically, it has long been known that many of these men
remain part of the police apparatus in their refuges. In light of IFOR's refusal to make arrests,
Lawrence Weschler, who occupied the seat next to mine at The Hague for a time, has posed an
intriguing question: Are they supposed to arrest themselves? The coming crunch in The Hague,
THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 12, 1996.
8. Anthony Lewis, writing for the New York Times in two recent columns (Oct. 28 and
Nov. 11, 1996) cites the following: Former United States Ambassador and current head of
Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Robert Frowick as saying
"[tihe whole peace process rests on this issue .... going in there and arresting those wanted for
war crimes." "There will not be a better moment than right now," Mr. Frowick said. "We have
to have some mustering of a greater will." James D. Bevan, First Secretary of the British
Embassy in Washington, for the proposition that "Bosnia won't be a normal country until war
criminals are brought to justice" and Former US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbroke
as admitting, "[w]e face an unusual moment in history." "Not since the years 1945 to 1949 has
the United States had such an opportunity to act in the world." Prof. Charles Ingrao of Purdue
University, a political and diplomatic historian specializing in Central Europe observing Radovan
Karadzic driving through the parking lot of the Pale headquarters of the International Police Task
Force and being told by IFOR official that arresting him "is not in our mandate .... Our guys
are afraid we're going to run into Karadzic."
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political will. Popular perception and media coverage are crucial to the
larger issues which surround the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the Tadic trial.
II. VOX POPULI
The commencement of the Tadic trial in May saw the small staff of
the ICTY overwhelmed with requests for media coverage. American
television networks were joined by electronic colleagues from throughout
the world. Print representatives were so numerous that the office of the
Registrar resorted to a pass system to control access to the suddenly
precious seats in the press gallery. Eventually, the overflow portion of the
media was exiled to a tent on the courthouse lawn. An experienced
colleague described the gathering as "a genteel media madhouse, O.J. with
accents. "I
The media frenzy would not last long. Within a week this torrent
had dwindled to an intermittent stream leaving CourtTV, among a handful
of American radio and print outlets. During the second week of the trial
prosecutors called Muslims and Croats who had been tortured and who
had witnessed rapes and murder in northern Bosnia. In the midst of their
dramatic testimony an American reporter in a nearby gallery seat, one of
the few from a major daily, appeared to stir impatiently. Finally he
muttered, "my readers don't care about this stuff" and stalked off into the
cloudy Dutch afternoon.
The elevation of hype and histrionics over historically sound
interpretation is not restricted however, to daily newspapers and the
electronic media.
Il. THE TRIAL OF THE CENTURY
The phrase Trial of the Century was posed as a general computer
research query shortly before the of the Tadic trial. It yielded curious
results. Most responses referenced the trial of California v. O.J.
Simpson. 10 Numerically, the Nuremberg trials rated an honorable mention,
as did the Rosenberg, Sacco and Vanzetti, Leopold and Loeb, and Charlie
Chaplin's paternity proceedings. The search yielded only one reference to
Dusko Tadic's upcoming trial."
9. Terry Moran, anchor at CourtTV Prime Time Justice, was at the Hague for the
opening week of the trial.
10. This included an exciting offer to purchase copies of the Simspon wedding video.
11. William Home, The Real Trial of the Century, AM. LAW. (Published by American
Media Lawyer). There were a number of subcategories unconvered -by this query including
Trials of the Century that Never Were (Tawana Brawley; the settled Westmoreland v. CBS);
Trials of the Century for other countries (e.g. The People's Republic of China's trial of the 'Gang
1997]
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Undeterred by this result, an Internet search was made at the end
of the Tadic trial. (In fairness it should be noted that the closing
arguments of the Tadic trial took place while O.J. Simpson was testifying
in his civil case.) In a deliberate attempt to fudge the test, the names O.J.
Simpson and Tadic were substituted for the phrase Trial of the Century.
Despite this change in methodology the results were equally discouraging.
Using several search engines the ration of hits overwhelmingly favored
Simpson. More discouraging, many of the Tadic hits referred to a
scientific treatise by a physicist named B. Tadic.'2
It is too simple to dismiss this phenomenon as a uniquely American
preference for the pornographic and the sensational. Even the fact that the
competing affair Simpson has struck sensitive nerves along America's
racial divide and at the synapses of its newfound focus on domestic
violence is not sufficient explanation.
Perhaps closer to the mark is a concern that ethnic strife remains a
frightening possibility in America and a detailed inquiry into its dynamics
a painful exercise. Additionally, there is the fact that witness testimony
through interpreters (and by court order, occasionally with their faces
obscured) does not create a visually scintillating image for television.
A significant factor also is the apparent disregard shown by the
prosecuting team for sustaining the world's interest and attention.
IV. THE PROSECUTION PLODS ON
"What man has done to man in the former Yugoslavia strains the
most agile capacities of human reason."
Prosecutors commenced the Tadic trial with stirring rhetoric.
However, their choice of a premier witness tossed a wet blanket over the
electronic eye anxiously awaiting the fulfillment of their opening promises.
The prosecution summoned James Gow, a professor of War
Studies from the University of London who offered an exhaustive history
of the Balkans. Gow served important strategic purposes although there
were times when he appeared to try the judges' patience.
Of primary importance was his opinion that Serbia, under the
leadership of Slobodan Milosevic, formed an alliance with the Bosnian
Serbs, to wage an international conflict and execute a policy of ethnic
of Four'); and a personal favorite of the author's, Nabisco v. Proctor & Gamble, The Cookie
Trial of the Century.
12. S. LUbeck, B. Tadic et al., Nonequilibrium Phase Transition and Self-Organized
Criticality in a Sandpile Model with Stochastic Dynamics, 53 PHYSICAL REV. 2182 (1996).
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cleansing3 against Muslims and Croats. This testimony and the subsequent
factual support from other policy witnesses14 permitted the prosecution to
satisfy threshold jurisdictional requirements."5
Gow's views did not go unchallenged. Defense co-counsel,
Alphonse Orie, made his first attempt at a common law style cross
examination with Gow. His strongest attack was aimed at the most
dramatic piece of demonstrative evidence offered through Gow, scenes
from the BBC film, The Death of Yugoslavia, for which Gow served as a
consultant.
Gow emphasized the film's depiction of Radovan Karadic's
infamous speech to the Bosnian Parliament declaring that "[y]ou Muslims,
will face extinction." Orie almost forced Gow to concede that certain
nuances of timing, context, and linguistic interpretation (which the witness
omitted on direct examination) constituted a significant qualification of the
prosecution's view that the speech was a clarion call to genocide. 6
Later in the trial, the defense called its own expert witness who
testified that the conflict was a civil war which began with the decision of
the Slovenes to withdraw from Yugoslavia."
Tactically, the most interesting effect of Gow's testimony was on
cross examination of alibi witnesses called five months later by the
13. In the Yugoslav context this term has been defined to mean "rendering an area
ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove from a given area persons from
another ethnic or religious group." FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF
EXPERTS - ANNEX IV - THE POLICY OF ETHNIC CLEANSING.
14. During the trial prosecutors called 81 witnesses. Fifteen of the first 16 were expert or
lay witnesses called to establish the dominance of the Yugoslav Army (JNA) and of Serbian
paramilitary and police forces in the warfare in Northern Bosnia, as well as detail the existence of
the Policy of ethnic cleansing. They came to be known as policy witnesses.
15. The jurisdictional requirements are: 1) To establish that this was an international
conflict in order to prove Grave Breaches of the Geneva Convention of 1949 against Tadic and
2) To show that Tadic's alleged crimes were part of a "widespread and systematic" attack on a
civilian population, thereby constituting Crimes Against Humanity.
16. After a lengthy contretemps during which Orie tried again to get Gow to concede that
all of these variables constituted a significant qualification of Karadzic's extinction statement,
Judge Ninian Stephen of Australia pounced as he had before (politely but firmly) saying, "[t]he
witness has answered yes to a degree." Orie also confronted Gow about various Security Council
resolutions and memoranda attempting to force him to concede that Slobodan Milosevic wanted
to withdraw the JNA from Bosnia, but was prevented from doing so by Bosnian troops and by the
refusal of General Ratko Mladic to cooperate. On these points Gow adamantly refused to
concede ground offering his own interpretation of the U.N. documents.
17. Robert M. Hayden is an associate professor of anthropology at the University of
Pittsburgh whose specialties include Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe. He placed less emphasis on
Serbian responsibility for the Yugoslav conflict saying that civil war was inevitable after the 1991
Plebiscite and the Slovene decision to secede from Yugoslavia.
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defense. Each witness" who testified on direct examination that the
defendant never attacked Muslims and Croats in northern Bosnia, was hard
pressed to explain where all of his former Muslim neighbors had gone. If
the judges believe Gow and the other policy witnesses they must entertain
serious doubts about the candor of these defense witnesses and perhaps
even of Tadic himself.
Despite Gow's strategic importance his appearance as the first
witness called by the prosecutors partially explains the flight of the media
from the Hague. Gow testified with a dry, academic, almost patrician
aloofness. Aficianados of international law and Yugoslav history would
undoubtedly overlook his manner. To everyone else in the world he was a
crashing bore.
This raises the question of whether prosecutors should have cared
that they were driving off one of the largest television audiences in history.
It can be argued that the prosecution's exclusive function is to try a case,
without concern for public perception and response. However, Richard
Goldstone, then Chief Prosecutor for both Ad Hoc Tribunals expressed a
contrary view shortly before Tadic's trial began:
I have no doubt that in any country, no less in an
international court, the media is a partner in the whole
criminal justice system. If people in a country are not told
what their criminal courts are doing, then the deterrent
aspect of criminal justice is going to fail. Its just not going
to be there.19
Any dispute over the prosecution's continued lack of concern for
the dramatic structure of its case cannot be resolved until the current
prosecutors are free to speak publicly. However, faced with the charge
that they cheated history and failed pedagogically, they might cite in their
own defense one powerful precedent. The proceedings a half century ago
in Nuremberg apparently caused the world and many trial participants to
18. The defense called 40 witnesses, most of whom supported Tadic's alibi. Those
testifying for the defense included the defendant's wife and brother.
19. CourtTV interview with Richard Goldstone, (Feb. 26, 1996) (discussing the role of
courtroom cameras). In another interview Cherif Basiouni, Chairman of the U.N. Commission
of Experts on Yugoslavia, Oct. 26, 1995, argued that trials like those before the ICTY serve
multiple purposes. "When you have so many people who have been killed, who have been
tortured, who have been raped, you've got to be able to at least say 'this is what happened.'
Victims need to have a recognition of their victimization. That is the first step towards
establishing peace." (Interviews by Terry Moran).
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doze between Justice Robert H. Jackson's dramatic opening statement and
the screening of shocking concentration camp footage. Y
Whether justified or not the decision to start with James Gow
meant that most cameras and much of the world's attention were absent
during some of the most dramatic testimony ever offered in a modem
courtroom.
Gow was followed by Bosnian Croats and Muslims who had
served either in public office or in the Yugoslav military or security
apparatus prior to the fall of 1991. They described the Serb military
buildup and subsequent spring offensive in 1992. Their stories included
harrowing tales of torture, brutality, friendship, heroism, and incredible
ethnic animosities.
Men from Bosansi Samac, ' Brcko, 2 Vlasenica, 23 Rogaltica, 24 and
elsewhere described the carefully balanced power sharing arrangements
between Serbs, Muslims, and Croats constructed after the election of April
1990. They told of how the SDS,11 the JNA, and undisciplined
paramilitary organizations26 destabilizing these structures, disarmed the
local militias, and began brutalizing Muslims and Croats.
These witnesses sometimes sought refuge in words like
indescribable, unspeakable, or unimaginable. However, they ultimately
recounted acts of torture in painful detail. They testified about being
beaten until their urine ran red with blood, watching bulldozers dig holes
so that meat wagons full of bodies could unload their grizzly cargo, and of
helplessly observing the repeated rape of young Muslim women.
20. "During the opening weeks, the pace of the [Nuremberg] trial was slow ... the
documentary evidence - reams of it - at times had judges yawning and the defendants themselves
nodding off." Robert Shnayerson, Judgment at Nuremberg, SMITHSONIAN, Oct. 1996, at 132.
Also note that "[Nuremberg] got so repetitious," recalls Harold Burson, then radio correspondent
for the Armed Forces Network, "[iut was like the O.J. trial, where you got surfeited with DNA
information you didn't really understand." Tom Post, The Trial of the Century, NEWSWEEK,
Nov. 6, 1996, at 56.




25. Isak Gasi, a witness from Brcko, told of two appearances of Radovan Karadzic in his
hometown where the Bosnian Serb leader made ethnically inflammatory speeches.
26. Witnesses described the activities of Captain Dragan's Red Berets and Arkan's Black
Caps and paramilitary forces wearing Tiger Head patches, patches with Serbian slogans, the
Cetnik "Eagle, Skull and Cross Bones," and the famous 4 S's, worn in the Brcko area by the
Black Panthers. For more detail on this subject see Military Situation Section of the FINAL
REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS - ANNEX IV - THE POLICY OF
ETHNIC CLEANSING.
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Their testimony was permeated with descriptions of efforts made
to humiliate prisoners. Sulieman Tihic, a judge, told of being taken to
Serbia where he and others were forced to kiss the picture of Draza
Mihailovic, a World War II Serbian hero, or risk being beaten. He spoke
of being forced to clean toilets with his hands, made to watch other
detainees perform oral sex on each other, and of having an Arkan soldier
stop torturing him long enough to call his girlfriend in Belgrade on the
telephone so that she could listen. Isak Gasi told of watching a detention
camp guard carving a cross into the forehead of a Muslim prisoner. 27
V. THE LoST EYES OF OMARSKA
The American media focused twice on the Yugoslav drama as if it
were watching the opening and closing acts of a bizarre tableau noire.
These fleeting moments of intense interest occurred during the discovery
of the detention camps in August of 1992 and during the slaughter which
followed the collapse of the United Nations safe haven at Srebenica in July
1995.
Of the two events, the exposure of Omarska and other camps drew
most attention. This was perhaps because unlike Srebrenica, for which the
international community bears much responsibility, the outside world did
not have to include itself in the cast of camp villains. Additionally, images
from the camps caused many to cast eerie glances at Dachau and
Auschwitz.5
At Tadic's trial the judges heard days of testimony about the
Bosnia camps without ever hearing the defendant's name. Prosecutors
introduced the subject by calling a second expert policy witness a stern
Norwegian Judge named Hanna Sophie Greve. 9
27. The defense spent little time cross-examining policy witnesses except to suggest that
Muslims in Prijedor had more weapons than the hunting rifles and World War II pistols described
by prosecution witnesses.
28. The first western reporter to alert the world to conditions in the camps was Newsday's
Roy Gutman who earned a Pulitzer Prize in the process. Gutman says that he was inspired by
Nazi Hunter Simon Wiesenthal to compile his dispatches in a book, A WITNESS TO GENOCIDE
(1993).
29. Greve spent much of her career as an international consultant to the United Nations
High Commission for Refugees and other international relief agencies including work in
Thailand, Ethiopia, Angola, Romania, Latvia, and Cambodia. In October of 1993, she joined the
U.N. commission of Experts (the Bassiouni Commission) and was assigned to investigate
Prijedor. Her manner was so sober and uncompromising that CourtTV's Dutch crew referred to
her simply as Judge Norway. The defense objected vigorously to her testimony on the grounds
that her references to interviews conducted by others were hearsay and that she lacked any




Although Judge Greve did not speak Serbo-Croatian she offered
linguistic insights to the Tribunal. In response to Judge McDonald's °
request for a definition of ethnic cleansing, Greve pronounced the term a
euphemism for rounding up members of an ethnic group and taking them
to detention for torture, murder or deportation." She mocked the use by
the Serb authorities of the terms military investigation centers for detention
camps, and informative talks for torture.
Other policy witnesses offered numbing tales of torture and abuse
in Trnoplje, Keraterm, and Omarska. Typical of these was Muharem
Nezirevic, a journalist who spent time as a prisoner in Omarska.
On his first night in the White House 2 at Omarska, Nezerovic saw
an elderly man throw his body across that of his young son to shield him
from blows. Another man gave half of his ration (1/8 loaf of bread each
twenty-four hours) to his son through an intermediary who was quartered
near the son. One day, the intermediary approached Nezirevic and said he
did not know how to tell the man that his son had been taken away and
killed. His dilemma was short lived, the father himself was soon dead.
On another night in the White House, inmates heard a young
woman's screams. When they looked in the corridor they saw an elderly
Muslim doctor and a young girl forced to strip. The Serbs ordered the old
man to rape the young woman. He refused, saying "she could be my
child." The next day Nezirevic saw the doctor's body outside the White
House.
At one point in his testimony Nezirevic paused and simply said of
the inmates at Omarska, "Their eyes! That look! Their eyes were not on
the outside, but somewhere deep, deep inside!"
The eyes of the tribunal were able to look directly into Omarska
with the aid of the final prosecution policy witness Edward Vulliamy.
Vulliamy followed Roy Gutman to Omarska and was the first non-Serb
film journalist to film the camp.,,
America's fleeting glimpse of the camps in August of 1992 was a
snapshot compared to the detailed mural drawn early in Dusko Tadic's
30. The Presiding Judge for the Tadic trial chamber, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, is a former
Federal District Court Judge from Texas.
31. She placed the number of missing persons from Prijedor to include 43,000 Muslims
and 3000 Croats. While on the stand, she has also explained the strategic significance of Prijedor
to the Serbs in the Spring of 1992. It was a corridor which could link the Serb areas in Northeast
Bosnia adjacent to Serbia with the Krajina Serbian sector in Northwest Bosnia and Croatia.
32. The indictment and witnesses claim that the White House at Omarska was "a small
building where particularly severe beatings took place."
33. He also wrote a book about the experience called Seasons in Hell. EDWARD
VULLIAMY, SEASONS IN HELL (1994).
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trial. The lack of interest in this testimony is merely another piece in a
curiously apathetic puzzle.
To Dusko Tadic, forced to sit in the dock of an alien tribunal and
to listen to the detailing of horrors with which he was not charged, it must
have been a tremendous enigma.
VI. WITHER THE PROSECUTION? WHITHER TADIC?
"Dule,3' brother, how have I wronged you? Why do you beat
me?"
The most haunting words of the trial? Perhaps. They were
uttered in despair by Mehmed Alic a Muslim from Prijedor, who had
known the defendant's father. Alic, who lost one son, Ekrem, was an
inmate at Omarska along with his remaining son Enver. He testified that
he and Enver were beaten by guards including Tadic. During one beating
he lost sight of his son only to hear him wail, "[flather, look after my
children, take care of my children" followed by his unavailing plea for
mercy to Dule. Alic testified that he never saw his son again."
This dramatic testimony was buried in the middle of the
prosecution's case as was that of Nihad Seferovic. Seferovic said that he
saw Tadic slit the throats of two Muslim policemen. He was the only
eyewitness to testify publicly that he saw the defendant commit murder. 36
The prosecution moved rather mechanically through its witnesses
with no sign of giving much thought to dramatic timing. Prosecutors may
believe that with experienced judges timing is irrelevant, even offensive.
This is clearly not true however, of the public at large.
Part of the problem of course is that prosecutors did not have
many dramatic witnesses. Of the eighty-one prosecution witnesses more
than twenty were called simply to counter the defendant's alibi and prove
that Tadic was present at Omarska, Keratern Trnoplje, or near Kozarac
between May and December of 1992. While the defense challenged this
evidence, the testimony was not gripping.
Approximately half of the prosecution's witnesses testified to
beatings (some quite severe) at the hands of Tadic or offered frequently
34. This is Dusko Tadic's nickname.
35. Counts 5 - 11 charge the defendant with Alic's death. Earlier in the trial, the witness'
daughter Hasiha Klipic (sister of the deceased Evner Alic) also testified for the prosecution.
36. It appears that Seferovic's testimony was used in support of counts 24 through 28
although there is a variance between one of the victims named in the indictment and one named
by the witness. The indictment also charges that the victims were shot.
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oblique circumstantial evidence of murders." Only Seferovic publicly"
claimed to be an eye witness to a Tadic killing.
Prosecutors would like to have avoided much of the drama that did
impact on the their case. Redacted transcripts of two in camera witnesses
for whom prosecutors appeared to have high hopes were helpful to the
defense. One, witness H, seems to have undermined the prosecutions-
proof on its most dramatic allegation.
From the outset of the trial the most bone chilling charge was that
Tadic had forced witness G to bite off one of Fikret Harambasic's testicles
with the help of witness H and other prisoners at Omarska.19
Several witnesses testified to being at Omarska and hearing
Harambasic's screams. Two indicated that they had seen Tadic near the
location where the incident occurred.4° One witness, Halid Mujkanovic,
seemed on direct examination to connect Tadic to the incident.
However, near the end of Mujkavovic's testimony the following
colloquy took place between the witness and Judge McDonald:
Q: Did you see Tadic himself involved at all in the incident,
taking an active part.
A: I did not see those moments.
Q: So you did not see Tadic require G to commit the act you
described.?
A: No I did not.
When the redacted transcript of witness H's testimony was
released the mutilation allegation seemed finally to fade from view.41
Q: But one thing is sure, that the man with the beard giving
you the orders was not Dusko Tadic?
A: I do not believe so.
Q: You never saw Dusko Tadic in Omarska, would that be
right?
37. All of these witnesses if believed would support count 1, a general "persecution count"
which encompasses virtually every substantive allegation against Tadic and could be used to
embrace acts not specifically charged in the Indictment. The sheer number of persons whose
testimony is arrayed against the defendant on this count appears overwhelming.
38. The following witnesses testified in camera: For the Prosecution - 'P,' 'Q,' Sulejman
Besic (partially), 'H,' 'L,' 'AA' (rebuttal) and For the Defense - 'V,' 'W,' 'Z,' 'A,' 'B,' Pero
Opacic, Janko Opacic. Other witnesses for both sides had their identities hidden or their faces
hidden from the cameras.
39. Counts 5 -11.
40. Ferid Mujcic and Muharem Besic said they saw Tadic nearby, but could not connect
him to the incident. Armin Jujcic testified similarly on direct examination, but on cross-
examination was unsure if he had ever seen Tadic at Omarska.
41. This excerpt is from cross-examination by defense counsel Stephen Kay. Note that
there were still other allegations against Tadic in counts 5-11.
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A: I did not see him.
The greatest fear of journalists covering Tadic's trial is that
incredibly important testimony will .be offered in camera. This fear proved
to be well founded when, towards the end of the prosecution case, a
redacted transcript of the testimony of witness L was released. It
contained shocking eyewitness descriptions of Tadic's personal
participation in murders, beatings, and rapes. It even contained the
allegation that Tadic was actually the commandant of the Trnoplje camp.
However, on the day that Tadic himself took the stand prosecutors
requested that the court disregard the testimony of witness L. Based on
information supplied by two in camera defense witnesses prosecutors had
interrogated Witness L and extracted from him the confession that he had
lied in his testimony to the tribunal.
He claimed that he had been forced to lie to tribunal prosecutors
by agents of the Bosnian intelligence services. He admitted that he had
never seen Tadic at Trnopolje where he himself had once been a camp
guard.
However, defense exultation at the disappointments in the
prosecution's case may reflect false hope. As Dusko Tadic mounted his
defense he faced significant challenges. As any trial lawyer knows,
proving an alibi is a daunting task. Any small hole or imperfection in the
elsewhere tapestry can prove fatal. To establish an alibi for a six month
period, in a country at war, is especially difficult.
The particulars of Tadic's alibi were also worrisome. At no point
does he place himself more than twenty-five kilometers from the camps
and areas around Kozarac where he is alleged to have committed crimes.
Furthermore, Tadic is forced to rely heavily on the traditional alibi
coterie of witnesses, friends, relatives, and co-workers. Two of the co-
workers are part of the security apparatus although one, like Tadic,
occupies the lowly status of a checkpoint guard. This means that he has
been forced to call as witnesses police officers who had difficulty
explaining on cross-examination how they could be totally unaware of the
horrors of ethnic cleansing perpetrated on their beats.42
VII. WHO IS DAVID DuKE?
The legal journalist assumes that the Fourth Estate will play a
positive role in struggling to master the treacherous currents of debate
42. This problem presented special problems for Miroslav Brdar, who allegedly manned
the checkpoint with Tadic, and for their superior, Duro Prpos, who came under particularly sharp
attack on cross-examination and rebuttal (see the testimony of Fikret Kadiric).
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swirling about the trial of Dusko Tadic. However, testimony at Tadic's
trial exposed another kind of media activity.
Many witnesses testified about the destabilizing role played by
Radio Belgrade and Radio and TV Pale, as well as newspapers, in
northern Bosnia. They which spewed forth exhortations to ethnic
intolerance and violence for at least a year before the war.43 These organs
served as fountains of hate and intolerance, not as the eyes and consciences
of their communities.
Ironically, this testimony about the media's sordid role in the
former Yugoslavia led to one of the few light moments of the trial. This
occurred during the testimony of Judge Greve.
Greve testified that legitimate historical Serb grievances4 were
used by Serb leaders to frighten Serbs in northern Bosnia. She made
particular reference to Noel Malcolm's Bosnia, A Short History, which
offers the analogy articulated by a Bosnian journalist for this Serb
television propaganda blitz.
The journalist compared the Serb broadcasts to David Duke
producing a message that would be blasted throughout the United States by
virtue of the Klu Klux Klan's seizure of United States television stations.
As the day's session ended Judge Lal Vorah of Maylasia asked
prosecutor, Alan Tieger, "[w]ho is David Duke?"
This produced polite laughter among the Americans present.
Ironically, David Duke's name is a metaphor for racial intolerance in the
United States.
However, there is less reason for Judge Vorah to know of Duke
than for Americans to know the details of the struggle to bring justice to
43. Disturbing parallels can be seen to the circumstances surrounding the 1994 genocide in
Rwanda. Hutu controlled Radio Rwanda and its more virulent sister Radio-Television Libres Des
Mille Collines (RTLM) continually broadcast incendiary anti-Tutsi speeches before the genocide.
"Individuals targeted in the radio broadcasts were among the first killed (along with their
families) in April 1994." FINAL REPORT OF THE OF EXPERTS [Rwanda] par. 64. There is a
shocking similarity between the 1992 speech of a Leon Mugusera, an accused Hutu genocidaire
and that of Karadzic tot he Bosnian Parliament. "They belong in Ethiopia and we are going to
find them a short cut to get there by throwing them into the Nyarabongo River. I must insist on
this point. We have to act. We have to wipe them all out." Rwanda expert report para. 63.
Text is from GERARD PUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS, HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 172 (1995).
Edward Vulliamy enhanced our comprehension of riparian imagery in this decade's genocides
when he testified in the Tadic trial that the Serb engineer operating the damn on the Drina River
complained that Muslim bodies were interfering with the operation of his plant.
44. The most recent, and most troublesome claim is that as many as 750,000 Serbs were
exterminated by Croatian Ustashe forces in World War II without the redress sought or offered
by the international community. FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF
EXPERTS - ANNEX - THE POLICY OF ETHNIC CLEANSING, III, THE BALKAN WARS AND THE
WORLD WARS.
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the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. Until Americans become informed
it is unlikely that western governments will exercise the political muscle
required to bring powerful indictees to trial.
Of course this still leaves the legal journalist struggling with the
question of why Americans should care. Perhaps that answer can be found
most clearly in the words of an American who is a looming presence in the
trial of Dusko Tadic, Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald.
We ourselves in the United states I think still have a
problem dealing with ethnic differences and what has
happened in the former Yugoslavia of course is nothing
that we would ever expect to occur in the US but is an
example of what can happen when you don't resolve your
ethnic divisiveness. When you cannot come to respect
people for their difference and accept the differences and
yet live together and respect each other that is what
happens.
So it seems to me that to the extent that we in America
have not come to grips with our kind of aspirational
assertions of equality and non-discrimination and with the
reality of discrimination that there are some parallels and
so perhaps we can learn something.41
Such knowledge will not come without struggle, without braving
the dangerous waters between Scylla and Charbidis which can only be
traversed seated in the galleries of the Hague or in Arusha. The voyages
will be difficult but there are few issues more pressing for our species than
finding just solutions to the problems of mass murder and genocide.
45. CourtTV interview with Terry Moran (May 3, 1996).
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THE LIKELY LEGACIES OF TADIC
Jose E. Alvarez *
How will historians and others judge the Balkan war crimes
tribunal? In my brief time, I would like to indicate how the prosecution of
Tadic, the first case before that tribunal, has raised some doubts about that
body's legitimacy and likely legacy.
It is clear the creators of this tribunal attempted to correct some of
the obvious problems with Nuremberg and Tokyo. The legitimacy of
those earlier prosecutions had been attacked on a number of grounds:
1) as revenge trials subject to double standards wrought and conducted
by the victors against the vanquished;
2) for violating the rights of defendants through such questionable
practices as trials in absentia and unfair evidentiary rules that
subjected defendants to trial by document subject to no appeal or
review with little attempt to equalize the opportunities between
prosecution and defense;
3) for violating the rule against ex post facto imposition of criminal
liability, principally through charges invoking crimes against
aggression, crimes against humanity, and for membership in criminal
organizations;
4) for dishonoring the memory of Holocaust victims by artificially
limiting all prosecutions to crimes committed in the course of
aggressive war by one state against another thereby denying victims
of German atrocities, particularly against the Jews and gypsies, from
presenting the world with an accurate picture of the nature of the
Holocaust (both during the War and before) and the very real
complicity of ordinary German citizens.'
* Professor, University of Michigan Law School. This talk is based on the author's
recent article, Nuremberg Revisited: The Tadic Case, in 7 EUR. J. INT'I L. 245 (1996). For
additional references, readers should consult that article.
1. For a summary of some of these critiques, see, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL
MODERNISM 335-78 (1994); Kevin R. Chatey, Ptifalls and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons of
Nuremberg to the Yugoslav War Crimes Trials, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 57 (1995); for partial
responses combined with additional critiques, see, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF
THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1993).
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The creators of the Balkan tribunal sought valiantly to anticipate
and correct these possible problems. Thus, they created an institution that
they believed would not be subject to the charge of victor's justice since
the tribunal was created by the world community in the form of the United
Nations Security Council and not merely through the action of incidental
victors of a war. They sought to ensure that the tribunal's judges would
reflect the world's diversity and not merely the interests of the five
permanent members of the Council. They further attempted to defuse
accusations of partiality by giving the tribunal jurisdiction over all crimes
committed in the former Yugoslavia by any side They incorporated the
guarantees of modern international human rights to ensure fairness to
defendants and gave solace to victims by providing mechanisms in the
tribunal's procedures to protect them from harm should they testify. In
response to fears of ex post facto law, they restricted the tribunal's
jurisdiction to crimes based on those "rules of beyond any doubt part of
customary law. "'2 With an eye on the ultimate legitimacy of the tribunal,
they omitted the death penalty, trials in absentia, or liability for mere
membership in a criminal organization.,
Despite all these ostensible improvements vis-A-vis Nuremberg and
Tokyo, the legitimacy of the tribunal remains an issue. The most obvious
set of constraints for the Tribunal has been ably suggested by others and I
need not dwell on them in my remarks. There are grave doubts about the
likely efficacy of the tribunal's efforts given the unstable nature of the
former Yugoslavia itself, and most significantly, the fact that many of
those responsible for heinous crimes remain at large and some in positions
of considerable influence and power. Whatever else might be said about
Nuremberg and Tokyo, those proceedings at least succeeded in convicting
some of high official and not merely small fry like Tadic. Critics charge
that by comparison, the enormity of crimes that are likely to remain
unaddressed in the former Yugoslavia mocks justice and that the tribunal's
efforts are likely to be as ludicrous as an effort to conduct Nazi war crimes
prosecutions would have been in the absence of D-Day.4
Less obvious legitimization issues have become clearer as a result
of the Tribunal's responses' to pre-trial motions filed in the Tadic case. In
an unsuccessful attempt to resist trial, Tadic argued that the tribunal was
2. See Secretary-General's Report Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993).
3. For a favorable assessment of the tribunal in light of these changes, see, e.g., Chaney,
supra note 1.
4. See. e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Nuremberg Sensibility: Telford Taylor's Memoirs of the
Nuremberg Trials, 35 HARV. INT'L L. J. 281, at 292-93 (1994).
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illegal because the United Nations drafters had not envisaged it; because
the United Nations General Assembly was not involved in the tribunal's
creation; because the text of the United Nations Charter did not grant the
United Nations Security Council authority to create such a judicial organ;
because the Council had not consistently created such tribunals in other
instances; because the Council could not act on individuals; because there
had been no real threat to the peace; and because the Council could not
displace national courts and therefore had illegally violated national
sovereignty. It surprised no one that both the trial and appellate chambers
of the tribunal dismissed all of Tadic's arguments and upheld the legality
of the tribunal X indeed a cynic would say that judges had little choice but
to uphold the legality of the enterprise of which they were such an
important part. Nonetheless, the judges' responses demonstrated how
difficult it is to legitimize this tribunal given through traditionally
legalistic, as opposed to policy-driven, arguments.
The trial and appellate chamber's diverse responses to Tadic's
contentions show that novel issues of United Nations Charter
interpretation, including contestable propositions about the reviewability of
Security Council decisions, are posed by the tribunal's creation and
continued operation.
From the perspective of an academic, Tadic's arguments put the
tribunal's judges between a rock and a hard place. In order to justify the
legality of their tribunal, Tadic's judges found that they either had to
modestly defer from Tadic's questions in deference to an non-reviewable
Security Council or boldly proclaim review authority over the Security
Council while affirming in substance all that the Council had done. The
trial chamber in its response of August 10, 1995, took the first tack while
the appellate chamber took the second in its opinion issued on October 2,
1995. Neither response is likely to be entirely acceptable to both
permanent and non-permanent members of the United Nations and the
chambers' opinions are provoke further debate about the viability and
wisdom of the ad hoc war crimes tribunals.
The weakest set of responses to Tadic's arguments came from the
trial chamber. In an opinion signed by Judge Gabrielle MacDonald of the
United States, that chamber attempted to put off these issues by relying on
the political question doctrine imported from U.S. constitutional law.,
Essentially, the trial judges demurred on Tadic's substantive arguments on
the grounds that the Security Council is all-powerful and non-reviewable.
Although the heart of a criminal trial such as Tadic is the need to resolve
5. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-T, Balkans war Cr. Trib. (Aug. 10, 1995) (hereinafter
"trial chamber"), in particular paras. 6, 23-24.
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the rights of individuals X both Tadic's and the rights of his alleged
victims the trial judges opted to privilege state power embodied in the
Security Council over the human rights integral to the tribunal's enterprise.
In suggesting the Council had done presented a non-reviewable political
question, the trial chamber came very close to suggesting that the judges
need to follow the Council's dictates, even if this were to violate
defendants (or victim's) human rights or even if the Council were to
mandate selective enforcement of international humanitarian law. In
deference to the likely reaction this conclusion was likely to provoke (and
not just among human rights lawyers), the trial chamber straddled a
number of inconsistent propositions to the satisfaction of no one. Thus,
for example, while the tribunal affirmed that individuals gain human rights
under applicable law, including the individual right to be tried by courts
established by law, it also simultaneously tried to affirm that individuals
have no standing to assert these rights because states generally and the
Council in particular have said otherwise.
The most withering critique of the trial chamber's approach came
from the tribunal itself, namely the appellate chamber. As the majority of
the appellate judges pointed out, the trial chamber's answers to Tadic are
inconsistent with international law principles granting all international
adjudicative bodies competence de la competence - that is, the power and
the duty to determine the legality of its own jurisdiction.6 The majority of
the appellate judges wisely decided that refusing to answer Tadic's
questions by relying a variant of the political questions doctrine would not
be a credit to the tribunal. They wisely decided in a case in which the
freedom of an individual was at stake, the tribunal's own judges needed to
defend why this tribunal was as legitimate a body to render such a decision
as any national court. The appellate chamber decided that it could ill
afford to avoid an opportunity to justify their tribunal's existence.
But while the majority of the appellate judges attempted to give
more substantive answers to Tadic's challenges, the implications of their
answers are likely to be contested by many United Nations members as
well as the human rights community. Among the contestable conclusions
of the majority of the appellate judges were the following:
1) That notwithstanding Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,
sitting judges like themselves were empowered to pronounce on the
legality of Security Council action a conclusion that permanent
6. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, Balkens war Cr. Trib. (Oct. 2, 1995)
(hereinafter appellate Chamber), in particular paras. 11-12,14, and 18.
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members of the Council are not likely to find altogether comforting
and one that the World Court itself has to date resisted;
2) That (at odds with one above) the validity of Council action can be
presumed, even when not supported by either the text of the Charter
or its negotiating history, particularly if supported by the Council's
prior practice a conclusion that neither nonpermanent members nor
some segments of the human rights community concerned by recent
Council actions (as with respect to the conduct of the Gulf War) are
likely to altogether favor;
3) That the Security Council can delegate its functions to another body
(even one that is not subject to the veto), can act prosecutions
conclusions that are as likely to prompt discomfort in permanent as
well as non-permanent United Nations members and even more so in
the human rights community;
4) That "it is only for want of resources that the United Nations has to
act through its Members" 7 a recipe for institutional override over any
and all sovereign rights that would have surprised the original drafters
of the limited security regime which is the United Nations Charter;
5) That internal armed conflicts may constitute threats to the
international peace notwithstanding the language of article 2(4)
banning only inter-state force another conclusion that is not likely to
win the hearts and minds of any state with unruly internal disputes
who naively believes that such matters are within their protected
domestic jurisdiction and is not subject to forceful Council
intervention;
6) That criminal defendant's rights to be tried before courts established
by law merely means a right to be tried by any court that respects a
defendant's other procedural rights - a result at odds with the
position of human rights advocates before other tribunals. As a result
of the Tadic case, defenders of the tribunal may now find it necessary
to defend contestable readings of the United Nations Charter and the
powers of the Security Council which go to the heart of post-Cold
War debates about that body's newly flexed muscles. Today, the
United Nations finds itself in a quandary with respect to legitimacy
and future direction of the Security Council.
7. Id. at 36.
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Increasingly, non-permanent members question the representative
nature of that body as well as the scope of many of its post-Cold War
precedents. As is clear from recent opinions of the World Court as well as
scholarly debates, many United Nations members resist giving that body
unchecked authority as much as permanent veto-wielding states such as the
United States resist any suggestion that what the Security Council does is
ultimately reviewable by any court even one that the Council itself has
created.8  The appellate body's response to Tadic's pre-trial motions
manages to offend all sides in this debate without settling the underlying
issues.
Of more immediate concern to litigants in the Balkan tribunal is
that the appellate body's response to Tadic does not answer important
questions concerning the future relationship between that tribunal and the
Security Council. While the tribunal is, of course, financially dependent
on the Council, as well as on the generosity of particular United Nations
members, it remains unclear the extent to which the rights of defendants
and victims remain legally subservient to the demands of the Council or
even to the General Assembly. Could those political bodies interfere with
on-going trials or investigations? Does the Security Council retain the
authority to, for example, instruct the tribunal not to try prominent Serbs
because of the supposed threat to the peace process or to the reconciliation
of the country? Could the Council direct a United States national court not
to pursue the on-going civil case against Karadzic?9 If Security Council or
General Assembly override remains a possibility, what does that possibility
never mind its exercise mean for the fulfillment of the tribunal's grand
goals, especially its claim to be non-partial and devoted to the equal
application of established law?
These are not the only difficult issues that have been presented by
this initial prosecution. In response to Tadic, the tribunal has also
determined that charges can be brought against Tadic even for acts
committed in the course of an internal conflict. The judges specifically
found that the nexus required at Nuremberg between crimes against peace
and crimes against humanity is no longer required by modem international
law.'0 Because of the nature of the Balkan conflict, the tribunal has seen fit
8. For a review of these debates both on the World Court and off, see, e.g., Jose E.
Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 AM. J. INT'L. L. (1996).
9. Kadic v. Kadic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
10. Appellate Chamber, Case No. IT-94-I-AR2, paras. 138-42.
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to go beyond the Nuremberg precedents, thereby raising some doubts
about the application of ex post facto law."
Finally, the trial court's answer to at least one pre-trial motion by
the prosecutor in the Tadic reveals one likely point of contention with
respect to the perceived fairness of the tribunal's procedures. The trial
chamber ruled that the prosecutor is free to present defense witnesses
without identifying these to either Tadic or his defense counsel.'2 While
the prosecutor has decided not to take advantage of this ruling during
Tadic's trial, the possibility that she may resort to unidentified witnesses in
other cases involving, for example, charges of mass rape is likely to
prompt a barrage of criticism by many common law lawyers to whom
cross-examination is sacred. Indeed, one prominent U.S. lawyer, a former
legal adviser to the State Department, has argued that if this were to occur,
he would support amendment of the United Nations Charter to add a bill of
rights." On the other hand, should the prosecutor respond to such fears by
dropping charges of mass rape against other defendants, she is apt to be
criticized for ignoring one crucial aspect of ethnic cleansing as practiced in
the former Yugoslavia: its brutally gendered nature. Indeed, if future
trials fail to deal with the rape charges because of the difficult evidentiary
issues, historians are likely to say that this tribunal sanitized ethnic
cleansing as much as Nuremberg did the Holocaust. Those who have been
raped in order to cleanse parts of the former Yugoslavia will not forgive
this tribunal if it ignores their stories or if it fails to condemn the guilty for
this particular crime. For many, a failure to acknowledge this aspect of
ethnic cleansing would betray one of the tribunal's principal goals: an
accurate rendering.
Some of the doubts about the legitimacy of this tribunal emerge
because its composition is as cosmopolitan as it is. Some of the doubts
arise because of the judges' differing answers to the pre-trial motions made
in the Tadic case. Even those most concerned with the tribunal's
legitimacy its judges individually differ on such basic questions as the
reviewability of Security Council decisions, the nature of the underlying
11. For more thorough discussion of some of the tribunal's innovative findings with respect
to international humanitarian law, see, e.g., Theodore Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in
the Formation of International Humanitarian Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 238 (1996); Christopher
Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic Case, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 265 (1996).
Cf. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 349-357 (1994) (discussing the ex post facto problem as
applied to Nuremberg).
12. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-T (Decision on Prosecutors motion Aug. 10, 1995)
(Stephens, J. dissenting in part).
13. Monroe Leigh, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against, 90 AM. J.
INT'L L.
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conflict in the Balkans, the extent to which internal conflicts can be said to
trigger threat to the peace, and the need to resort to unidentified witnesses.
Yet, as the dissent of Judge Pal in the Tokyo trials" should remind us,
some degree of judicial unanimity between east and west, north and south
may be necessary if this international tribunal is to retain (or acquire) true
international legitimacy. The Tadic case shows that we have not yet
reached closure with respect to fundamental jurisprudential issues about
this tribunal. Instead, one gets the strong sense that, at least with respect
to some basic issues, Tadic's judges simply turned to circular arguments
such as their all-purpose answer that the legality of the tribunal needs to be
affirmed because "the very purpose of the creation of an international
criminal jurisdiction" would otherwise be defeated."5
Such arguments, though grounded in political necessity, encourage
a search for alternatives to ad hoc war crimes tribunals created on the
mere whim of the Security Council. The proceedings in Tadic have not
stemmed a growing skepticism that, despite the stenuous efforts of its
drafters, the Balkan tribunal has not (yet) overcome the flawed legacy of
Nuremberg.
14. Justice Pal, Dissenting Opinion, in 21 Tokyo War Crimes Trial (R. Pritchard & S.
Zaide, eds. 1981).
15. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, Balkans war Cr. Trib. (Oct. 2, 1995).
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STATE COLLABORATION IN UNITED STATES
RATIFICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
James A.R. Nafziger"
The process in the United States of negotiating and ratifying
human rights treaties seldom engages the states, either individually or
collectively. This has been a strange turn in the evolution of our federal
system that I believe should be of greater interest to human rights
advocates and specialists in foreign relations law. Let me suggest why.
As The Federalist makes clear, the framers of the Constitution
were confident that the Senate, and the Senate alone, would be an ideal
instrument for the expression of state interests in the treaty-making
process.I The Senate was going to be small and its members were to be
elected by state legislatures. It could, therefore, transmit the will of the
states in working closely with the executive branch to make and ratify
treaties. Moreover, it was expected that the Senators would be among the
most able, virtuous, and therefore trustworthy citizens of the various
states.'
How times have changed over the past two centuries! The role of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the powers and paternalism of its
Chairman, and a routinely clumsy handling of foreign affairs would have
been beyond the imagination of even the remarkably imaginative Founding
Fathers. Nor was their intent to vest a determination of state interests
exclusively within the discretion of a handful of Senators. The states,
themselves, through a plenary Senate, were to decide collectively what,
within constitutional limits, was in their interest. In effect, it was the states
* Thomas B. Stoel Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. The author
appreciates the insights and suggestions of his colleagues Claudia Burton and Hans Linde.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 354 (Alexander Hamilton) (Goldwin Smith ed., 1901).
See also TREATIES AND OTHER AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE: A
STUDY PREPARED FOR THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE
xxxii, S. Print 103-53, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Treaties Study].
2. As the select assemblies for choosing the President, as well as the state
legislatures who appoint the Senators, will in general be composed of the most
enlightened and respectable citizens, there is reason to presume that their attention and
their votes will be directed to those men who have become the most distinguished by
their abilities and virtue, and in whom the people perceive just grounds for confidence.
The Constitution manifests very particular attention to this object.
THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 354, supra note 1.
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that were to advise the President on international agreements and consent
to their ratification.,
Surely the states have always had fundamental interests in the
codification and progressive development of human rights. In the words
of The Federalist, "[t]he powers reserved to the several States will extend
to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the
lives, liberties, and properties of the people and the internal order,
improvement, and prosperity of the State." 4  A little later, the Tenth
Amendment, in effect, confirmed these powers.' Today, the states, subject
to the United States Constitution and civil rights laws, are where much of
the action is.6 It is to state government, in the words of The Federalist,
that "the first and most natural attachment of the people will be.",
Senator John Bricker knew that. Senator Jesse Helms knows that.
Both of those powerful adversaries of human rights treaties have known
that to a serious fault. Why don't the states themselves get the message?
Why don't they become more involved in the process of ratifying human
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. ("[The President] shall have power, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur.")
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 256 (James Madison), supra note 1.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. X. ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people. ")
6. Consider that state, not national, laws govern our most important social
relationships. Marriage, divorce, and parenthood are matters of state law. State courts
applying state law decide deeply human and moral disputes - - whether a hospital may
discontinue life support for a hopelessly ill patient or force treatment for a child over
the parent's religious objections, for example, or whether a child should live with a
father or with a surrogate mother who has changed her mind about her surrogate status
- - issues of personal rights more meaningful to many people than freedom of the press
or the Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination or double jeopardy.
Property ownership, inheritance, and the use of land are governed by state law. So are
buying and selling, employment, and other contracts. So is compensation for personal
injuries. Workers' compensation laws were enacted by state legislatures, and battles
over tort liability and insurance coverage are won and lost there as well. The states,
not Congress, decide who may practice law or medicine, be a plumber or a.
hairdresser, drive a car or buy a drink.
The mass of conventional crimes are defined by state laws, and the overwhelming
majority of criminal cases are investigated by local police officers and prosecuted by
states' attorneys in state courts. Decentralized police power and the limited functions
and small number of federal law enforcement officials are crucial protections of liberty
in a federal system. Consider also that, second only to law enforcement, our most
important and largest social service, education, is provided by state and local schools
and colleges or governed by state laws.
Hans A. Linde, Citizenship and State Constitutions, in ROOTS, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
386-87 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1992).
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 258 (James Madison), supra note 1.
Nafziger
rights treaties? Of course, many human rights advocates might shudder at
the suggestion: The last thing we need is the ghost of the Bricker
Amendment' come alive. Let's not give the states any more ideas about
how they can puncture the Commonweal. What's more, state and local
governments claim that they lack resources. They will therefore do
anything to avoid new obligations. Worse yet, local police and district
attorneys are out to suppress, not expand, human rights. And what about
Proposition 187? 9 After all, that was the people of California speaking
directly. The less we hear from the states, the better.
Despite the risks, however, I would argue that fuller and more
direct collaboration by the states in the treaty making process would
strengthen and perhaps accelerate our national commitment to the
conventional regime of human rights. Such collaboration would make it
more likely that the states would promote ratification and implement
human rights treaties, even if they are not self-executing. The political
branches of the federal government need to enter into a more direct,
educational dialogue with the states. The Meiklejohn Civil Liberties
Institute, in a letter to the United Nations Human Rights Committee
concerning Proposition 187,10 questioned United States implementation of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Three out of
seven questions raised by the Institute in their letter highlighted the need to
educate state authorities on their responsibilities under the Covenant."
Greater collaboration by the State of California in ratifying the Covenant
might well have weakened some of the appeal to California political
8. The Bricker Amendment, rooted in a fear of human rights treaties, would have
provided, inter alia, against self-execution of treaties and international supervision of any matters
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states. Hearings on S. R. Res. I and S. J. Res. 43,
Treaties and Executive Agreements, Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Constitutional Amendments, S. REP. No. 2-3, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) [hereinafter Senate
Judiciary Committee Hearings]. See Natalie Hevener Kaufman & David Whiteman, Opposition
to Human Rights Treaties in The United States Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment, 10
HUM. RTS. Q. 309 (1988).
9. Proposition 187, which California voters approved in November 1994, denies access
by undocumented aliens to publicly funded social services, nonemergency health care, and
education. Codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 43215, 66010.8 (West Supp. 1995); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 130 (West Supp. 1995); CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE § 10001.5 (West
Supp. 1995) [hereinafter Proposition 187].
10. Proposition 187, supra note 9.
11. MEIKLEJOHN CIVIL LIBERTIES INSTITUTE, ISSUE SHEETS: FACTS AND QUESTIONS ON
THE FIRST REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES ON ENSURING AND ENFORCING THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 56-57
(Feb. 10, 1995), quoted in Anne Paxton Wagley, Newly Ratified International Human Rights
Treaties and the Fight Against Proposition 187, 17 CHICANO LATINO L. REV. 88, 98-99 (1995).
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leaders of Proposition 187,12 for example. And when we look at what,
really, we have accomplished in more than a symbolic sense by our.
heavily qualified ratification of a limited number of human rights treaties
during the past fifty years, the probable benefits of more direct state
involvement in the treaty-making process would seem to outweigh the
costs or risks. It is at least worth a try.
We should not forget that state constitutions and laws are Often out
in front of corresponding federal provisions. Consider just a few examples
from three states with which I am most familiar: Oregon, Washington,
and California. One judicial decision has gone beyond Title IX of the
Federal Civil Rights Act" in eliminating gender discrimination in sports.14
Another simply made gender a suspect classification for judicial scrutiny.'
Still another rejected polygraph tests as a condition for public employment
of persons not involved in public safety. 6  Courts have allowed medical
patients to terminate life sustaining equipment or treatment," and voters in
one of the three states approved of a ballot measure that provided for
physician assisted suicide."8 Even if California's notorious Proposition
187' 9 spoils this record, we should note that California's next-door
neighbor has prohibited state and local law enforcement officials from
assisting the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in rounding up
undocumented aliens.m
These actions are just a few examples of state leadership in
promoting and protecting human rights. They are, of course, controversial
and far from universal actions among the states. The point is, however,
that states can be on the vanguard of championing human rights." Indeed,
there has been a trend toward the use of state courts to implement human
rights under state laws and constitutions rather than federal constitutional
12. Proposition 187, supra note 9.
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) ("No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.")
14. Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975).
15. Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 653 P.2d 970 (Or. 1982).
16. Long Beach City Emp. v. City of Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660 (Cal. 1986).
17. In re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.3d 445 (Wash. 1987); Matter of Welfare of Colyer,
660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983).
18. Death With Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (1995).
19. Proposition 187, supra note 9.
20. E.g., 38 Or. Op. Att'y Gen. 759 (1977).
21. See generally, Judith Avner, Some Observations on State Equal Rights Amendments, 3
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 144 (1984).
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provisions. Moreover, state courts in the three-state region have had the
courage and wisdom to cite international instruments in recent decisions. 22
That should remind us that customary human rights law is made not
"merely by national governmental actors within a federal system.",,
Whether states are more progressive or retrograde in promoting human
rights is not the most important point. What matters most is that, although
state and local governments deal with human rights around the clock, they
are not playing a direct enough role in advising the federal government on
instruments that ultimately rely on implementation by all three levels of
government.
I contacted several leading associations of state and local
governments to see if this was true. The National Association of Attorneys
General reported that they had been involved in the making of only a
single treaty, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
because of their concern that it might preempt states' rights. They were
not, however, involved in drafting NAFTA's side agreement on labor
rights .2  The National Governors' Association noted they had been a
leading force in support of NAFTA, but that they never "get involved," in
their words, with any human rights treaties., 5 Neither the Democratic
Governors Association nor the Republican Governors Association assigns
staff members to follow treaty developments.-6 Perhaps the most striking
comment was made to me by the United States Conference of Mayors.
They reported that they normally deal only with "urban" as opposed to
"national" issues. Because they have classified human rights treaties as
national rather than urban, they have chosen not to be involved in the
treaty-making process .17
The underlying message of this very limited survey may be that
human rights treaties are too arcane, too remote, or too trivial for busy
state and local governments. Another message may be that state and local
authorities rely, quite reasonably in theory, on their United States Senators
22. HURST HANNUM, MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL. HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11 (1985), citing, e.g., Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981);
American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fair Emp. & Hous. Comm'n, 651 P.2d 1151 (Cal. 1982).
23. Jordan J. Paust, The Complex Nature, Sources and Evidences of Customary Human
Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 147, 158 (1995/96).
24. Telephone Interview with Paul Beaulieu, Deputy Director and General Counsel, Nat'l
Ass'n of Att'ys Gen. (Oct. 10, 1996).
25. Telephone Interview with Jim Martin, Director, Office of State and Federal Affairs,
Nat'l Governors' Ass'n (Oct. 3, 1996).
26. Taped telephone messages from Democratic and Republican Governors Ass'n (Oct. 5,
1996).
27. Telephone Interview with Chip Brown, U.S. Conf. of Mayors (Oct. 5, 1996).
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to do the job. Or, perhaps, governments presume that human rights
treaties have only symbolic value by confirming the Federal Bill of Rights.
Because human rights treaties, therefore, are thought to pose little or no
risk to the nation,2 9 they are not worthy of much attention. To the extent
treaty provisions may exceed constitutional protections, the Chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee can be counted on to fend off any
unwarranted international intrusion.
The states have therefore been missing in action during the great
battles over human rights. On the other hand, a private body, the
American Bar Association (ABA), has been able to deploy its forces very
effectively. The saga of ABA obstructionism during the first twenty-five
or thirty years of the modern human rights era is well known. 0
Apparently the ABA feared that the President, conniving with the Senate
behind the backs of the states, would accomplish by treaty what the
Congress for many years had refused to enact, namely, civil rights
legislation. What is more, the long-time Chairman of the ABA Section on
International Law, Eberhard Deutsch, adamantly opposed human rights
treaties not only as a threat to states' rights but as a device, in his words,
to destroy local government. 31 Perhaps his New Orleans background led
him to fear a sort of French-style system of prefects serving only the
interests of the nation. Deutsch used this premise to launch a broader
attack on the treaty clause of the Constitution? 2  He described it as a
"'Trojan Horse,' ready to unload its hidden soldiery into our midst,
destroying State laws and constitutions and leaving behind the wreckage of
the dream of the Founding Fathers which envisioned maintenance of the
established constitutional balance between State and Federal power, and
28. After all, "in an impressive number of instances," both the Senate and the House of
Representatives have been involved in the negotiation process leading to conclusion of a treaty.
Anne M. Williams, United States Treaty Law, in THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 40 (Hurst
Hannum & Dana D. Fischer eds., 1993).
29. RICHARD B. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT 13
(1981).
30. For a chronicle of the ABA's opposition to human rights treaties, see NATALIE
HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A HISTORY OF
OPPOSITION, passim (1990). "States' rights were ardently defended and often presented as the
only bulwark against an expansive federal government that would use its powers to impose a host
of liberal programs on states and local communities, programs such as the elimination of racial
restrictions on property ownership, marriage, and education." Id. at 12.
31. Id. at 115-16. In Deutsch's words, "[guilding of multipartite treaties with such
idealistic immediate goals as the prevention of genocide and the promotion of human rights
cannot conceal their underlying long-range objective to destroy local government while expanding




preservation of the Bill of Rights intact."" The ABA has, of course,
changed its mind. Since it began to support human rights treaties in the
1970s, the ABA has played a constructive role in the process of ratifying
them. But it is not a role that can ever replace the states.
The perceived importance of states' rights in the treaty-making
process is clear from a statistical profile of arguments made against human
rights treaties?' Moreover, the trend is toward greater reliance on the
states' rights argument to oppose human rights treaties." It is ironic that
precisely because "human rights fall in the domain of states' rights,"3 , the
Senate, without bothering to consult the states directly or to solicit their
testimony, has an excuse for refusing to ratify a treaty that might serve
their interests or for nonaction." The question, however, should be about
human rights and not states' rights. It should not be a question of what a
few Senators perceive states' rights to be, as a technique for blocking
human rights treaties. Instead, the question should be how to involve the
states in a fuller, more open dialogue about the human rights with which
they are concerned on a daily basis.
It is high time, therefore, that we reinvigorate the states' role at the
federal level in the ratification process, as the Framers of the Constitution
intended. We need to stir up a sluggish process. "[Clurrent opposition to
33. Id. at 119.
34. Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 8, at 33 1.
35. For example, between 1953 and 1979 there was a reported increase of nearly fifty
percent in the percentage of total arguments against human rights treaties (16.8% to 23.4%).
36. Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 8, at 313.
37. Of course, the reasons for the poor record of the United States in acceding to human
rights treaties extend beyond the issues of states' rights:
Although the United States has been in the vanguard of observance of human rights,
the issue of entering into legally binding human rights treaties has been controversial.
While sometimes there is a difference on the nature of human rights to be guaranteed,
often the controversy has extended to treaties guaranteeing human rights on which
there is wide agreement. Various administration officials and Senators have contended
that human rights should remain a matter of domestic jurisdiction and have expressed
concern that internationally determined human rights could have an impact on rights of
American citizens under the U.S. Constitution. They feared that since in the United
States treaties are the law of the land, human rights treaties could supersede national
and state laws. Other administration officials and Senators emphasized the value of the
conventions in promoting human rights in other countries and believed that the United
States should become a party to maintain its leadership in the human rights fields.
They contended the United States usually had a higher standard of human rights than
called for in the treaties, and in any event no international agreement could supersede
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
TREATIES STUDY, supra note 1, at 231.
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human rights treaties is a legacy of the 1950's."I' Enlisting greater state
collaboration would, of course, impose burdens on the human rights
movement. We can expect, for example, that states, individually or
collectively, would oppose as well as support ratifications. But that is
democracy and the federal system at work. And who knows? Broader
collaboration might help convert skeptical state authorities. It might also
diminish the significance of federal-state clauses in human rights treaties 39
and the appeal of reservations to them on the basis of so-called states'
rights. We might then avoid some of the Swiss cheese effect of this
country's treaty commitments to the international protection of human
rights.
38. KAUFMAN, supra note 30, at 2.
39. Id. at 171.
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The painfully slow process of securing the United States
ratification of human rights treaties is a well established part of American
history.' Although it is not surprising that one of the newest treaties, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, has not been ratified yet, it is
nevertheless remarkable that it has attracted such strong, well organized
opposition. According to Mr. Robert Dalton, Assistant Legal Adviser for
Treaty Affairs in the Department of State, in the past decade no other
treaty has attracted such a virulent reaction.2 In this analysis I will discuss
some of the reasons why ratification of this particular convention appears
to be fraught with peril.
* Alison Dundes Renteln is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University
of Southern California and in 1996-1997 is a Visiting Professor at both Boalt Hall, School of
Law, University of California, Berkeley, and Stanford University in the Department of Political
Science. She has a J.D. from the USC Law Center and a Ph.D. in Jurisprudence and Social
Policy from Boalt Hall, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
1. When the United States does ratify, it attaches to the ratification a package of
reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDS), which calls into question the sincerity of
any treaty commitment. As one commentator put it: "As a result of those qualifications of its
adherence, United States ratification has been described as specious, meretricious, and
hypothetical." Louis Henkin, United States Ratification of Hwnan Rights Conventions: The
Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995). See also HURST HANNUM & DANA
FISCHER, UNITED STATES RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS (1993); NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A
HISTORY OF OPPOSITION (1990); Natalie Hevener Kaufman & David Whitman, Opposition to
Human Rights Treaties in the Senate, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 309-337 (1988).
2. Interview with Robert Dalton, Assistant Legal Advisor for Treaty Affairs in the Dept.
of St. (Oct. 25, 1996).
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I. BACKGROUND
One might have expected that the United States would endorse the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), an exciting new treaty that
is based in large part on the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child.
The drafting of the Convention was undertaken at the behest of the Polish
government as part of the celebration of the 1979 International Year of the
Child. After years of debate, representatives of states were able to forge a
consensus, and the treaty represents an internationally agreed upon
minimum standard for the treatment of children everywhere. It has been
heralded as a "magna carta for children." 3  According to Lawrence
LeBlanc: "No other specialized United Nations human rights convention
has been accepted so quickly and with such apparent enthusiasm." 4
After more than ten years of drafting, the CRC was adopted by the
United Nations on November 20, 1989, and came into force on September
2, 1990, with the requisite twenty ratifications. Although the treaty
specified that only twenty ratifications were required before it would enter
into force, approximately 187 states promptly signed, ratified or
implemented the treaty. This left the United States in the company of only
a handful of states which had not ratified or indicated an intent to ratify.
One reason to expect United States ratification was the key role
played by the United States during the drafting of the treaty.5 Indeed, the
inclusion of four articles reflected the strong influence of the United
States.6 However, the leadership role might not have been a significant
indicator of United States support if the United States participants in the
drafting process reflected the views mainly of the Presidential
3. This phrase was used by James Grant when he was the Executive Director of UNICEF.
CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN
AMERICA: UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD COMPARED WITH
UNITED STATES LAW iii (Cynthia Price Cohen & Howard A. Davidson eds., 1990).
4. LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: UNITED
NATIONS LAWMAKING ON HUMAN RIGHTS xi (1995). Another commentator also noted that:
"[n]o other multilateral human rights treaty has ever taken effect so soon after it was original
proposed for ratification." Lawrence L. Stentzel, II, Prospects for United States Ratification of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1285-1322 (1991).
5. Id. at 1285. See also Report to the House of Delegates: United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child, 25 INT'L LAW. 804 (1991). The report also notes that the United States
voted for the adoption of the treaty in the General Assembly. Id. at 804. "Roughly one-third of
the provisions can be directly traced to United States proposals." Cynthia Price-Cohen, United
States Should OK Rights of Children, TULSA WORLD, May 5, 1996, at G2.
6. Susan Kilbourne, United States Failure to Ratify the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child: Playing Politics with Children's Rights, TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.




Administration and not of Congress or the public.7 Furthermore, many of
the nation-states that ratified the treaty quickly were not involved in the
drafting process.
Some condemn the United States' failure to ratify the CRC, calling
it an embarrassment. 9 Others deny this criticism by arguing that the
United States is simply being circumspect in its approach. The United
States government maintains that the reason for the sluggish pace of
ratification reflects the degree to which it takes multilateral human rights
treaties seriously.'0 Whereas other nation-states ratify quickly but fail to
implement the policies mandated by the treaty, the United States only
agrees to adhere to a convention when it is certain it will be able to follow
through by enforcing the treaty provisions.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child has been at the center
of many different controversies." In what follows I will highlight some of
the major conflicts associated with efforts to secure ratification in the
United States.' 2 In my view most of the disputes, e.g., abortion, juvenile
executions, and corporal punishment, reflect ideological divisions within
this country that have little to do with the treaty itself. Because so much
attention has been focused on these issues, there has been little time to
address more serious questions such as the normative coherence of the
convention. 13
7. Interview with Patricia McNerney, Associate Majority Counsel to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations (Oct. 29, 1996).
8. Cynthia Price Cohen, Book Review, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 852 (1995).
9. See, e.g., Barbara J. Nauck, Implications of the United States Ratification of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Civil Rights, the Constitution and the
Family, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 677 (1994).
10. Interview with Robert Dalton, Assistant Legal Advisor for Treaty Affairs in the Dept.
of ST. (Oct. 25, 1996).
11. In a 1993 Minnesota court of appeals case, Baker v. Chaplin, 497 N.W. 2d 314 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1993), Janine Baker, attended a rally outside the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Minneapolis
where President George Bush was at a function. She wore a men's business suit, a George Bush
mask, and carried a sign which read: "Q?? Why doesn't George sign the United Nations
Convention on Rights of Children?" After a barricade fell (or was pushed over), a police officer
attacked her with a riot stick. The legal issues were whether the officer used excessive force in
violation of Baker's fourth amendment rights and whether he was immune under state and federal
law. The trial court rejected both rejected both the qualified and official immunity claims,
dismissing the officer's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed. Id.
12. For an overview of this subject, see Howard Davidson, The New United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Preliminary Assessment of Legal Issues Related to
United States Ratification, 11 CHILDREN'S LEGAL R. J. 8-12 (1990).
13. In an extremely astute analysis of the treaty, one scholar contends: . . . the
Convention needs a comprehensive statement as to how the various human rights conventions
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II. UNITED STATES RATIFICATION
In September 1990 the Senate and House of Representatives both
adopted resolutions urging the President to the sign the CRC and to seek
the advice and consent of the Senate. 14  The resolutions passed by large
majorities."5 In 1993 the Senate 6 passed Senate Resolution 70 which again
urged the President to transmit the treaty to the Senate for advice and
consent. In the House there were repeated calls for the President to act. 7
Despite these overtures, President Bush declined to do so. A few years
later, however, on February 16, 1995, President Clinton signed the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. On April 3, 1995, Madelaine
Albright, United States Ambassador to the United Nations, gave a speech
in which she announced: "[wie have decided to seek Senate consent to the
ratification of two important human rights agreements - the convention
prohibiting all forms of discrimination against women, and the Convention
on the Rights of the Child." 8
In response, in June 1995 Senator Helms submitted Senate
Resolution 133 to the Committee on Foreign Relations and expressed the
opposition of nearly twenty senators to the CRC. In this resolution Helms
admonished the President not to act on the treaty: "[i]f the President does
attempt to push this unwise proposal through the Senate, I want him to
know, and I want the Senate to know, that I intend to do everything
interrelate in regard to children's rights." Walter H. Bennett, Jr., A Critique of the Emerging
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 45 (1987).
14. Stentzel, supra note 4, at 1286. The Senate voted for the Bradley Amendment No.,
2626, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. 12, 784-86, 808-11 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1990).
The House adopted H. Res. 312, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG, REC. 7, 685 (daily ed. 1990).
15. Report to the House of Delegates: United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child, supra note 5. The Senate passed the resolution despite an abortive attempt by Senator
Helms to attach an amendment (2628) to the Bradley amendment (2626) which would have
defined a child as any person under the age of 18 including "the unborn offspring of any human
being in every state of biological development." 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. 1074
(daily ed. Sept. 11, 1990). The Helms amendment was tabled. 136 CONG. REC. 12803, 12807
(daily ed. 1990).
16. S. Res. 70, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 CONG. REc. 1640 (daily ed. 1993).
17. See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 140, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 140 CONG. REC. 1791 (daily
ed. 1994).
18. Ambassador Madelaine Albright, Remarks at the State Department Conference on
Crises (April 3, 1995). FED. NEWS SER. (available in Lexis). In a speech in the House of
Representatives, Congressman George Miller stated in reference to the CRC that: " . . . the
Clinton Administration has all but pledged it would recommend that the United States Senate
ratify the convention." 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., 139 CONG REC E2967 (daily ed. 1993).
632 [Vol. 3:629
Renteln
possible to make sure that he is not successful." 19 According to Senator
Helms, more than 5,000 letters in opposition "poured into" his office and
only one letter in support. 20 As of September 1996, there were no official
plans to transmit the treaty to the Senate.2'
III. TYPES OF OBJECTIONS TO RATIFYING THE CRC
A large number of right wing organizations have disseminated
literature criticizing the CRC. An excellent essay which surveys these
arguments is Susan Kilbourne's article United States Failure to Ratify the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Playing Politics
with Children's Rights.22 Among some of the more controversial issues
associated with the treaty are abortion, education, and discipline.23
The treaty does not, in fact, mention abortion.24 So, the question
of whether it is pro or anti-abortion must be inferred from various
provisions. Several organizations focus on articles which they interpret as
being pro-abortion, e.g., Article 24(4)(f) concerning family planning and
Article 16, the right to privacy.'
One might think that the CRC could be invoked to criticize
abortion. The lack of a clear definition of the child in the treaty might
support this. A child is defined in Article 1 as a person under the age of
eighteen, but the treaty provides no lower limit. 26 In the preamble there is
language cited from the Declaration of the Rights of the Child to the effect
that the well being of the child shall be protected both before as well as
after birth. It is unclear what legal status the Preamble has but it probably
19. Jesse Helms (June 14, 1995). Senate Resolution 133-Relative to the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child. S. Res. 133, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. REC.
8400 (daily ed. 1995).
20. Id.
21. Remarks by Jamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Adviser, State Dept., cited in Susan
Kilbourne, supra note 6, n. 8.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 8.
24. Interestingly, Senator Helms tried unsuccessfully to introduce an amendment to Senator
Bradley's amendment urging submission of the CRC for advice and consent which would define a
child as "all human beings under the age of 18 including the unborn offspring of any human
being in every state of biological development."
25. Martha Minow, Whatever Happened to Children's Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV. 298
(1995).
26. For a criticism of the absence of minimum age, see Dominic McGoldrick, The United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 5 INT'L J. L. & FAM. 133 (1991).
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lacks juridical significance.' In addition, Article 6 contains the phrase
"every child has the inherent right to life."
Evidently, some thought the above provisions were coded
provisions designed to impose a position on abortion.2" Despite this
suspicion, the history of the drafting process indicates that the treaty was
drafted in such a way as to enable each State party to determine its own
policy regarding abortion.29
Education has also proved to be a controversial issue. According
to some of the conservative literature, the concern was that the state could
prevent parents from educating their children in accordance with their
religious beliefs. 0 Article 29 is the specific provision which sparks debate
about the nature of education in the United States.
Another major point of contention is discipline.31 Some critics
contend that ratification of the CRC would outlaw spanking because of
language in Article 19. They assert further that Article 28 of the treaty
would prohibit school discipline. The treaty itself does not explicitly
forbid corporal punishment, but the Committee on the CRC has endorsed
this policy.
3 2
According to Kilbourne's study of this subject, organizations
opposed to the CRC object particularly to the following articles: Article
13, freedom of expression; Article 14, freedom *of thought, conscience,
and religion; Article 15, freedom of association and peaceful assembly;
Article 16, right to privacy; Article 17, access to information; and Article
18, responsibility of both parents to care for the child. While these types
of rights are acceptable for adults, they are objectionable for children.
27. See Philip Alston, The Unborn Child and Abortion Under the Draft Convention on the
Rights of the Child, 12 HUM. RTs. Q. 169-172 (1990).
28. Report to the House of Delegates: United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child, supra note 5.
29. Alston, supra note 27. See also Report to the House of Delegates: United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 5; Kilbourne, supra note 6, at 9, Travaux
Preparatoires, at 26.
30. See Phyllis Schafley, The New World Order Wants Your Children, THE PHYLLIS
SCHAFLEY REPORT, Mar. 1993, Vol. 26, No. 8, at 3; James P. Lucier, Unconventional Rights:
Children and the United Nation, FAM. POL'Y (PUB. IAM. RES.), Aug. 1992, at 1-16.
31. Media coverage focussed on this issue. See, e.g., John Rosemond, Movement to
Outlaw Spanking is Growing, FRESNO BEE, Feb. 19, 1995, at F4.
32. Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Canada, United
Nations Comm. on the Rights of the Child, 9th Sess., 25 U.N. Doc. CRC/C/1S/Add.37 (1995).
The Committee asked the British government to prohibit corporal punishment in private schools
and "chastisement" of children at home. Alan Travis & Frances Rickford, United Nations Attack
on British Child Care, GUARDIAN, Jan. 28, 1995, at 1.
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Underlying all the objections is an interpretation of the CRC as an
"anti-parent" and "anti-family" instrument. This sentiment is expressed
in Senator Helms statement in support of Senate Resolution 133: "[t]he
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is incompatible with
the God-given right and responsibility of parents to raise their children. ,33
On the Internet, there is a discussion group on the CRC, and documents
have circulated which exemplify this type of interpretation. These are
intriguing pieces of data because they reflect the fears of many of the
groups mobilized to challenge any attempt to secure ratification of the
CRC.34
It is quite odd that the CRC is characterized as anti-family.
Consider, for instance, Article 5:
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and
duties of parents or, where applicable, the members of the
extended family or community as provided for by local
custom, legal guardians or other persons legally
responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child,
appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the
child of the rights recognized in the present convention?5
This provision clearly shows concern for respecting the autonomy of
families and is commendable also for including a broader definition of
family than the "nuclear" family. There are other provisions in the CRC
which demonstrate a concern for balancing the rights of parents and
guardians with those of the child. 36 For example, Article 14(3) concerns
parental rights to control the religious upbringing of their children and is
phrased in a careful way. Since the drafter of this provision wanted to
make sure not to grant parental rights at the expense of children's rights,
they included the caveat that the parental rights had to be exercised "in a
manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child." Overall, it is
33. 141 CONG. REC. S 8400 (daily ed. 1995) (Statement of Senator Helms).
34. See Kilbourne, supra note 6 (discussing the study of these organizations). At the same
time that the CRC was being debated, a pro-parents' rights piece of legislation, the Parental
Rights and Responsibilities Act of 1995, was introduced in Congress. Similar legislation was
also proposed in Colorado. Kilbourne points out that while this does not directly conflict with
the CRC, this legislative development does suggest that the nature of the dispute is parents' rights
versus children's rights.
35. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N.
GAOR, art. 5, Nov. 20, 1989.
36. LEBLANC, supra note 4, at 114.
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obvious to anyone who reads the CRC that it is a carefully drafted
instrument that tries to balance parents' rights and children's rights.
There are other more standard objections to ratification. Some
maintain that the United States already has sufficient legislation in place to
guarantee child welfare.37 Consequently, the treaty is unnecessary. The
American proclivity to reject economic rights also contributes to the
treaty's lack of appeal. The cost of guaranteeing some of the rights
enumerated in the CRC worries some of the critics of the treaty. Another
common complaint is the assertion that international tribunals are "biased
against the United States." 3 8  It would be inadvisable to have other
countries judge United States policies. This is part and parcel of an anti-
international attitude which seems prevalent in this country in the 1990s.
As it happens, the treaty-monitoring Committee has more women than
men.39 It is conceivable that it worries opponents that they will be judged
by outsiders, and, moreover, outsiders who are female.
There seems to be greater fear of ratification in light of a general
comment issued by the Human Rights Committee concerning ratifications.
If reservations are deemed incompatible with the basic object and purpose
of a treaty, then they may be treated as invalid. Indeed, this policy
statement is cited by opponents of CRC to underscore the claim that
United States sovereignty will be undermined by ratification.
If we consider the combination of criticisms of the CRC, it begins
to be more clear why there has been such consternation. The treaty seems
to implicate family values and world government. Conjuring up American
paranoid fears about international scrutiny of American families seems to
more than the Senate can bear.
IV. ACTUAL DIFFICULTIES WITH THE CRC
A number of normative issues remain, particularly the question of
how to rank order the specific rights enumerated in the instrument.' A
careful reading of the fifty-four articles in the treaty suggest that there are
some internal conflicts. Where the rights clash, there is no guiding
principle for determining the relative priority of these rights.
37. See Lucier, supra note 30.
38. See Schafley, supra note 30.
39. Seven women and three men are on the committee.
40. There are not only normative inconsistencies within the treaty but between it and other
treaties. See LEBLANC, supra note 4, at 274.
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Some of the newer rights relate to identity.41 For example, several
articles seem to support a right to maintain cultural and religious identity:
Article 8, right to preserve identity; Article 14, right to religious freedom;
Article 16, right to privacy and non-interference in the family; and Article
20, temporary placements and adoptions should take into account cultural
background. The key provision is Article 30, which like Article 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, guarantees the
cultural rights of ethnic minorities, but Article 30 is broader as it includes
indigenous peoples.
Despite clear language in support of these rights, there are also
rights which conflict with them. Most directly in conflict is Article 24(3)
which provides that, "[s]tates Parties shall take all effective and
appropriate measures with a view to abolishing traditional practices
prejudicial to the health of children."4' Of course, the dilemma is that
these very traditions, prejudicial to the health of children, may be
necessary for the maintenance of their cultural or religious identity.
One of the most challenging questions is how to interpret the best
interests of the child standard.43 Most would argue that this is to be
construed consistent with Western European individualistic notions. 44 This
is not a necessary outcome, however, and is the focus of a book edited by
Philip Alston.45 In the United States this might prove problematic because
of a potential conflict between United States treaty obligations under the
CRC and domestic obligations to indigenous peoples. The Indian Child
Welfare Act is based on a group rights notion that is in tension with the
individualistic best interests of the child standard.46 If this is so, then it
would be advisable to have a reservation on reservations, so to speak.4'
41. See George A. Stewart, Interpreting the Child's Right to Identity in the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 26 FAM. L. Q. 221-233 (1992).
42. This article was weakened and was almost excluded altogether were it not for NGO
efforts. Though the article was drafted with female circumcision in mind, it could certainly be
applied to other kinds of cultural traditions.
43. The most prominent advocate of the Children's Convention is Cythnia Cohen. She
acknowledges the challenge of applying this standard cross-culturally. See Cohen, supra note 5,
at 854.
44. See, e.g., Russell Lawrence Barsh, The Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child: A
Case of Eurocentricism in Standard-Setting, 58 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 24-34 (1989).
45. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(Philip Alston, ed. 1994).
46. George Stewart senses this difficulty. See Stewart, supra note 41, at 231.
47. For a discussion of reservations likely to be attached, see Elizabeth M. Calciano,
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Will It Help Children in the United States,
15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 515 (1992).
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Another reason why the Convention on the Rights of the Child has
been stalled is the "one at a time" rule. Human rights NGOs seem
convinced that it is best to concentrate on one treaty. The preferred one in
1996 is CEDAW which has priority ostensibly because it was sent to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1980. It has languished for over
fifteen years, while the CRC has not even been submitted to the
Committee yet. Another justification is that the women's convention is
more likely to be ratified.
This does not, however, explain why both could not be publicly
supported simultaneously. That is, human rights NGOs and the Clinton
Administration could lobby for both. Evidently, there is concern that the
right wing opposition that is mobilized to challenge the Children's
Convention might lead to the demise of CEDAW. It is unclear why
CEDAW is regarded as less threatening than the Children's Convention.
Both seem to involve some degree of societal change.
The reality is that feminists are, to some degree, ambivalent about
children's rights. In a thought-provoking treatment of this subject,
Frances Olsen discusses the "complex and ambiguous relationship"
feminists have to the idea of legal protection for children.48 According to
Olsen women experience a loss of freedom at the birth of a child rather
than at marriage. 9  This implies that as the rights of children are
expanded, so, too, the correlative duty to guarantee these rights will
require increased responsibilities on the part of women/mothers.
A related observation is that the CRC is basically oriented toward
male children. According to one version of feminist theory: "[t]o the
extent that the Convention deals with children as unspecified, unsituated
people, it tends in fact to deal with white, male, relatively privileged
children."5" This concern has led to a campaign to guarantee the rights of
the "girl child", a term used by UNICEF. Although the CRC may not
explicitly address the problems of female children, it is unclear to what
extent this contributes to the delay in securing its ratification in the United
States. It is true, however, that the desire to protect CEDAW from the
organizations poised to attack the CRC seems to have made it less likely
that the human rights community will insist that the CRC be considered in
the near future.
The most serious challenge is the undifferentiated set of
responsibilities for parents and states under the CRC. There is a general
48. Frances Olsen, Children's Rights: Some Feminist Approaches to the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 6 INT'L J. L.& FAM. 192 (1992).
49. Id. at 193.
50. Id. at 195.
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problem with any attempt to secure children's rights because there will
always be a tension among parents, governments, and children.1 In the
Anglo-American tradition citizens have not supported much intervention
by the state. If the CRC is perceived as mandating unwarranted state
intervention in family decision making, that will make it extremely difficult
to be accepted. This triangular structural problem is a subtle one, and one
which is not sufficiently worked out in the treaty itself. If the scope of the
rights were more clear, this would alleviate the fears of American parents
that the government would usurp their control of their own families.
In the final analysis, the overreaction to the CRC seems peculiar.
Since the United States usually ratifies human rights treaties with a
reservation that ensures that it will be non-self-executing, the effect of the
treaty would be minimal. The United States government sometimes
ratifies with a reservation to the effect that the treaty will only guarantee
rights to the same extent as domestic law, in which case, again, there
would be nothing to fear from ratification. It strikes one as odd that the
treaty cannot even be accepted on a symbolic level. What can account for
this?
It is not only the right wing and feminists who are uneasy about
empowering children. It is likely that all parents fear this outcome.52 With
all the publicity about Gregory "divorcing" his parents has come a reaction
that things have gone too far. In the current climate it will be hard to allay
adult fears about children with legal rights that courts would enforce.
Despite this anxiety, it is time to champion the CRC to protect children,
who are, in virtually all cases, vulnerable.
V. IMPORTANCE OF TRANSMITTING THE CRC
The rhetoric surrounding the CRC is mostly absurd. The treaty
would pose no threat to American families, and what is needed is a serious
51. For analyses of the triangular relationship here, see Walter Bennett, supra note 13, at
34; Roger Levesque, The Internationalization of Children's Human Rights: Too Radical for
American Adolescents, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 237-293 (1994); Stephen Parker, Child Support:
Rights and Consequences, 6 INT'L J. L. & FAM. 148-169 (1992); Sharon Rush, The Warren and
Burger Courts on State, Parent, and Child Conflict Resolution: A Comparative Analysis and
Proposed Methodology, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 461-513 (1985).
52. The courts are themselves ambivalent about children's rights. Martha Minow mentions
that the United States Supreme Court decisions on children's rights in domestic constitutional law
reflect " . . . legal ambivalence in the face of repeated efforts by advocates to extend
constitutional rights to children." See Martha Minow, Whatever Happened to Children's
Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV. 277 (1996). Some scholars have suggested that the campaign for the
CRC might be a strategy by children's rights advocates who failed to win legislative battles in
Congress. See Bruce Hafen and Jonathan Hafen, Abandoning Children to their Autonomy: The
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 37 HARV. INT'L L. J. 449-490 (1996).
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debate of the meaning of the treaty to clarify the interpretation of the
especially controversial provisions. The strategy of using a low profile
advocacy of treaty ratification has not proven effective in the case of the
Children's Convention. 3 It would be far better to have an open debate on
the relative advantages and disadvantages of ratification.
The debate may be a nasty one. Cynthia Price Cohen, perhaps the
leading advocate of the CRC, anticipates a major battle between the
supporters and opponents of the treaty once the President submits it to the
Senate. 4 It is only by taking on one's opponents directly that consensus
building becomes possible. Securing ratification quietly may temporarily
avoid a clash, but it simply postpones the conflict.
It has been said that the drafting of the CRC was partly a
consciousness raising effort. If the United States signing of the CRC was
merely a symbolic gesture of support,55 then attempting to complete the
process would, at the very least, show a serious commitment to the notion
of children's rights. Even if ratification were 100 percent impossible, the
President should show moral courage by transmitting the Convention to the
Senate. It may take many years to secure ratification, as with the
Genocide Convention, but it is time to begin the process.
53. Stentzel suggests that the quiet lobbying will not be effective. Comparing the
unsuccessful effort to win ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights with the non-campaign to do the same for the CRC, Stenzel extends Philip
Aiston's assessment of the IESCR strategy: "[tihere is little reason to believe that the stealth or
toothless tiger approach would succeed when it has been unsuccessful for the IESCR." Stentzel,
supra note 4, at 1321-1322.
54. Cohen, supra note 8.
55. Kilbourne maintains that the signing was "only at the death-bed behest" of James
Grant, former executive director of UNICEF, KILBOURNE, supra note 6, at 1.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has been ambivalent in its attitude toward the
United Nations and toward human rights in particular. On the one hand
United States legal experts have been instrumental in helping to craft the
United Nations Covenants and Conventions. On the other, the Senate did
not give its advice and consent to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide until 1986, nearly thirty-seven years
after it was first submitted by President Truman.
The role of non-governmental organizations (N.G.O.s) has been
essential in the development and implementation of international human
rights law. In the United States, the N.G.O. community has provided
legal expertise to both the Department of State and Congress, has lobbied
Capitol Hill, and has developed a nationwide constituency for ratification
of the various human rights treaties.
In 1984, a Washington-based Human Rights Treaty Ratification
Working Group (hereinafter "Working Group") was formed to pursue
ratification of the United Nations human rights treaties. The Working
Group was composed of representatives of N.G.O.s from the legal, human
rights, and religious communities, including the American Bar
Association, Amnesty International U.S.A., B'nai Brith International, the
* Bahd'is of the United States; Organization listed for purposes of identification only.
This article is based on a presentation given at a panel discussion entitled U.S. Ratification of
Hwnan Rights Treaties at the International Law Weekend '96, sponsored by the American Branch
of the International Law Association, November 1, 1996, in New York City. The author wishes
to thank Ms. Patricia Rengel, Chief Legal Counsel of Amnesty International U.S.A., and Ms. Kit
Cosby, Deputy Director for External Affairs of the National Spiritual Assembly of the BahA'is of
the United States for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
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International Human Rights Law Group, United Nations Association of the
United States, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the Bahd'is of the
United States, the Lutheran Office, and others. Over the years additional
working groups that focused on specific treaties were formed. These
treaties included the conventions on genocide, torture, race, children, and
women, as well as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
This paper will focus on the experience of the Washington, D.C.
human rights community. Other human rights coalitions based in New
York, the West coast, and the Midwest have also played an essential role
in the ratification of human rights treaties. While it is beyond the scope of
this paper to provide a comprehensive overview of the N.G.O. efforts to
promote ratification during the past decade, the general political strategy of
the Working Group will be summarized with examples of decisions and
action taken to illustrate each point.
A. Political strategy
The political strategy of the Human Rights Treaty Ratification Working
Group may be summarized as follows:
1) Lobby for ratification of at least one treaty during
each Congress.
2) Start with those treaties narrowest in scope and
establish broad bipartisan support thereby building
momentum for each subsequent treaty.
3) Push for ratification with a minimum of limiting
reservations, declarations and understandings.
4) Work closely with allies in Congress and the
Executive Branch to accomplish ratification and appeal to
popular support when necessary.
5) Support passage of implementation legislation
when necessary.
1. Lobby for Ratification of at Least One Treaty During Each
Congress
The Carter Administration made human rights the center of its
foreign policy. In 1978 the Administration submitted four human rights
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treaties' to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and in 1980 it
submitted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women. Following the 1980 election of President
Reagan, the treaties remained in Committee without further consideration.
In retrospect, the action taken by the Carter Administration appeared to be
a gesture with no strategy behind it.
In 1984, after consultation with the Legal Advisor's Office in the
State Department and with key members of Congress, the Working Group
agreed upon the goal of seeking ratification of at least one human rights
treaty during each Congress. Allies in Congress warned that the Senate
would consider only one human rights treaty at a time. Treaty supporters
also felt that if more than one treaty at a time were submitted, the
opponents of any one treaty could stop the others that were tied to it. The
members of the Working Group recognized that it was engaged in a long-
term education process in both the Congress and throughout the nation.
2. Start with Those Treaties Narrowest in Scope and Establish
Broad Bipartisan Support Thereby Building Momentum for Each
Subsequent Treaty
There is a creative tension between the demands and expectations
of the Executive Branch, Congress and of N.G.O.s. Depending on the
season, electoral politics, domestic politics, and the politics of the
international community all come into play.
The Genocide Convention was the first human rights treaty to be
considered for ratification. Because it was the first human rights treaty
submitted to the Senate in 1948 by President Truman and because the
treaty narrowly addressed only the issue of genocide, the subject elicited
universal condemnation and generated little domestic opposition. During
the presidential election campaign of 1984, President Ronald Reagan
announced his support for ratification of the Genocide Convention at the
National Convention of B'nai B'rith International. The timing and
conception- of his statement of support were not coincidental as the
American Bar Association, Amnesty International U.S.A., and B'nai
B'rith International had recommended that he take such action. Senator
William Proxmire submitted statements into the Congressional Record
every day for years calling for United States ratification of the Genocide
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); Covenant on Economic, Social
& Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (entered into force
Jan. 3, 1976); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 5 I.L.M.
352 (1966); American Convention on Human Rights, 9 I.L.M. 99 (1970).
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Convention. In this instance the Working Group worked closely with
Senator Proxmire's office as well as with key members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee to ensure the Senate's advice and consent of
the Treaty.
Of special significance at the time was the fact that following the
Republican takeover of the leadership of the Senate in 1984, Senator
Richard Lugar, as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee,
persuaded a majority of Republicans to support the Convention while
ensuring the continued support of Democratic Senators. In addition, the
Working Group coordinated constituent visits with key members of the
Senate, including Senator Symms in Idaho, Senator Thurmond in South
Carolina, and Senator Hecht in Nevada, to urge them to vote for the
Convention on its own merits and not against it out of an exaggerated
concern for national sovereignty. As a result, in November 1988, almost
forty years after the United States had signed the Genocide Convention,
President Reagan signed implementing legislation thus completing the
process of ratification.
Having opened the door to the ratification process, the Reagan
Administration proposed for Senate consideration the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, or
Punishment which the Bush Administration subsequently brought to the
Senate for its advice and consent in October 1990. Subsequent treaties
brought before the Senate by the Bush and Clinton Administrations
included the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
3. Push for Ratification with a Minimum of Limiting Reservations,
Declarations or Understandings
Political considerations have had a profound influence not only on
the timing and order of treaties to be considered by the Senate but also on
the package legal provisions proposed by the State Department for each of
the treaties. In principle, the members of the Working Group agreed that
the human rights treaties could be ratified by the United States with a
minimum of limiting legal provisions. Each organization had to decide for
itself what legal issues were amenable to compromise. While the Working
Group recognized that compromises would have to be made with the State
Department and the Senate on legal issues of concern to get the ratification
process started with the Genocide Convention, the overall strategy was to
decrease the impact of limiting legal provisions negotiated for each
subsequent human rights treaty.
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For example, Senator Jesse Helms had insisted that a reservation
on national sovereignty be attached to the Genocide Convention. The
reservation stated "[n]othing in the Convention requires or authorizes
legislation or other action by the United States of America prohibited by
the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States."
Many members of the Working Group found this reservation
objectionable and unnecessary. The Working Group agreed, however,
that it was not worth stalling the momentum for ratification by insisting
that the reservation be taken out and thus perhaps delaying indefinitely the
proceedings. Subsequently, the Working Group cited the negative reaction
of other governments against the sovereignty reservation in insisting that
the reservation should not be included in the legal package negotiated for
the Convention Against Torture.
Although Senator Jesse Helms, ranking Minority Leader of the
Foreign Relations Committee, strongly favored the inclusion of the
sovereignty reservation in the instrument of ratification for the Convention
on Torture, a bipartisan compromise was subsequently reached to reduce
the sovereignty reservation to that of a proviso to be sent to all state parties
which stated that "no legislation or action is required that is prohibited by
the U.S. Constitution." Significantly, the proviso was not included with
the instrument of ratification deposited by the President at the United
Nations. Similar provisos were sent upon ratification of the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights in 1992 and the Convention on the Elimination
for All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1994.
Modification in the language of other provisions has occurred over
the history of the ratification of human rights treaties. For example, the
federal-state reservation under the Convention Against Torture has become
an understanding under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Race Convention. However, the United States continued to take a
reservation on the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice under the Race Convention as it had under the Genocide
Convention. In addition, the Conventions on torture and race, and the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights each had understandings stating the
treaties were not self-executing.2
In the package submitted by the Clinton Administration to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the Women's Convention in
October 1994, the reservation on the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice taken under the conventions on genocide and
race has been reduced to a declaration. The freedom of speech reservation
2. Krr COSBY, MULTILATERAL TREATIES: RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION (Nov.
1994).
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taken under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Race
Convention has been proposed as an understanding.
There is also a creative tension within the N.G.O. community in
the negotiation of political strategy and legal policy. Clearly, the active
members of the Working Group were all committed to the overall goal of
ratification. Some organizations have wanted to use the treaties to
condemn the government's domestic record while others felt it more politic
to emphasize the international influence the treaties would have in
establishing basic universal human rights standards at home and abroad.
Each organization had to decide what it could live with and what it could
not when it came to consulting with the State Department on the United
States package of provisions for each treaty. Some organizations such as
the Bahl'is of the United States upheld ratification of the treaties in support
of the general principle of the rule of law without taking legal positions on
the specific provisions of the treaties. In this regard the Bahd'is could help
facilitate a consensus on issues where various organizations differed.
Other organizations such as Amnesty International U.S.A., which
condemns the use of the death penalty under all circumstances, had to
decide when they could accept a compromise and when they had to
threaten to oppose ratification of a treaty all together because of a
proposed position of the government on a given treaty provision. On
many of these difficult issues, the American Bar Association was
instrumental in helping to hammer out a compromise solution acceptable to
all parties.
For example, in 1988 the Administration had proposed a
reservation for the Convention Against Torture that would have changed
the definition of torture by introducing specific defenses for torture.
Amnesty International U.S.A. decided that it would have to oppose
ratification unless this reservation were eliminated. In the fall of 1989,
following President Bush's election, Amnesty International's then Legal
Director, Nigel Rodley, a world expert on torture, met with the Legal
Advisor and staff of the State Department and members of the Criminal
Division of the Department of Justice. After the meeting, the
Administration created a new package for submittal to the Senate. On the
other hand, when the Administration proposed a reservation for the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that permitted capital punishment,
Amnesty International U.S.A. decided, after extensive debate, that they
would not oppose ratification on this issue, recognizing that Congress was
reluctant to resolve domestic controversies through the adoption of
international treaties under the Constitution.
Finally, limiting provisions for treaty ratification are not only a
source of controversy domestically, but internationally as well. A number
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of State Parties have submitted to the United Nations their objections to
United States provisions.
4. Work Closely with Allies in Congress and the Executive Branch
to Accomplish Ratification and Appeal to Popular Support When
Necessary
Over the years, national organizations with grassroots
constituencies have requested their membership to write or call relevant
members of Congress and the Administration in support of the ratification
of various human rights treaties. Letter writing campaigns have been
timed to urge the Administration to actively support ratification, to urge
the Senate to hold hearings or vote on a given treaty, or to request
sponsorship of congressional resolutions or letters that recommend such
action be taken.
The first two treaties on genocide and torture that were ratified by
the United States could not have been ratified without the support of key
national organizations such as the American Bar Association, Amnesty
International U.S.A., B'nai B'rith International, and others who lobbied on
Capitol Hill and provided essential legal expertise. Neither treaty had
great popular support. The same was true to a great extent for ratification
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The issues addressed by the remaining treaties, however,
particularly those dealing with children and women, and the Covenant on
Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, are not so clear cut precisely
because of the legacy of the Cold War and the opposition against the
social, economic, and cultural provisions in each of them. In addition,
many of the provisions of these treaties deal more directly with state law
than with just federal law.
In this instance, it has become necessary to build a grassroots
constituency for both the Convention on the Rights of the Child and for the
Women's Convention.
The role of the United Nations World Summits and Conferences
has been crucial in helping to develop such a constituency in the United
States, particularly the World Summit for Children in New York in 1990,
the Human Rights Conference in Vienna in 1993, and the World
Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995.
B. Convention on the Rights of the Child
Following the World Summit for Children in New York in 1990,
InterAction, the organization that took the lead in coordinating N.G.O.
support for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, developed a very
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effective legislative and grassroots campaign which included a National
Advisory Council on the Rights of the Child co-chaired by Senators
Bradley and Lugar. House and Senate resolutions were passed in the 10 1 st
Congress with eighty-five and sixty cosponsors respectively. Nine
governors and states issued proclamations or passed resolutions in support
of the Convention. Other resolutions were passed at the city and local
levels. Sign-on letters addressed to President Bush and the Congress from
corporate leaders and N.G.O.s were sent. Periodic letter writing
campaigns were initiated by the members of the Working Group on the
Rights of the Child. In Washington, the American Bar Association
sponsored a working group to do an analysis of the Convention and its
impact on United States domestic law.
Of all of the human rights treaties the Convention on the Rights of
the Child enjoyed the greatest widespread constituent popularity. It also
enjoyed the support of the First Lady, Hillary Rodham Clinton, formerly
affiliated with the Children's Defense Fund. On February 16, 1995,
United States United Nations Ambassador, Madelaine K. Albright, signed
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on behalf of the United States.
However, perhaps because of its relative popularity, the Convention also
inspired the most intense organized opposition by such groups as the
National Center for Home Education, the Eagle Forum, and the Family
Research Council. A second resolution in support of the Convention
which was to be introduced in the 10 4 ' Congress was stalled because of
the withdrawal of support from several senior senators such as Senator
Bob Dole. Several Senate offices reported that most constituent phone
calls and letters regarding the Rights of the Child treaty were
overwhelmingly negative.
C. Convention on Women
The United States signed the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women on July 17, 1980, and President
Carter transmitted it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
November 1980. The Committee held hearings on the Convention in the
101st and 10 3' Congresses. In the hearing held during the summer of
1990, the State Department, under the Bush administration, testified that it
had not yet prepared a legal analysis.
In the Spring of 1993, after intense lobbying by N.G.O.s, sixty-
eight senators signed a letter to President Clinton asking him to take the
necessary steps to ratify the Women's Convention. In June 1993,
Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced at the United Nations
World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna that "[g]uaranteeing
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women their human rights is a moral imperative." In the Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action the United States agreed that "[t]he
United Nations should encourage the goal of universal ratification by all
States of the [Women's] Convention by the year 2000." The United States
also announced its intention to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the
Child and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Significantly, the United States and the other nations represented at the
Conference agreed that human rights are "universal, indivisible and
interdependent and inter-related."
Administration officials had hoped that ratification of the
conventions on race and women would take place by the summer of 1994.
Following ratification of the Race Convention in June 1994, the Clinton
Administration submitted a package for the Women's Convention to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee which passed favorably on September
29th by a vote of thirteen-five (with one abstention). At the same time
there was an eleventh hour mail and phone campaign against the treaty,
fueled in part by radio talk shows. Several senators put a hold on the
Convention, thereby blocking it from the Senate floor during the 103'
Congress.
Following the fall 1994 elections, the Republicans took over the
leadership of Congress and Senator Jesse Helms became Chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee. When the new Senate convened in January
1995, the Convention on Women reverted to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, where it remains to this day.
In September 1995, at the Fourth World Conference on Women in
Beijing, China, the United States reaffirmed the commitment to seek
ratification of the Women's Convention. With approximately 8,000
Americans attending the Conference, the Beijing Declaration and Platform
for Action provided fresh momentum to build popular support for United
State ratification. After the Beijing Conference, the Washington D. C.
based Working Group on Ratification of the Women's Convention,
currently co-chaired by Amnesty International U.S.A. and the Bahi'is of
the United States, offered as a model an effort initiated in 1995 by the
Iowa Division of the United Nations Association. That effort resulted in
the Iowa City Council passing on August 1, 1995, a resolution endorsing
United State ratification of the Women's Convention. Since its passage,
four other Iowa municipality campaigns have been launched. Five state
legislatures, California, Iowa, Massachusetts, New York and South
Dakota, have also endorsed resolutions in support of ratification.
On April 30, 1996, over one hundred organizations signed a letter
addressed to all Senators urging that "the Senate give its prompt advice
and consent to ratify" the Convention.
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5. Support Passage of Implementation Legislation When Necessary
he process of ratification of human rights treaties does not end with
the advice and consent given by the Senate. States Parties are required to
undertake measures to adopt and give effect to treaty provisions, through
the implementation legislation if necessary, and to participate in the United
Nations system for monitoring compliance.
An issue of concern for nearly all human rights N.G.O.s is that to
date each of the human rights treaties has been ratified with the declaration
of non-self-execution. This means that provisions of the treaty may not be
enforced directly by the judiciary in the absence of implementing
legislation passed by both houses of Congress. Many object to this
declaration because it prevents United Nations treaties from becoming
United States law and United States citizens may not invoke treaty
provisions in United States courts unless implementation legislation has
been passed by Congress.3
The members of the Working Group recognized that there is great
reluctance on the part of Congress to change domestic law through treaty
law. The Constitution is the supreme law of land, and even though the
Constitution makes treaties the supreme law of the land as well, Congress
is reluctant to use the treaty process as a means of changing domestic law
because only the Senate is given the responsibility for advice and consent
to ratification. In contrast, implementation legislation requires the consent
of both houses of Congress.
Implementation legislation was required to make specific
provisions of the conventions on genocide and torture a part of the United
States legal code. For both treaties, the Working Group assisted the
relevant congressional committees in drafting the implementing legislation
and in helping to ensure that the legislation went through the ordinary
legislative process necessary for final passage by both houses of Congress.
Following the Senate's advice and consent of the Genocide
Convention in 1986, President Reagan signed, in November 1988, the
Genocide Convention Implementation Act,4 which made genocide a federal
crime, established penalties for commission of that crime, and defined the
jurisdiction of the United States over acts of genocide as referred to in
article V of the Convention. In June 1994, President Clinton signed the
State Department Authorization Bill which included legislation
implementing articles 10-14 and 16 of the Convention on Torture. In
November 1994, the instrument of ratification to the Convention on
3. Id.
4. Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. §1091 (1996).
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Torture was deposited at the United Nations after the proviso on national
sovereignty had been sent to all governments party to the convention.
In the fall of 1994, the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights led
an effort to introduce legislation that would make United States law the
provisions on which the United States took reservations under the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The International Human Rights
Law Group began an effort to introduce implementation legislation on the
Race Convention.5 The intent of the proposed legislation was to provide
United States citizens a cause of action in United States courts as provided
for by the relevant treaty provisions. They failed to find congressional co-
sponsors for both measures.
Once a convention is ratified, the United States is obliged to report
periodically its progress to responsible United Nations committees that
monitor compliance of each treaty. In March 1995, United States
representatives appeared before the Human Rights Committee, the treaty
monitoring body of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to answer
questions about the United States Government's initial report submitted to
the Committee in September 1994. Human rights organizations provided
information to the State Department for its preparation of that report and in
March 1995 made public an N.G.O. report which was also given to the
members of the Human Rights Committee. The purpose of the N.G.O.
report was to
assess the accuracy and completeness of the United States
Report; to identify the subject areas where the most serious
compliance problems exist that are not addressed
adequately in the U.S. Report; and help the U.S.
government and the United Nations agencies responsible
for monitoring human rights instruments develop more
effective methodology for assessing and reporting on
compliance status and needs on a regular basis.6
The human rights community has communicated with the State
Department officials responsible for preparing the reports required by the
conventions on race and torture. However, the United States has not met
the deadlines as required by the conventions. The human rights
5. COSBY, supra note 2.
6. Joint Working Group of Non-Governmental Civil, Political and Human Rights
Organizations in the United States, The Status of Human Rights in the United States: An Analysis
of the Initial U.S. Government Report to the Human Rights Committee Under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in SC. AND HUM. RTS. PROGRAM, AM. ASS'N FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF SCt. (Morton Scklar, ed., 1995).
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community also expects to prepare its own reports for each of these
treaties.
II. CONCLUSION
Support of the ratification of human rights treaties has been a
dynamic process which has required the cooperation of the executive and
legislative branches of government in collaboration with non-governmental
organizations. The role of the N.G.O. community has been essential in
generating popular support for human rights and in providing legal
expertise and applying political pressure to Congress and the Executive
Branch to accomplish ratification. While it appears that the anti-United
Nations sentiment in Congress has been tempered somewhat since the 104'
Congress adjourned, serious obstacles within the Senate must be overcome
before ratification of the remaining United Nations human rights treaties
can be achieved. These treaties include the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the
Rights of the Children, the American Convention on Human Rights, and
the Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. The challenge
before the N.G.O. community is to significantly increase the popular
support that already exists for the ratification of human rights treaties
through a nationwide grassroots education program while continuing to
press for prompt ratification on Capitol Hill.
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A HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA FOR THE NEXT
ADMINISTRATION
Gare A. Smith"
I would like to thank the American branch of the International Law
Association for inviting me here today. It's a pleasure to join such a
distinguished group of business people, scholars, and community leaders.
I bring the warmest regards of Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck,
who had very much looked forward to attending today. He was,
unfortunately, called to The Hague for an emergency meeting regarding
the War Crimes Tribunal-a good example of the Clinton Administration's
human rights policy in action.
It is often said that "the past is prologue." The Clinton
Administration's human rights agenda in its second term will be certain to
capitalize upon the successes of the first term. To this effect, I'd like to
discuss what we in the Administration have been doing-and will continue
to do-to promote respect for human rights.
There are many reasons why respect for human rights plays an
important role in our foreign policy. Three of these reasons stand out.
First, as Vice President Gore recently put it, the United States of
America stands for something in this world. People all across the globe
look to us as a model of freedom, respect for human dignity, and justice
under law. This is one of our proudest legacies, and the American people
want us to put these ideals into practice.
Second, our dedication to universal values is a vital source of
America's authority and credibility. We cannot lead, and we cannot be a
be a world leader, without it.
Our interests are most secure in a world where accountable
government strengthens stability, and where the rule of law protects both
political rights and free market economies.
Open borders, transparent legal systems, and respect for freedom
of speech are fundamental values to individuals and multinationals alike.
A country that respects human rights is far more likely to be a good
country in which to transact business than one that does not.
* Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Dept. of
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Third, the costs to the world of repressive governments are
painfully clear. In the twentieth century, the number of people killed by
their own authoritarian governments is four times the number killed in all
this century's wars combined. Even in 1996, after the end of the Cold
War, there are still millions of people who live under repressive regimes
and authoritarian governments. It is their suffering, courage, and hope
that is the moral basis of our efforts.
Today, people around the globe are engaging each other in ways
that transcend national borders. National economies are becoming
intertwined. New technologies of communication and transportation,
satellite TV, and the Internet are bringing people of different countries and
cultures closer together, as are shared concerns about the environment, the
population explosion, and international terrorism.
Meanwhile, the political and economic forces that are bringing the
world together are also driving it apart, as cynical and self-serving leaders
fan the flames of nationalism into deadly ethnic conflict.
In this complex interconnected world, it is becoming increasingly
urgent that we create new institutions of justice and new ways of resolving
conflicts.
Ever since President Clinton took office, this Administration has
steadily worked to move human rights to the center of our foreign policy.
We have worked with other countries to build new human rights
institutions, such as International War Crimes Tribunals, National Human
Rights Commissions, and the new United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights.
The Human Rights Bureau, has been given authority to oversee
those parts of the foreign aid budget going to help new democracies.
We have made an unprecedented effort to work with the business
community to promote respect for human rights and worker rights in the
countries where they set up shop.
We have, for the first time, integrated women's rights issues into
all aspects of our human rights policy. We saw to it that systematic rape
was defined as genocide under the Genocide Convention. We have woven
women's issues throughout the State Department's annual Country Human
Rights Reports and successfully promoted the initiation of a substantial
women's rights agenda throughout the United Nations system. At the
Fourth United Nations Conference on Women in Beijing we made our
position unambiguously clear, that women's rights are human rights.
This Administration has worked to strengthen the structure of
international human rights law, by winning ratification of the Convention
on Racial Discrimination, and by releasing the first report published by the
United States Government on our own compliance with the International
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Law of Human Rights. These efforts reflect our commitment to the
universality of human rights principles and greatly enhance our own
credibility in pressing for human rights abroad.
We have made a significant difference in specific countries. Haiti
has its best chance for democracy in its history, thanks to an intensive
international effort led by the United States over the last three years. We
led the way in creating an International War Crimes tribunal to try the
ringleaders of the genocide that exterminated more than half a million
people in Rwanda two years ago. We are working with our NATO ally
Turkey to curtail the human rights abuses of its military, and move
towards fuller democracy. We are running programs to train police and
prosecutors in civil liberties in countries all across Eastern Europe and
Latin America. And despite the difficulties we have encountered, we have
managed to cast a spotlight on human rights abuses in China as never
before.
I would like now to turn to Bosnia. The story of Bosnia, of the
war there and the diplomatic settlement that has ended the fighting, is the
story of our new world, of the challenges we will face, and of the ways we
are learning to respond.
Human rights have been at the heart of this terrible war from the
beginning. Leaders spurred ethnic cleansing by playing on people's fears
that their rights would not be protected in the states emerging from the
former Yugoslavia. The conflict they set in motion generated some of the
worst atrocities Europe has seen since World War II. And now that the
conflict has a chance of ending, justice and respect for human rights are
imperative.
Only justice can lift the burden of collective guilt from a society
and place it on the shoulders of the perpetrators where it belongs. Without
a full accounting that holds those who committed the crimes of genocide
responsible for their a6tions, lasting reconciliation will lie beyond reach.
The Clinton Administration has worked to stop the bloodshed, hold
accountable those responsible for war crimes, and ensure that the rule of
law-not the rule of genocide-prevails. And the lessons we are learning in
Bosnia today can be put to good use tomorrow.
To begin with, it was intensive United States diplomacy backed by
credible force that led to the Dayton Accords which ended the conflict.
This unprecedented peace agreement synthesizes human rights, justice, and
conflict resolution in a framework that offers the best chance of securing a
lasting peace.
At Dayton, John Shattuck was the first Assistant Secretary for
human rights to take an active part in a major diplomatic peace
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negotiation. This in itself was a new integration of human rights into the
most serious issues of diplomacy, of war and peace.
The Dayton Accords created a set of human rights institutions,
including a Constitutional Court, a Human Rights Chamber, and an
Ombudsman; provided for international monitoring of elections and human
rights performance; and obligated every party to cooperate with the
investigations of the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague,
however the chips may fall.
And we were not starting from scratch in Dayton-we were
working with the lessons of Haiti, where U.S. leadership and support for
the reconstruction of civil society, democratic institutions, and the rule of
law was essential to ending a human rights catastrophe.
This Administration has consistently, steadily, and successfully
helped make international justice a reality in the hellholes of Bosnia,
Rwanda, and now, if we succeed in our effort to create a permanent
International Criminal Court, throughout the world.
Since the Tribunal's inception in 1993, the Clinton Administration
has been its steadiest and strongest supporter. We have given the Tribunal
more financial, logistical and political support than any other country.
This has taken a lot of heavy lifting in a lot of bureaucracies, but we have
stuck with it.
At Dayton, we made sure that support for the Tribunal was an
essential element of the Agreement, and binding on all parties. And our
military forces in Bosnia have taken it upon themselves to provide a safe
environment for the Tribunal's investigations and to assist its investigators
in their work.
The significance of the Tribunal's work goes far beyond the
present-day conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda.
The Tribunal is precisely the kind of human rights institution we
need to be creating in the post-Cold War world. Just as the postwar
generation rose to the task of creating new institutions that guided the
international community for the next half-century, so too now it is our
responsibility to create new transnational institutions of justice for the
global community of the twenty-first century. Much of this work is slow
going, and well removed from the headlines. But I am convinced that our
work on creating institutions of accountability will stand, not only as a
significant achievement of this administration, but as one of our country's
noblest efforts.
Half a century ago, the need for a global structure protecting
human rights was given special urgency by the unprecedented horrors of
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the Holocaust of World War II. But the foundation of that structure is
embedded in the deepest values of every part of the world.
Throughout modern history, when fundamental human values have
been assaulted by governments and their leaders, humankind has turned
toward self-destruction. That is what happened in the Nazi concentration
camps, in the Soviet Gulag, in the Chinese Cultural Revolution, in the
killing fields of Cambodia, and more recently in the acts of genocide
carried out in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. These and other
massive human horrors live in our historical memory.
Universal human rights are the measure of these horrors and of
our commitment to strive not to repeat them.
It is in this arena of human rights institution-building, of creating
structures of justice and accountability that will extend into the future and
on which others can build, that the Clinton Administration has made its
greatest contribution to the unending work of human rights.
In closing, I would like to remember on whose behalf we labor in
the field of human rights, and on whose behalf a global structure of
protection is being built. In this work we are responding to the pain and
need of men, women, and children on all continents, and to our own
interest as Americans in peace, security, and the ideal on which our nation
was founded.
The challenges human rights advocates face today are greater than
we had ever anticipated during the heady early days after the fall of the
Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. Yet the new international
environment offers unprecedented opportunities for the promotion of
human rights and human dignity.
One of our greatest American heroes, the Reverend Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., said that "the moral arc of the universe is long, but it
bends towards justice." We all have a long way to go along that arc, but
our nation and our Administration are committed to going the distance.
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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DEVELOPING
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
Cynthia Price Cohen
The Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on November 20, 1989.' At the time of
the International Law Association's 1996 International Law Weekend, 187
countries had ratified the Convention. As of February 1, 1997 the number
of States Parties had increased to 189.2 Because of the Convention's
worldwide popularity, it is having a major effect on both national and
international law applicable to children. As a consequence, there is a new
and growing body of international law on the rights of the child. The
purpose of the International Law Weekend panel, The Developing
Jurisprudence of the Rights of the Child, was to inform International Law
Association members about this new body of international law, the general
direction that its development has taken thus far and its effects on United
Nations child rights activities, private international law and
nongovernmental bodies, such as academic institutions.
Drafting of the Convention on the Rights of the Child was
originally undertaken as a part of the celebration of the 1979 International
Year of the Child. It was drafted over a ten year period by a Working
Group established by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.
* Cynthia Price Cohen received her B.A. in Political Science and Philosophy summa cur
laude from the City College of New York, winning prizes in both departments and being elected
to Phi Beta Kappa Honor Society. She holds a Masters Degree in Political Science from the City
University of New York, and a Juris Doctor degree from New York Law School, where she
received the Human Rights Award. Dr. Price Cohen was awarded the degree of Doktor Nauk
Prawnych (Doctor of Juridical Science) from the Instytut Nauk Prawnych (Law Studies Institute)
of the Polska Akademia Nauk (Polish Academy of Sciences) for her dissertation, The Process of
Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, (Warsaw: 1994). She is currently a
doctoral candidate in Social Policy at the University of Gent (Belgium), where she is examining
the role of non-governmental organizations in the development of the human rights of children.
She is the Executive Director of ChildRights International Research Institute, which she founded
in 1992.
1. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, 1
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 4a), U.N. Doc. A/144/149 (1989), 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989), corrected at
29 I.L.M. 1340 (1990) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Convention].
2. Nations that ratify treaties and are thus legally bound by them are known as "States
Parties." The only countries in the world that had not yet become States Parties to the
Convention were: the Cook islands, Somalia, Switzerland and the United States.
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The final text of the Convention was an elaboration and an extension of a
model convention presented to the Commission in 1979 by the Polish
government, which was its sponsor. Participants in the Working Group
included delegates from nations that were members of the Commission on
Human Rights, delegates from nations that participated as observers3 and
representatives from other bodies, such as international governmental
organizations4 and nongovernmental organizations.,
During the drafting process, the original Polish model, which had
twenty substantive articles, was expanded to such an extent that the
substantive portion of the Convention's final text contains forty-two
articles. 6  The Convention on the Rights of the Child is the only
international human rights treaty that incorporates the full range of human
rights envisioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights., In fact,
it also includes rights that are not covered by the Universal Declaration.
Not only does it protect the child's civil-political rights (i.e., freedom of
speech, religion and the right to privacy)8 and economic-social-cultural
rights (i.e., the right to education, a standard of living and health care), 9 it
also protects the child who has no family,' ° the child in time of war" and
3. The difference between nations that were members of the Commission on Human
Rights and those that were not had to do with voting powers. However, this distinction was
essentially irrelevant because all decisions of the Working Group were made on the basis of
consensus and no vote was ever taken.
4. Represented were such bodies as UNICEF, the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, the World Health Organization and the International Labour Organisation.
5. Especially active were members of the Informal NGO Ad Hoc Group for the Drafting of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child which included such organizations as Amnesty
International, International Catholic Child Bureau, Defense for Children International, R.dda Barnen
International, Human Rights Internet and the International Commission of Jurists.
For a full record of the Convention's drafting process, including a list of governmental
and nongovernmental participants see THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF
THE CHILD: A GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES," (Sharon Detrick, ed. 1992).
6. For details of this expansion and its effects on the international law of children's rights
see infra note 21, Developing Jurisprudence.
7. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948)
[hereinafter Universal Declaratioh]. The Universal Declaration was drafted to clarify the meaning of
the words "human rights" in the United Nations Charter.
8. See supra note 1, Convention at e. g. arts. 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 25,
30, 37, and 40.
9. See supra note 1, Convention at e.g. arts. 23, 24, 26. 27, 28, 29, 30, and 32.
10. In particular see supra note 1, Convention at arts. 20 and 21. Article 7 is also relevant
because it speaks of the child's right to "know and be cared for by his or her parents."
11. See supra note 1, Convention at arts. 22 and 38.
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provides for physical recovery and social reintegration of children who
have been traumatized by a variety of causes.'"
The Convention on the Rights of the Child is distinguished by four
overriding principles that apply to all of the Convention's articles: 1)
protection from discrimination; 3 2) the right to survival;"4 3) the "best
interests of the child;"', and 4) respect for the child's views.' 6  The
Convention on the Rights of the Child strongly protects the family-child
relationship,' 7 but not to the detriment of the child's well-being. For
example, article 5 gives the family a guiding role in the child's exercise of
his or her rights, but makes allowances for the maturity of the child. The
Convention calls on States Parties to
respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or,
where applicable, the members of the extended family or
community as provided for by local custom, legal
guardians or other persons legally responsible for the
child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving
capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance
in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the
present Convention. ' 8
Although the Convention on the Rights of the Child supports the
child's right to a nurturing family, it does not assume that the family-child
relationship is perfect. Article 19 protects the child from "all forms of
physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent
treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in
the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the
care of the child." '9
The Convention on the Rights of the Child is also notable for the
fact that it is the only international human rights treaty that has been
written in language that is equally respectful of both genders. Wherever a
12. See supra note 1, Convention, at art. 39.
13. See supra note 1, Convention at art. 2.
14. See supra note 1, Convention at art. 6.
15. See supra note 1, Convention at art. 3.
16. See supra note 1, Convention at art. 12.
17. The Convention on the Rights of the Child is decidedly pro-family. Recognition of the
parent-child relationship can be found in articles 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23,
24, 27, 37 and 40.
18. See supra note 1, Convention at art. 5. Emphasis supplied.
19. See supra note 1, Convention at art. 19 (1).
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singular possessive pronoun has been used in the Convention, it appears as
both masculine and feminine forms. Thus, for example, article 2 speaks of
the principle of non-discrimination not only in relation to the child, but
also in relation to "his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national ethnic or social
origin, property, disability, birth or other status."20
The overall effect of the Convention on the Rights of the Child is
that of radically altering the way the world looks at children. Its impact
has not been limited to the national legislation of States Parties, it has also
been an inspiration to the drafters of the numerous international legal
instruments that have been adopted since the Convention on the Rights of
the Child went into force.2 1
Like other United Nations human rights treaties, the Convention
on the Rights of the Child calls for States Parties to submit periodic reports
to a committee of "experts of high moral standing and competence in the
field" 2 who are to examine the reports to ascertain the extent to which
each State Party has fulfilled its obligations under the treaty.2 3  Since
September 2, 1990, when the Convention on the Rights of the Child went
into force, countries that have ratified the Convention have been involved
in conforming their national law to meet the Convention's standards and in
preparing their initial reports to the Committee on the Rights of the Child,
which is the Convention's monitoring body. While in some respects the
Convention's monitoring process replicates that of other United Nations
human rights treaties, it is unique in that article 45 provides a special role
for nongovernmental organizations.24 As a result of article 45, the
Committee on the Rights of the Child has access to a broad range of
information with which to evaluate the accuracy of States Parties' reports.
The reporting process has already enabled many countries to discover and
remedy flaws in their national children's policies.
The impact of the Convention on the Rights of the Child has
reached far beyond the State Party reporting process. It has brought about
20. See supra note 1, Convention at art. 2 (1). Emphasis supplied.
21. For an overview of the way in which the Convention on the Rights of the Child is
changing the international law of children's rights see Cynthia Price Cohen, The Developing
Jurisprudence of the Rights of the Child, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 1 (1993). [hereinafter Developing
Jurisprudence].
22. See supra note 1, Convention at art. 43 (2).
23. See supra note 1, Convention at art. 44.
24. See supra note 1, Convention at art. 45. The words "other competent bodies" in
paragraphs (a) and (b) were particularly intended to mean "nongovernmental organizations."
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the drafting and adoption of two regional children's rights treaties.2 It has
influenced the language used in the text of Hague Conference treaties on
private international law.2 It has brought about a restructuring of the work
of both the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the
United Nations Children's Fund to reflect internationally recognized rights
of the child." It has given new impetus to the activities of
nongovernmental organizations and has inspired a new basis for research
by the academic community.21 Most importantly, it has assured that
children's rights have a regular place on the international human rights
agenda.29
Unfortunately, it was not possible at the International Law
Weekend panel, The Developing Jurisprudence of the Rights of the Child,
to present the full picture of what is happening in the international law of
children's rights. Instead, the panel touched on some of the high points of
this development. Anders R6nquist, Counselor for the Swedish Mission to
the United Nations, spoke about the place of children's rights within the
Third Committee of the General Assembly and the Commission on Human
Rights and the child rights' resolutions annually adopted by those bodies. 0
Professor Gertrud Lenzer, The City University of New York, outlined a
future role for academic institutions in: 1) interpreting the rights
enumerated by the Convention on the Rights of the Child; 2) supplying
reliable information to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, and 3)
developing new academic child rights projects', such as the Children's
25. See Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child, July 11, 1990, OAU Doe.
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 [hereinafter Charter on the African Child], reprinted in AFRICAN NETWORK FOR
THE PREVENTION AND PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, CHARTER ON THE
RIGHTS AND WELFARE OF THE AFRICAN CHILD 12 (Peter 0. Ebigbo, ed., 1991); European
Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights, published in RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, Maria Rita
Saulle (ed.).
26. For a detailed description of the evolution of the text of the Hague Convention on the
Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption see supra note 21
Developing Jurisprudence.
27. Since U.N. adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees has issued guidelines for field officers to assure that the rights of
refugee children are adequately protected. UNICEF, on the other hand, is making child rights the
organizational basis for all of its activities.
28. For example, the University of Gent has instituted an annual summer study course on
children's rights and St. Xavier University in Chicago is exploring the possibility of establishing an
interdisciplinary research center for children's rights.
29. The rights of the child is now formally on the agenda of both the Commission on Human
Rights and the Third Committee of the General Assembly. Each of these bodies adopts a resolution
each year focusing on the most important issues effecting children.
30. Anders R6nquist, address at International Law Association, International Law Weekend,
Oct. 31 - Nov. 2, 1996.
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Studies Program which she heads at Brooklyn College.3' Unfortunately,
because of their busy schedules, neither of these speakers were able to
provide publishable papers for the proceedings.
The other two speakers, both of whom have submitted essays for
the International Law Association International Law Weekend
Proceedings, provided distinctly different approaches to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child. Peter Pfund, Legal Advisor's Office of United
States Department of State, explained the way in which the Convention on
the Rights of the Child had been recognized in recent treaty drafting
processes of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.3 2
William D. Angel, Youth Division of the United Nations, described United
Nations youth policies and pointed out the often ironic overlaps between
youth policy and the rights of the child and speculated about possible future
methods of relating the two areas of international law."
The panel topic was particularly well received. The "standing
room" audience stayed to the very end, despite the cramped quarters. 34
Naturally, during the question and answer period, the audience wanted to
know why the United States has not ratified the Convention on the Rights
of the Child and what can be done about it. The consensus was that
biggest problem comes from the fact that those who oppose the Convention
are active and in continuously contact with their Senators and
Congresspersons. 31 While those who support the Convention's ratification
are essentially silent. To overcome the already mobilized anti-Convention
campaign, what will be needed is a state by state drive for ratification that
will counterbalance the activities of those in opposition. Only by obtaining
the support of individual states will it be possible to counter federalism
arguments that will undoubtedly be raised against the Convention at future
Senate hearings. Unless a grassroots movement begins to build, there is a
strong likelihood that the United States will enter the 21st Century as the
world's only country that has not taken a stand for children.
31. Professor Gertrud Lenzer, address at International Law Association, International Law
Weekend, Oct. 31 - Nov. 2, 1996.
32. See infra Peter Pfund, The Developing Jurisprudence of Rights of the Child, this volume.
33. See infra William D. Angel, Developing Jurisprudence on the Rights of Youth: Review
of Problems and Prospects: North-South, this volume.
34. To some extent this may have been influenced by the fact that the 1996-97 Jessup Moot
Court problem contains a children's rights issue.
35. Senator Jesse Helms has said that he gets one thousand letters against the Convention for
every one in favor.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I would like this morning to discuss with you three multilateral
treaties produced since 1980 by the international organization known as the
Hague Conference on Private International Law. All of them seek to serve
the best interests of children on the move with protections to which the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child declares that they
are entitled. It looks as if the United States will sooner or later be a party
to all of these conventions. I also want to mention one other encouraging
development in the United States in the area of international child support
enforcement.
The Hague Conference was established in 1893. The United
States joined the organization in 1964 after its re-constitution with a
Permanent Bureau in the 1950s. The organization celebrated its 100th
anniversary during its diplomatic session in May 1993 at the conclusion of
which it adopted the final text of the Hague Convention on intercountry
adoption.
Before the 1960s the Hague Conference's work was primarily
aimed at preparing conventions setting out rules for determining which
country's law would apply to various types of legal transactions and
* Peter H. Pfund is the Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law, U.S
Department of State. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily the views of
the Department of State.
666 ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
relationships and which country's authorities would have jurisdiction.
However, the Conference also prepared conventions dealing with civil
procedure and providing for international judicial assistance and
cooperation, such as the conventions on service of process abroad and the
taking of evidence abroad, always only in civil and commercial matters.
The conventions on international judicial assistance called on party States
to establish Central Authorities with the responsibility to cooperate with
each other and to make these conventions work. The Hague Conference
has also convened very useful sessions permitting Central Authority
officials to discuss the implementation of these Conventions with their
counterparts from other countries.
This other type of convention generally attracted more party States
than most of the Hague conflicts conventions, suggesting that there was a
niche for the Hague Conference to prepare conventions in various legal
areas providing for cooperation among national authorities.
Starting with the 1980 Convention on the International Child
Abduction, the Hague Conference and its member states focused much of
their attention on conventions providing for cooperation among party states
for the purpose of protecting children, and children on the move from one
country to another. Children are particularly vulnerable and in need of
protection when they have been parentally abducted or when they are
being adopted by persons residing in another country than their country of
origin. The same is true when their divorcing or separating parents living
or planning to live in different countries are dealing with the question of
which parent will have primary responsibility for protection of the person
and property of the child and which parent may be given only visitation
rights.
II. INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION
Work on the first such convention in 1976-1980 predated the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child by about a decade.
I am told that some of the provisions of this Hague Convention formed the
basis for ideas that are reflected in similar language and concepts in the
United Nations Convention.
The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction, was intended to deter parental abductions and to remedy
as much as possible their very bad effects on children. It was also
designed to help governments and the left-behind parents involved better
1. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Actes et documents de la quatorzigme
session, 1982, Tome III, Child Abduction, at 413-22; T.I.A.S. No. 11,670; 51 Fed. Reg. 10498-
502 (1986); 19 I.L.M. 1501-05 (1980).
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to cope with the previously intractable problem of international parental
child abductions. The Convention requires the prompt return of children
removed or retained outside the country of the child's habitual residence,
when the removal or retention is in breach of the rights of custody of a
parent, whether those rights exist by operation of law or are based on a
custody decree. Negotiators were aware that many such abductions take
place before any court proceedings for divorce have been initiated. In
those days, one still spoke more of custody rights, meaning the rights of
the parents to have custody of the object of custody, the child, than of the
rights of the child to be the subject of protective measures.
The child abduction convention already speaks in its preamble of
the conviction of the signatory States "that the interests of children are of
paramount importance in matters relating to their custody" and refers to
the desire "to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of
their wrongful removal or retention," language very similar to that found
in the later United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
The wrongfully removed or retained child is promptly to be
ordered returned, unless one of the narrow exceptions to the return
obligation has been established by the .parent resisting the return request.
The return obligation anticipates article 11 of the United Nations
Convention which provides that party states are to take measures to combat
illicit transfer and non return of children abroad. Looking at article 12 of
the United Nations Convention, one notices its underlying concerns for the
child's opinion to be taken into account as the basis of the earlier provision
in article 13, paragraph 2, of the 1980 Hague Convention stating that the
requested judicial or other authority "may also refuse to order the return of
the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained
an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of
its views."
Anticipating also the provisions of article 9(3) of the United
Nations Convention on the rights of the child who is separated from one or
both parents "to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both
parents on a regular basis," article 21 of the 1980 Convention, while
somewhat sketchily, provides for the possibility of an application "to make
arrangements for organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of
access" by non-custodial parents, for the exercise of which governmental
Central Authorities are to take steps to remove obstacles.
The United States became a party to this Convention in mid-1988
and the Convention now has forty-five party states. The Department has
no way of knowing how many cases of wrongful removals to or retentions
of children in the United States occur annually. However, there are about
300 such cases annually covered by the Hague Convention and coming to
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the attention of the State Department. Similarly, there are about 700
children from the United States wrongfully removed or retained abroad
annually, about 500 covered by the 1980 Convention. Helping with
Hague and non-Hague cases is an office in the Consular Affairs bureau of
the State Department, the Children's Issues Office, which serves as the
United States Central Authority, that also deals with intercountry adoptions
to the United States. This office has a staff of eight officers.
On the whole, the Convention has worked quite well, and the
cooperation between Central Authorities in party states is helpful. Unique
to the Hague Conference as an organization unifying private law, there
have been two one-week sessions of a special commission that has brought
together Central Authority officials from party states. These officials
assemble to discuss systemic and other problems encountered in the
implementation of the Convention and to develop solutions for them, to
meet each other face-to-face, and to develop a level of confidence in each
others' motivations to make the Convention work as well as possible in
their respective countries. The next such meeting is scheduled for mid-
March 1997, and the State Department is already examining in what
respects United States implementation of the Convention is short of what it
should be and how we can improve on it. We are, of course, also
examining in what respects implementation of the Convention by other
countries seems unsatisfactory and should be improved.
HIL. INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION
In 1988 the member states of the Hague Conference decided that
the organization should seek to prepare a convention to set internationally
agreed norms and procedures to safeguard children involved in
intercountry adoptions. Up to that time there were no internationally
agreed standards for such adoptions. However, between 15,000 and
20,000 children were thought to be moving annually from one country to
another in connection with their adoption by persons resident in a country
other than their country of birth or origin.
The member states were clear that the primary objective of work
on a convention would be to regulate and improve intercountry adoptions.
The legal institution was seen as the vehicle for providing children in need
of families permanent families of their own, after consideration of the
possibility of their adoption by a suitable family in their country of origin.
Intercountry adoption was not seen as a process designed primarily to




If there was any doubt that there were abuses in the intercountry
adoption process, such as the marketing of children for adoption, excessive
payments to facilitators, or the inadequate protection of birth parents, this
was borne out after work on this Convention had already begun by the
situation in Romania shortly after the overthrow of Ceaucescu. Hundreds,
even thousands, of children were snapped up by persons wishing to adopt
them during a period of almost no laws, regulations or procedures in
Romania to protect the children and their birth parents and to ensure that
the children were really available for intercountry adoption, involving as it
does in most cases the severance of the previous legal parent-child
relationship.
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, in
article 21(b) as interpreted by many, placed intercountry adoption,
internationally unregulated as it then was, at the end of the list of
alternative methods of care for children without families. This is thought
to follow from the recognition in that sub-section that intercountry
adoption may be considered an alternative means of child's care if the
child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any
suitable manner be cared for in the child's country of origin. The order of
preferences envisaged in the United Nations Convention places return of
the child to its family of origin first, followed by placement of the child by
adoption with a family in its country of origin, and then other forms of
care in the country of origin not involving a permanent family for the
child, foster and institutional care, all before intercountry adoption, which
was seen by many to be only an alternative of last resort.
Now let's look at the preamble of the 1993 Hague Convention on
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry
Adoption,2 the final text of which was adopted in May 1993, about five
years after the United Nations Convention.
The preamble begins: "Recognizing that the child, for the full and
harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a
family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and
understanding" and continues "[riecalling that each State should take, as a
matter of priority, appropriate measures to enable the child to remain in
the care of his or her family of origin." It then states "[r]ecognizing that
intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent family to a
2. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Proceedings of the Seventeenth Session,
1994, Tome II, Adoption-Co-operation, Final Act, Part A, at 523-35; 40 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 292
(1993); I/I UNIFORM L. REV. 237-67 (1993); 32 I.L.M. 1134 (1993); see Appendix of P.H. Pfund,
Intercountry Adoption: The 1993 Hague Convention: Its Purpose, Implementation, and Promise, 28
FAM. L.Q., 76 (1994).
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child for whom a suitable family, [as opposed to suitable care,] cannot be
found in his or her State of origin." You can see that the stress on the
need for a child to have a permanent family of its own because of the
importance of such a family for the full and harmonious development of
the child's personality leads to the new conclusion that intercountry
adoption may offer the advantage of a family that foster and institutional
care can not. This realization that intercountry may offer the advantage
can be understood as "does offer the advantage" when intercountry
adoptions result from sound and ethical adoption practices or when they
are internationally regulated under the 1993 Hague Convention. In these
circumstances, the Hague Convention suggests that intercountry adoption
should be preferred over forms of care in the child's country of origin that
do not offer the advantage of a permanent family.
The preamble, then, while not a legally binding part of the 1993
Hague Convention but rather its mis-en-scene, the face with which it
presents itself, and the entire Convention of which the preamble is a part,
represent for the first time a real, rather than a grudging, international
endorsement of intercountry adoption.
The preamble continues, noting the necessity to take measures to
ensure that intercountry adoptions are made in the best interests of the
child, with respect for the child's fundamental rights, and to prevent the
abduction, the sale of, or the traffic in children. For corresponding
language in the United Nations Convention, see its articles 11, 34, and 35.
The preamble closes, noting that the signatory states desire to establish
common provisions taking into account the principles set forth in
international instruments, among them, in particular, the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child of November 1989.
Having presented itself in this way, the Convention sets out a
framework of minimum norms and procedures, with certain determinations
to be made in the country of origin of the child, and certain others in the
receiving country, before the adoption may proceed. Among the
determinations to be made by competent authorities in the country of
origin are that they have ensured, having regard to the age and degree of
maturity of the child, that "the child's consent to the adoption, where such
consent is required, has been given freely. . . ." This is a direct follow-up
to the mandate in article 12 of the United Nations Convention to which
reference was made earlier.
The Hague Convention requires the establishment of Central
Authorities in every party state with certain mandatory, largely
programmatic oversight and cooperation functions and responsibilities,
although in some countries they may also have case specific functions.
Those Central Authority functions that are specific to individual adoptions
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may largely be performed by Convention-accredited agencies, and
approved other providers of adoption services. However, it is left up to
each country to determine with which agencies accredited, or providers
approved, by another state it may choose to work. It is also up to each
party state to determine what additional requirements and conditions to
those established in the Hague Convention it may set with regard to the
intercountry adoptions of children from that country or coming to that
country. The Convention also requires that all Convention adoptions be
recognized in all party States.
The United Nations Convention, in particular article 7, is behind at
least one other provision of the Hague Convention, article 30, which
requires the competent authorities of a Contracting State to ensure that
information held by them concerning the child's origin, "in particular
information concerning the identity of his or her parents, as well as the
medical history, is preserved." Those competent authorities are to ensure
that the child or the child's representative has access to such information,
under appropriate guidance, in so far as is permitted by the law of the
State where the information is held. In transmitting information on the
child to the receiving state, the state of origin is reminded in article 16(2)
to take care not to reveal the identity of the mother and the father if, in the
state of origin, these identities may not be disclosed. Thus, the
requirement to preserve information concerning the identity of the parents
is directed primarily at countries from which the children come.
However, the Hague Convention leaves it to the law of the country or
countries where such information has been preserved to determine whether
the child's access to that information will be permitted. If access is
permitted, currently or at some future time, the information will have been
preserved and will be available.
As I hope will be evident from this very sketchy and incomplete
summary of the provisions of this Convention, the Hague Conference
member states had the United Nations Convention in mind in setting out
rather detailed norms and procedures.
The Hague Convention has already broken a number of records,
more countries involved in its negotiation than for any other Hague
Convention (66), including thirty countries of origin that were not member
states of the Hague Conference, but whose involvement in the preparation
of the Convention as the voting equals of member states was deemed
crucial for the Convention's relevance, effectiveness, and broad
acceptance. More countries, including the United States, signed the
Convention in the first year after it was finalized than any previous Hague
Convention, and signing States now number twenty-seven. The
Convention entered into force in just under two years with three ratifying
1997]
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States, another first. In the meantime, eight other States have become
parties. Many other countries of origin and receiving countries, including
the United States, are working towards becoming parties to this
Convention, which promises to become one of the Hague Conference's
greatest success stories.
The Convention will require federal legislation to ensure its full
and uniform implementation in the United States. Such legislation is also
necessary, among other things, to establish and provide for the
establishment and funding of the required United States Central Authority,
to set up the system for Convention-accreditation of United States adoption
agencies, to ensure recognition of Convention adoptions throughout the
United States, and to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to make
special allowance for entry for permanent residence of children from
abroad under the Convention. In order for the United States to be able to
comply with the requirements of the Convention imposed on countries of
origin, there will need to be a new form of state court determinations for
those few children from the United States that are to be the subject of
adoptions, whether in the United States or abroad, that will be covered by
the Hague Convention.
On the whole, we expect that if our primary focus is on meeting
our obligations under the Hague Convention, current practices in the
United States can be modified in relatively minor ways to fit into the
framework of requirements set by the Hague Convention. Thus, once the
President sends the Convention forward for Senate advice and consent to
United States ratification, probably next year (1997), and the State
Department achieves the introduction in Congress of legislation that is
currently in preparation for clearance by the Administration, and provided
there is adequate support for United States ratification from the United
States private sector including the adoption and child welfare community,
the United States should be able to ratify the Convention by the year
before the end of the millennium.
IV. PROTECTION OF CHILDREN (CUSTODY)
At the seventeenth session of the Hague Conference, the
suggestion was accepted that the organization seek by its eighteenth session
in 1996 to prepare a convention on the protection of the person and
property of minors that would revise an earlier 1961 Hague Convention on
this topic. The 1961 Convention had placed jurisdiction for the purpose of
custody primarily with the authorities of the country of the child's
nationality, as well as in other states in certain circumstances and for
certain purposes. These competing bases of jurisdiction, the poor
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functioning of cooperation between authorities of the countries involved,
and absence of a provision on enforcement in one party state of measures
of protection taken in another, plus only modest acceptance of the 1961
Convention, led to the belief that a new Convention was needed.
The Hague Conference member states on October 18, 1996
adopted a new Convention,' after three two-week preparatory sessions and
a three-week diplomatic session of the organization at all of which the
United States delegation played a very active role. The Convention
provides that the judicial or administrative authorities of the contracting
state of the child's habitual residence have clear, primary jurisdiction to
take measures directed to the protection of the child's person or property.
The Convention's preamble, after noting conflicts between legal
systems, the importance of international cooperation for the protection of
children, confirming that the best interests of the child are to be a primary
consideration, and noting that the 1961 Convention needs revision, notes
that the states signatory desire to establish common provisions taking into
account the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
The Convention provides, by way of exception, for transfer of
jurisdiction to the authorities of certain other states to be offered, sought,
and effected if they are deemed better placed than the country of the
child's habitual residence to assess the best interests of the child.
The Convention sets out rules for determining the applicable law,
requires the recognition in all other contracting states by operation of law
of measures taken by authorities of contracting states, and has rather
detailed provisions for mandatory and possible cooperation between
Central Authorities and competent authorities in contracting states.
The 1996 Convention seeks to bolster the provisions of the 1980
Child Abduction Convention concerning the prompt return of parentally
abducted children and the exercise of rights of access.
There was considerable concern, particularly among United States
experts, that the jurisdiction provisions of the new Convention could
undermine the return requirements of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction
Convention. Fortunately, article 7 explicitly now provides that the
authorities of the state of the child's habitual residence before the wrongful
removal or retention keep their jurisdiction until the child has acquired
habitual residence in another state and either each person or body having
rights of custody has acquiesced in the removal or retention, or there was a
3. 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and
Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children,
Oct. 18, 1996, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Final Act of the Eighteenth Session,
Part A, at 3-22 (English and French on alternating pages); 35 I.L.M. 1391-405 (1996).
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long delay amounting, in effect, to laches, i.e., acquiescence, on the part
of the person or body with the breached custody rights in bringing the
return request and no return request is still pending and the child is settled
into its new environment. Thus, if the return request under the 1980
Hague Convention should be refused and so long as jurisdiction with
regard to measures of protection has not shifted because the requirements
of article 7 have not been met, jurisdiction can only be shifted to the state
where the child is located pursuant to the transfer arrangements set out in
articles 8 and 9 that require the consent of authorities in the state from
which the child was abducted.
V. INTERNATIONAL CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
These three most recent Hague Conventions concerned with child
protection and, in effect, also children's rights to such protection, have
firmly established the Hague Conference as an important international
forum for filling in the framework of laudable general aims and goals set
out in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. It does
so with conventions focused on substantive obligations and detailed norms,
as well as procedures for intergovernmental cooperation among
governmental authorities, including periodic intergovernmental
consultations.
Looking at the United States we see that it is already a party to the
Hague Convention on International Child Abduction. Inter-agency
consultations are under way in the United States government aimed at
preparing federal implementing legislation for the Hague Intercountry
Adoption Convention, the United States being the country that is adopting
more children from abroad annually than all other countries put together
(11,340 in the year ending September 30, 1996). A United States
delegation recently returned from the final negotiations on the Hague
Convention on Protection of Children with the belief that in due course the
United States should be able to become a party to that Convention as well.
I would like to mention work done since 1980 on her own time
and expense by Gloria DeHart, a Deputy California Attorney General,
until her retirement a few years ago. Her efforts resulted in agreement on
arrangements with twenty foreign countries on behalf of the individual
States of the United States that effectively provide for the reciprocal
enforcement by each of support obligations, including child support,
emanating from the other.
Since Ms. DeHart's shift to part-time work in California, she has
also been working part-time in my part of the Office of the Legal Adviser
in the State Department. In consultation with the National Child Support
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Enforcement Association and with the help of the State Department and the
Office of Child Support Enforcement in the Department of Health and
Human Services, Gloria DeHart prepared provisions that became part of
the just-enacted Welfare Reform Legislation.' These provisions for the
first time formally give the federal government a role in international
support enforcement. Under Title 42, United States Code, new section
659A, the Secretary of State, with the concurrence. of the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (HHS), is authorized to declare, by
international agreement or unilateral declaration or both, that a foreign
country is a reciprocating country if it has the means to .enforce support
owed to obligees resident in the United States and those means
substantially conform with the enforcement standards set out in that
section. Such a declaration entitles the child and spousal support
obligations emanating from such a reciprocating country to enforcement
throughout the United States. HHS, in a function likely to be delegated to
its Office of Child Support Enforcement, is made responsible to facilitate
support enforcement in cases involving United States residents and
residents of foreign countries that have been declared to be reciprocating
countries.
Once, as the result of this new authority, new arrangements have
been made at the federal government level with most of the twenty
countries mentioned earlier, we shall seek to make such arrangements also
with the dozen or so additional countries with which Ms. DeHart was
earlier seeking to conclude arrangements at the state level in the United
States, as well as further countries that indicate their interest.
VI. CONCLUSION
I believe that it is possible to conclude from the above that there is
very considerable motion within the United States towards improving,
through United States implementation of certain conventions and reciprocal
arrangements, the protection and welfare of children on the move to or
from the United States in various circumstances in which they are
particularly vulnerable. Those efforts extend also to children dependent on
support which a person located in another country should be paying.
4. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, § 371; 110 Stat. 2253, 42 U.S.C. § § 659a, 654.
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I. HISTORICAL SOURCES OF YOUTH RIGHTS
Whatever civilization one analyses in history, one invariably finds
generational conflicts of youth rebelling against the various systems (legal,
political, economic, and/or socio-cultural) established by their adult
generation. While the majority of youth tend to conform to the rules
granted by their elders, the minority of youth (who may be called
forerunner youth) often challenge societal laws and standards. If the
former are often integrated into the existing orders, the latter act to
transform those orders. In terms of what is today called North-South
relations, it is interesting to note that the evolution and growth of what I
term the international law of youth rights can be traced to actions in both
the North and the South.
In 1158, in what is now Italy, the Holy Roman Emperor,
Frederick Barbarossa made a formal grant of rights and privileges to what
he described a student class. The rights of students to education, freedom
of thought, speech, association, assembly, and travel were thus recognized
and spread throughout the universities in the Middle Ages. Yet, major
demands for youth rights were also made in the South. For example, in
1918, when a group of Argentine students drafted and demanded a
* Officer in Charge, United Nations Youth Unit, drawn from remarks at the Youth
Forum of the European Union in Brussels, Belgium on the launching of his book: THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF YOUTH (Kluwer Law International: Dordrecht, Boston, London,
1995). Presented to the Conference on Rights and Obligations of Persons under International
Law, Nov. 2, 1996, New York American Branch of the International Law Association.
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University Reform Programme, they set in motion a far-reaching
movement that would subsequently affect the rights of students at
universities throughout the world. That reform advocated greater student
participation in the administration of the university and a grass roots
orientation against the aristocratic traditions of the past.
The university became a legally autonomous republic and the base
for student opposition against laws and policies of corrupt political
regimes. The Cordoba Student Charter, as it was called, affirmed that
students had not only the legal right to participate in the administration of
the university, but also to participate in political processes for the
democratization of society. The legal principle of university autonomy,
student participation in university administration (co-gobierno) and the
rights and responsibilities of young people to reform society spread
throughout the world and are not unrelated to the current actions of youth
to transform the political, economic, and socio-cultural landscapes of the
contemporary world (North and South). And on May 4, 1919, student
demonstrators adopted a manifesto in China which signaled protests: 1)
against foreign intervention; and 2) for modernization. That manifesto and
protest also spread throughout the world to encourage students to unite for
political action. It is worth noting that these important sources of the
international law of youth rights (especially regarding student political
participation) actually came in the second decade of the twentieth century
from what is now termed the developing world of the South.
The political, economic and social rights of youth were further
elaborated after World Wars I and II. The subject of international law
consisted of not only States, but individuals (including students, youth,
young workers, girls, and young women), and non-governmental
organizations (such as student unions, youth organizations, trade union
youth associations, young women groups, etc.). After the First World
War, international/intergovernmental institutions (such as the ILO and the
League of Nations) became subjects of international law, as did, after the
Second World War, the United Nations, UNESCO, WHO etc. Indeed,
both the League of Nations system (1919-1940) and the United Nations
system (1945-1995) have played important roles in codifying major
international instruments and standards which have provided the basis of
the international law of youth rights.
II. NORTH-SOUTH NEGOTIATIONS ON YOUTH RIGHTS
During the period of the League of Nations system (1919-1940),
such negotiations led to the adoption of eleven international conventions by
the International Labour Conference on such questions to promote and
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protect the rights of young workers regarding minimum age for
employment, medical examination, conditions of work, and employment
and training. The League's Assembly adopted one major convention to
protect the rights of girls and young women: the Slavery Convention of
1926, and appointed a Rapporteur in 1933 to prepare and submit a report
on The Traffic of Girls and Young Women in the Far East. The Assembly
also adopted several resolutions setting standards on "The Instruction of
Children and Youth in the Existence and Aims of the League of Nations"
and on "The Protection of Children and Young People."
With the birth of the United Nations and its system of affiliated
agencies and organizations in 1945, the international law of youth rights
took on a more far-flung and diverse nature. The General Assembly has
adopted ten different categories of resolutions concerned with youth rights
and responsibilities, including a Declaration on the Promotion Among
Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and Understanding between
Young People (1965), and two international Guidelines on youth: one on
Further Planning and Suitable Follow Up in the Field of Youth (1985) and
one on Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (1990). At its Fiftieth session
in 1995, the Assembly adopted a United Nations world Programme of
Action for Youth to the Year 2000 and Beyond, containing specific targets
for action in ten issue areas: education, employment, hunger and poverty,
health, environment, drug abuse, juvenile delinquency, leisure-time, girls,
and young women, and full and effective participation. While there was
no specific section on the issue of youth and human rights or youth rights
and responsibilities, the delegates of Member-States of the European
Union proposed and the delegates of the G-77 agreed to the insertion of
the latter two sections in the Programme of Action in 1995, as well as a
sentence on youth and human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
United Nations Declaration of Intent on Youth: Problems and Potentials
which serves as a preamble to the Programme of Action.
During the Cold War, and in particular since 1985, the United
Nations International Youth Year, the topic of youth rights and
responsibilities was often used as an ideological football between West and
East blocs in international negotiations. Every time a county of the East
(often led by Romania) proposed action on this topic, many Western
countries resisted new international instruments on youth rights, preferring
operational activities to enhance youth participation in development
projects as a concrete expression of such youth rights. Yet, even during
that period, it was often countries in the developing regions of the South
that proposed international action in this field. In that regard, it should be
recalled that representatives of Costa Rica (a nation which became
Chairman of the G-77 at United Nations Headquarters, New York in
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January, 1996), Guinea, Indonesia, Lebanon, Romania, and Rwanda
submitted in 1982 a draft declaration on the rights and responsibilities of
youth to the Advisory Committee for International Youth Year. That
document was distributed to Member-States of the United Nations for
comments. Of the seventeen States that replied, five agreed. The
Governments of Rwanda and Pakistan expressed general support of the
draft declaration, and the Government of Thailand supported, in particular,
the provisions of the draft declaration that did not appear in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Rights of the
Child. The Government of France, while noting that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights already covered the substance of the matter,
nevertheless recognized the necessity of having an instrument that would
adapt the Universal Declaration to the specific case of youth. It expressed
the view, however that the draft declaration was not satisfactory as it
stood, and indicated that, at an appropriate time, it would propose a
revised or a new text
Unfortunately, most of the other states of the North were not
supportive, and the idea of a declaration on the rights and responsibilities
of youth was shelved. However, again from the South, the idea was
further discussed: the United Nations Economic and Social Commission
for Western Asia Preparatory Meeting for International Youth Year in
Baghdad, Iraq on October 13, 1983, adopted a regional plan for youth
which concluded with a call to the United Nations to take the necessary
measure to expedite the issuance of the International Declaration of the
Rights of Youth before the advent of the International Youth Year. While
there was subsequent action taken by the General Assembly on the topic of
youth at the international level on, there has been no specific instrument
adopted by the General Assembly on this issue. In retrospect (1985-1995),
that draft declaration remains the only comprehensive instrument
specifically devoted to th6 rights and responsibilities of youth, and it is
interesting to note that most of the co-sponsors and supporters of the idea
ten years ago were states of the South!
However, in 1985, International Youth Year, the issue of youth
rights and responsibilities took on added importance. For, in 1985, the
Commission on Human Rights requested its Sub-Commission to pay due
attention to the role of youth in the field of human rights, and the
Sub-Commission, the same year, requested Mr. Dimitru Mazilu, one of its
members and a Romanian national, to prepare a report analyzing the
efforts and measures for securing the implementation and enjoyment by
youth of human rights, particularly, the right to life, education, and work,
and requested the Secretary General to provide him with all necessary
assistance for the completion of his task. This report was to be submitted
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to the Sub-Commission in 1986. Mr. Mazilu had been nominated by
Romania to serve as a member of the Sub-Commission for a three-year
term, due to expire on December 31, 1986. But, in his new role, as an
official of the United Nations (a special rapporteur), he was entitled to
continue his task in 1986. However, the Sub-Commission did not meet in
1986, but in 1987. No report was received from Mr. Mazilu, nor was he
present. The Government of Romania sent a letter to the United Nations
with information that that Mr. Mazilu suffered a heart attack and could not
attend that session. In reality, Mr. Mazilu had been under house arrest in
Romania because he had insisted to include in his report a section about
the violation of youth rights in Eastern Europe. The Government thought
it best to place him under house arrest, but to insist that it was a health
matter. Yet, the United Nations received two post marked letters from
him in 1987 stating that he was able and willing to come to Geneva and
deliver his report. The Commission on Human Rights, through the
Economic and Social Council, requested an advisory opinion from the
International Court of Justice in The Hague on this case of the United
Nations vs. the Government of Romania. In brief, the legal issue was
whether a special rapporteur of the United Nations enjoyed privileges and
immunities under the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations. The Court ruled on December 15, 1989, in favour of the
United Nations and against Romania - insisting on the applicability of this
Convention in the case of Mr.Mazilu as a special rapporteur of the
Sub-Commission. Mr Mazilu returned to Geneva in 1990, and submitted
two reports (in 1990 and 1992) to the Sub-Commission.
At the forty-eighth session of the United Nations Commission for
Human Rights in 1992, the representative of the Netherlands introduced a
draft amendment to draft resolution V, sponsored by Austria, France, the
Netherlands, and Portugal, which consisted in replacing, by a new
paragraph, operative paragraph four which read: "Invites Mr. Mazilu to
consult governmental and non-governmental organizations in order to
elaborate further and to complete his work on the draft charter of the rights
and freedoms of youth throughout the world, with a view to submitting the
final version to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination of
Minorities, at its forty-fourth session, for its consideration of follow-up to
this draft charter." The Commission adopted that amendment, without a
vote, and adopted resolution 1992/49 Human Rights and Youth, as
amended on March 3, 1992. Unfortunately, and by some strange
coincidence, neither that resolution nor the one subsequently adopted by
the ECOSOC made reference that amendment concerning a charter on the
rights and freedoms of youth. Yet, Mr. Mazilu submitted his final report
to the Sub-Commission in August, 1992, and included a final chapter
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entitled Charter on the Rights and Freedoms of Youth. However, it
contained only general remarks on the topic, but no draft international
instrument on youth rights as first proposed in 1982 by several states from
the South. His report was discussed and eventually shelved. The issue of
youth rights was taken off the agenda of the Sub-Commission after nearly
twenty-five years being a separate item of debate.
This case revealed several important points: 1) the controversial
nature of the matter for Communist countries in Eastern Europe, and in
several developing countries in the South, 2) the unwillingness of the
majority of other countries (many in the North) to defend the rights of
youth on a global basis - at least in such a way (via a special rapporteur).
Declarations or resolutions on paper were one matter, but an investigative
United Nations rapporteur on human rights and youth was simply too
much for many countries in 1992. Indeed, the majority did not even
favour a general declaration or charter on the rights and freedoms of
youth. Now that the Cold War has ended, perhaps its time to take a fresh
look at this question, and propose renewed action.
III. CURRENT PROBLEMS REGARDING NORTH-SOUTH NEGOTIATIONS
ON YOUTH RIGHTS
There are several basic problems confronting current negotiations:
1) legal confusion regarding the definitions of children and youth;
2) an anti-youth lobby which often uses the argument of the age of
majority as a dividing line between children and adults - thereby
subsuming the concept of youth;
3) the proliferation and fragmentation of international instruments and
standards on youth and the consequent multiple reporting
requirements for Governments;
4) the concept of parental rights vs. youth rights on the issue of
reproductive health needs of adolescents; and
5) continued violations of youth rights around the world - in legal,
political, economic, and socio-cultural ways in both the North and
South.
The General Assembly of the United Nations agreed to the
following definition of youth in 1985 for International Youth Year: a
chronological definition of who is young, as compared with who is a child
or who is an adult, varies with nation and culture. However, for statistical
purposes, the United Nations defines those persons between the ages of
fifteen to twenty-four years of age as youth, without prejudice to other
definitions by Member-States. Yet, when the Convention on the Rights of
the Child was adopted by the General Assembly in 1989, it defined the
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child in Article I as a child means every human being below the age of
eighteen, unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is obtained
earlier. The definition of youth age at fifteen to twenty-four and indeed as
the concept of that age group seemed to get lost in the process.
Yet, young people gradually assume increasing responsibilities
well before the age of majority in many countries (age eighteen). Since
youth are obviously more independent than children, they are likely to face
legal problems when trying to make their way in life. This problem can be
seen in such issues as parental authority, schooling obligations, adolescent
health entitlements, employment rights, unemployment benefits, status in
law, military service, management of property, etc. However, for
political reasons, young people are deprived of such legal protection,
including guaranteed freedoms of association and assembly, as well as
specific opportunities to participate in national development efforts,
particularly in the developing countries. While 141 countries (seventy-
seven percent of the total 185) reported to the United Nations in 1995 of
having formulated national youth policies, only fifty-four (twenty-eight
percent) indicated they had implemented a national youth service or
programme of action involving youth in national development. National
action is certainly required to implement international standards on youth
rights and responsibilities.
Thus, it is no accident that at the international level, there are
conventions to protect the rights of women, children, families, migrant
workers, and refugees, etc., and a special rapporteur to protect the rights
of disabled persons, but no convention or charter of a general nature to
promote and protect the rights of youth (legal, political, economic, and
socio-cultural). There are, on the other hand, many diverse international
standards and instruments on specific rights and responsibilities of youth
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, International Labour
Conference, UNESCO General Conference, World Health Assembly, etc.,
but no international instrument of a cross-sectoral nature on youth rights.
This has led to multiple reporting requirements for governments and a
fragmentation of international standards on youth rights.
There has also been continued confusion and disagreements in
recent North-South negotiations on the question of the reproductive health
needs of adolescents. That was perhaps the biggest controversy at the
International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) at Cairo,
September 5-13, 1994. Delegates of the Holy See and G-77 argued
successfully to maintain the words in paragraph 7.45 "recognizing the
rights, duties, and responsibilities of parents and other persons legally
responsible for adolescents to provide, in a manner consistent with the
evolving capacities of adolescents, appropriate direction and guidance in
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sexual and reproductive health." For many of the delegates from the
North (where sex education classes are permitted in schools and abortion
rights for young girls without parental consent exist) such words on the
rights of parents were against national legislation in a number of countries.
Further, in both the negotiations between delegates from the North and
South on the Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action and on the United
Nations Declaration and Programme of Action for Youth to the Year 2000
and Beyond, the same issue resurfaced, but with different results: In
Beijing, the term parents' rights was again used in paragraphs 95-118
regarding the rights of young people "to acquire knowledge about their
health, especially information on sexual and reproductive health issues,
and on sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS, taking into
account the rights of the child and responsibilities of parents."
However, in the North-South negotiations in 1995, on the Draft
United Nations World Programme of Action for Youth to the Year 2000
and Beyond, agreement was reached on the section on youth and
promotion of health services, including sexual and reproductive health
using language which did not refer to the issues of either the rights or
responsibilities of parents in that regard. The agreement was achieved for
many reasons, among them was the definition of youth as persons aged
fifteen to twenty-four was approved in paragraph nine of the Programme
of Action. Thus, while it was believed acceptable to refer to such parental
rights and responsibilities in the ICPD Programme of Action regarding
legal responsibility for adolescents, and while it was again cited in the
Beijing Platform of Action regarding the specific needs of adolescents, it
was not mentioned in the corresponding section of the World Programme
of Action for Youth because the youth age group extended well beyond the
normal age of majority in many countries and beyond the legal
responsibility or control of parents. This represented a major advance in
both the definition of youth and its rights and responsibilities.
Finally, despite the lip service of governments in both the North
and South to youth rights and responsibilities, there has continued to be
blatant violations of those rights and responsibilities. For example, in
terms of the economic rights of youth, unemployment rates for youth (aged
fifteen-twenty-four) in the North are very high. In 1992, Canada (which
ranked first in a UNDP human development index list) had a youth
unemployment rate of 17.8 percent, Australia 19.5 percent, Finland 23.5
percent, Ireland 19.5 percent, Spain 34.4 percent, and Italy 32.7 percent.
While criticism is often aimed at governments in the South for violations of
the rights of youth (especially freedom of association, speech, movement,
participation, etc.), the topic of youth unemployment is a major problem
around the world in both the North and the South. The International
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Labour Organization (ILO) has recently reported that comparable
unemployment rates in 1994 for Indonesia were: 13.7 percent young
women and 11.9 percent young men as compared to 2.2 percent and 1.6
percent for their adult counterparts. And .ILO cited similar problems in the
countries in transition in Eastern Europe (ie. Poland: 34.5 percent young
women and 27.3 percent young men as compared to 14.5 percent and 11.3
percent for their adult counterparts). More than legal standards are needed
for such youth in poverty. Obviously, action is needed to better link
educational programmes to training, apprenticeships and jobs. National
youth service programmes can be an excellent way to mobilize such
people, resources, and action. Yet, only fifty-four of 185 Member-States
of the United Nations (twenty-nine percent) have indicated that such
programmes have been launched.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE
A number of Governments as well as non-governmental youth
organizations have called for a United Nations Charter of Youth Rights
and Responsibilities, as well as a special rapporteur and a network of
national youth correspondents to monitor such a charter. The idea was
proposed by the First United Nations World Youth Assembly in 1970 at
United Nations Headquarters, New York, in honour of the twenty-fifth
anniversary of the United Nations Charter. It was again recommended by
the World Youth Forum of the United Nations System at its first session in
1991 at Vienna, Austria, and by youth delegates to the United Nations
General Assembly in 1992 and 1995, and to the United Nations World
Conference on Human Rights at Vienna in 1993. Despite the fact that the
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Youth of the Sub-Commission
described such a Charter in his final report in 1992, the only draft text of
such an instrument was prepared by the Governments of Costa Rica,
Guinea, Indonesia, Romania, and Rwanda in 1982. At the European level,
a Youth Rights Charter was drafted by the Youth Forum of the European
Union in 1992 to serve as a model for legislation it sought to be adopted
by the European Parliament. The 1982 text had only general principles in
eight draft articles, while the 1992 text had specific rights set forth in
thirty-six draft articles. The former illustrates the concerns of
governments, while the latter reflects the needs of youth. There should be
a renewed effort to bring such representatives together to update and
complete such a draft at the United Nations. However, such work was last
discussed at the Commission for Human Rights in 1992 and shelved by the
ECOSOC. Perhaps the time has come for an initiative to take the matter
off the shelf.
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Previous attempts to elaborate such a charter at the United Nations
failed primarily because there was:
a) insufficient research undertaken and time spent investigating the needs
for and content of such a charter;
b) the evidence of an international law of youth rights was not clearly
articulated;
c) the multiple reporting requirements of governments on existing
international instruments and standards were not exposed;
d) the political will of most Member-States of the United Nations was not
adequate for adopting such an instrument during the Cold War; and
e) the existence of such international instruments as the Convention on the
Rights of the Child seem to bury, confuse, and or subordinate the
issue of youth rights to those of the child.
The time would seem appropriate for further work and adoption of this
charter by the United nations General Assembly through the commission
for Human Rights. The drafts of both 1982 and 1992 should be reviewed
and used as models. The outline for such a charter could include sections
on: the definition of youth (with references to past definitions of children,
adolescents, and juveniles); the specific groups of youth (urban youth,
rural youth, students, trade union youth, young women, disabled youth,
refugee youth, etc.); cross-sectoral rights of youth (participation,
development, and peace); sectoral rights of youth (education, health,
employment, etc.); responsibilities of youth (self, family, society, etc.);
and monitoring the Charter (national youth correspondents designated by
national youth non-governmental organizations, role of United Nations
regional commissions, and a Special Rapporteur on Youth Rights
appointed by the Secretary-General and assisted by an advisory group of
representatives of youth NGOs in consultative status with the United
Nations and of youth-serving agencies and organizations of the United
Nations system). Such a system was set up by the General Assembly to
monitor the implementation of the United Nations Standard Rules for the
Equalization of Opportunities for Disabled Persons. The second session of
the World Youth Forum of the United Nations System, November 25-29
November 1996 at Vienna, Austria, adopted recommendations for such a
United Nations Youth Rights Charter and Special Rapporteur on Youth
Rights. There would seem to be a unique opportunity for such an initiative
to improve the global promotion and protection of the rights and
responsibilities of youth. These are some important measures which could
be taken to strengthen the development of the jurisprudence and
implementation of the international law of youth rights and to better clarify
some problems associated with the international law of the rights of the
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child which have tended to confuse the rights and responsibilities of these
two age groups.
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During three months in 1994, genocide was committed in Rwanda.
Two years after those events, and notwithstanding efforts at both national
and international levels to bring the perpetrators to justice, the first case
has yet to go to trial. Over the past months, I have worked closely with
the government of Rwanda on justice issues in the course of a research
project that I am doing on the role of national and international tribunals in
the former Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, and Rwanda. I would like to share with
you some observations arising from that work. I will examine the
approaches to justice that have been employed in Rwanda, and consider
some of the obstacles that have been confronted despite, or, in some
instances, because of, the approaches taken. I will first discuss the
recently enacted Rwandan legislation on the handling of genocide-related
cases, and then examine the interaction of national and international
tribunals as they exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the Rwandan context.
I will conclude by briefly considering some of the broader implications of
the Rwandan experience.
I. JUSTICE IN THE WAKE OF GENOCIDE
Rwanda was largely destroyed in the spring of 1994. About ten
percent of the population was massacred. Another twenty-five percent of
the population fled the country. The physical infrastructure of the country
was substantially damaged, and the treasury was looted.
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Along with the overall destruction of Rwanda in the spring of 1994
came the devastation of Rwanda's judicial structures. The great majority
of judicial and law enforcement personnel were killed or fled the country.
Even the basic materials needed to run a legal system - books, vehicles,
even paper - were essentially unavailable. And if there was a vehicle
available, then there was no gasoline. It was in this context that Rwanda
confronted the question of how to pursue justice in the wake of genocide.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
In September of 1994, the new government of Rwanda requested
that the United Nations establish an International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR). As negotiations over the terms for establishment of an
ICTR proceeded, however, Rwanda objected to a number of provisions.
The objections related to the absence of a death penalty in the ICTR
Statute, that the seat of the ICTR would be outside of Rwanda, and a
number of other issues. By strange coincidence, Rwanda held a seat on
the United Nations Security Council [hereinafter Security Council] at that
time. Ironically, because of its objections to the ICTR Statute, Rwanda
cast the sole vote opposing adoption of the Security Council resolution
establishing the ICTR.
Nevertheless, the ICTR was established; and Rwanda ultimately
expressed its intention to cooperate with its work. Now, two years after
its establishment, the ICTR, barring further delays, will begin its first trial
in several weeks.'
But the ICTR is not expected by any means to address the bulk of
Rwanda's staggering volume of genocide-related cases. Rwanda's prison
population has grown to over 80,000 virtually all awaiting prosecution for
genocide-related crimes. The equivalent proportion of the American
population would amount to 3,000,000 prisoners. The caseload of the
ICTR is expected to be in the hundreds at most.
III. NATIONAL JUSTICE
So Rwanda is faced with the enormous problem of how to handle
the other 80,000 plus criminal cases arising from the genocide.
Specialized legislation to facilitate handling of those cases was drafted over
the course of the past several months and was enacted this past September
1st.
Drafting that legislation required finding a path through an array of
profoundly problematic options. The Rwandan criminal justice system had
1. The text of this speech was delivered on Nov. 1, 1996.
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never been equipped to handle a large volume of cases, and it had been
entirely disabled during the violence. It tried zero cases in 1995. That
was the justice system that had to manage, in some way, to handle 80,000
serious criminal cases (mostly murders). The defendants in those cases
were already in prison, having been arrested by soldiers of the rebel army
that halted the genocide. So even just doing nothing was not an option.
This criminal justice crisis had to be met with almost no resources, barely
any trained personnel and, even worse, in a highly volatile political
environment.
The specialized criminal justice program laid out in the law that
was passed to respond to this situation is quite simple. Suspects will be
classified into four categories according to their degrees of culpability.
The most culpable category will include leaders and organizers of the
genocide and perpetrators of particularly heinous murders or sexual
torture. All others who committed homicides will come within category
Two. Category Three will include perpetrators of grave assaults against
the person not resulting in death. And those who committed property
crimes in connection with the genocide will fall into category Four.
This specialized criminal justice program will rely heavily on a
system of plea agreements. All perpetrators other than those in category
One will be entitled to receive a reduced sentence as part of a guilty-plea
agreement. Specifically, a pre-set, fixed reduction in the penalty that
would otherwise be imposed is available to all non-category One
perpetrators in return for an accurate and complete confession, a plea of
guilty to the crimes committed, and an apology to the victims. A greater
penalty reduction is made available to perpetrators who confess and plead
guilty prior to prosecution than to perpetrators who come forward only
after prosecution has begun.
The requirement of a detailed confession was thought to be
important for purposes of establishing a truthful historical record of the
Rwandan genocide; for purposes of allowing for meaningful verification of
the accuracy of the confession; and for purposes of assisting in
prosecutors' continuing investigations and prosecutions of other cases.
The additional requirement that a perpetrator make an apology to the
victims is intended to contribute to the process of national healing. While
it is true that defendants will have an ulterior motive for making these
apologies to obtain reduced sentences, the apologies nevertheless are
thought to represent at least some acknowledgment of wrongdoing, which
in the aggregate, may contribute to reconciliation.
This specialized criminal justice program represents a complex
compromise. While regular criminal prosecution of every suspected
perpetrator might in many respects have been most desirable, the resources
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demanded by such an approach would quickly overwhelm national
capacities. Therefore, a decision has been made in Rwanda to establish a
program which, it is hoped, will accomplish the crucial purposes of
criminal justice while also respecting resource limitations.
An approach such as that adopted in Rwanda offers the benefit of
expediency in the handling of an enormous volume of cases and may make
some contribution to national reconciliation. At the same time, there is
reason for concern about the potential for miscarriage of justice under such
a system. Factually innocent suspects may choose to plead guilty for fear
of a worse outcome at trial or to avoid extensive delays before trial. These
concerns are exacerbated by the fact that no provision has been made for
any form of defense counsel for the many indigent defendants in Rwanda
(though a program for training lay defense counsel as counterparts to the
lay prosecutors in Rwanda is currently under consideration). Moreover,
and on the other side of the equation, survivors and others rightly ask why
perpetrators of these horrific crimes should receive leniency, especially
when an "ordinary criminal" who committed a murder in Rwanda
tomorrow would not receive the same benefit.
The question to ask in evaluating legal responses in the complex
situations surrounding crimes of mass violence is: What action will do the
most good and the least harm under the circumstances? Full trial of
80,000 defendants, more than one percent of the national population,
would be infeasible in even the wealthiest nation and is emphatically not an
option in Rwanda. The alternative at the other extreme, releasing
prisoners en masse under an explicit or implicit grant of amnesty, would
perpetuate a culture of impunity in a country with a long history of inter-
ethnic violence, would be unacceptable to the survivor population, and
would constitute a heightened risk to security, both of the regime and of
the individuals released. The value of the system adopted in Rwanda will
depend in the end both on the soundness of the design itself and on the
quality of its implementation which will unfold in the coming months.
IV. THE TRIALS OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
The administration of justice in post-genocide Rwanda is rendered
uniquely complex by the fact that concurrent jurisdiction for the genocide-
related crimes is actively exercised by two different entities: the
government of Rwanda and the ICTR. This concurrent jurisdiction has
exposed difficult issues which are likely to recur in future contexts.
Concurrent jurisdiction raises complex questions regarding
cooperation in investigations and the sharing of evidence. Obvious
advantages are to be gained by close national and international cooperation
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in investigations and evidence-gathering. But difficulties concerning
confidentiality of evidence, witness protection, due process standards, and
the need to avoid any appearance of partiality of the international tribunal
raise delicate questions which have yet to be systematically addressed.
Discussion of these matters has been ongoing between the ICTR and the
government of Rwanda. But the issues, for the most part, remain largely
open.
An area which has been of particular concern in the exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction is the distribution of defendants between the
national and international fora. This issue has been the cause of
uncertainty, and, at times, of tension between national governments and
the ICTR. On more than one occasion, the ICTR and the government of
Rwanda have sought to obtain custody of the same suspect. In one case,
not only the ICTR and the Rwandan government, but also the Belgian
government were attempting to gain custody of the same suspects who
were being held in Cameroon. As an aside, I should also note that, while
many speculated that these conflicts over custody were really illusory
because no country would be willing to transfer a suspect to Rwanda, that
speculation has proven false. At least one defendant has already been
transferred to Rwanda by Ethiopia, and other countries have expressed a
willingness in principle to do the same.
The tensions between the government of Rwanda and the ICTR
over distribution of defendants have resulted, in part, from a lack of
communication over time and perhaps in part from a more fundamental
conflict of interests or, at least, of agendas. When the ICTR was
established, the Rwandan government had not yet decided upon an
approach to national prosecutions. The approach ultimately adopted was
one that relies heavily on plea agreements, as I have discussed. That plea-
agreement program turned out to be somewhat incompatible with the
operation of an international tribunal that views its mandate as prosecuting
the top-level leaders of the genocide.
The reasons for this incompatibility are easy to understand. The
leniency in sentencing that goes with plea agreements can easily create a
perception that impunity has prevailed - unless at least the leaders are
fully prosecuted and punished. If, however, the leaders are taken to an
international tribunal, and there receive more favorable treatment than they
would in the national courts, then this leaves a gap in the national justice
picture. This more favorable treatment enjoyed by defendants at the
international tribunal includes escaping the death penalty (which may be
imposed by Rwandan courts, but not by the ICTR); likely being
imprisoned in more favorable conditions than those in Rwandan prisons;
and being guaranteed various due process safeguards including appointed
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defense counsel, among other factors. So, then, if the leaders are away
receiving international justice which is perceived as lenient, and the
followers are at home getting bargains in the national justice system, then
no one is punished fully and severely, relative to national standards, for
the horrors that were committed. A perception may thus be created,
especially among the survivor population, that the plea-agreement program
is really a program of impunity. So you can see why trying at least some
category One defendants is so important to Rwanda.
This problem became apparent over time. After the ICTR had
been in place for many months, and when ICTR personnel thought that the
Tribunal was finally showing results and deserved to be congratulated, the
Tribunal, instead, was reaping the wrath of the Rwandans each time it
pursued a leader to be prosecuted. ICTR personnel and supporters found
this wrath especially difficult to accept since Rwanda had not managed
actually to begin any trials, of leaders or otherwise. The Rwandans, in
reply, noted that the ICTR had been no swifter, and had so far also tried
no one. This friction was caused at least in part by the fact that the parties
had not communicated regarding policies to govern the distribution of
defendants in light of the national justice program as it evolved.
On the authority of the Security Council Resolution that brought
the ICTR into being, the ICTR enjoys primacy of jurisdiction. This means
that, where the ICTR and a national body each have a legal basis for
jurisdiction over a given case, the ICTR is entitled, but not obliged, to
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the national body (a defendant
cannot be tried by both). But the criteria to be employed in deciding
whether to exercise jurisdiction in any particular case have yet to be
articulated by the ICTR. Conflicts over exercise of jurisdiction that have
arisen have been resolved on an ad hoc basis.
A more satisfactory basis for consistent decision making regarding
the distribution of defendants will have to rest upon a careful analysis of
the purposes of the ICTR and of its concurrent jurisdiction with national
courts. This analytic process still remains to be completed.
Identifying the appropriate criteria for distribution of defendants
between national and international fora is tricky within any one context.
The issues are further complicated when one recognizes the need to
articulate underlying principles and guidelines that will serve across
contexts - in Bosnia or in Croatia as well as in Rwanda, and very likely,
in future instances as well.
In anticipation of such future instances, a statute for a permanent
International Criminal Court is currently under consideration by the United
Nations. That draft statute to some extent averts potential conflicts over
defendants by giving deference to national-level prosecutions under most
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circumstances. But those provisions giving deference to national
jurisdictions would not apply where the international criminal court's
jurisdiction had been invoked by the Security Council, as can occur under
the draft statute. In such instances, the same difficulties regarding
distribution of defendants as have arisen in Rwanda would be likely to
recur.
Further, the draft statute for a permanent International Criminal
Court does not directly address whether an international court's role is
especially tied to trying leadership-level defendants. Article 35(c) of that
draft statute provides that the International Criminal Court may decide
"that a case before it is inadmissible on the ground that the crime in
question . . is not of such gravity to justify further action by the Court."
One might imagine that such a provision, if adopted, would form the basis
for an admissibility challenge by a defendant, such as Dusko Tadic, the
defendant currently being tried at the Hague, who was not in a leadership
position in the overall criminal enterprise. Such a challenge would be
based on the proposition that gravity includes within its meaning the notion
of leadership or other special responsibility. The claim, in other words,
would be that it is not the role of an international court to try small fry, as
President Cassesse of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals recently
implied.
Not only those issues concerning distribution of defendants, but
also the dilemmas that arise more generally from concurrent jurisdiction
are starkly posed in the context of Rwanda. But Rwanda is unlikely to
remain unique in this respect. The same problems predictably will arise in
future contexts where concurrent jurisdiction is actively exercised. Many
of these issues are currently under debate by the United Nations
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court. The broad range of issues concerning the interaction of national
and international jurisdictions forms the basis for ongoing debates on
complementarity between national criminal jurisdictions and a permanent
international criminal court.
A threshold requirement for greater coherence in the interaction of
national and international jurisdictions is a clear articulation, in each case
in which an international tribunal is to be convened, of the needs which
that particular tribunal is intended to meet. The needs that are likely to be
present in greater or lesser degree, singly or in combination include:
responding to an overwhelmed national justice system; substituting for a
national system in which the fact or appearance of bias would substantially
undermine justice processes; substituting for a national justice system
where the national system would be unable to obtain custody of suspects,
and expressing, through the exercise of international jurisdiction, a
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universal condemnation of some special feature of the crimes in question
such as the special international responsibility of certain perpetrators. So,
the purposes for an international tribunal will not be identical across
contexts.
Two important benefits can be gained by articulating in each
context the particular needs to be met by convening that international
tribunal. First, such an articulation will permit confirmation of whether an
international tribunal will best serve the goals sought in that particular
context. For instance, if the purpose is to respond to a situation where the
national justice system is overwhelmed, then we can analyze whether it is
best to provide an international tribunal or to provide assistance to the
national system, or some combination of the two. Second, having
reference to clearly articulated purposes for convening an international
tribunal will allow the operation of that particular tribunal, and especially
its interaction with national jurisdictions, to be appropriately tailored to
those goals. For example, if the purpose is to substitute for national courts
where they cannot obtain custody, then arguably, that international tribunal
should defer to the national justice system if that national system can gain
custody in a particular case. By contrast, if the purpose is to express
universal condemnation of certain crimes, then that international tribunal
may wish to exercise jurisdiction even where the national court could gain
custody. In that sort of instance, a very careful analysis would be required
of how the international interest in universal condemnation should be
weighed against the national (and international) interest in successful
operation of the national justice system if the two should conflict. In sum,
it will be essential to the fruitful operation of an international court that its
purposes are clearly articulated in each instance and that its operations are
appropriately tailored to those purposes in each case.
V. THE FUTURE IN RWANDA AND BEYOND
In Rwanda, the performance of the national justice system and that
of the ICTR remain to be seen. Two years after the massacres and yet
before the first trial in either jurisdiction, it is clear that the best form of
justice that the ICTR or the national courts will be able to render will be
justice delayed. The slow progress of justice in Rwanda points to needs
for protocols for prompt international assistance to national justice
systems; for permanent bodies, such as an International Criminal Court,
that can be put readily into service when warranted; and for clear
articulation of the purposes of each international tribunal in order that both
national and international jurisdictions may be as effective as possible in
responding to crimes of mass violence.
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PANEL DISCUSSION ON INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES: PROBLEMS OF
ENFORCEABLE NORMS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Myron H. Nordquist *
This panel's scope of discussion covers norms as well as
compliance regarding international environmental crimes during both times
of peace and armed conflict. This is a huge subject, as indicated by the
comments of my colleagues, which was largely directed to the past and
current state of international law for environmental crimes. The task
assigned to me on this panel is to focus more on the future. The views that
follow are presented in a personal capacity. I am not an official
spokesman for the United States government, although I work for it.
Bearing in mind that seventy percent of the earth's surface is
covered by salt water, it is appropriate to begin by noting that many
principles and rules to protect the international marine environment in
peacetime are found in the Third United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea. Articles 213 through 222 deal specifically with enforcement
related to marine pollution violations from land-based sources, the seabed,
the atmosphere, dumping and the like. Criminal violations of rules based
on the Convention's norms may trigger criminal responsibility and
enforcement is carried out under domestic law based on nationality, flag
state, or territorial jurisdiction. Detailed regulations for commercial vessel
operators are developed through the International Maritime Organization
where work is underway on many complex marine environment issues.
Environmental crimes committed by commercial vessel operators in the
world's oceans are typically enforced through the flag state. There are
instances, however, where the coastal-state enforcement jurisdiction is
based on its control over fisheries, petroleum, or by conditioning the entry
of vessels into its ports. This latter nexus is particularly effective for
enforcing vessel standards intended to protect the marine environment. A
recent regional agreement on straddling stocks and tunas, nudging
enforcement against third-state vessels for overfishing on the high seas
beyond the 200 mile exclusive economic zone, is a modest step beyond
traditional law. The underlying jurisdictional innovation follows from the
customary law obligation, which is embodied in the 1982 Law of the Sea
* Department of Law, United States Air Force Academy.
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Convention, and by which the flag states ensure that their vessels fishing
on the high seas do not undermine the effectiveness of regionally agreed
rules, whether or not the flag state is a party to the relevant regional
agreement. If overfishing on the high seas proper is an international
environmental crime, and it certainly can be, we may conclude that
criminal enforcement to ensure better accountability is improved in this
limited, but important area of international law. The principle reflected in
this jurisdictional innovation may even contain the seeds for discovering
more effective enforcement of environmental rules in non-high seas areas.
Unfortunately, the bad news is that the United States is only one of three
parties to the new agreement on straddling stocks and highly migratory
species. The good news is that the world's largest high-seas fishing
nation, the Peoples Republic of China, plans to sign the Convention in the
near future.
Turning from the sea to the air in peacetime, we can expect any
pertinent law with respect to civil aircraft involved with international
environmental law and with respect to civil aircraft involved with
international environmental crimes to be developed in the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The conventional rules governing
this area are largely found in the Tokyo, the Hague, and Montreal
Conventions. These Conventions, along with customary international law,
provide what can only be fairly described as a rudimentary system of
sanctions for civil aviation crimes during peacetime. The imperfect
enforcement regime for civil aviation crimes in general, has been
dramatically demonstrated in terrorism cases. Compliance on safety
matters, on the other hand, is excellent, being based on well-defined and
widely recognized international law rules.
At this juncture it is worth recalling that both warships and
military aircraft enjoy sovereign immunity. This fundamental precept of
international law is reflected both in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
and in the various ICAO conventions.
Conventional and customary international law norms governing
environment crimes during peacetime on land territory occur within the
jurisdiction of sovereign states. Accordingly, they are only effectively
enforced when these international norms are incorporated into the domestic
authorities who base their actions on the classic jurisdiction exercised by a
sovereign state over its territory or nationals. This is by far the most
significant and pervasive interface between international environmental
norms and their enforcement. To the extent that deficiencies exist in
states' agreeing on legal norms that are equivalent to international
environmental crimes, and in taking effective criminal enforcement in their
sovereign territory during peacetime, suggestions for corrections are
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properly addressed to generating greater political will by sovereign states.
And to misuse a line from Mark Twain to make a point, the reports
announcing the death of state sovereignty are greatly exaggerated.
In reviewing the international normative rules pertaining to
environmental crimes, a curious pattern emerged. It became evident that
there seemed to be greater agreement among states and experts about the
general principles that apply during hostilities than during peacetime. At
the same time, the contrary appears with respect to the enforcement regime
for environmental criminal violations: enforcement seems to be more
effective in peacetime than during armed conflict. This state of affairs
may explain why the text of a statute for an International Criminal Court
due to be finalized in 1998 by a United Nations preparatory Committee is
expected to be limited to core crimes. Genocide will then be whether the
international environmental crime at issue is a war crime. In addition,
expectations are that enforcement of the Court's judgments will depend
upon cooperation from national courts.I
With the foregoing observations in mind, let us focus on possible
improvements in the legal regime governing international environmental
crimes during armed conflict. The comments which follow concentrate on
both normative standards and on enforcement mechanisms.
A sensible beginning point is to ask whether there is sufficient law
concerning international environmental crimes during hostilities and follow
on with a discussion about enforcement. My fellow panelists have
addressed that question by citing an impressive array of conventional and
customary law rules and principles that proscribe international criminal
conduct against the environment during armed conflict. A similar detailing
of existing international law on this subject is contained in joint
memorandum prepared by Jordan and the United States for the United
Nations'General Assembly in 1993.2 It appears that the prevailing expert
opinion is to answer the question about the adequacy of substantive law in
the affirmative. Support for this view was borne out when the General
Assembly urged compliance with the international rules spelled out in the
memorandum and endorsed their incorporation into the military manuals of
members.
To facilitate common understanding of the norms and their
practical implementation, the International Committee of the Red Cross
1. See AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. NEWSL., Sept.-Oct. 1996, 16.
2. Joint Memorandum prepared by Jordan and the United States, U.N.G.A. Doc.
A/C.6/47/3/ Annex (1992).
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even drafted guidelines for military manuals and instructions on the
protection of the environment during armed conflict.3
The United States position, that is supported by other responsible
governments and many leading experts, is that the substantive law on
international environmental crimes is adequate for now. A leading expert
from the Office of Legal Adviser in the United States Department of State,
J. Ashley Roach, identifies nine specific customary law provisions
pertaining to the protection of the environment during armed conflict.4 He
cites articles 22, 23, and 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, articles 53,
55, and 147 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, and among other
customary law principles, military necessity, proportionality and humanity.
Note is made of articles 35 and 55 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949
Convention adopted in 1977 and a number of other possibly applicable
rules.
The idea is that international law rules are adequate and that the
international community ought to place its emphasis on the education of
military personnel and on the dissemination of existing legal obligations
under international law. From this policy perspective, the real problem is
seen not as a lack of norms, but rather as a lack of enforcement for
environment crimes committed during armed hostilities.
Pertinent questions raised by this approach are how much effort
states ought to expend on promoting international enforcement to protect
the environment, and more importantly, how much effort they will exert?
The painful comparison that immediately comes to mind is that
international enforcement to prosecute individuals indicted for murdering
groups of humans in mass killings is woefully lacking. Protracted
philosophical debates about the relative weight to be accorded
anthropocentric or inherent values regarding the environment have their
place. But the outcome on that issue does not resolve the practical
question of how much limited political capital a nation should use on trying
to improve enforcement for international environmental crimes, whatever
the underlying value. Only die-hard inherent value fans would quibble
with the observation that crimes against the environment per se involve
less direct and immediate human suffering and loss of life than do the
crimes of genocide or democide. Abstract arguments, even when true,
that humanity will perish if it neglects the environment fade in value
intensity when compared with the evil slaughter of innocent people now.
Governments must prioritize their foreign policy goals and make choices
3. Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the Environment
durrring armed conflict, U.N. Doc. A/47/328, at 2-15, (1992).
4. The Laws of War and the Protection of the Environment, (1996).
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that husband their limited political capital. A political leader who pushes
for enforcement against murderers harder than for enforcement against
polluters is unlikely to be faulted. Stated plainly, if Saddam Hussein is not
brought to justice for murdering Kurdish badies, how much effort should
governments expend attempting to try him for crimes against the
environment? Is the international community likely to pursue indicting
him for killing plants when it does not indict him for killing thousands of
innocent humans? The attitude in the real world toward enforcement
priorities is illustrated in the current Bosnia conflict. So far, the leadership
in the North Atlantic Council lacks the political will to carry out a clear
legal obligation by its Member States to search for individuals known to be
in IFOR's area of operations and who are indicted by the international
criminal tribunal for grave war crimes. Even if international
environmental war criminals ought to be tried, is there any evidence that
they will be in the near future?
Despite the weight of the opinion cited above, I do not see the
problem as being limited to just enforcement. My judgment is that the
substantive law governing international environmental crimes is inadequate
for the post Cold War era. As one of the eminent authorities on war
crimes recently observed: "Governments have been exceedingly slow in
drafting law-of-war agreements, or even provisions, for protecting the
environment."- One basis for my skepticism stems from a lack of
confidence in the substantive norms themselves being adequate for
successful prosecution in an international criminal court where the
operative procedural presumption is that guilt must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt. As is well known, this is a high standard of proof. On
their face, the norms suffer from too often appearing as mere afterthoughts
scattered helter-skelter throughout conventions that were concluded before
modern outlooks arose that place an independent value on the
environment. In truth, many of the customary international law norms that
are cited by the experts as protections for the environment are, in reality,
protections against wanton destruction of non-combatant property. There
is quite a different legal concept that is motivated by markedly different
human values. In part due to these inadequacies, the meaning of key
definitions and textual terms regarding environmental crimes is often too
vague to meet the standards for criminal misconduct under either
substantive or procedural due process, as those concepts are generally
understood. Admittedly, the notion of due process itself is at an early
stage of development insofar as its use in an international criminal court
5. Howard S. Levie, War Crimes in the Persian Gulf, ST. LOUIS WARSAW
TRANSATLANTIC L.J., 167 (1996).
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trial is concerned. But this fact simply makes it all the more important that
vague and ambiguous standards not be advanced prematurely. Critics will
be looking for openings, especially when the victim is the environment,
rather than dead groups of human beings. Fundamental fairness also
dictates genuine concern for the rights of the accused. Minimum due
process in criminal trials of any nature requires establishing that the
accused understood the rules he allegedly breached. Promoting respect for
the rule of law in the world is not enhanced if vague rules are treated as if
they were clear cut and are only enforced by the victors after winning the
conflict.
Assuming, for the sake of reasoned debate, that progressive
codification of the law, that is, that a consolidation and more precise
reformulation of international criminal norms to protect the environment
were desired, how might it be done?
It is recognized that an attempt to clarify norms runs the risk of
opening a Pandora's Box. Respect for the rule of law in this area is not
advanced if a good faith effort to create a forum for discussion on this
issue is seized upon as a pretext for opponents of weapons of mass
destruction to concentrate their efforts to foist unacceptable rules on non-
consenting states. The mischief potential for overreaching by well
meaning, but sometimes over-zealous supporters of the environment is
well understood by experienced international negotiators. Suffice it to say,
it's bad enough for this area of international law that meaningful
international enforcement is lacking for acknowledged war crimes against
large groups of humans. Respect for law on a global scale will not be
enhanced and environmental protection goals not advanced by developing
a new set of criminal norms to protect the environment that will be notable
only for being universally ignored.
With the above caveats about the possibility of counterproductive
results in mind, I still believe that it is worthwhile to consider a
consolidation and clarification of the norms applicable to international
environmental crimes during armed conflict. Perhaps the day will come
when there will also be realistic grounds to expect better enforcement. If
it does arrive, this modest step would at least have the substantive law in a
better state of organization and international consensus than it is now.
Along these lines, one approach that may merit consideration is to ask the
International Law Commission to prepare a draft Protocol V to the 1980
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Step one should be to
condense the wordy title of this Convention.
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The Preamble to the Conventional Weapons Convention provides,
"it is prohibited to employ methods of warfare which are intended, or may
be expected, to cause wide spread, long term and severe damage to the
natural environment, reaffirming the need to continue the codification and
progressive development of the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict. "6
The Conventional Weapons Convention is thus seen as an umbrella
document that could provide the legal structure for a progressive
codification of the rules pertaining to international war crimes. This
proposition assumes that the terms of reference are strictly confined to a
good faith effort only to clarify existing international law. This must be
the limited mandate given to the International Law Convention. Use of the
Conventional Weapons Convention would provide no means for
enforcement beyond what states are already obligated to do as parties to an
international agreement. To the extent that codified norms reflecting
customary international law are embodied in the new Protocol V, then all
states are already obligated to abide by them. And for the customary law
rules to be true law, sovereign states must have manifested their
acceptance of the rules through state practice. The suggestion to consider
normative clarification and consolidation is therefore a modest one. It
ought not to be taken as a signal that enforcement will be improved by
creating a permanent, or even of an ad hoc, international judicial organ
specifically chartered to try environmental war crimes. The sole objective
of the new Protocol V would be to codify existing international law that
many government experts say is already clear enough.
Responsible governments and environmentalist activists ought to
share the objective of ensuring that there is little doubt about the existence
in international law of a common understanding of the applicable
substantive norms. Without that, convictions cannot be obtained beyond a
reasonable doubt. After all, it will be members of the armed forces of the
responsible governments who will actually try to obey the law. They
deserve better than to be left with any doubt about what is and is not an
international environmental crime. After there is no room for meaningful
disagreement between experts on what constitutes crimes against the
international environment in the normative sense, world leaders will be
better positioned to turn to the task of making enforcement take place in
good faith and in accordance with due process and respect for the rule of
law.
6. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons, Apr. 10, 1981, reprinted in JOSEF GOLDBLAT, ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, 242
(1982).
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND THE
CAMBODIAN KILLING FIELDS
Diane F. Orentlicher*
I have been asked to discuss various models that might be available
to address crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge during its murderous
reign in the 1970s. Before turning to these, I would first like to identify
several overarching considerations pertinent to the question, which model
is most appropriate for Cambodia?
Let me begin by noting a paradox that lies at the heart of the issues
addressed by this panel. On the one hand, since Nuremberg there has
been a general acknowledgment, in principle if not always honored in
practice, that some crimes are of genuinely universal concern and
responsibility. That responsibility is captured by the very name of such
offenses-"crimes against humanity." This conference, and this panel,
affirm the degree to which crimes against the human condition engage
international regard and responsibility.
Yet on the other hand, responses to such crimes must, in a
meaningful way, reflect the peculiar social and historical culture of the
country in which they occurred if the process of accountability is to
achieve its central aims. There cannot be a one-size-fits-all response to
crimes against human dignity.
Let me elaborate on both points, beginning with the first.
International legal responsibility for some offenses is reflected in
the fact that genocide, certain war crimes, and crimes against humanity are
subject to universal jurisdiction. Significantly, too, in a decision rendered
on July 11, 1996, the International Court of Justice held that the obligation
under the Genocide Convention to prevent and to punish genocide is not
territorially limited.'
* Professor of Law and Director of the War Crimes Research Office at the Washington
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1. The case, brought by Bosnia-Herzegovina against Yugoslavia, alleges that the
respondent state committed genocide. In response to Yugoslavia's claim that the Court lacked
jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention because the acts allegedly giving rise to responsibility
by Yugoslav authorities occurred in Bosnia, the court wrote: "[T]he rights and obligations
enshrined by the Convention are rights and obligations erga ormnes. The Court notes that the
obligation each State thus has to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide is not territorially
limited by the Convention." Decision on Preliminary Objections, Application of the Convention
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This dimension of international law is deeply rooted in moral
obligation. The nature of that responsibility was suggested in a recent
article in the Washington Post about a lawsuit by a Holocaust survivor
against Swiss banks. Those banks, the plaintiff alleged, withheld money
deposited by her father before he fell victim to the Nazi machinery of
death. The Post article quotes the plaintiffs husband reading a passage
from the Talmud, which describes a debate among ancient rabbis: "If a
mouse steals a piece of cheese and runs into a hole, then who's
responsible? It's the hole who's responsible. If he didn't have the place to
hide it, then he wouldn't steal it." This passage evokes the basic principle
underlying international law's recognition of universal responsibility for
assuring that those who commit crimes against humanity are brought to the
bar of justice. If a state provides sanctuary to Nazis, it has breached the
vow of universal conscience, "Never Again." If the world fails to demand
justice for the sweeping crimes of the Khmer Rouge, it is complicit in
those crimes.
Further, by the very nature of crimes against humanity,
accountability will come, if at all, only when international society demands
it. The decision of a United States Military Tribunal in Nuremberg is
instructive. "Crimes against humanity are acts committed in the course of
wholesale and systematic violation of life and liberty," the Tribunal wrote
in the Ohlendorf case. The Tribunal continued:
It is to be observed that insofar as international jurisdiction
is concerned, the concept of crimes against humanity does
not apply to offenses for which the criminal code of any
well-ordered state makes adequate provision. They can
only come within the purview of this basic code of
humanity because the state involved, owing to
indifference, impotency or complicity, has been unable or
has refused to halt the crimes and punish the criminals.
But if crimes against humanity engage the responsibility of
international society, an effective response must include measures that
meaningfully reflect the culture and circumstances of the nation that
endured those crimes. In particular, to the extent that the aim of a process
of accountability is to inoculate a country like Cambodia against the
revival of brutal governance, the most effective approach will reflect the
social, historical, and legal culture in which the crimes occurred.




Press accounts of the recent amnesty accorded Ieng Sary suggest
the importance of this issue in. respect of Cambodia. Much of the press
coverage surrounding Ieng Sary's demand for an amnesty suggested that
criminal prosecution might sound a dissonant chord in Cambodian
Buddhist culture. For example, in an article on September 8 entitled Why
Cambodia May Overlook Its Past, a reporter for the New York Times
wrote:
Many Cambodians seem to prefer not to reopen old
wounds, and on the streets of Phnom Penh today people
seem more eager for peace than for retribution. Though
human rights groups and foreign governments, along with
a number of Cambodian public figures, voice dismay at the
respectful treatment of Mr. leng Sary, most people here
seem prepared to accept his proposal to forget the past. 'It
does not feel good to have people who killed our parents
coming to live with us, but as Buddhists, we are taught not
to seek revenge,' said a restaurant owner in Phnom Penh.
I cannot say whether, or to what extent, this reporter's account
fairly represents Cambodian views. I have seen and heard other accounts
that give cause to doubt sweeping claims that prosecution of Khmer Rouge
atrocities would offend Cambodian values. Notably, when he granted Ieng
Sary a royal amnesty at the behest of Cambodia's two Prime Ministers but
against his own conscience, Prince Sihanouk made plain that such a pardon
should not prevent an international tribunal from prosecuting leng Sary.
While Prince Sihanouk of course does not speak for all Cambodians, I
suspect that he speaks for many. Again, I cannot speak with any authority
about whether prosecutions would, as the Times suggests, comport with
Cambodian values. My point is simply that, to be effective in inoculating
a society against a recurrence of state violence, a process of accountability
must be rooted in that society's culture.
Up to a point. We surely would not want to defer to cultural-
relativist arguments counseling against accountability when the culture in
question is one of wholesale impunity. A key aim of trials following
sweeping violations of personal integrity is to help dispel the culture of
impunity that enabled the crimes to occur. In some respects, then, the
demands of universal justice may in fact require some measure of
meddling with patterns of national culture.
The complex concerns on which I have focused are, as I have
suggested, especially pertinent to the extent that a process of accountability
seeks to prevent a country from returning to abuses of the past and to
advance reconciliation within a deeply riven nation. But these are not the
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only aims. Consider, for example, the work of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague. This Tribunal,
established by the United Nations Security Council, seeks not only to
establish a foundation for peace and security in Bosnia, but also to
broadcast a global message: Those anywhere who might in the future
contemplate crimes against the human condition should think again. They
will not get away with it.
That processes aimed at establishing accountability may have
multiple audiences surely complicates the question, what is the best model
for a country like Cambodia? Criminal prosecution might, for example,
send the strongest message to a global audience, while a more broad-
ranging process, like that currently underway in South Africa, might best
promote the sort of deliberative reflection that enables a brutalized society
to heal.
How to reconcile these competing claims presents questions to
which no easy answers are available. I would suggest, however, that we
must take this challenge far more seriously than has heretofore been
common. Too often, transnational efforts to establish accountability for
gross abuses have evinced a tendency to disregard the voices of those most
directly concerned.
With these general considerations in mind, let me turn now to the
principal question which I have been asked to address-what models of
accountability are available in respect of the Cambodian killing fields? A
range of measures are potentially available to address -the crimes of the
Khmer Rouge, though it remains doubtful whether any will garner the
political support essential to their success.
One option is the institution of a contentious case before the
International Court of Justice. Such a case must be brought against
Cambodia, which is a party to the Genocide Convention, by another state
party. The case would, in essence, allege that the Cambodian government
breached its treaty obligation to prevent and punish genocide.
The excellent report prepared by Jason Abrams and Steven Ratner
for the United States Department of State on accountability for Khmer
Rouge atrocities concluded, however, that this option is improbable for
several reasons. First, despite diligent efforts, nongovernmental
organizations have been unable to convince any government to institute
proceedings against Cambodia before the International Court of Justice,
Second, with the Khmer Rouge no longer in control of Cambodia's
government, it might not be possible to establish that there is a genuine
dispute between a petitioner state and the government of Cambodia.
The recent decision of the Cambodian government to grant an
amnesty to Ieng Sary might change this legal calculation, establishing a
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genuine dispute under the Genocide Convention. In particular, a petitioner
state could allege that Cambodia breached its explicit duty under the
Convention to punish genocide by granting leng Sary an amnesty. Still, it
scarcely seems likely that a state will institute such a case now, when none
could be found to do so throughout the years when the Khmer Rouge
constituted, or was part of, the internationally recognized government of
Cambodia. Further, as the State Department report concludes, even if
such a case were instituted and led to a finding that Cambodia had
breached its obligations under the Genocide Convention, it is by no means
clear that such a judgment would stimulate national prosecutions in
Cambodia.
National prosecutions would, of course, be the response to those
crimes of the Khmer Rouge constituting genocide that is most consistent
with Cambodia's obligations under the Genocide Convention. But national
prosecutions against leng Sary are presumably precluded by the recent
amnesty, and in any event that amnesty may signal the Cambodian
government's general disinclination to institute genocide prosecutions
against the Khmer Rouge.
Even if these obstacles could be surmounted, Cambodia's national
legal system is by all accounts in a state of shambles-in no small measure
a result of Khmer Rouge policies. International support for national
prosecutions would therefore be necessary, and also problematic. The
specter of a clash of legal cultures would loom large over such a venture.
Foreign legal advisors assisting Cambodians would surely insist on
benchmarks to measure the success of their efforts and to justify their
continuing support. But such a process often entails the sort of paternalism
that has been problematic in other contexts, like Ethiopia. National
prosecutions underway in Addis Ababa for crimes against humanity have
been the object of well meaning, but at times counterproductive,
international advice. These risks should not deter us from pursuing more
effective approaches in Cambodia, but should sound a cautionary note
about how to proceed.
As Prince Sihanouk observed, any amnesty conferred by
Cambodian authorities would not prevent an international tribunal from
prosecuting leng Sary (or others) for the murderous policies of the 1970s.
What, then, are the prospects for such a tribunal?
It is unlikely that the Security Council would establish an ad hoc
tribunal for Cambodia's crimes similar to the tribunals it created for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Both of those tribunals were created as
enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
As such, they were predicated on Security Council determinations that the
situations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda constituted threats to
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international peace and security. Such a finding in respect of Cambodia
seems unlikely, to put it mildly. Further, even if a permanent international
criminal court is established, it is unlikely that such a tribunal would have
retroactive jurisdiction.
One option that might be available is the establishment of an
"international penal tribunal" by states parties to the Genocide Convention
pursuant to article VI of that treaty. Presumably such a tribunal could be
established by a small number of states. But Cambodia almost surely
would have to agree to cooperate with such a tribunal. In light of the
recent amnesty for leng Sary, the present government does not seem
disposed to support such an effort.
Another model for establishing accountability for crimes of the
past is through a "truth commission"-a body that attempts to establish a
comprehensive and authoritative record of serious abuses committed
during a specific period. In fact, such commissions represent "models"
rather than "a model" for accountability, as their mandates, powers, and
modes of operation have varied considerably from one country to another.
One of the principal virtues of truth commissions is the extent to
which they can, potentially, engage society in a broadly gauged and
broad-ranging deliberative process about its past. This process is, I
believe, essential in securing one of the principal aims of accountability in
nations recently scourged by crimes against human dignity. Such
collective deliberation may help strengthen the sinews of civic culture,
fostering a deep commitment to personal rights and a demand that they be
respected. At the same time, a national truth-telling process provides a
framework for healing the wounds of those who endured atrocious crimes.
In these and other respects, the process of accountability engendered by
truth commissions tends to be more inclusive than that of criminal trials.
One noteworthy process is now underway in South Africa. To
reckon with apartheid-era crimes, the Mandela government has established
an architecture of accountability that ingeniously facilitates both truth and
justice. To qualify for amnesty for politically-motivated human rights
abuses, potential and actual defendants must fully confess to their role in
such crimes. Even then, amnesty may be denied if the confessor's crime
is deemed disproportionate to its political aim.
This approach creates an incentive for human rights violators to
come forward which has been missing in other countries that have recently
emerged from periods of sweeping abuses, several of which have
established truth commissions. Typically, such commissions have failed to
breach the wall of silence surrounding participants in the prior regime's
system of abuse. Instead, in Latin America, where the institution of truth
commissions was inaugurated, such initiatives typically have encountered,
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and perhaps helped inspire, a closing of ranks among those who were
complicit in state-sponsored violence.
In South Africa, in contrast, the information obtained from those
who seek amnesty through confession can lead to prosecution of those
whom they implicate, while the threat of prosecution may prompt a
broader reckoning with the past through an ever-widening circle of
disclosures. Finally, the amnesty committee's residual power to deny an
amnesty may prevent the South African approach from ultimately ratifying
wholesale impunity.
The South Africa experience is a model in other respects as well.
When South Africans grappled with the question of how to deal with
abuses of their past, they received considerable international support in this
deliberative process, and explored the experiences of other countries, such
as Chile, that had tried to come to terms with their legacy of dictatorship.
Ultimately, however, South Africa found its own solution-informed by
the experiences of other nations, but uniquely South African.
In conclusion, then, I have tried to suggest that, as we seek to meet
our responsibility for enforcing universal conscience, we must recognize
that our charge begins at precisely the place where universal and local
values converge. To make meaningful the vow "Never Again", there
must be a genuinely global demand for justice in respect of crimes against
human conscience. But if this project demands universal engagement, its
basic themes must be composed, above all, by those who have endured
offenses against their humanity.
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SWAPPING AMNESTY FOR PEACE AND THE DUTY
TO PROSECUTE HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES
Diane F. Orentlicher *
I am fortunate to have as a foundation for my remarks Professor
Roht-Arriaza's lucid presentation of the principal sources of international
law bearing on amnesties for gross violations of human rights. My own,
remarks will address the policy dimension of such amnesties, focusing on
their implications for peace in countries that are tenuously emerging from
brutal conflict.
First, however, I would like to note that, in respect of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, there is an additional source of legal obligation bearing on
the question of punishment beyond those found in general international
law. The Security Council resolution establishing the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia requires all states that are
members of the United Nations to cooperate fully with the Tribunal,
including its orders of arrest and requests for assistance. That obligation
was reiterated in the Dayton peace agreement with respect to the parties to
that accord.
Turning to the subject of my remarks: "Do amnesties represent
sound policy?" The answer can only be, "It depends." Those who claim
to have a universally relevant answer to this question surely overreach the
limits of human knowledge. Still, I would offer several general
observations respecting the wisdom of amnesties for gross violations of
human rights.
First, one ought to be skeptical of claims that a wholesale amnesty
is the approach most likely to facilitate national reconciliation, even while
being open to persuasion on this point. All too often, the term
"reconciliation" has been used as a code-word for impunity when invoked
as a justification for amnesties. In fact, however, punishment may be an
essential foundation for reconciliation, as Hannah Arendt suggested when
she wrote: Men cannot forgive what they cannot punish.
More generally, when the decision is too easily made in the
direction of overlooking crimes of the past in the service of national
reconciliation, the costs, both morally and socially, are high.
* Professor of Law and Director of the War Crimes Research Office at the Washington
College of Law, American University in Washington, D.C.
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Finally, I believe that we would do well to resist the tendency to
address the wisdom of amnesties in terms of stark dichotomies, such as
"punish or pardon" and "amnesty or accountability". These dichotomies
present unduly narrow options, detracting from more constructive efforts
to balance the demands of justice against those of reconciliation and,
ultimately, to promote reconciliation within a framework of accountability.
A model of such an approach is that which has been undertaken by
the government of South Africa. Under that country's law, individuals
must confess fully to their crimes in order to receive an amnesty. Even
then, an amnesty committee may deny the petitioner's request if the
committee deems his crime disproportionate to its political objective.
Although it remains to be seen how this approach will play out, it may
well have the effect of fostering a fuller accounting of the truth behind
apartheid's grim litany of crimes, as well as a more robust record of
prosecution, than has been possible in other countries that have endured
crimes against the human condition.
The possibility of receiving an amnesty provides an inducement for
those who participated in apartheid-era depredations to disclose
information about those crimes, thereby facilitating full disclosure of the
truth. These disclosures may, in turn, facilitate successful prosecutions of
persons implicated by the confessors. In this respect, the South African
approach establishes a dynamic relationship between the truth - and
justice - seeking dimensions of accountability, while breaking out of the
sterile dichotomy ("punish or pardon") that has too long framed
international debate about how nations should address their legacies of
brutal governance.
I will devote the rest of my remarks to another country - Bosnia
and Herzegovina - because decisions made in the months ahead will have
truly critical implications there. Further, policy determinations respecting
the crimes that raged across Bosnia during its recent conflict have been,
and will continue to be, almost peculiarly the province of the international
community.
That policy is one of professed commitment to accountability but,
for the most part, has emerged in the past year as a policy of de facto
impunity.
The official policy is embodied in the Security Council's
establishment of the first international criminal tribunal since Nuremberg
and Tokyo. The Hague Tribunal was created to prosecute those
responsible for serious violations of humanitarian law committed during
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. As I noted earlier, the Security
Council resolution establishing the Tribunal imposes an obligation on all
states that are members of the United Nations to cooperate with the
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Tribunal. Further, the governments of Yugoslavia, Bosnia, and Croatia
reiterated their commitment to cooperate fully with the Tribunal when they
ratified the Dayton peace agreement. The Dayton accords also authorize,
but do not require, the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) to arrest
suspects indicted by the Tribunal.
The very establishment of the Tribunal speaks volumes about the
subject of this panel. Above all, this measure was a powerful tribute to the
role of justice in securing peace. Notably, the Tribunal was established as
a peace enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter. The Council determined that the work of the Tribunal would help
ensure an end to the crimes known as "ethnic cleansing", and would
"contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace" in the war-
ravaged territory of the former Yugoslavia.
Notably, too, the provisions in the Dayton accords requiring
parties to cooperate with the Tribunal upended the conventional wisdom
about the need and desirability of "swapping amnesty for peace." It had
been widely predicted that such a deal would be inevitable if the parties to
the Balkan conflict were to reach a peace agreement. Instead, the accords
affirmed the important role that the Tribunal would play in assuring lasting
peace in Bosnia.
Further, it is widely acknowledged that the Dayton peace accords
would not even have been possible had the Tribunal not already indicted
two men who bear principal responsibility for "ethnic cleansing": General
Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic. Before his indictment, when
Karadzic headed the Bosnian Serb delegation to United Nations-sponsored
peace conferences, no success was possible. Far from hindering peace
prospects, then, the Tribunal played a central part in clearing the way to
Dayton.
But if Dayton avows that legal process is a keystone of lasting
peace in Bosnia, implementation efforts have thus far defied Dayton's
clarion call for justice. Among the authorities in the former Yugoslavia in
a position to arrest war criminals, only the Bosnian government has
complied fully with this obligation (though it too may have breached its
duty to cooperate fully with the Tribunal by allegedly putting forth false
testimony, thereby forcing prosecutors in The Hague to retract the
testimony of one witness in the trial of Dusko Tadic). Of seventy-four
suspects indicted by the Tribunal, only seven are in its custody.
Dario Kordic, the most senior Croat official indicted by the
Tribunal, reportedly lives in a government-owned apartment in Zagreb.
Since his indictment, he has been seen sitting in the row behind Croatian
President Franjo Tudjman at a public concert. Another Croat indicted by
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the Tribunal, Ivica Rajic, reportedly lived for almost a year in a hotel
owned by the Croatian Defense Ministry.
This week, it was reported that four Bosnian Serbs indicted by the
Tribunal have been working openly as police officers in Prijedor and
Omarska, cities indelibly linked with images of "ethnic cleansing".
Yesterday, the Boston Globe reported that two other Bosnian Serbs
indicted by the Tribunal were working as public officials in Bosanski
Samac, one as the highest-ranking municipal official, and the other in the
local office of Bosnian Serb state security.
For its part IFOR has made a shameful mockery of its professed
policy to arrest suspects indicted by the Hague Tribunal if they are
"encountered". One United States commander asserted that his troops
would arrest suspects like Radovan Karadzic only if they literally stumble
into an IFOR checkpoint. In fact, the record suggests that IFOR would not
even arrest indicted suspects under these circumstances. In August, when
IFOR inspectors learned that General Ratko Mladic was inside a bunker
they had planned to inspect, they rescheduled their visit rather than
confront the indicted war criminal within.
Two days before the September elections in Bosnia, the United
States Commander of IFOR, Admiral Joseph Lopez, met with Serb
officials in the headquarters of Radovan Karadzic, who, according to Serb
sources, was almost certainly inside the building. And in a virtuoso
display of IFOR's talent for not "stumbling into" Mladic or Karadzic,
none of the 53,000 IFOR troops deployed to provide security on election
day in mid-September had an arrest-worthy encounter with these men,
although both reportedly turned out to vote.
The costs of this policy have been evident in each grim dateline
from Bosnia, and the principal casualty has been the Dayton peace
process. Emboldened by IFOR's repeatedly avowed resolve not to arrest
him, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic has undermined virtually
every major non-military provision of the Dayton accords. The first
significant test came last February, when Serb-held neighborhoods in
Sarajevo were transferred to the authority of the Bosnian Government.
Coming in the early months of the peace, this transfer could have been a
harbinger of reconciliation in the best spirit of Dayton. Instead, heeding
the calls of Karadzic, Serbs abandoned these neighborhoods rather than
live with returning Muslims-and torched their homes as they left.
More recently, negotiated out of public office but not political
influence, Karadzic derailed the possibility of a credible voter registration
process, a fact that led to the postponement of municipal elections that had
been slated to be held in mid-September, but not to the postponement of
national elections. Humanitarian aid programs administered in Serb-held
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areas of Bosnia by Karadzic's wife, for example, were flagrantly
manipulated to secure a Serb victory that would ratify the results of ethnic
cleansing. To qualify for aid packages, displaced Serbs reportedly had to
agree to register in certain key locations. In this setting, the elections
effectively ratified ethnic cleansing, bringing into office hard-line
nationalists who openly oppose inter-ethnic cooperation.
Above all, Srebrenica, where thousands of Muslims were
slaughtered by Serb forces last summer, stands as a tragic monument to the
folly of letting Mladic and Karadzic remain at large. The largest massacre
in Europe since World War II, this happened under the supervision of men
who had already been indicted by the Tribunal. That it occurred before
the Dayton accords were signed does not affect the grim reality that if any
semblance of the rule of law had been enforceable only last year, an
odious crime could have been avoided.
Finally, the costs of this de facto impunity include an intangible,
but potentially serious, erosion of the Hague Tribunal's authority. Just as
the craven acquiescence in "ethnic cleansing" by the United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia deeply compromised the
credibility of the United Nations, a continuing failure to secure the arrest
of suspects indicted by the Hague Tribunal will surely diminish its hard-
earned credibility and its ability to advance national healing in Bosnia.
Yesterday, Carl Bildt, the civilian High Representative for
implementation of the Dayton peace plan, said through a spokesman that
he would like NATO to reconsider its current policy respecting the arrest
of war criminals. Significantly, Mr. Bildt suggested that a reversal of
IFOR's policy of de facto impunity would "stimulate the peace process in
Bosnia-Herzegovina to go in a normal direction." It is time, past time, to
change course.
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The recent ratification by the United States of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)' and the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (Torture Convention)2 raise important possibilities for the
rights of criminal defendants in United States courts. Although the treaties
are both non-self executing and encumbered with reservations,
declarations and understandings that blunt their force in domestic tribunals,
they can still be useful to criminal defendants in strengthening
constitutional and statutory claims3 through "indirect incorporation."
Essentially, indirect incorporation uses international human rights law to
infuse interpretation of domestic law, both constitutional and statutory.4
1. ICCPR
The ICCPR contains a number of provisions that can be indirectly
incorporated into constitutional and statutory defenses and claims. Article 6
recognizes that every human being has an inherent right to life and a right
not to be arbitrarily deprived of life. Where it exists, the death penalty may
be imposed only for the most serious crimes, and not for crimes committed
by persons under the age of eighteen, nor carried out on pregnant women.
Article 7 provides that no one shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 9 guarantees the right to
liberty and personal security, and prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention.
Article 10 provides that detainees and prisoners be treated humanely, and for
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
2. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (1985), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 [hereinafter Torture Convention].
3. The reservations, declarations, and understandings to the ICCPR can be found in UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: INITIAL
REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE UNDER
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 214 (1994). The reservations,
declarations, and understanding to the Torture Convention can be found in S. EXEC. REP. NO. 30,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
4. See Gordon Christenson, The Uses of Hwnan Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional
Interpretation, 4 HOUs. J. INT'L L. 39 (1981); Gordon Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to
Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analysis, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3 (1983); Nadine Strossen,
Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal
Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 805 (1990); Richard B. Lillich, The
Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 228, 239-40 (H. Hannum ed., 2d ed. 1992).
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the segregation of accused from convicted persons, and juveniles from
adults. Finally, article 14 provides for the equality of all persons before the
courts and for due process guarantees in criminal proceedings, including the
right to the presumption of innocence, to have adequate time to prepare a
defense, and to be tried in one's presence.
Importantly, under article 28, the ICCPR has an active supervisory
organ, the United Nations Human Rights Committee. Under article 40, all
states parties must submit periodic reports to the Committee evaluating their
own compliance with the ICCPR. The Committee then meets with
representatives of the states parties to ask questions about their reports.
Following theses meetings, the Committee issues comments on the reports
and the subsequent question-and-answer sessions. The United States
submitted its first report to the Committee in 1994, and representatives of the
United States Government - including Assistant Attorney General for Civil
Rights Deval Patrick, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy and
Human Rights John Shattuck, and State Department Legal Adviser Conrad
Harper - met with the Committee in early 1995. The Committee issued its
comments on the United States report in the spring of 1995.
In addition, the Committee also issues general comments, similar to
advisory opinions, regarding the interpretation of the treaty. These
comments may address a specific treaty provision, such as a comment
addressing the meaning of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment," or a general treaty practice, such as a comment addressing the
attachment of reservations, declarations, and understandings by states
parties.6
Finally, a number of states parties have also ratified the Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR which permits individuals to pursue claims against
states parties before the Committee.7 As a result, the Committee has begun
to compile a substantial human rights jurisprudence.
2. Torture Convention
The Torture Convention also contains provisions that can be
incorporated indirectly into constitutional and statutory defenses and
claims. Article 1 defines "torture" as the intentional infliction of severe
physical or mental pain and suffering, carried out by a public official or
5. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under article 40 of the Covenant:
Comments of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (Apr. 7, 1995).
6. See Gen. Comm. No. 24 (52) 1/, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 11, 1994)
(commenting on issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant
or Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant).
7. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev.2 (1989).
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person acting in an official capacity, for purposes of obtaining a
confession, meting out punishment, intimidation, or for any reason based
on discrimination. Article 3 prohibits the expulsion, return ("refouler") or
extradition of a person to another state if that person would be in danger of
being subjected to torture. Article 16 requires each state party to prevent
acts by public officials or persons acting in an official capacity that, while
not amounting to torture, amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.
The supervisory organ to the Torture Convention, the Committee
Against Torture, provided for by article 17, operates in similar fashion to the
Human Rights Committee. States Parties are required to submit regular
reports on compliance and must meet with the Committee to discuss their
reports. At this point, the Committee Against Torture is just beginning to
develop it jurisprudence, so the breadth of interpretation of treaty provisions
is somewhat limited. However, because there is some overlap among
provisions of the ICCPR and the Torture Convention, interpretations of the
Human Rights Committee on similar provisions of the ICCPR can help in
explaining and understanding the provisions of the Torture Convention.
B. Declarations, Reservations and Understandings: The Challenge
Posed by Non-Self-Execution and Indirect Incorporation as a
Solution for Criminal Defendants
Both the ICCPR and Torture Conventions were ratified by the
United States pursuant to specific reservations, declarations, and
understandings. In terms of the legal effect of the treaties in domestic
tribunals, perhaps the most important declarations in both treaties are the
ones indicating that the treaties are non-self-executing. In other words, the
provisions of the treaties that establish certain rights, as ratified by the
United States, cannot stand alone as the legal basis of a defense or cause of
action in a domestic court.
To make matters even more difficult, the aggregate substantive
effect of the United States' reservations, declarations, and understandings
to the ICCPR and Torture Convention is to limit the scope of the treaties'
provisions to that of similar provisions contained in the United States
Constitution. In other words, the United States reserves the right to
consider itself bound by certain treaty provisions only to the extent of their
meaning in United States domestic law.
The issues of non-self-execution and the aggregate, substantive
effect of the reservations, declarations, and understandings to the ICCPR
and the Torture Convention pose at least two significant challenges for
criminal defendants intending to raise treaty-based international human
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rights defenses or claims. First, non-self-execution requires that human
rights treaty provisions and international jurisprudence interpreting treaty
provisions be raised in conjunction with domestic constitutional and
statutory defenses and claims. In this regard, ICCPR and Torture
Convention provisions and interpretations via the respective United
Nations supervisory organs can only be used to bolster constitutional and
statutory defenses and claims.
Second, the substantive effect of the reservations, declarations, and
understandings requires criminal defendants to fully and persuasively
integrate domestic constitutional and statutory (e.g., civil rights) law with
international human rights law. In this connection, the ultimate purpose of
indirect incorporation is to persuade domestic tribunals, first, that the
United States, by ratifying the ICCPR and Torture Convention, has again
recognized that protection of the individual from the arbitrary
encroachments of the state is of the highest priority; and, second, that
because the state is prone to violate its international human rights
obligations in the pursuit of justice, just as it is with its domestic
constitutional obligations, domestic constitutional and statutory
interpretation must now also conform with international human rights
standards.
II. ANALYSIS OF INDIRECT INCORPORATION
A. International Human Rights Law in United States Courts
1. Dealing With Non-Self-Execution by Not Dealing With It
This analysis assumes that federal and state courts will give legal
effect to the non-self-execution declarations contained in the ICCPR and
Torture Conventions! While, from a human rights perspective, the non-
self-executing nature of the ICCPR and Torture Convention is unfortunate,
the futility of challenging the relevant declarations in United States courts
must be appreciated. However, acquiring such an appreciation is not the
same as admitting defeat. Rather, it allows a lawyer's creative energies to
be employed elsewhere. In this regard, human rights lawyers must
recognize that, simply because human rights treaty provisions cannot alone
provide the legal basis for a defense or claim, they can inform a court's
interpretation of domestic law.
8. See Carlos Manuel Vasquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 695 (1995).
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2. Indirect Incorporation
Basically, the provisions of the ICCPR and Torture Convention
must be invoked as persuasive authority, bolstering constitutional and
statutory defenses or claims, and must be connected to customary
international law. Unlike treaty law, customary law, "at least where the
United States has not persistently objected to a particular norm during its
formation, ipso facto becomes supreme federal law and hence may
regulate activities, relations, or interests within the United States." 9
Perhaps the most successful infusions of customary international
human rights law and, more recently, international human rights treaty law
into United States domestic law have been in cases involving the Alien
Tort Claims Act (ATCA).' 0 The seminal case in this area is the 1980 case
of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala." In that case, two Paraguayan plaintiffs
brought an action against another citizen of Paraguay for the torture and
death of their son and brother, basing their claim on the Alien Tort Claims
Act. The statute, part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, provides that "the
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States." Notably, Filartiga took place prior to United States
ratification of the Torture Convention. Thus, jurisdiction under the statute
turned upon whether torture violated customary international law.
Ultimately, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that "an act of torture committed by a state official against one held in
detention violates established norms of the international law of human
rights, and hence the law of nations. " 12
More recently, in Kadic v. Karadzic,'3 a 1996 case that followed
United States ratification of the ICCPR and Torture Convention, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a district
court order dismissing an action under the ATCA initiated by Bosnian
Muslims who claim they were tortured by Bosnian Serbs under the
leadership of Radovan Karadzic. The court of appeals held, inter alia, that
certain forms of conduct, such as torture, violate the law of nations
whether undertaken by persons acting under the auspices of a state or only
as private individuals. For instant purposes, however, the actual holding
9. Lillich, supra note 4 at 235 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) and
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(1)- (3) cmts.
c, d, reporters' notes 2 ,3 (1987)).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
11. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
12. Id. at 884.
13. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1996).
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of the court is less important than the method by which it arrived there. In
addition to discussing Filartiga, the Second Circuit examined customary
international human rights law on genocide, war crimes and torture, and
treaty law covering these subject areas, including the Torture Convention.
In addition to Filartiga and Kadic, United States courts have held
that torture, prolonged arbitrary detention and causing the disappearance
of individuals are prohibited by customary international law. Further,
Section 702 of the Restatement contains a list of the international human
rights that have achieved customary international law status. In addition to
those already listed, these include genocide; slavery or slave trade; cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and systematic racial
discrimination. 4
Although the ATCA cases involve civil actions by aliens against
alien tortfeasors, the ATCA cases bear striking resemblance to successful
cases initiated pursuant to both civil actions and criminal prosecutions
brought under federal civil rights statutes. Thus, plaintiffs and prosecutors
in federal civil rights cases might be able to bolster their domestic statutory
claims by using international human rights law, both customary and treaty-
based. Further, because federal civil rights laws are based on the
protection of rights embodied in the Bill of Rights, criminal defense
counsel should bolster constitutional arguments by using international
human rights law, both customary and treaty-based.
As evidenced by the ATCA cases, despite certain judicial trends
which seem to militate against making international human rights law
arguments in domestic courts, there is another, more subtle trend that
favors such arguments. However, in order to further this trend,
international human rights law arguments must be especially artfully
crafted, connecting domestic law, with customary international law and,
then, treaty law. If they are not, they could very well set back the
advancement of international human rights in United States courts.
B. Relevant ICCPR and Torture Convention Provisions Lending
Themselves to Indirect Incorporation in the Criminal Context
1. Arrest, Initial Detention and Detention on Remand
a) Police Conduct Prior to and During Arrest
The United States faces continuing difficulties regarding ill
treatment of persons in police custody. According to Amnesty
14. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
702 (1987).
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International, instances of police brutality are particularly prevalent in
metropolitan police departments such as the New York City Police
Department and the Los Angeles Police Department.'" Citing cases such as
that of Rodney King in Los Angeles and those uncovered by the Mollen
Commission in New York City, Amnesty's allegations included use of
excessive physical force, and inappropriate use of police weapons such as
batons, pepper spray and firearms.1 6 The Washington, D.C. Metropolitan
Police Department also has had serious problems of excessive force used
by police against civilians.17 At the federal level, the misuse of force by
the federal government against alleged white separatists, and members of
religious cults has been well documented.,8
Article 7 of the ICCPR and article 16 of the Torture Convention
each require states parties to prevent acts by public officials or persons
acting in an official capacity that, while not amounting to torture, amount
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. These
provisions, when combined with ATCA jurisprudence, the customary
international human rights law analyzed in ATCA jurisprudence, and
Human Rights Committee commentary defining "cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment," might lend themselves to use by both
civil plaintiffs and prosecutors to bolster claims and prosecutions brought
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The Human Rights Committee, in
General Comment 20, addressing article 7, specifically refused to "draw
up a list of prohibited acts or establish sharp distinctions between the
different kinds of punishment or treatment."' 9 According to the Human
Rights Committee "the distinctions depend on the nature, purpose and
severity of the treatment applied." 0
15. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA-HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS:
A SUMMARY OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CONCERNS 5-11 (1995) (hereinafter AMNESTY
REPORT I).
16. Id.
17. See D. Tillotson .... And A Little Fear of Punishment, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1994, at
C8. See generally U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1 RACIAL AND ETHNIC TENSIONS IN
AMERICAN COMMUNmES: POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION-THE MOUNT
PLEASANT REPORT (1993) (analyzing racial and ethnic tensions in the District of Columbia).
18. AMNESTY REPORT I, supra note 15, at 11-12; George Gardner, Ex-FBJ Aide Charged in
Siege Probe: Prosecutors Allege Coverup of Report on Ruby Ridge, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1996, at
Al.
19. Human Rights Committee, General Cmt. 20, art. 7 (44th Sess., 1992), in Compilation of
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N.




Similar to ATCA, under which an alien can initiate a civil
damages action for acts of torture committed by an alien who is either a
state actor or acting under color of state law, the Civil Rights Act of 1871
provides both civil and criminal remedies where a person is deprived of
his or her civil rights under color of state law. While police misconduct
prior to and during arrest, such as that at issue in the Rodney King case,
may not amount torture, it can be credibly argued that where such acts
deprive a person of his or her civil rights, they also amount to "cruel,
unusual or degrading treatment" under customary international law as
reinforced by the ICCPR, Torture Convention and relevant commentary.
Thus, relevant international norms can inform a court's articulation of the
proper legal standards under domestic civil rights law. That way, courts
will be reconciling United States statutory law with the law of nations.
International human rights legal norms can similarly inform state
court interpretations of state statutory and constitutional law - for
example, laws that create an administrative process for complaints of
police misconduct. Since international law applies to both the federal
government and the states, international legal norms can be used as
independent state grounds for a court decision. As such, the decision
would remain insulated from United States Supreme Court review.
b) Police Conduct Following Arrest
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
an individual's right not to self-incriminate and the right to be free from
deprivations of life, liberty or property without due process of law. It is
not unheard of for law enforcement officers in the United States to attempt
to physically coerce persons under arrest and interrogation into confessing
to a crime.
United States courts have indicated that post-arrest law
enforcement conduct that shocks the conscience can result in a violation of
the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and the Fifth Amendment's due process requirement.' In this
regard, articles 7, 10 (right of detainees to be treated humanely), and 14
(right to due process) of the ICCPR, and article 16 of the Torture
Convention might be taken into account in determining constitutional
standards in post-arrest misconduct cases.
21. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (1974); See also United States v. Birdsell, 346
F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Nagelberg, 434 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1970). But see United
States ex. rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975)
(holding that where facts similar to those in Toscanino but without claim of torture or United States
involvement in the interrogation, Toscanino relegated to cases involving "torture, brutality and
similar outrageous conduct.").
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Notably, in General Comment 7, the precursor to General
Comment 20 to article 7 of the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee
indicated that "the scope of protection required goes far beyond torture as
normally understood. "2 Further,
[a]mong the particular forms of punishments and practices
the application of which have attracted the attention and
sometimes the criticism of [Human Rights Committee]
members have been certain interrogation methods, the
evidential use of illegally obtained information ... stoning
and flogging, whipping, 30 - 40 years rigorous
imprisonment . . . . and deprivation of civil and political
rights for extended periods. 3
2. Sentencing, Capital Punishment and Prison Conditions
a) Discrimination in Sentencing and Capital Punishment
Recently, certain aspects of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines and state capital punishment statutes have been the subject of
criticism alleging disparate impact on African Americans. The Fifth
Amendment's due process clause contains an equal protection component,
and the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly states that no state shall deprive
any person of the equal protection of the laws. United States Supreme
Court equal protection jurisprudence has increasingly required evidence of
individualized discrimination in order for a claimant to succeed, rather
than evidence indicating a pattern of discrimination giving rise to a
disparate impact. However, article 14 of the ICCPR contains an equal
protection clause. This clause, combined with international legal norm
recognizing that systematic racial discrimination violates the law of
nations, may assist federal courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, in understanding that there need not be a conscious, discriminatory
motivation in order for a law to violate the concept of equal protection if
the law disparately impacts adversely a particular racial or ethnic group.
With regard to capital punishment and racial discrimination
specifically, article 6(1) of the ICCPR prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of
life. In the United States, such arbitrariness is evidenced by the history of
1) racial discrimination in death penalty cases; 2) ineffective assistance of
22. Human Rights Committee, General Cmt. 7, art. 7 (16th Sess., 1982), in Compilation of
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N.
Doe. HRIGEN\I\Rev. 1, at 7 (1994).
23. DOMINIC McGoLDRIcK, THE HuMAN RiGHTS COMMIEE 365 (2d ed. 1994).
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defense counsel where a capital defendant is indigent; and 3) by recent
federal legislation and jurisprudence restricting the habeas corpus rights of
capital defendants. Further, article 6(5) of the ICCPR prohibits
application of the death penalty to "persons below eighteen years of age."
Studies show that race continues to play an important role in the
process of who will be sentenced to death. Further, the disparity in
resources available to the prosecution and defense for capital cases in the
United States ensures that capital trials are unfair. Finally, the United
States Supreme Court and the United States Congress have both acted to
limit the right to appeal a capital conviction at the federal level after a trial
and post-conviction appeal at the state level, thereby eroding a
fundamental safeguard in ensuring a fair outcome. In this regard, article
6(1) and article 14 might be combined with constitutional due process and
equal protection arguments to persuade courts reviewing capital cases that
the imposition of the death penalty is arbitrary in the particular case.
Notably, in the 1988 case of Thompson v. Oklahoma,14 the United
States Supreme Court consulted extensively the law of nations in
concluding that execution of a person who is sixteen years of age or
younger at the time of the offense violates the Eighth Amendment's
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments. Thus in cases involving
the execution of juveniles and mentally retarded persons whose mental age
is below eighteen, Eighth Amendment arguments can be combined with
articles 6(5) and 7 of the ICCPR and article 16 of the Torture Convention
in an attempt to persuade courts that, if capital punishment must be carried
out, only adults, signified by the age of eighteen, should be subject to it.
b) Prison Conditions
Certain prison conditions in the United States arguably violate the
ICCPR article 7 and Torture Convention article 16 requirements that each
state party prevent acts by public officials or persons acting in an official,
capacity that, while not amounting to torture, amount to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. Particularly disturbing are current
trends in federal and state criminal justice policies that may encourage
violations of articles 7 and 16 by law enforcement and corrections
officials.Y
24. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
25. See Crime in America: Violent & Irrational - and That's Just the Policy, THE
ECONOMIST, (June 8, 1996), at 23-25. See also, National Council on Crime & Delinquency, District
of Columbia Department of Corrections Study: Final Report (January 1996); Amnesty Report I,
supra note 15; Amnesty International, 1995 Report on Human Rights Around the World 302-05
(1995) (hereinafter Amnesty Report II); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1996 321-28
(1996); Paula Mergenhagen, The Prison Population Bomb, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS 36, Feb. 1996, at
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With regard to conditions of detention specifically, alleged
conditions that can violate article 7 have included
incommunicado detention in a small cell (1 m. by 2 in.) in
solitary confinement for eighteen months; solitary
confinement for several months in a cell almost without
natural. light; detention in a garage with open doors,
sleeping uncovered on the floor, with no change of
clothing, blindfolded, hands bound, having only two cups
of soup per day; detention in overcrowded cells with 5 cm.
to 10 cm. of water on the floor, being kept indoors all day,
insufficient sanitary conditions, hard labour, poor food,
periods of incommunicado detention, chained to a bed
spring on the floor with minimal clothing, and severe
rationing of food. The [Human Rights Committee]
described these as inhuman conditions.26
i. Overcrowding
As of June 1996, the United States prison population stood at 1.1
million.27 Because of increasingly strict federal and state laws regarding
mandatory prison time,18 incarceration rates are high, making it difficult
for federal and state governments to keep up with demand for bed space.
This has led to double-and triple-bunking in facilities originally intended to
single - cell inmates; deteriorating physical conditions and sanitation;
reduced levels of basic necessities, such as staff supervision, health care
and counseling services, and recreational facilities. Moreover,
overcrowding is directly linked to the spread of airborne diseases, such as
36; Joan Petersilia, A Crime Control Rationale for Reinvesting in Community Corrections,
SPECTRUM: THE JOURNAL OF STATE GOVERNMENT, June 22, 1995, at 16; Without the 'Rock,'
Florida Criminals Get the Hard Place, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1994, at Al; Making Hard Time
Harder, States Cut Jail TV and Sports, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1994, at 1.
26. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 23, at 372.
27. Crime in America: Violent & Irrational - and That's Just the Policy, supra note 25, at
24.
28. JOINT WORKING GROUP OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL CIVIL, POLITICAL AND HUMAN
RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S., THE STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE INITIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT REPORT TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS 26 (1995) (citations omitted) (hereinafter U.S. NGO WORKING GROUP REPORT); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 25, at 322,
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tuberculosis. In addition, HIV infected individuals are more at risk in
contracting TB and the MDR-TB strain of the disease.2 9
Both the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
and the 1996 Prison Litigation Reform Act restrict the ability of prisoners
to challenge confinement conditions, the latter by directing that prospective
relief extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the
federal right of a particular prisoner or prisoners. °0 Constitutional
challenges to prison conditions brought pursuant to the Fifth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, and statutory challenges to prison conditions
based on deprivations of civil rights might be combined with customary
international law recognizing the right to be free from cruel, unusual or
degrading treatment or punishment, article 7 of the ICCPR and article 16
of the Torture Convention.
ii. Control Units
Criminal justice policy in the United States has increasingly
encouraged the use of so-called "control units," "security housing units,"
and "super-max" units in state and federal prisons.
The term 'control unit' was first coined at United States
Penitentiary (USP) at Marion, Illinois in 1972 and has
come to designate a prison or part of a prison that operates
under a 'super-maximum security regime. Control unit
prisons may differ from each other in some details but all
share certain defining features:
1. Prisoners in a control unit are kept in solitary
confinement in tiny cells (six by eight feet is usual) for
between twenty-two and twenty-three hours a day. There
is no congregate dining, no congregate exercise, no work
opportunities and no congregate religious services.
2. These conditions exist permanently (temporary
lockdowns occur at almost every prison) and as official
policy.
3. The conditions are officially justified not as
punishment for prisoners but as an administrative measure.
29. Id. at 26-27. See Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§20409 108 Stat. 1827.
30. Prison Litigation Reform Act, 64 U.S.L.W. 2708 (May 14, 1996).
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Prisoners are placed in control units in administrative
moves and since there are no rules governing such moves
(in contrast to punitive moves), prisoners are denied any
due process and prison officials can incarcerate any
prisoner in a control unit for as long as they choose,
without having to give any reason.'
As of 1994, at least thirty-six states were reported to have constructed
super-max units.32 There is one federal super-max prison, located at
Florence, Colorado33 which assumed the operations of the former federal
super-max at Marion, Illinois.
In January 1995, in Madrid v. GomezM a federal court in
California found that conditions of the Security Housing Unit (SHU) at
Pelican Bay State Prison, operated by the California Department of
Corrections, violated the constitutional rights of a class of defendants. The
344 page opinion condemned
what [the court] described as a pattern of brutality and
neglect at, Pelican Bay State Prison, California, a high
security prison complex which opened in 1989. The ruling
called upon the state to discontinue practices which
included repeated assaults on prisoners; a pattern of
punitive violence toward prisoners during 'cell extractions'
(the forcible removal of prisoners from cells); the punitive
shackling of inmates to toilets or other cell fixtures; and
grossly inadequate medical and mental health care. The
ruling also found that guards resorted to firearms too
quickly and in circumstances that did not warrant the use
of lethal force. The ruling referred to a number of
individual cases including the case of Vaughn Dortch, a
mentally disturbed prisoner who suffered third-degree
bums over a third of his body after guards forced him,
handcuffed behind his back, into a bath of scalding water.
Another prisoner, Arturo Castillo, who refused to hand
over his food tray, had a gas gun fired into his cell, was
knocked unconscious and beaten so severely that a piece of
31. COMMITTEE TO END THE MARION LOCKDOWN, FROM ALCATRAZ TO MARION TO
FLORENCE - CONTROL UNIT PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1992) <
http://www.unix.olt.umass.edu/-kastor/ceml.html>.
32. AMNESTY REPORT I, supra note 15, at 14.
33. See U.S. NGO WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 28, at 28.
34. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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his scalp became detached. The judge also found that the
guards were rarely disciplined for excessive force and that
their accounts of incidents were routinely accepted at face
value, ignoring any other evidence. The judge also
ordered the state to cease holding mentally ill prisoners in
the prison's Security Housing Unit . . .on the ground that
the conditions could exacerbate their condition."
Amnesty International has documented conditions at other super-
max prison units. The H-Unit at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary at
McAlester opened in 1991 to house prisoners in administrative or
disciplinary segregation as well as the state's death row population. 6
Inmates are housed two to a small, windowless cell for all but five hours
per week. Guards are isolated, from inmates and serious health problems
go untreated and inmate conflicts undetected. Opportunities for exercise
and programs were lacking. Some prisoners were reported to have
become seriously mentally ill while on H-Unit but to receive little or no
psychiatric care.37 Amnesty concluded that such conditions "amounted to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" 8 and that certain conditions also
violated the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners39 and the standards of the American Correctional Association.40
Oklahoma authorities have not acted on any of Amnesty's
recommendations to bring the facility into compliance.4'
Amnesty also reported on conditions at the Maximum Control
Complex (MCC) at Westville, Indiana, a control unit which opened in
1991. The practices at MCC mirrored those at Pelican Bay, the McAlester
H-Unit and other control unit prisons despite an agreement by authorities
to change conditions following a lawsuit filed by prisoners.42
35. AMNESTY REPORT 1, supra note 15, at 13-14. See also Holly J. Burkhalter, Torture in
U.S. Prisons, THE NATION, July 3, 1995, at 17; Paige Bierma, Torture Behind Bars: Right Here in
the United States of America, THE PROGRESSIVE , July 1994, at 21.
36. See Amnesty International, USA: CONDITIONS FOR DEATH ROW PRISONERS IN THE H-
UNIT, OKLAHOMA STATE PENITENTIARY (1994).
37. AMNESTY REPORT I, supra note 15, at 17.
38. Id.
39. U. N. Doe. A/CONF/611, annex I, E.S.C. res. 663C, 24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at
11; U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957, amended E.S.C. res. 2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 35;
U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977), Rule 10, 11.
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Problems persist at other control unit prisons. Trenton State
Prison in New Jersey utilizes a Management Control Unit in which inmates
must use an activity module, measuring fifteen inches by fifteen inches and
made of tubular steel and chain-link fencing, for group meals, indoor
recreation, haircuts, meetings with counselors and classes.43
In Maryland, control units exist at the Maryland Correctional
Adjustment Center (MCAC) and the Maryland House of Corrections
Annex (MHC Annex). The MCAC's first warden was forced to leave
because of an alleged pattern of sexual harassment of female employees.
More disturbingly,
[t]here were stories of a 'pink room,' where prisoners
were taken for 'disciplinary segregation.' Many reported
being stripped naked there and chained in a three-piece
shackle, where they were often beaten by guards and left
to shiver in forty-five degree air, blown in by the powerful
fans of an air conditioner."
In 1995, the United States Department of Justice initiated an
investigation of the MCAC. The investigation found, among other things,
that inmates are subjected to extreme social isolation by being confined to
single person cells twenty-four hours a day; food is served lukewarm or
cold; access to meaningful sick call is inadequate; inadequate staffing;
mental health care that is inadequate to satisfy minimum constitutional
standards; less than an hour of indoor out-of-cell time every second or
third day; total lack of outdoor exercise or exposure to fresh air and
natural light; and indefinite segregation. The investigation confirmed use
of a "pink room," which was
an unheated strip cell inappropriately located in the
medical unit where an inmate was held in isolation for
punishment. The cell was made of concrete and contained
no furniture or mattresses. Inmates remained in the pink
room sometimes as long as four days, wearing only
underwear and a three piece restraint (leg irons, handcuffs,
and a waist chain connected to the handcuffs and holding
the hands very close to the body). Inmates used a hole in
the floor as a toilet. The cell was filthy, covered with old
feces and urine. Because hands were chained to waists,
43. 'Modules' or 'Cages'? TSP Enclosures Stir Protest, THE TIMES (Trenton), Aug. 17,
1991, at Al.




inmates were usually forced to urinate or defecate on
themselves. Inmates in the pink room could not feed
themselves with their hands due to the restraints. There
was no running water in the pink room.
4 5
The pink room was closed just prior to the Justice Department
investigation. Since then, the pink room has been replaced by "cadre
cells," which are normal cells, located in an isolated area, which are used
for disciplinary purposes. "The doors to the cadre rooms have large metal
closers on the inside of the doors which present a suicide risk. "4 Although
the Justice Department was unable to uncover evidence of a pattern of
physical abuse by MCAC staff against inmates, the report noted that the
Department has "received and continue to receive a substantial number of
inmate allegations that staff at Supermax are using excessive force against
the inmates out of the range of Supermax cameras."'4 In response to the
Department of Justice's letter informing the state of its findings, the State
of Maryland stated: "[T]he conclusions contained in your May 1 letter are
supported by neither law nor fact. Instead, the letter reflects your Division's
philosophical opposition to "super maximum" facilities without regard to
constitutional criteria. 4 8 The state's response also generally challenged the
Justice Department's jurisdiction to investigate the facility, stating that
"absent any . . . wholesale constitutional misconduct, the DOJ simply has
no right to proceed against a state in the management of its prisons." 4 9
Ultimately, the state rejected the Justice Department's findings.
Again, cases brought by either individual plaintiffs or
governmental entities, as in Madrid and the Maryland MCAC, challenging
prison conditions pursuant to the United States Constitution and federal
civil rights statutes, should be combined with customary international
human rights laws and relevant treaty provisions in order to strengthen the
constitutional and statutory legal standards.
ii. Prison Rape and Sexual Abuse
Rape and sexual abuse of prison inmates - both women and men -
by guards and other inmates remains a problem in the United States. In
45. Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights to Parris N.
Glendening, Governor of Maryland 9-10 (May 1, 1996).
46. Id. at 10.
47. Id.
48. Letter from Stuart M. Nathan, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Maryland and
Stephanie Lane-Weber, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Maryland, to Deval L. Patrick,
Assistant Attorney General for Civil 1 (Jun. 19, 1996).
49. Id. at 2.
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1993 the Justice Department began investigating allegations of widespread
sexual abuse by guards of inmates at the Georgia Women's Correctional
Institution. The abuses included coercion of inmates into having sex with
guards and forcing inmates into guardrun prostitution rings.- Criminal
charges were brought against at least twelve prison employees and others
were either dismissed or transferred.5'
From 1993-95 Human Rights Watch found that women
incarcerated in state prisons in California, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan,
New York and the District of Columbia
face a serious and potentially pervasive problem of sexual
misconduct by prison officials. Male officers have
engaged in rape, sexual assault, inappropriate sexual
contact, verbal degradation, and unwarranted visual
surveillance of female prisoners.
In virtually every prison. . . , state prison authorities were
allowing male officers to hold contact positions over
female prisoners with no clear definition of sexual
misconduct, no clear rules and procedures with respect to
it, and no meaningful training on how to avoid it. Prison
officials were also failing to equip female prisoners to deal
with the potential abuse in the cross-gender guarding
situation. They rarely, if ever, informed female prisoners
of the risk of sexual misconduct in custody. Nor did they
advise them of the mechanisms available - to the extent
that any existed - to report and remedy such practices.
Two prison systems . . . in Georgia and the District of
Columbia, had taken initial steps to address this problem.
But most states were failing to address adequately custodial
sexual misconduct and had yet to train officers to avoid
such misconduct or to put in place administrative measures
and, where appropriate, to apply criminal sanctions to
prohibit and punish this abuse. Moreover, the federal
government was failing to meet its international obligations
to ensure that custodial sexual violence was not only
prohibited but also remedied by the states. In fact, the
United States government had allowed custodial sexual




misconduct at the state level to fall into a kind of legal and
political vacuum where in large measure neither
international, nor federal, nor state law was seen to
apply. 2
With regard to the situation of rape and sexual assault against male
inmates, in Mathie v. Fries," an inmate alleged that the Chief of Security
at the Suffolk Jail on Long Island handcuffed him and raped him
repeatedly between January and April 1990. The inmate was diagnosed in
April 1990 with post traumatic stress disorder, specifically, rape trauma
syndrome. An investigation undertaken in 1980 by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation uncovered a pattern of sexual misconduct with prisoners by
the Chief of Security going back to 1972 with a number of corroborating
witnesses. However, the Department of Justice declined to prosecute.
In Bell v. Phenster,5' an inmate at the Indiana Youth Center
complained to several officials that he was in danger of sexual abuse from
a fellow inmate. Following his complaint, he was moved to a cell with his
pursuer, and was anally raped by him on August 23, 1994. After
reporting the rape, the inmate was treated at a hospital and diagnosed as a
rape victim. He was then placed in solitary confinement. He was
shackled hand and foot to a steel bunk, face down, with arms and legs
crossed, wearing only underwear, with the window open and rain coming
through. He was kept without hot food until he agreed to withdraw his
demand for an investigation. In April 1995, the inmate was denied asthma
medication for one week and was near death when brought to the hospital.
He was charged thirty times with violating prison rules which led to a
rescheduling of his release date. He was again placed in solitary
confinement.
Rape of inmates by other inmates in particular, a frequent
occurrence that is often exacerbated by the actions and policies of
corrections officials, is accompanied by the pervasive transmission of HIV
and AIDS. One of eight New York state prisoners is HIV positive, and
half of HIV/AIDS prisoners are in New York, Florida and Texas.15 In this
regard, the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment which
requires inmates to demonstrate prison officials' deliberate indifference to
52. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 25, at 347.
53. Mathie v. Fries, 939 F.Supp. 1284, 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
54. Bell v. Phenster IP95-0205C (S.D. Ind. 1995).
55. Mergenhagen, supra note 25.
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cruel and unusual conditions56 may offer little protection in such
circumstances. 7  Under such a standard, it might be helpful to those
seeking relief to combine their claims with customary international human
rights law, relevant provisions of the ICCPR and Torture Convention, and
Human Rights Committee and Committee Against Torture jurisprudence,
if any, that provides examples of similar treatment held to violate the
ICCPR.
iv. Treatment of Women Prisoners Involving Problems Other than Rape
and Sexual Abuse
The number of women in prison in the United States is increasing.
Between 1980 and 1990, the number of women in state and federal prison
increased from 12,331 to 43,8451 However, women still only comprise
approximately 6.1 percent of all prisoners in the United States .1 Problems
other than rape and sexual abuse experienced by women inmates include
being housed far from home, and fewer recreational and vocational
opportunities than are available to male inmates.: Some federal courts
have held such conditions to violate the United States Constitution's
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of the laws; but
other courts have disagreed with employing equal protection analysis. 61
Possibly combining article 14 of the ICCPR with equal protection claims
may strengthen the constitutional standard.
On April 4, 1996 women prisoners housed at two large California
prisons, the Central California Women's Facility (CCWF) at Chowchilla
and the California Institution for Women (CIW) in at Frontera, filed a
federal class action charging "that the prisons' dramatically deficient
medical care for chronically and terminally ill women has caused needless
pain and suffering and threatened their health and lives." 62 According to
the lawsuit:
56. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
57. See David M. Siegal, Rape in Prison & AIDS. A Challenge for the Eighth Amendment
Framework of Wilson v. Seiter, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1541, 1551-78 (1992).
58. Cliffor Krauss, Women Doing Crime, Women Doing Time, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1994, at
E3.
59. U.S. NGO WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 28, at 28-29.
60. Id. at 29.
61. Id.
62. California Women Prisoners Sue Over Deficient, "Life Threatening" Medical Care,
ACLU OF NORTHERN CALZoRNiA PRESS RELEASE, Apr. 4, 1996 [hereinafter ACLU PRESS
RELEASE]. See Shumate v. Wilson, No. Civ. 5-95-619 WBS JFM (N.D. Cal.) at 1.
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Lead plaintiff Charisse Shumate is incarcerated at CCWF
and suffers from sickle cell anemia, serious heart
problems, pulmonary hypertension and asthma. In spite of
her life-threatening condition, Ms. Shumate frequently has
been denied necessary medication and appropriate medical
care and treatment. She does not receive a diet necessary
to maintain her health....
The lawsuit describes case after case of shockingly
deficient treatment:
-a seizure patient at CCWF who is paralyzed on her left
side has never been given occupational or physical
therapy;
-a sixty-eight year old woman at CIW with asthma and
cardiac problems who was placed in a locked room for
approximately twelve hours without oxygen, necessary
medication or treatment;
-a woman at CCWF who suffered burns over 54 percent
of her body has gradually lost mobility because she was
denied the special bandages which would prevent her
burned skin from tightening;
-a prisoner at CCWF was confined naked in a filthy cell
where she ingested her own bodily waste. She died of
untreated pancreatis that went undiagnosed until she was
terminally ill;
-a women at CCWF unsuccessfully begged staff for
months to allow her to see a doctor. She was finally
diagnosed with cancer. Though in enormous pain, she
received almost no pain medication. Because of swelling
in her legs, she could barely walk, yet she was required to
walk to the dining hall if she wanted to eat. She died
approximately nine months after the diagnosis.6
63. ACLU PRESS RELEASE, supra note 62, at 2-3.
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Notably, only twenty-nine percent of the guards at CCWF are women."
Once again, in cases such as this, international human rights norms,
customary international law and relevant treaty provisions and supervisory
organ jurisprudence should be used to strengthen domestic claims.
v. Treatment of Juveniles
Current trends in juvenile justice policy and practice in the United
States also pose problems under article 10(3) of the ICCPR, which
mandates that juvenile offenders "be accorded treatment appropriate to
their age and legal status" and article 16 of the Torture Convention.
Increasingly, states are passing legislation which subjects, in certain cases,
juvenile offenders as young as fourteen years of age to prosecution as an
adult. The 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
"permits the federal government to prosecute juveniles as young as 13 as
adults in federal court. "65
Children are increasingly involved in the criminal justice system.
Between 1989 and 1993, the number of juveniles arrested for violent
crimes increased 36 percent."6 During the same period, due to the major
increase in weapons use among young people, arrests for homicide have
increased nearly 40 percent. 6 Further, "a growing proportion of convicted
criminals are children. Nearly 600,000 juveniles were under some type of
correctional supervision in 1991, according to the [Bureau of Justice
Statistics]" 100,000 of whom were in prisons, juvenile detention facilities
or jails."
The problems associated with the conditions of juvenile
confinement are serious. According to a 1994 OJJDP report, "substantial"
and "widespread" problems exist with regard to living space, health care,
security, and control of suicidal behavior. 9  The research team that
compiled the report visited ninety-five randomly selected public and
private juvenile facilities. Notably, the team found that "deficiencies were
distributed widely across facilities. Most had several deficiencies, and the
64.. Adrian Nicole LeBlanc, A Woman Behind Bars Is Not a Dangerous Man, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. June 2, 1996, at 35.
65. U.S. NGO WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 28, at 86.
66. JUVENILE OFFENDERS & VICTIMS: A FOCUS ON VIOLENCE, OJJDP STATISTICS
SUMMARY 1-4 (May 1995).
67. Id.
68. Mergenhagei, supra note 25.
69. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: JUVENILE DETENTION AND
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES-RESEARCH REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 (1994).
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types of deficiencies at these facilities varied considerably. " 70 The report
noted specific problems related to "crowding," insufficient staffing,
insufficient screening for suicidal behavior, and untimely health
screenings.
In 1995 Human Rights Watch reported pervasive physical brutality
and lack of a formal complaint system in the juvenile detention system of
the state of Louisiana.
7
1
Moreover, children are confined unnecessarily in restraints
such as handcuffs and shackles, and are kept in isolation
for as long as five days, contrary to international
standards. In addition, many children told [Human Rights
Watch] that they were hungry. The overall environment
of the institutions failed to meet the primary goal required
by international standards for any form of juvenile
incarceration: to create an environment that will ensure
children's successful integration into society. 72
The juvenile justice system of the District of Columbia, like its
adult prison system,7 has become notorious as an institution unable to
protect its population. The District of Columbia's juvenile justice system
has been the subject of serious litigation since 1970.74 Despite the presence
of a court-appointed monitor to oversee implementation of a 1986 consent
decree entered into by the city and juveniles comprising a class that
initiated legal action," the District of Columbia has failed to implement the
terms.76 Conditions at Oak Hill, the District's remaining juvenile detention
facility, have improved over the past ten years. However, there are still
instances of failure to comply with the consent decree. Problems continue
70. Id.
71. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 25, at 341. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS PROJECT, UNITED STATES: CHILDREN IN CONFINEMENT IN LOUISIANA
(1995).
72. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 25, at 341.
73. Jonathan Smith, Overview of the Crisis in the District of Columbia's Correctional System,
in WASHINGTON LEGAL CLINIC FOR THE HOMELESS, COLD, HARSH AND UNENDING RESISTANCE:
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA'S GOVERNMENT'S HIDDEN WAR AGAINST ITS POOR AND ITS
HOMELESS 279-318 (1993).
74. In re Savoy, 98 D.W.L.R. 1937 (D.C. Juv. Ct. 1970).
75. See Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (D.C. Super. Ct.), certain
memorandum orders affid in part and rev'd in part, 521 A.2d 178 (D.C. 1990).
76. Elizabeth M. Brown & Anne R. Bowden, Juvenile Justice, in WASHINGTON LEGAL
CLINIC FOR THE HOMELESS COLD, HARSH AND UNENDING RESISTENCE: THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIAS GOVERNMENTS HIDDEN WAR AGAINST ITS POOR AND ITS HOMELESS. See Jerry M. v.
District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (IFP), Thirtieth Report of the Monitor (Nov. 20, 1995).
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in such areas as extended stays between detention and trial, delay in
community placement, allegations of sexual abuse by staff against female
residents, occasional overcrowding in the girls' unit, unfair treatment of
residents by staff, understaffing of professional social services personnel,
and a "crumbling, poorly maintained, and dirty" physical plant."
One of the more popular trends in juvenile justice has been the
creation of military-style 'boot camps" as alternatives to
institutionalization. A research report sponsored by the Justice
Department's National Institute of Justice found that although the camps
were successful in some areas, such as program completion rates;
improvement in educational performance, physical fitness and behavior;
and cost-effectiveness, problems persisted in achieving a healthy balance
between programming emphasizing military discipline and programming
focusing on remedial education and counseling; and high levels of
absenteeism and non completion in aftercare (including re-arrest).78
Like the situation in Thompson v. Oklahoma, this situation raises
potential Eighth amendment and international human rights concerns,
albeit in a non-capital punishment context.
vi. Prison Labor and Chain Gangs
Current trends in prison construction, management and labor in the
United States also pose problems under article 7 of the ICCPR and article
16 of the Torture Convention. With regard to the public policy effects of
the prison construction industry:
[w]hat is new in criminal justice policy in the last decade is
the growth of . . . private prison companies . . . . The
American prison-industrial complex involves some of the
largest investment houses on Wall Street. Goldman Sachs
and Co. and Smith Barney Shearson Inc. compete to
underwrite jail and prison construction with private, tax-
exempt bonds that do not require voter approval. Titans of
the defense industry such as Westinghouse Electric and
Alliant Technisystems, Inc. have created special divisions
to retool their products for law enforcement. Publicly
traded prison companies such as the Corrections Corp. of
America and Wackenhut Corp., as well as correctional
77. Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-85 (IFP), Thirty-first Report of the
Monitor (Feb. 26, 1996), at 19.
78. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, BOOT CAMPS FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS (1996).
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officers unions, also exercise a growing influence over
criminal justice policy.19
One of the primary problems caused by the privatization of prisons
is that, since the companies are for-profit entities, "there is inherent
pressure to provide a minimum of services in order to maximize profits."so
Indeed, Esmor Correctional Services, the corporation responsible for
operating an private detention facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey "hired
correctional staff with little or no experience, served a substandard diet to
the inmates and shackled detainees in leg irons when they met their
lawyers." '81  Certainly, there are some prison companies, such as
Corrections Corporation of America, that are providing a positive
atmosphere in their facilities. However, as the industry continues to grow,
so might abuses. 2
Also troubling is the extent of influence of corrections officers'
unions. The California Correctional Peace Officers Association is that
state's second-largest campaign donor.83
Trends in prison labor in the United States are also disturbing. At
the Lockhart Work Program Facility, a Texas prison facility operated by
Wackenhut, private employers locate production operations there and
employ prison labor.8 Current employers include a circuit board
assembler, an eyeglass manufacturer, and a maker of valves and fittings.
Prisoners built the factory assembly room. Those working on the
assembly line are paid minimum wage, of which the prison deducts eighty
percent for room and board, victim restitution and other fees. The state
pays for workers' compensation and medical care. The company pays one
dollar per year in rent and receives a tax abatement from the city of
Lockhart. The Local AFL-CIO has charged that Wackenhut and Texas
have violated federal law by not consulting with the AFL-CIO regarding
79. Steven Donziger, The Prison Industrial Complex: What's Really Driving the Push to Lock
'Em Up, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1996, at C3; but see John J. Dilulio, Jr., No Angels Fill Those
Cells: The Numbers Don't Lie: It's the Hard Core Doing Hard Time, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1996,
at C3.
80. Donziger, supra note 79.
81. Id.
82. Privatizing America's Prisons, Slowly, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1994, §3, at 1 ("Not
everybody is Corrections Corporation," said John J. Dilulio Jr., a professor at Princeton University,
"I'm worried about the fly-by-night companies.")
83. Id. See also Crime in America: Violent and Irrational - and That's Just the Policy, supra
note 25, at 25.
84. Reese Erlich, Prison Labor: Workin' for the Man, ARM THE SPIRIT <
http://burn.ucsd.edu/-ats>.
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the effect of the prisoner-manned assembly line on the local civilian
workforce. Notably, in 1992, the United Auto Workers successfully
challenged an auto parts manufacturer in Ohio that had hired prisoners at
two dollars and five cents per hour, of which the prisoners received thirty-
five cents. The UAW stated that prison labor undercut the civilian
workforce and pressured the auto parts manufacturer to eliminate its prison
labor contract.85
Yet another disturbing trend at the state level is the reinstitution of
chain gangs. Currently, Alabama, Florida and Arizona have reintroduced
the punishment. Wisconsin and California are considering it.86 However,
the new chain gangs are much different from the old system, which was
dismantled in the 1960s. Unlike the prior system which provided cheap
labor for both private and public projects, today's chain gangs do not
engage in large scale private or public works and are not bound together
by heavy-gauge chains. Rather, the primary purpose of today's chain
gangs is humiliation."
Chain gangs at Limestone Correctional Facility in Alabama began
by cutting weeds and picking up trash along the highways. Now they
break rock. Prisoners are shackled together with lightweight leg irons,
walk into a barbed wire pen, and work on the rock pile with sledge
hammers. 8  Interestingly, chain gangs are cost efficient, an important
factor in light of increasing prison populations. "One officer can guard 40
chained prisoners but only 20 without chains." 9 Facility officials take
pride in showing the chain gangs to the media and tourists.90
In Arizona, members of chain gangs are shackled at the ankles but
not to each other. Prisoners are used for road clean-up.91
85. Id.
86. Pat Flynn, Chain Gangs: Alabama Brought it Back. Now California Considers Adopting
the Old Prison Practice Some Think is Just and Some Consider Humiliating, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIm., Feb. 25, 1996, at Al; Working on the Chain Gain, in Wisconsin?, CAPrrAL TIMES
(Madison), Sept. 4, 1995, at 1A.
87. William Booth, Link to the Past: The Return of Chain Gangs is Not About Hard Labor.
For Alabama, It's Good PR In a Crime-Weary World. For Inmates, It's Humiliation That Weighs
Heavier Than Leg Irons, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1996, at El.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. See also Christy Parsons, Tourists, Other States Curious About Alabama Chain
Gangs; But Some Critics Say Humiliation Won't Help Rehabilitate Inmates, Cm. TRIB., May 10,
1996, at 10.
91. Norm Parish, Link to Slavery: Chain Gangs Inhumane and Offensive, Critics Charge,
ARIz. REP., May 29, 1995, at Al.
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Challenges to prison labor and chain gang policies brought
pursuant to constitutional and statutory law should be combined with
customary international law and relevant treaty provisions.
3. Right to Counsel and Equality of Arms
The United States has been aggressively using civil in rem
forfeiture against the property of criminal defendants. Asset forfeiture and
seizure can result in the indigence of a criminal defendant and, therefore,
reduce significantly the defendant's ability to mount an effective defense.
Thus, asset forfeiture may lead to a deprivation of due process, ineffective
assistance of counsel, and inequality of arms. 9
Although the United States Supreme Court recently ruled, in
Bennis v. Michigan,9 3 that civil in rem forfeiture does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, the opinions in the case
indicate that there may be some room for movement, especially in cases of
egregious conduct by the state, including conduct that may leave the
defendant a pauper. In such cases, constitutional claims should be
combined with customary international human rights law recognizing the
right against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and
relevant treaty provisions regarding such treatment or punishment, and due
process.
4. Expulsion, Return and Extradition
Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Torture Convention states a general
prohibition against expulsion, return and extradition of persons where
substantial grounds exist for believing that they would be in danger of
being subject to torture.2
Traditionally, the United States government has not considered its
obligations under multilateral human rights treaties and conventions as
affecting its role in expelling, returning or extraditing from the United
92. See Richard J. Wilson, Humwn Rights and Money Laundering: The Prospect of
International Seizure of Defense Attorney Fees, 3 CRiM. L.F. 85 (1991).
93. Bennis v. Michigan, 64 U.S.L.W. 4124 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1996).
94. See Khan v. Canada, Communication No. 15/1994, U.N. Doe. A/50/44, at 46 (Thirtieth
Session 1995) (Committee against Torture held that Canada may not deport Kashmiri author to
Pakistan because substantial grounds exist to believe he would be subject to torture in Pakistan);
Mutombo v. Switzerland, Communication No. 13/1993, U.N. Doc. A/49/44 at 45 (1994)
(Committee against Torture held that Switzerland may not deport Zairian of Luba ethnicity active in
democracy movement because substantial grounds exist to believe that he would be subject to torture
in Zaire).
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States persons accused or convicted of crimes elsewhere. 9 However, the
United States routinely considers its international non-return (i.e., non-
refoulment) obligation in refugee cases governed under the Convention and
Protocol Related to the Status of Refugees.9 This opens the door for
United States courts to consider its non-refoulment obligations under the
Torture Convention in expulsion and return cases in the criminal context,
as well as extradition cases.
Expulsion from the United States in the criminal context occurs
when a non-citizen in the United States is convicted of a crime and,
subsequently, faces deportation. Traditionally, such persons are required
to serve their full sentence in the United States, at the conclusion of which
they are subject to the deportation process. Within the deportation
process, and depending on the type of crime for which the person was
convicted, the person may attempt to raise issues relating to the possible
deprivation of his or her human rights in the receiving country. Recently,
however, the United States has embarked on a policy of expelling such
persons prior to completion of their sentences and, simultaneously,
narrowing the avenues for recourse.
In a 1994 agreement between the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) and the State of Florida, undocumented
prisoners serving time for non-violent offenses such as drug possession
and burglary, were to be granted early release. 9 Each case was to be
reviewed by the Florida state clemency board, and the board would
recommend commutation of the sentences of only those prisoners who give
their consent to deportation. Because of the consent requirement, there is
no inquiry into the possibility that the person would be subject to torture
once returned to his or her home country. This could place an inmate
subject to the agreement in the interesting position of having to either
remain in prison in the United States, or be granted clemency and take the
chance that they will not be tortured once they arrive back home.
95. Donald K. Piragoff & Marcia V.J. Kran, The Impact of Human Rights Principles on
Extradition from Canada and the United States: The Role of National Courts, 3 CRIM. L.F. 225, 238
(1992).
96. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33, 189 U.N.T.S. 150;
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
With regard to the self-executing nature of the Convention and Protocol in the United States, see
Richard B. Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International Human Rights Law, in
GuIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RiGHTS PRACTICE 228, 233-35 (H. Hannum ed., 1992); Carlos
Manuel Vasquez, The "Self-Executing" Character of the Refugee Protocol's Non-Refoulment
Obligation, 7 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 39 (1993).




Notably, a statute similar to the INS-Florida agreement has been
enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996. 91 Importantly, the statute does not provide for prisoner consent to
deportation and does not provide for inquiry regarding the possibility of
torture upon return to the receiving country. The 1996 Act also narrows
the ability for persons subject to deportation as criminal aliens to challenge
the validity of a deportation order via collateral attack," makes "certain
criminal aliens who are not permanent residents" presumptively
deportable, denies such persons discretionary relief from the government,
and judicial review of any issue other than whether the person "is in fact
an alien."'0
Return from the United States in the criminal law context may
arise in the context of cases involving international cooperation in criminal
matters - for example, when the United States requires testimony from a
witness who is a foreign national in foreign custody and who must be
brought to the United States to testify. Such cases are rare, but it appears
as though the United States government does not inquire into the human
rights implications of returning the person to the country cooperating with
the United States. As a result, it has been left up to the individuals subject
to return to raise human rights claims before a United States court. It is
then up to the court to determine whether it should inquire and, if so, to
what extent.
In Wang Zong Xiao v. Reno °1 a Chinese witness in the custody of
the People's Republic of China (PRC) was brought to the United States to
testify in a heroin smuggling case in federal district court. The witness
had been arrested on drug charges and subjected by PRC authorities to
detention without trial, forced confession, physical and mental torture, and
was scheduled to be executed. Although the United States government had
knowledge of the witness's torture and the potential for further torture
upon his return to the PRC, the government failed to inform the court.
The United States government also interfered in the witness's attempt to
obtain political asylum once he was in the United States. Although the
district court held that the United States government's conduct was
shocking to the conscience and deprived the witness of his substantive due
98. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214,
1275, § 438 (1996).
99. Id.§ 441.
100. Id. §442.
101. Wang Zong Xiao v. Reno, 837 F.Supp. 1506 (Cal. Dist. 1993), aff'd slip op. 93-17262
(9th Cir. 1994).
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process rights under the United States Constitution,'0 the court dismissed
the witness's international human rights claims for technical reasons.103
Extradition refers to the return of a fugitive to a requesting state
via either bilateral or multilateral treaty, or irregular rendition. The
United States government possesses virtually sole discretion to inquire
whether a person requested for extradition will be subject to torture upon
delivery to the requesting state.', Federal courts, following the "rule of
non-inquiry," traditionally have deferred to the government in making the
extradition determination. '0 However, in some cases, federal courts have
examined human rights claims raised by persons subject to extradition.10
Still, even in such cases, United States courts do not typically refer to
international human rights treaties or conventions that have been ratified
by the United States. Ultimately:
[in view of the Department of State's superior position to
inquire into the alleged extra-legal dangers faced by . . . a
person, to set conditions on his surrender to satisfy any
concern raised by its inquiry, and to monitor compliance
with those conditions after surrender, courts have
uniformly ceded to the Executive the sole responsibility to
pass upon such a claim by a requested person. '0
Some United States courts have explicitly rejected any
responsibility to inquire regarding the potential treatment of the requested
person by the requesting country.'°8 However, at least one district court
has inquired about such treatment, citing, inter alia, the Torture
Convention. That court, examining Israel's extradition request of a
suspected terrorist, stated that the court "'must be satisfied that it is more
probable than not that the requesting country will treat the accused
unfairly, denying him or her the fundamental protection of due process,
and will take inadequate measures to prevent cruel and inhuman
102. Id. at 1551-59.
103. Id. at 1563.
104. Piragoff & Kran, supra note 95, at 239 (citing Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition,
62 COLUM. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (1962)).
105. Id. at 238-39.
106. Id. (citing Leslie Anderson, Protecting the Rights of the Requested Person in Extradition
Proceedings, MICH. Y.B. INTr LEGAL STUD. 153 (1983)).
107. 5 MICHAEL ABBELL & BRUNO RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE:
CRIMINAL-EXTRADMON 231 (1990). See also Piragoff & Kran, supra note 95.




treatment."' 10 Although the district court permitted the extradition to
forward, the Court of Appeals rejected the district court's inquiry into
Israel's justice system. 110
Based on the recent ratification of the Torture Convention,
combined with existing non -refoulment jurisprudence under the Refugee
Convention and Protocol as well as constitutional and statutory issues that
arise in expulsion, return and extradition cases, this area appears to be
fertile ground for raising international human rights law as persuasive
authority informing the interpretation of domestic law.
III. CONCLUSION
Hopefully, it has become clear from the admittedly incomplete
laundry list included herein, that it is not necessary to engage in a frontal
attack on the state, through challenges to the ICCPR and Torture
Convention's reservations, declarations and understandings, in order to
engage United States courts, both federal and state, on issues of
international human rights. Of course, there is no doubt that indirect
incorporation is far more difficult than direct incorporation. It requires
artful advocacy and a solid understanding of both domestic "human rights"
and international human rights laws, for the advocate must weave them
together in a persuasive way. However, as highlighted by the ATCA
jurisprudence and cases such as Thompson v. Oklahoma, domestic courts
are not averse to arguments using international human rights norms,
customary international law and relevant treaty provisions to inform the
interpretation of domestic law.
The recent United States ratifications of the ICCPR and the
Torture Convention provide further incentive for civil rights plaintiffs,
prosecutors bringing criminal civil rights claims, and criminal defense
counsel to attempt indirect incorporation. The ratifications have
legitimized the use of relevant treaty provisions combined with customary
international law and international human rights norms. Now, the primary
question is: How best to do it? The answer can only come, literally,
through trial and error. However, some error has already occurred, as has
some success. The time has come to examine these mistakes and victories
more closely and to learn from them.
109. Id. at 259-60 (quoting Ahmnad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 416 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd,
910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990)).
110. Id. at 260-61 (citing Ahmad, 910 F.2d at, 1067.
1997] 749
TOWARD THE ENFORCEMENT OF UNIVERSAL
HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH ABROGATION OF THE
RULE OF NON-INQUIRY IN EXTRADITION
Richard J. Wilson *
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................. 751
II. THE Now-OBSOLETE ORIGINS OF THE RULE OF
N ON-INQUIRY ................................................................ 753
III. EROSION OF THE RULE OF NON-INQUIRY IN
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC COURTS .............................. 755
IV. THE STRENGTHENING OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS AND THE BROADENING OF
EXTRADITION TREATIES TO CONFORM TO THOSE
O BLIGA TIONS ................................................................. 761
V . C ONCLUSION ................................................................. 765
I. INTRODUCTION
In June of 1995, the Mexican government requested the extradition
of former Deputy Attorney General Mario Ruiz Massieu, who was accused
of engaging in a cover-up in the investigation of the assassination of his
own brother, a top official in Mexico's ruling party. A federal magistrate
who reviewed the extradition request, sitting in Newark, New Jersey,
denied the government's request, ruling that witness statements taken in
Mexico were "incredible and unreliable" because they were taken in a
country which was infected with "massive corruption growing out of the
cocaine-smuggling trade," and that Mexico "has admittedly practiced
torture in the questioning of suspects." The magistrate also suggested that
statements were further tainted because the witnesses did not have counsel
* Professor Richard J. Wilson is Professor of Law and Director of the International
Human Rights Law Clinic at the Washington College of Law, American University, in
Washingtion, D.C. Professor Wilson was a Peace Corps volunteer in Panama from 1966-68, a
Fulbright Scholar in Colombia in 1986, director of the law school's summer study program in
Chile in 1995 and 1996, and Visiting Lecturer at Daito Bunka University in Tokyo, Japan in the
fall of 1995. This paper was presented at International Law Weekend American Branch of the
International Law Association.
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present when they were given.' This magistrate thus joined a number of
other federal judicial officials who conduct full judicial inquiry into the
protection of human rights in the criminal justice system of the receiving
state, here Mexico. His and other judicial decisions are part of a growing
international trend to abandon or radically narrow the rule of non-inquiry.
The rule of non-inquiry is part of extradition law in the United
States and other countries. It asserts that the sending country will not look
behind the receiving country's request for extradition to the quality or
severity of criminal justice in that country because such inquiry is an
invasion of the requesting country's sovereignty and a violation of
international principles of comity. The rule of non-inquiry tacitly assumes
that the quality of justice in the receiving country is addressed in the initial
decision to execute an extradition treaty with the country in question, as
well as in the content of the treaty itself. Thus, under the rule, neither the
criminal processes to which the defendant will be subjected, nor the
potential conditions of confinement or severity of punishment in the
receiving country are relevant factors for consideration by the reviewing
authority in the sending state. New critical scholarship has asserted that
the rule of non-inquiry, devised at the turn of the century in the United
States, should be abandoned.2 I will not replicate those arguments in depth
1. Robert L. Jackson & Juanita Darling, U.S. Judge Won't Extradite Former Mexico
Official, L.A. TIMEs, June 23, 1995, at Al. The most adventurous of the court decisions in this
protracted litigation arose when the government changed tactics after repeated failure to obtain an
extradition order for Ruiz Massieu, and instead shifted to deportation proceedings. A federal
district court in New Jersey reviewed the authority of the Secretary of State to order deportation
and found the unreviewable nature of that authority to be, inter alia, an unconstitutional
delegation of judicial powers to the executive branch. The decision finds unconstitutional 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(C)(I), which, according to the court, had not been construed previously.
Ruiz Massieu v. Reno, 915 F. Supp. 681 (N.J. 1996). The government successfully appealed the
grant of a permanent injunction against the deportation proceeding of Ruiz Massieu. Without
reaching the broader constitutional claims addressed by the lower court, the Court of Appeals
recently held that Ruiz Massieu must exhaust available administrative remedies before pursuing
federal court review. Ruiz Massieu v. Reno, 91 F.3d 460, (3d Cir. 1996).
2. See, e.g., John B. Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and the Impact of Human Rights
on Extradition Law, 15 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG. 401 (1990); Lauren Sara Wolfe, Gill &
Sandhu v. Imundi: Due Process and Judicial Inquiry into Potential Mistreatment of Extraditees
by Requesting Countries, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1009 (1991); David B. Sullivan,
Abandoning the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP
L. REV. 111 (1991); Michael P. Shea, Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights in
Extradition Cases After Soering, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 85 (1992); John Quigley, Criminal Law
and Human Rights: Implications of the United States Ratification of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 59, 80-5 (1993); Valerie Epps, Note,
International Decision: Treaties-United States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaties-Rule of
Expanded Political Offense-Type Exception, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 296 (1996). But see Michael P.
Scharf, Note, Foreign Courts on Trial: Why U.S. Courts Should Avoid Applying the Inquiry
Provision of the Supplementary United States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty, 25 STAN. J.
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here. The critics, however, struggle to articulate a standard by which such
review should take place, or a remedy when the reviewing authority
anticipates serious violations of human rights in the receiving country.
I propose here that judicial inquiry should be permitted so long as
both the sending and receiving states are parties to international human
rights instruments which define each country's common acceptance of
binding principles of international human rights in the criminal process.
Whenever the reviewing authority finds it more likely than not that a
human right commonly subscribed to by the two countries would be
violated, the extradition request should be denied unless assurances can be
obtained that the receiving government will not violate the rights in
question and a means of review for compliance with those assurances is
provided. Failure to adhere to these principles itself amounts to a violation
of human rights, in that most such instruments provide for "effective
remedies" 3 in the domestic courts for their enforcement. In short, shared
human rights commitments must take precedence over mere notions of
comity or political considerations.'
II. THE Now-OBSOLETE ORIGINS OF THE RULE OF NON-INQUIRY
In the United States, the rule of non-inquiry was developed
judicially in 1901 in the United States Supreme Court's decision of Neely
v. Henkel. The Court rejected a contention by the extraditee that, if
surrendered to Cuba, he would not be tried under procedures which
conformed to guarantees found in the United States Constitution. The
Court held that the safeguards of the United States legal system, and in
particular its criminal procedures, are inapplicable to crimes committed in
foreign jurisdictions.6 Other rationales have developed, in the United
States and abroad, to justify the use of the rule of non-inquiry. In general,
these include assertions that court review of decisions on the operation of
overseas legal systems would involve the courts in foreign affairs. This
INT'L. L. 257 (1988); Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of
Non-Inquiry in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1198 (1991)
(arguing for strict adherence to the rule of non-inquiry).
3. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 2.3(a). See
generally discussion in JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 386-391 (1996).
4. An argument might also be made that in the case of reluctance by the receiving country
to accept basic human rights norms through treaty ratification, the sending country should apply
customary international human rights norms to the receiving country to ascertain its legal
obligations.
5. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
6. Id. at 123.
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argument is expressed through the political question doctrine or its
international analog, the act of state doctrine, under which the courts may
decline consideration of issues that are more appropriately undertaken by
the political branches of government. Another argument is that courts lack
the investigative machinery to verify claims of alleged abuses of human
rights in foreign legal systems. Still another is that review of the legal
systems of states with differing ideologies allows notorious criminals to
escape punishment.7 -None of these reasons, including those originally
offered in Neely, can withstand scrutiny in the face of the developing law
of international human rights.
The premises underlying the Neely decision have been undermined
with the passage of time. There, the person being extradited argued that
the Cuban legal system failed to conform with the requirements of the
United States Constitution. No argument was offered that the country's
legal system could not measure. up against a universally accepted
international human rights standard because no such standards existed at
that time; they did not formally come into being as a body of law until
after World War II. Understandably, the Court was reluctant to extend
United States constitutional guarantees to another country. Moreover, the
person to be extradited had no real case or controversy alleging an actual
violation of his rights by the Cuban legal system; nor did he offer proof
that the Cuban legal system was likely to treat him badly in fact. He
offered only general allegations that Cuba did not provide habeas corpus
or jury trial protection, nor did it prohibit ex post facto laws. He did not
offer proof as to how he had been or might be affected by such failures in
Cuban law.8 Today, such proof is easily available through extensive
human rights reporting by both domestic and international monitors or
through expert testimony. In the context of political asylum claims, for
example, the Cuban legal system routinely comes under close scrutiny and
has been held to violate human rights norms inherent in the law of political
asylum.9
Asylum judges make findings of fact and law about the quality of
justice, often basing their findings on submissions from the applicant for
asylum as to that issue as found in human rights reports from credible
governmental and non-governmental offices. In fact, the extensive and
detailed annual reports on human rights country conditions prepared by the
7. These arguments are collected and analyzed in Shea, supra note 2, at 93.
8. Neely, 180 U.S. at 122.
9. See, e.g., Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, Int. Dec. 3222, (BIA 1990), (granting
withholding of deportation to a gay Cuban because he could not expect to find adequate
protection in the Cuban legal system if he were returned there).
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United States Department of State are now generally considered a model of
accuracy and fairness, and have been a great help to judges in their
assessment of the risks of return of putative asylees. 0
There is also little evidence that the executive branch is any more
capable of exercising the fact-finding function than the judicial branch,
and some evidence to demonstrate the contrary. For example, in the
United States, the executive branch has negotiated extradition treaties with
many countries whose governments have since changed to repressive
regimes. While the State Department reserves the right to terminate an
extradition treaty where fundamental fairness cannot be preserved, the
United States has never done so in its history." Finally, the executive
branch, acting through the Justice Department in extradition proceedings,
may have ethical conflicts in distancing itself from the interests of foreign
governments. In an affidavit describing the role of the executive branch in
the extradition process, submitted by the State Department in an
extradition proceeding in New York, the Department asserted that "the
Department of Justice, through the office of the United States Attorney,
will represent the legal interests of the requesting State at the hearing...
, 12 It is hard to imagine how the government of the United States can
represent the interests of the receiving state in extradition, and then
neutrally assess the potential human rights consequences of extradition
prior to the extraditee's surrender in the same proceeding.
III. EROSION OF THE RULE OF NON-INQUIRY IN INTERNATIONAL
AND DOMESTIC COURTS
Courts in the United States have shown increasing interest in
abandonment of the rule of non-inquiry. A series of decisions in the
United States uses the standard set out in the decision of Gallina v. Fraser.
Where the Second Circuit United States Court of Appeals observed that
judicial inquiry is appropriate when "the relator, upon extradition, would
be subject to procedures or punishment so antipathetic to a federal court's
sense of decency as to require reexamination" of the rule of non-inquiry. 3
10. This has not always been true. In the years of the Reagan and Bush administrations,
during which the State Department's country reports became extremely politicized, human rights
organizations published an annual critique of the reports, arguing their factual inaccuracy and
errors, and adding information relevant to human rights concerns. The need for such correction,
in itself, argues for removal of the fact-finding function of the judicial branch.
11. WOLFE, supra note 2, at 1029.
12. State Department affidavit in Gill and Sandhu v. Imundi, quoted in Paust, supra note 3,
at 387.
13. Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960).
The Gallina court's reasoning has been questioned more recently in the appeal from a well-
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Despite this narrow and strict standard for abandonment of the rule, courts
in the United States have begun to question the application of the rule of
non-inquiry. Similar trends are discernible in Canada and the United
Kingdom.' 4
An interesting and very recent case, for example, is the January
1996 decision of a New Jersey federal district court judge in Sidali v.
INS.'" There, the court refused extradition and granted habeas corpus
relief, finding that the government had not established probable cause to
believe that the petitioner had committed a crime in Turkey, although the
highest reviewing court of that country had upheld his conviction for rape
and murder. The judge provides an excellent analysis of arcane criminal
procedure in Turkey, noting that the petitioner was acquitted by two
separate trial courts before his conviction was upheld on appeal when the
prosecution petitioned a reviewing tribunal to reexamine both the factual
and legal sufficiency of the lower courts' decisions to acquit.
The strictness with which the Gallina standard for waiver of the
rule of non-inquiry is applied, however, has created great difficulty for
those who seek to inquire into potential human rights violations by the
receiving country. Typical is the protracted litigation arising from a
request by the Indian government to extradite two gentlemen named
Sandhu and Gill, begun in the late 1980's and still in progress today. In an
attempt to challenge their extradition, the two men offered extensive
evidence that the Indian government systematically engaged in terrorism
against Sikhs. They were twice rejected by a federal magistrate who held
that such evidence was outside judicial purview, as such review is reserved
for the State Department.' 6 The federal district court, on review of the
application for extradition by writ of habeas corpus, granted the writ, in
large measure because of a finding that a confession of a third party
implicating Gill and Sandhu in the crimes for their extradition was tainted.
Indian courts themselves had found the confession to be involuntary and
reasoned decision granting extradition to Israel, but, relying on the reasoning of the Soering
decision, infra, n. 16, observing that a court which extradites to a state that violates human rights
makes the court a party to the violation. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 410 (E.D.N.Y.
1989), aff'd, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
An excellent compilation of decisions which erode the rule of non-inquiry can be found in
John B. Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and the Impact of Human Rights on Extradition Law,
15 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 401 (1990). See also SULLIVAN, supra note 2.
14. Cases from Canada and the United-Kingdom are collected in Shea, supra note 2, at
113-119.
15. Sidali v. INS, 914 F. Supp. 1104 (N.J. 1996). No appeal was reported in the case at
the time of this writing.
16. WOLFE, supra note 2, at 1016.
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untrue; the Indian decisions had not been revealed to the United States
courts in a timely fashion. The judge specifically declined, however, the
broader invitation to review the anticipated mistreatment of the men on
their own return to India.17 The grant of habeas corpus relief included an
option for the government to file new extradition complaints. When the
government availed itself of this option, another United States Magistrate
Judge, in the most recent of this long line of decisions, again declined to
permit the introduction of evidence that the men would be subjected to
torture and extrajudicial execution if extradited, agreeing reluctantly that
he must follow the law of the circuit on application of the rule of non-
inquiry. 8
Aside from judicial reluctance to intervene in this area, perhaps the
most difficult issue to resolve is that of an appropriate remedy. It is often
asserted that a decision not to grant a petition for extradition because close
judicial inquiry will make the sending country a "haven for international
criminals" given that the only effective remedy in such situations is the
release of the defendant from custody.19 While this is often offered as a
theoretical problem, it rarely occurs in actuality. Perhaps the best example
is the case involving Jens Soering, a German national who sought review
of Britain's decision to extradite him to the United States in the European
human rights system.2" Soering's extradition was sought in connection
with charges of capital murder in Virginia. When he prevailed at the
European Court of Human Rights, prosecutors in Virginia eventually
relented on their pursuit of the death penalty and assured British authorities
that capital punishment would not be sought. Soering was extradited,
convicted of murder, and sentenced to life without parole. 2, The
17. See discussion in Matter of Sandhu and Gill, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11828, at 3-4
(S.D.N.Y, Aug. 19, 1996).
18. Id. at 13.
19. See, e.g., WOLFE, supra note 2, at 1037.
20. Soering prevailed in the European Court on the claim that conditions on death row in
Virginia were so egregious that his return to face the "death row phenomenon" would constitute
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment under international human rights law. Soering v. United
Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A)(1989), reprinted in 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989). The
United States was so concerned about its potential liability for violations of Soering that it
included an express reservation to Article 7 of both the Torture Convention and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, limiting the meaning of "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment" in the latter to the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment under the
Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. David P.
Stewart, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the
Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 77 (1993).
21. Steinhardt, Recent Developments in the Soering Litigation, 11 HUM. RTS. L.J. 453,
454 (1990). For a full discussion, see Lillich, The Soering Case, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1991);
Quigley & Shank, Death Row as a Violation of Human Rights: Is It Illegal to Extradite to
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requirement that assurances be given before the sending state surrenders
the individual to be extradited goes a long way toward addressing the
"haven for international criminals" argument. Moreover, the Soering
decision contains two implicit premises which should operate in all
extradition cases: first, the sending state is responsible for the
consequences of its actions in surrendering a person to potential abuse of
human rights; and second, human rights principles must prevail over the
law of extradition.
A more difficult problem, in my view, is that of the consequences
of the receiving government's failure to fulfill its assurances. A recent
example from my own practice is relevant here. In 1994, the International
Human Rights Law Clinic at American University was contacted by
United States lawyers representing Joseph Kindler, an American who
escaped to Canada following his conviction for murder and death sentence
in Pennsylvania in 1983. These lawyers represented Kindler after his
return from Canada by extradition.
Kindler was extradited from Canada in a case which drew
international attention. The Canadian Supreme Court ordered his
extradition and that of another prisoner, Charles Ng, in opinions which
sharply divided on the question of whether extradition to face the death
penalty in the United States would violate the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.22 The Human Rights Committee of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also reviewed the decision under its
powers to hear individual complaints against states parties. In a divided
decision, the Committee found that Kindler's extradition from Canada to
face the death penalty would not violate Article 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in that Kindler's facts were
distinguishable from Soering's. Counsel for Kindler had not alleged poor
conditions or the effects of delay in the Pennsylvania death penalty regime,
and there had been no simultaneous request for extradition to a non-death
penalty jurisdiction, as had been the case with Germany in the Soering
litigation.'
The United States had apparently assured the Canadians that
review of Kindler's murder conviction would comply in all respects with
Virginia?, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 241 (1989). The decision has been criticized as an overreaching by
the Court. Colin Warbrick, Coherence and the European Court of Human Rights: The
Adjudicative Background of the Soering Case, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1073, 1078-1080, 1090-1095
(1990).
22. Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 84 D.L.R.4th 438, 67 C.C.C.3d 1 (1991).
See discussion in Shea, supra note 2, at 114-119.
23. Kindler v. Canada, Communication No. 470/1991, Decision of 30 July 1993, reported
in 14 HuM. RTS. L.J. 307 (1993).
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due process. z4 After his extradition, Kindler's United States defense
counsel asserted to me that his appeals in the United States legal system
were being given short shrift by the courts, generally on grounds of
procedural bar, waiver, and collateral estoppel. His lawyers inquired
whether there was any recourse for this failure to provide fundamental due
process, which they felt had been part of the basis for the Canadian
executive branch and the courts' willingness to return Kindler to the
United States. The Canadian government had purportedly expressed some
interest in intervention in the appellate process but had no means, other
than by diplomatic note, to intervene in the jurisdiction of the United States
courts. On consultation with colleagues, our conclusion was that there is
no legal basis, and no legal precedent, for intervention in the proceedings
based on "breach of promise" by the receiving state. Our conclusion was
that Kindler had only diplomatic, not judicial, recourse. This lack of
ability to monitor the assurances, or to take action in the event of non-
compliance by the receiving state, also needs a judicial solution.
The International Human Rights Law Clinic handled a case
involving the application of the rule of non-inquiry. Calum Ian Innes v.
United States was an appeal from denial of a petition for habeas corpus
seeking a bar on extradition of Mr. Innes from the United States to France,
where he had been convicted in absentia in 1982 of various offenses
having to do with importation of illegal drugs, smuggling, and fraudulent
profits.,, French authorities commenced the extradition process by filing a
complaint in the Western District of Louisiana, where Mr. Innes was
serving time on a federal conviction, in December 1992. A federal
magistrate certified Mr. Innes as extraditable after an extensive hearing on
the issue, and Mr. Innes filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The
writ was denied in June 1993, and Mr. Innes filed a pro se notice of appeal
when the district court denied his request for appointment of appellate
counsel. The Clinic was approached to undertake his appeal on a pro bono
basis on August 23, 1993. The same day, unknown to us, the Secretary of
State signed a warrant for the transfer of Mr. Innes to France. On August
27, 1993, Mr. Innes was surrendered to authorities in France. Not
knowing the exact whereabouts of our client, the Clinic entered an
appearance on August 31 and sought an emergency stay of removal, or in
the alternative, for Mr. Innes' return to the United States. The motion was
24. The assertion by Kindler's lawyers to this effect were part of their conversations with
me, and are not apparent from a review of the Canadian litigation surrounding his surrender.
25. Calum Ian Innes v. United States, No. 93-5112 (5th Cir. Ct. App.).
1997] 759
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
denied as moot, but the appeal was not dismissed. Briefing of the case
went ahead as scheduled.
The Innes appeal raised two principal questions: first, whether the
executive branch violated court rules and separation of powers by
intentionally removing Innes from the jurisdiction, knowing of his pending
appeal; and second, whether the French government's guarantee of "trials
de novo" as a curative for the 1982 in absentia trials could meet minimal
standards of international human rights norms accepted as binding by both
the United States and France by virtue of their common ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Among
other fair trial guarantees, the ICCPR requires in article 14(3)(d) that the
defendant be tried in his presence. The second issue is the concern of this
paper.26 Our brief asserted that the mutual ratification by France and the
United States of the ICCPR establishes a minimum floor for due process
and fair trial considerations in both countries. Under these criteria, there
is little doubt that the French procedures for trial de novo after trial in
absentia violate the norms of the ICCPR and other international human
rights instruments. Such has been the position of both the Human Rights
Committee27 and the European Court of Human Rights28 when reviewing
cases involving denial of the right to trial in one's presence.
Unfortunately, the court never reached the issue. Following full
briefing and oral argument of the case, a short memorandum decision
dismissed the appeal as moot in August 1994.
26. The first issue also raises fascinating issues of international law beyond the scope of
this article. The practice of removal of the extraditee during the pendency of his appeal is
apparently on the rise. We were aware of a number of such cases in addition to our own. In no
case, to our knowledge, did the court intervene to return the extraditee; all courts which have
reached the issue have dismissed the appeal as moot. While a stay order barring removal may
protect the appellant, many are unrepresented by counsel and unaware of the risk of not seeking a
stay. We did make the argument that another United States Court of Appeal had used the All
Writs Act to order the return of John Demjanjuk, alleged to be Ivan the Terrible, a notorious
guard at Treblinka, from Israel when he had been deported improperly from the United States.
That case is an unreported bench ruling, Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, No. 85-3435, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 20596 (1993).
27. See, e.g., Mbenge v. Zaire, cited in DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITrEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 425 (1994), and general discussion, id. at 425-429.
28. Cases in the European human rights system seem to uniformly read the right to
presence at one's trial (or appeals) in the strictest sense. In Poitrimol v. France, 18 E.H.R.R.
130 (1994), for example, the Court found a right to "presence" on appeal, through counsel, even
where the defendant himself intentionally absconded. A helpful discussion of this issue is found
in P. VAN DUK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 319-322 (2d ed. 1990).
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IV. THE STRENGTHENING OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS AND THE BROADENING OF EXTRADITION TREATIES TO
CONFORM TO THOSE OBLIGATIONS
A total of 135 nations now have ratified the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, including the United States.29 It is hard to
imagine a treaty that can be characterized more accurately as universal in
its application. The treaty carefully delineates rights to fair trial and
appropriate punishment in a fashion that could permit judicial
interpretation in the context of an extradition request. Moreover, article 2
of the Covenant requires, as noted above, that effective remedies for
vindication of the treaty rights be adopted by the parties to the treaty. This
requirement alone militates toward abrogation of the rule of non-inquiry
and recognition of the Gallina exception articulated above. However, the
United States has taken on a number of other treaty obligations that speak
directly to the extradition process.
Most specifically, the Torture Convention, to which the United
States has been a party since 1994, explicitly prohibits extradition from a
State Party "to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that [the extraditee] would be in danger of being subjected to
torture. "30 Application of this provision in the Sandhu and Gill litigation,
discussed above, seems appropriate, in that both the United States and
India have ratified the treaty, but it is never mentioned by the courts in any
of their deliberations. A similar provision is contained in Article 9 of the
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, which requires
that extradition:
shall not be granted if the requested State Party has
substantial grounds for believing: (a) That the request...
has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing
a person on account of his race, religion, nationality,
ethnic origin or political opinion; or (b) That the person's
position may be prejudiced (i) for any of the reasons
mentioned in subparagraph (a) . . . , or (ii) for the reason
that communication with him by the appropriate authorities
of the State entitled to exercise rights of protection cannot
be effected.
29. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1968, 6 I.L.M. 368. Information
on the current number of ratifying countries is taken from the United Nations Treaty Database on
the World Wide Web.
30. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027 at art. 3.1.
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This treaty was also ratified by the United States in 1984. 31
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
accompanying Protocol, to which the United States is also a party, use the
language of persecution or threats to life and freedom on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion as grounds for non-return or expulsion of refugees. 32 Finally, the
Third Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations, in its commentary,
notes that:
[e]xtradition is generally refused if the requested state has
reason to believe that extradition is requested for purposes
of persecution, or because the person sought belongs to a
particular political movement or organization, or if there is
substantial ground for believing that the person will not
receive a fair trial in the requesting state.33
A substitute for the Gallina exception to the rule of non-inquiry
might be gleaned from the foregoing treaty provisions, as well as the
language of the Supplemental Extradition Treaty between the United States
and the United Kingdom (Supplemental Treaty). 3" In article 3(a), the
Supplementary Treaty prohibits extradition "if the person sought
establishes . . . by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . he would, if
surrendered, be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in
his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality, or political
opinions." This language, taken in part from the international standard for
the establishment of a claim of political asylum, abrogates the rule of non-
inquiry. It then couples the evidence to be permitted with a reasonable
standard of proof - preponderance of the evidence - for establishment of
the claim. Moreover, unlike the traditional, unappealable extradition
inquiry before a federal magistrate, the Supplementary Treaty stipulates, in
article 3(b), that decisions by the magistrate are immediately appealable by
31. Covenant Against the Taking of Hostages, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1456.
32. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force,
April 22, 1954), at arts. 1(A)(2) and 33(1); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 6 I.L.M.
78 (1967). The United States has ratified the Protocol, which incorporates the Convention by
reference, and incorporated the refugee definition into domestic legislation as part of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§1101(42), 1253(h).
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, at 476, Cm. h., g., at
711.
34. Reprinted in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report, Supplementary




either party to the federal district court or court of appeal, as appropriate. 35
This congressionally established standard for abrogation of the rule of
non-inquiry makes the judiciary the appropriate locus for review of
compliance by the receiving state with basic norms of international human
rights.
The standard finds its roots not only in the language of human
rights treaties binding on the United States, but also in the European
Convention on Extradition, under which eighty-five percent of all
extraditions in the world take place each year.36 Convention article 3(2)
provides that extradition shall not be granted:
if the requested Party has substantial grounds for believing
that a request for extradition for an ordinary criminal
offense has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or
punishing a person on account of his race, religion,
nationality or political opinion, or that the person's
position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons.37
One treatise on international judicial assistance notes that the United States
"strenuously resisted" such language but ultimately agreed to some version
of it in treaties with three countries: Ireland in 1984, Jamaica in 1983, and
the United Kingdom. 3' This pattern of action by the State Department,
coupled with congressional action on the subject, show a clear willingness
by the other branches to permit judicial review of the question of potential
inequities in the criminal justice system of the receiving country.
Unfortunately, the limited judicial interpretations of the
Supplemental Treaty to date indicate a continued reluctance by courts to
intervene in extradition proceedings. In United States v. Howard, the First
35. Cases and commentary on this legislatively-established exception to the rule of non-
inquiry note that it was adopted as a concession to those in the United States Congress who
opposed a broader effort to sharply narrow crimes designated as political under the United
States-UK extradition treaty. The scholarly output on the advisability of this course of action
was heated. See, e.g., Scharf, supra note 2 (arguing for strict application of the rule of non-
inquiry); Note, Just Say No! United States Options to Extradition to the North of Ireland's
Diplock Court System, 12 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 249 (1989) (arguing for broad
application of the treaty exception because of the serious breaches of the right to fair trial posed
by the Diplock courts).
36. Otto Lagodny, Human Rights in the Field of Extradition, 62 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 45,
47 (1991).
37. MICHAEL ABBELL & BRUNO RISToW, 4 INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE,
CRIMINAL EXTRADITION 108-109, 211-212, A-47 (1990). There are also similarities with the
United Nations Model Extradition Code, Article 3(b), reprinted in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 459, 460
(1994).
38. ABBELL & RISTOW, supra note 37, at 108, 211.
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Circuit United States Court of Appeals found that the petitioner, an
African-American citizen accused of a particularly brutal murder of a
white female in the United Kingdom, had not established sufficient proof
of systematic racial prejudice in England to carry his burden of proof of
prejudice directed toward him. 39  The Court of Appeals, however, notes
that the new treaty language "openly alters [the] traditional practice" of
non-inquiry. °
A more troubling decision is that of the Ninth Circuit United States
Court of Appeals in United States v. Smyth. There, the District Court
refused to extradite based on an analysis of the potential harm to which
James Smyth would be exposed on return to Northern Ireland." The
Court of Appeals found that Mr. Smyth, convicted of attempted murder of
a prison officer in Belfast, had not established by a preponderance of the
evidence that his potential punishment or restrictions in Maze Prison in
Northern Ireland would be due to his affiliation with the Irish Republican
Army and not merely to his escape from prison.42 The extensive evidence
offered by the petitioner, as well as the refusal of United Kingdom officials
to cooperate with the fact-finding efforts of the trial judge, militate against
extradition if the reviewing court were to have applied the extensive
jurisprudence of asylum law on the issue of well-founded fear of
persecution based on political opinion. 3 Note should be made here of the
fact that both the United States and the United Kingdom are parties to the
Torture Convention's specific prohibition on extradition where there is a
strong probability of torture, a standard which no court examined. While
there is a question as to whether the potential retaliation against Smyth
would amount to torture, this explicit prohibition in international human
rights law should not have been ignored.
39. United States v. Howard, 996 F.2d 1320 (1st Cir. 1993). The decision seems correct
on the record before the court, in that the petitioner offered little specific evidence as to prejudice
directed toward him. The petitioner argued for a per se rule, once evidence of prejudice was
established. Id. at 1331. The reviewing court, justifiably in this author's view, rejected that
standard and the sufficiency of the proof to establish specific prejudice directed at the petitioner.
The case is discussed in Mary B. McDonald, Extradition Law-Supplementary Extradition Treaty
Between United States and United Kingdom-Interpreted as Partial Abrogation of the Rule of
Non-Inquiry, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 391 (1995).
40. Howard, 996 F.2d at 1330.
41. In Re Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
42. United States v. Smyth, 61 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995). Some of my concerns with the
reasoning of Smyth at the Court of Appeals were shared by Valerie Epps in her Note on the case,
Epps, supra note 2. She concludes that the court "reveals very little legal analysis and an almost
willful urge to reverse findings of fact." Epps, supra note 2, at 299.
43. See generally DEBORAH ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES: A




The rule of non-inquiry, like many rules of international law
generally, is based on now obsolete views of sovereignty and the
appropriate role for an independent and fully informed judiciary. For
almost twenty years courts in the United States have applied a standard for
the grant or denial of political asylum in this country which requires the
court to weigh and balance the information about the extent to which a
refugee might be exposed to potential dangers of persecution, torture,
denial of a fair trial, or many other human rights violations in their country
of origin. No one, the State Department included, has argued that the
courts lack sufficient expertise to make these judgments, or that such
matters are better left to the discretion of the Executive branch. In fact,
the traditional practice of heavy reliance by courts or asylum hearing
officers on the opinion of the State Department as to the viability of the
asylum claim, either specifically or more generally, has yielded to the
expertise of the courts, due to both the high volume of cases and the
relative lack of information provided by the State Department."4
Abandonment of the rule of non-inquiry is not a change in policy
nor a major leap in fact-finding for the courts, despite their apparent
reluctance to fulfill what is not only a need but an established international
obligation. The language of three now well-established extradition treaties
with the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Jamaica provides a framework for
abrogation of the rule of non-inquiry that was agreed to by the Executive
branch and adopted by Congress. Some European countries have gone
further. It is now statutorily provided in Switzerland and Austria that no
extradition can proceed if the requesting state's procedures are not in
compliance with human rights standards.45 There is no reason not to apply
the more modest framework proposed here more generally to all
extradition cases. To do so would bring the United States into closer
conformance with the practice of the European extradition regime, a
regime which is applied in the vast majority of the world's cases.
44. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REPRESENTING ASYLUM
APPLICANTS: AN ATrORNEY'S GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE 84 (1995), "An Asylum Officer.
• . is not required to wait for comments from the State Department before deciding whether to
grant asylum." But see SARAH IGNATIUS, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ASYLUM PROCESS OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 133 (1993), "[tlhe [State Department] opinion
letters continued to play a role in asylum adjudication, although less than the almost total reliance
on them under the previous INS examiners." Ignatius notes that, for her study, a response of "no
additional information" or no response at all constituted as many as eighty percent of all State
Department responses to INS asylum cases.
45. Christine VanDenwyngaert, The Political Offense Exception to Extradition: How to
Plug the Terrorist Loophole Without Departing from Fundamental Human Rights, 62 INT'L REV.
PENAL L. 291, 307-308 (1991).
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